

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告 期末報告

(子計畫七)緣起、無執與空之倫理：印度與中國中觀哲學的批判研究(第3年)

計畫類別：整合型計畫
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計畫主持人：何建興

計畫參與人員：碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：林郁強
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報告附件：移地研究心得報告
出席國際會議研究心得報告及發表論文

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中華民國 105 年 03 月 28 日

中文摘要：本計畫為三年期整合型計畫，配合總計畫的主題方向，以印度與中國佛教中觀哲學為對象，運用歐亞學術資源與網絡，進行文本詮釋、議題分析與比較哲學研究。與研究團隊成員密切合作，以便在更廣的哲學視野下，確認中觀哲學的現代定位與意義。

本計畫第三年，主要閱讀中國中觀哲學家吉藏對於《中觀論頌》、《十二門論》與《百論》等印度中觀論著的註釋，從中了解他對於龍樹的因果批判的詮釋，並撰寫相關英文論文。本計畫已完成

“Causation and Ontic Indeterminacy: A Chinese Madhyamaka Perspective”一文。此文先於104年4月於中國大陸華東師範大學發表未完成稿，其後花費頗多時間進行修改與補充，並閱讀與討論與處理議題相關的英美哲學著作。本論文批判當代學者Jay Garfield對於龍樹的因果批判的理解，也闡述吉藏對於這批判的解釋，最後訴諸吉藏「存在的不定性」的觀念以解消龍樹所提的因果難題，也藉此顯示吉藏的中觀思想的現代相關性與價值。

中文關鍵詞：吉藏、龍樹、空性、因果批判、存在的不定性

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During this third year of the project, I mainly engaged in writing an English paper titled “Causation and Ontic Indeterminacy: A Chinese Madhyamaka Perspective.” This paper has recently been completed. It begins with an introduction as section I. Section II elucidates Nāgārjuna's critique of causality. Section III discusses a prominent contemporary interpretation of the critique. Section IV explicates the rationale that Jizang provides for the alleged Madhyamaka denial of causality. Section V attends to Jizang's philosophy of ontic indeterminacy to further reconstruct his thought on causation. Section VI concludes.

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科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告

(期中進度報告/期末報告)

緣起、無執與空之倫理：印度與中國中觀哲學的批判研究

Dependent Origination, Nonattachment, and the Ethics of Emptiness: A Critical Investigation into Indian and Chinese Madhyamaka

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共同主持人：

計畫參與人員：林郁強、鄭詠順

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中 華 民 國 105 年 3 月 28 日

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一、目錄

一、目錄

二、報告內容

1. 前言

2. 研究目的

3. 文獻檢討

4. 研究方法

5. 結果與討論

三、參考文獻

四、計畫成果自評

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前言

本計畫為三年期整合型計畫，配合總計劃的主題方向，以印度與中國佛教中觀哲學以及大乘佛教倫理學為研究對象，運用歐亞學術資源與網絡，進行文本詮釋、議題分析與比較哲學研究。與研究團隊成員合作，以便在更廣的哲學視野下，確認佛教哲學的現代定位與意義。

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研究目的

探討初期印度與中國中觀論籍的因果批判與因果思想，進行與當代西方哲學相關理論的比較研究，以揭顯中觀學派因果思想的現代意義。

文獻探討

現代國際學界對於印度中觀的研究可謂汗牛充棟，就龍樹因果思想的研究而言，Jay Garfield、Mark Siderits以及Jan Westerhoff是最主要的研究者。此中最具有代表性的應該是Garfield的相關著作。Garfield的中觀研究強調因果議題對中觀思想的核心性，值得注意的是，他從David Hume的進路來理解龍樹的因果批判。這一理解有其影響力。不過，個人認為，Hume的進路與龍樹的批判並不相同，龍樹一方面不會以因果關係內含necessary connection，也不會如Hume那般視之為constant conjunction。在本計畫所完成的論文中，我們討論並批判Garfield (2002; 2015)的觀點。另一方面，Garfield (2014)於其不同著作中，有不太一樣的因果論述，論文中也略有提及。

討論中觀學派之因果論述的著作還有不少，但此處不詳述。由於個人希望以西方的因果理論為參照點，計畫研究中也閱讀不少當代西方哲學家的因果著作。其中與本研究比較相關者，多數已於論文中提及，也列於「三、參考文獻」內。論文主要討論的西方哲學家除了Hume之外，另有John Heil, Stephen Mumford, Rani Anjum, G. E. M. Anscombe等人。

研究方法

文獻研究法：傳統佛教思想的研究有必要建立在語言文獻學的基礎上，即便如本計畫的佛教哲學研究亦然。本計畫研究印度中觀的《中論》、《十二門論》與《百論》、吉藏的《中觀論疏》、《十二門論疏》與《百論疏》等論籍。此外，也閱讀佛教倫理學相關著作。佛書以《大正藏》所收錄版本為主，再參考其它可取得的校對本，運用 CBeta 電子佛典集成，從事文本的閱讀、理解、整理、摘要、對照等工作。

哲學分析法：本研究在文本閱讀理解時，進一步詮釋其文義，批判地分析、檢討其思想意蘊。此中著重對文本主要哲學名相之意義的分析，確認其意義使用的一致性；分析相關議題與觀點，探討其預設、內在結構、理路開展以及可能意涵，發展其思想意蘊，乃至揭露其問題或理論困局。此方法之施用於佛教思想文本，有助於藉現代哲學術語重新建構傳統思想，顯露其可能的現代價值。

比較哲學法：針對不同的哲學思想進行比較，確認其各自特色與異同關係，乃至進一步予以融通綜合，開展出新的思想觀念。此方法在整合型計畫的脈絡下格外重要。本計畫執行，閱讀西方分析哲學家有關因果論的著作。希望進一步進行對比、綜合、批判等比較哲學研究，有助於在更廣的視野下，確認佛教哲學的現代定位與意義。

結果與討論

對佛教中觀學派哲學家龍樹而言，一切事物都依因待緣而生滅，因此都無自性，並說為是空的。然而，他卻批判一切有關因果的理論，並結論說，事物實際上並未生起。這似乎否定了因果，認定因果關係或因果過程之不實在。龍樹對於因果現象的基本見解是，一切因果鍊鎖的相關項都是空的。然而，我們卻不容易進一步釐清龍樹因果批判的正面意含。於前述論文裡，我們轉而留意中國中觀哲學家吉藏，對他的因果思想進行理性的重構，一方面可視為理解龍樹因果批判的參考，另一方面或可使當代哲學界注意到這思想的現代價值。

如前述，本論文批判當代學者Jay Garfield對於龍樹的因果批判的理解，也闡述吉藏對於這批判的解釋。對吉藏而言，一切事物都不具有決定性，都不能說一定是如何如何。實則，事物的空性意謂著它們在存在上的不定性。本文認為，對吉藏而言，中觀的因果批判與事物的不定性密切相關。本文第一節是前言。第二節介紹龍樹的因果批判。第三節討論並批評Garfield對這批判的Humean式詮釋。第四節闡明吉藏對於這批判的基本解釋。第五節運用吉藏的思想，以解決龍樹的因果批判所涉及的關鍵議題。第六節為結論。

西方與東方的因果論述有一重要差異，西方重點在於事件與事件之間的因果關係，東方佛教著重的則是事物與事物之間的因果過程。就此而論，本文的討論或許不能直接轉移至西方哲學。即便如此，本文除了探討吉藏的因果思想之外，也呈現相關思想對於理解因果關係的價值，並顯示某些西方因果思想的不足處。要之，本文的思想進路應有新意，應有其不容忽視的學術貢獻。

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四、計畫成果自評

所撰寫的英文論文“Causation and Ontic Indeterminacy: A Chinese Madhyamaka Perspective”，約有九千兩百字，以英文論文而言篇幅頗多。這論文的撰寫相當費時，雖已完成，個人仍打算再次修改，之後投稿國際英文期刊。文中批評 Jay Garfield 對於龍樹因果批判的詮釋，應該具有說服力。此外，訴諸吉藏的「存在的不定性」概念以闡明、抉發其因果思想，相信具有創新性與適切性。另一方面，本文並非只是中觀哲學論著的詮釋。文中進行與西方因果理論的比較，試圖顯示吉藏的因果思想具有現代意義，中觀的「緣起」概念也頗適切地顯示因果關係，這些都值得當代哲學家措意。當然，文中的論述是否的當，還需要國際學界的評估。就本年度計畫而言，此計畫執行已達成預期的目標。

Causation and Ontic Indeterminacy: A Chinese Madhyamaka Perspective

I.

At least since written records began, the concept of causation has, along with space and time, occupied a foundational place in philosophical and scientific accounts of the world. In the West, Aristotle influentially identified four kinds of causes: material, formal, efficient, and final. Among them, efficient causation (which assumed the principal focus of attention in Western discourse after the Middle Ages) holds primarily between two things or substances, with the cause being the producer of, or the active initiator of a change in, the effect. In modern times, Western philosophers, perhaps motivated originally by their interest in locomotion, began to take causation to be a relation between particular events: one event, the cause, brings about a distinct event, the effect. This practice continues to the present day, though facts, states of affairs, etc., are also held by some to be the relata.

Indian philosophy displays both similarities to and differences from Western conceptions of causation. Here we encounter numerous causal notions, including those of efficient cause, material cause, and arguably final cause, but not formal cause. Traditional Indian thinkers generally believed in the causal operation of karma. Karma may be characterized as intentional action whose effect may extend to further rebirths. For example, if in this life I make my living by slaying animals for food, I may one day be reborn in the animal realm, doomed to live in a world in which killing for flesh to eat and being killed for food are the central facts of existence. My slaying animals for food and my experiencing subsequent suffering are, roughly speaking, events. However, in their philosophical debates, Indian philosophers generally took causation to hold among particular things: one thing (or several things) as the cause gives rise to another thing as the effect; in many cases, when the effect arises, the cause either perishes or becomes subordinate to the effect. In addition, unlike many contemporary Western philosophers, they saw no need to appeal to the laws of nature. Still, certain cross-cultural divergences in approach need not be seen as indicating incommensurability, but as giving promise of mutual enrichment of understanding.

Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE) was the purported founder of Madhyamaka (“middle way”), a prominent philosophical school of Indian Buddhism. For him, all things originate dependently, because their arising and perishing depend on various causes and conditions, which themselves originate dependently. They are devoid of any independent, unconditioned, and

invariable nature or existence; in brief, they have no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) or, so to speak, essence. Consequently, all things are said to be *empty*. Here, the relationship of dependence in the pivotal notion of dependent origination includes sequential causal relations, simultaneous reciprocal dependence relations, relations of dependence on human conceptualization, and so forth. Nāgārjuna criticized what he seemingly regarded as an exhaustive compendium of the possible ways of construing causation and concluded that things do not really arise.¹ This appears to be tantamount to the Western causal eliminativist view that there are no causal relations or processes in the world.

Nāgārjuna's fundamental conception of causality is that all participants in the causal nexus are empty of intrinsic nature. It is because all causal factors in the nexus are empty that they can interact with each other to generate the effect, which, being dependent and impermanent, cannot but be empty as well. However, it is difficult to uncover further positive implications of his critique of causality and contemporary scholars differ on how best to understand it. As a source of aid in this regard, I will explore the views on the Indian Madhyamaka critique of causality of Jizang (549–623), the foremost exponent of Chinese Madhyamaka.² Jizang's philosophy of emptiness differs in some ways from Nāgārjuna's, so I am not here concerned with the faithfulness to Indian Madhyamaka of his views. Rather, my aim is to offer a rational reconstruction of Jizang's thought on causation, thereby making it accessible and relevant to contemporary readers in different philosophical traditions.

For Jizang, the myriad things as we experience them are interdependent, ever-changing, and empty. Significantly, things are empty mainly because they are devoid of any *determinate* form or nature. This means that a thing cannot ultimately be determined as such and such: any determination we may impose on it is never to the exclusion of other determinations and no

¹ In Buddhism, causation is bound up with the notions of arising and perishing. Nāgārjuna's criticisms of causation are set forth in several chapters of his *magnum opus*, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (henceforth *MMK*). For a recent English translation and commentary of the text, together with the Sanskrit verses, see Siderits and Katsura 2013. The criticisms were usually directed against the views of various non-Buddhist and Buddhist schools, but I shall not refer to the schools nor discuss whether Nāgārjuna presented their views correctly. Given the nature of this paper, I shall keep Buddhist terms to a minimum and disregard those aspects of Madhyamaka that do not bear directly on our main concern.

² By "Chinese Madhyamaka" I mean the Sanlun (Three-Treatise) tradition of Chinese Buddhism. The *MMK* and its commentary by Piṅgala were together translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva (344–413) under the title "The Middle Treatise" (*Zhong lun*). Kumārajīva also translated the *Twelve Gate Treatise* (*Shiermen lun*), traditionally but erroneously attributed to Nāgārjuna, and the *Hundred Treatise* (*Bai lun*), which contains verses attributed to Nāgārjuna's disciple Āryadeva (c. 170–270) and a commentary by someone named Vasu. These three treatises formed the basis of the tradition, and Jizang wrote commentaries on all of them.

determination is definitive. For example, what a villager takes to be a daffodil may be food for slugs and snails, a stick ablaze for some meditating yogis, or a mass of wave-particles of indeterminate nature for a reductionist quantum physicist. Even the yellow surface of its flower would look differently to a cat, a honeybee, a person with tritan color blindness, or under a microscope. In addition, that things are ever-changing (say, once a caterpillar, now a butterfly) also indicates that they are devoid of any fixed identity. Consequently, the Madhyamaka notion of emptiness entails that all things are ontically indeterminate.³ As the way a thing presents itself to us is normally relative to our conceptual, convention-based, determination, Jizang would reject the ontological realist views that the world is as it is independent of what we think about it, and that things and properties exist independently of our mental access to them. For him, I believe, the Madhyamaka critique of causality follows from a recognition of the ontic indeterminacy of things.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II elucidates Nāgārjuna's critique of causality. Section III discusses a prominent contemporary interpretation of the critique. Section IV explicates the rationale that Jizang provides for the alleged Madhyamaka denial of causality. Section V attends to Jizang's philosophy of ontic indeterminacy to further reconstruct his thought on causation. Section VI concludes.

II.

Before presenting Nāgārjuna's criticisms of causality, we may note that Jizang distinguishes three kinds of causation.⁴ The first kind is termed "mutual-generating causation," a sequential causation such as that which holds between a lump of clay and a jar made from the clay or between a seed and a sprout growing from the seed. The word "mutual" is used to indicate the idea, to be explained later, that it is only when the effect arises that its cause can be adequately cognized as the cause. The second kind is termed "mutual-supporting causation," a

³ The notion of ontic indeterminacy bears some semblance to the Western philosophical notion of metaphysical indeterminacy. For instance, according to Barnes and Williams (2011: 108), it is metaphysically indeterminate whether p if and only if (1) it is indefinite whether p , and (2) the source of this indefiniteness is the nonrepresentational world. More notable is Skow's (2010) notion of *deep* metaphysical indeterminacy, which appeals to the orthodox (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics and differs from Barnes and Williams' notion by emphasizing that reality cannot be described perfectly using a precise language. Given the contextual and other differences between the two sides, I shall simply focus on our notion of ontic indeterminacy.

⁴ See *Zhongguan lun shu, Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* (hereafter abbreviated as *T*) 42: 132a22–24 (volume 42, page 132, column a, line 22–24).

simultaneous reciprocal causation.⁵ As an example, consider the relation between a wooden cottage and its constituent timbers. The timbers not only support the cottage, thereby maintaining its existence, but also depend on it to be what they are in the house. A common rafter would not be such if it were taken out of the roof and removed from the cottage. Thus, the cottage and the timbers support each other for their continuous coexistence. The third kind is termed “manifesting causation,” which basically enables something to be known: for example, a lamp as the cause illuminates and makes known an object as the effect. In this paper, we focus on mutual-generating causation.

Nāgārjuna considered and repudiated various views on sequential causation. As a case study, let us consider the arising of a sprout from a seed. We say that an apple seed gives rise to an apple sprout, that the sprout arises dependent on the seed, and that the sprout arises just as the seed perishes. It would seem that the seed causes the sprout, pure and simple. Nevertheless, close scrutiny reveals that this putative causal process is fraught with conceptual difficulties. Here we discuss three main issues.

The first issue concerns whether the sprout, the effect, preexists (at least substantively) in the seed, the cause. A related issue is whether the cause and the effect are the same or distinct. Nāgārjuna considered three possibilities, which would seem to be exhaustive: the sprout preexists in the seed, the sprout does not preexist in the seed, and the sprout both does and does not preexist in the seed.

Suppose that the sprout preexists in the seed. Then it, being existent, would not need to be brought into existence by the seed. It is odd to speak of the arising of an already existent thing. In addition, we do not cognize any sprout in the seed. It might be said in response that the cause and the effect are actually the same, but in this case the self-causing process would continue without an end, which is absurd.

Now suppose that the sprout does not preexist in the seed. Then, how can it, being nonexistent, arise, while *depending on* the seed and other causal factors? It is not possible for a nonexistent to depend on anything because a relation of dependence between two things

⁵ The existence of simultaneous reciprocal causation has been noted and explicated by some analytical philosophers. For example, Heil (2012: 119) asserts that examples of such causation are arguably the most common species of causal interaction. For him, we depend for our existence on stable structures that we inhabit, on our environment’s maintaining a high level of stability, yet stability requires massive cooperation among countless reciprocal powers. Perhaps, the idea of simultaneous reciprocal causation applies to *any* system that is in equilibrium, including machinery, ecosystems, and the weather. This causal relation holds between a whole and its parts as well as between different parts of a whole; our following explanation highlights the mutual dependence between a whole and its parts.

requires that both the depending thing and supporting thing exist; hence, the sprout could never arise. In addition, the seed could hardly be anything but a non-cause, and the sprout seems to arise out of nothing. Further, if an apple sprout is distinct from an apple seed and yet arises from it, there would seem to be nothing to exclude the possibility that we could plant an apple seed and eventually harvest a pineapple fruit.⁶

Now suppose that the sprout both does and does not preexist in the seed. Yet a thing cannot both exist and not exist, *qua* that thing, at the same time. It does not help to hold that a portion, E_1 , of the sprout preexists in the seed whereas another portion, E_2 , does not, because that could mean that E_1 does not really arise while E_2 arises out of nothing. If it is then held that E_1 causes E_2 , we can ask whether E_2 preexists in E_1 , and the problems recurs. Now, to say that the sprout preexists in the seed entails that it arises from itself, whereas to say that the sprout does not preexist in the seed entails that it arises from something other than itself. Yet, the sprout arises neither from itself, nor from something other; hence, it cannot arise from both itself and another. Meanwhile, to claim that the sprout arises, neither from itself nor from something other, but is simply uncaused, is clearly unacceptable, for there cannot be an effect, an arising thing, without a cause.⁷

The second issue is whether the seed perishes before, after, or at the same time as, the sprout arises. If the seed perishes before the sprout arises, then, since there is no longer any seed, how can we say that it causes the sprout? The latter would just arise uncaused. On the other hand, if the seed perishes after the sprout arises, it remains unchanged through the arising of the sprout, so we could hardly regard it as giving rise to the sprout. The arising of the sprout must have had some other cause.

It may seem promising to embrace the remaining possibility that the seed perishes at the same time as the sprout arises. For example, the seed, while perishing, transfers its causal character or capacity to the arising sprout such that there is no causal vacuum between them. However, there would then be two forms of cause, the perished and the transferred; the cause would absurdly possess a double substance.⁸ Moreover, since the seed and the sprout form a

⁶ *MMK* 1.6–7, 1.11–12, 20.16, 20.19–21; the verse number of *MMK* is given according to Siderits and Katsura 2013. For important studies of Nāgārjuna's critique of causality, see Garfield 2002 and Westerhoff 2009.

⁷ These problems may not easily be solved if we specify the causal process further. One may, for instance, assert that the seed and various causal conditions assemble together to yield the causal activity of producing the sprout as the effect. Yet the issue then arises as to whether the activity, or the effect, preexists in the assembly of the causal factors. See *MMK* 1.4, 20.1–4, 20.23–24.

⁸ *MMK* 20.5. The proponent of the view presumably takes the cause to be unitary in its substance or essential nature.

continuous spatial-temporal series, there would have to be a time when one and the same thing is both the seed and the sprout, both arises and perishes, which is preposterous.⁹

The third issue concerns whether, before the arising of the sprout, we can refer to the seed as the cause. This is like asking whether we can refer to someone as a father before the birth of his first child. The answer seems to be negative. Not only does the sprout depend on the seed for arising, but the seed also depends on the sprout for its being a cause. Thus, the Mādhyamika could contend that a cause depends on its effect for its existence, that there is no cause without effect.¹⁰

As noted above, an effect does not preexist in its putative causal factors. Just as an effect cannot arise out of a non-cause, it also cannot arise from the causal factors in which it is absent. Consequently, for Nāgārjuna, an effect does not really arise and is then said to be nonreal. Given the codependence of cause and effect, there is no real cause either.¹¹ It follows from this that there are no real causal relations or processes in the world.

Some of the above criticisms of the notion of causation may seem to be mere sophistry, but whether or not they are depends on how we interpret them. Perhaps there is a deeper point that validates the criticisms. One underlying idea is that all participants in the causal nexus are empty, namely, devoid of intrinsic nature. Aside this, we need to uncover further philosophical implications of the criticisms. In what follows, I attempt to shed some light on this issue.

III.

A handy way for contemporary philosophers to read the Madhyamaka critique of causality is as a dismissal of any view that posits a necessary connection between cause and effect. Some may think that *A*-type things cause *B*-type things just when, if a particular *A* occurs, a particular *B* follows necessarily. If we thus take causation to involve a necessary connection between a cause and its effect such that the cause necessitates the effect come what may, it would seem that the cause is endowed with the intrinsic nature of necessitating the effect, and the effect that of being necessitated by the cause. On this view, causation tends to be construed as a relation that obtains objectively and that links things independent of other things (such as interferers) as well as human conceptualization.

⁹ I take this point from *Zhongguan lun shu*, T 42: 49c22–26. Nāgārjuna expresses similar ideas in *MMK* 21.19–20.

¹⁰ *MMK* 1.5, 4.1–4, 20.22.

¹¹ *MMK* 1.11–14.

Since, for the Mādhyamika, all things without exception are empty of intrinsic nature, they would certainly reject the view that causation involves a necessary connection between cause and effect. If modern scholars focus on this as the target of Nāgārjuna's critique, it may then be tempting for them to draw parallels with Hume's critique of causality and to see Nāgārjuna as endorsing his conclusions. Briefly, for Hume, our ideas of causation and necessary connection have no basis in any objectively existing causes or necessary connections. Rather, the ideas come from our observation of a customary transition from one associated object or event to another. After seeing that one kind of object is constantly conjoined with another, we call the first, the cause, and the second, the effect, and expect the effect to follow necessarily from the cause. However, we are unable to observe anything in the causal chain that would ground any kind of objective causal necessity; all we have are observable regularities. Therefore, we should conclude that what we are disposed to call causation is, in fact, nothing more than constant conjunction, rather than necessary connection or the real production of one object from another.¹²

An exemplar of this approach is Jay Garfield, who avers that the emptiness of causation entails the unreality of any causal relationship that embodies causal power or activity. For a thing to have causal powers is for it to have intrinsic nature and so to be nonempty. For Garfield, Nāgārjuna's analysis, similar to Hume's, redescribes causation as a matter of explanatorily useful regularities, which are themselves explained, not by occult causal powers inhering in genuine causes, but by larger, more articulated patterns of interdependence.¹³ Similarly, Mark Siderits and Shōryū Katsura comment that, for Nāgārjuna, "the relation of production or causation must be conceptually constructed. It is something that we impute upon observing a regular succession of events, but it is not to be found in reality."¹⁴ This

¹² Hume 2004. I follow the traditional interpretation of Hume's analysis of causation. For a defense of the traditional account against the "New Hume" interpretation, which sees Hume as a realist about causal powers, see Millican 2009.

¹³ Garfield 2002: 24-45, 70-73, 81. However, Garfield (2014: 175) also clarifies that Nāgārjuna's critique of causal powers might be mistakenly read as indicating that causes and conditions "somehow *give rise to* events, but do not *necessitate* them," yet, the Mādhyamika actually affirms that "any event can be completely explained by reference to prior and simultaneous causes and conditions." Elsewhere, he (2015: 26) mentions a few differences between the Buddhist and the Humean conceptions of causality but asserts that Nāgārjuna, like Hume, rejects necessary causal connections. Presumably for Garfield, any putative necessary relation between a thing and its causal factors in fact concerns only constant conjunction, and never causal powers or real causal production.

¹⁴ Siderits and Katsura 2013: 23. Elsewhere, however, Siderits (2014) questions the validity of giving a Humean interpretation of the Madhyamaka critique of causality.

appears to suggest that, on Nāgārjuna's view, causation is nothing more than a constant conjunction between successive things or events.

However, there are difficulties in this largely Humean account that takes Mādhyamaka to reduce causation to regularity of sequence. For Nāgārjuna, the causal activity of generating an effect neither does nor does not preexist in the causal factors, the assembly of which yields the activity. The rationale for saying this is presumably analogous to what we saw above in respect of the effect. On Nāgārjuna's view, causal activity is ontologically on a par with cause and effect, indeed, with all things in the world: everything that we take to exist exists only conventionally. Thus, in an attempt to repudiate a nihilistic reading of his philosophy of emptiness, Nāgārjuna contended that if the opponent looks upon things as intrinsically real and so nonempty, the latter being independent and nonsusceptible to changes, it is he, not the Mādhyamika, who would end up nihilistically denying cause, effect, causal activity, and this world of manifold and changing phenomena.¹⁵ It is implausible that Nāgārjuna would ascribe conventional reality to fire and smoke, but not to fire's causal activity of generating smoke.

However, it is not as clear whether Nāgārjuna would ascribe conventional reality to causal powers. He did not refer to them explicitly. For my own part, I think it acceptable for a Mādhyamika to acknowledge causal powers at the level of conventional reality,¹⁶ so long as the notion of causal powers that is used does not entail that *A* or its powers necessitates *B*.¹⁷ (With any such necessitation, intrinsic natures are lurking.) Indeed, modern Western philosophy has suggested such a view: *A* disposes toward *B* in such a way that their connection is short of necessity, yet more than merely contingent.¹⁸ Significantly, the idea that causal powers could be *empty* in the Mādhyamaka sense is not incoherent: to posit causal powers is not necessarily to posit intrinsic natures.

¹⁵ *MMK* 1.4, 24.16–17, 24.37–38.

¹⁶ The *Twelve Gate Treatise* (*Shiermen lun*, *T* 30: 161c24–25) indicates that each cause has its own powers for generating the effect, and the commentary in the *Hundred Treatise* (*Bai lun*, *T* 30: 177b8–9) implies that one can cognize that the powers of a jar differ from those of a lump of clay from which the jar was made. However, the authors concerned might simply be resorting to common sense to impugn their opponents' views.

¹⁷ Mumford and Anjum (2010: 156–157) claim that many scholars have been misled by Hume into believing that those who posit causal powers when explicating causation are committed to positing necessary connections.

¹⁸ Arguing for a dispositional theory of causation, Mumford and Anjum (2011: 174) write: "The notion of cause is not something that automatically and immediately involves necessity. It is, rather, that of something that disposes towards its effect, where the modality of dispositionality is *sui generis*, of its own kind, and certainly not reducible to pure necessity or pure contingency. It is something in between." For them (though not, it must be said, for many others), dispositionality is a primitive modality that resists reductive analysis and rests intermediate between pure possibility and necessity.

Yet even though an appeal to causal powers is theoretically possible, Nāgārjuna's is a theory of dependent origination, not a dispositional theory that hinges explicitly on the positing of causal powers. Prima facie, the theory states that an effect originates in dependence upon a cause or causes and various auxiliary conditions. For example, grape wine is generated depending upon grapes as causes and such auxiliary conditions as yeast, sugar, and water. The theory underlines dependence on human conceptualization: consider the aforesaid view that there is no cause without effect. In addition, the theory of dependent origination has an edge over the dispositional theory in that it takes causation to involve a great number of known and possibly hitherto unknown causal factors, many of which are perceptually confirmable, while causal powers, most philosophers would have us believe, are hidden and imperceptible. This last point may explain the Mādhyamika's general unconcern with causal efficacy.

The differences notwithstanding, Nāgārjuna would concur that causation is short of necessity but more than merely contingent or accidental. This can be reasonably inferred from his philosophy of emptiness and the fact that he rejected both the thesis that the effect preexists in the assembly of its causes and conditions (henceforth T_1) and the thesis that the effect does not preexist in the assembly (henceforth T_2). We now investigate this issue further.

Given T_1 , the effect is basically present in the assembly of its causes and conditions, perhaps unmanifest but to become manifest soon. One interpretation of this is that the assembly is sufficient for the occurrence of the effect such that when the former is present, the latter follows necessarily. Since Nāgārjuna rejected T_1 , he would not regard the assembly as causally sufficient. Moreover, as remarked above, the necessity view borders on the affirmation of intrinsic natures, which the Mādhyamika dismisses. Thus, in all likelihood, Nāgārjuna would not take causation to involve necessary connection.

On the other hand, T_2 can be taken to mean that the causal factors as a whole do not render efficient and substantial services in making the effect forthcoming. There is no real link or interweaving relation between a causal assembly and its effect. Causation is reduced to a matter of contingent regularity: when the causal assembly occurs, the effect follows, and nothing more whatsoever. The effect just happens to be preceded by, and seemingly depends on, the assembly. The connection between cause and effect is merely external and accidental. Since Nāgārjuna rejected T_2 , he would be ready to reject this contingency view too. As we saw above, he dismissed explicitly the neighboring view that a thing arises without a cause. It does not hurt to note that Hume took cause and effect to be distinct events,¹⁹ whereas the

¹⁹ Garfield (2015: 26) is aware of this difference as he comments that "while Hume regards events as

Mādhyamika would consider this position a close ally of T₂. In Hume's fragmented picture of the world, all things are loose and separate, related merely externally and contingently. One may then think of them as independent and self-existent. For the Mādhyamika, such a picture is a breeding ground for delusive fabrication of intrinsic natures.

As is well known to Buddhist scholars, Nāgārjuna upheld a doctrine of twofold truth/reality that distinguishes between ultimate truth and conventional truth. For a thing to be empty is for it to be ultimately nonreal and conventionally real. On one construal, to say that things are ultimately nonreal is to say that they are intrinsic-naturally nonreal: only *intrinsic-natured* things can be ultimately real. Since there are no intrinsic natures, there is no ultimate reality. Conventional reality is the only thing we can experience. In a sense, we lose nothing except chimerical intrinsic natures.²⁰ Then, the aforesaid Madhyamaka thesis that there are no real causal relations simply denies the ultimate reality of causal relations and their relata. Our notion of causation applies only to conventionally real things. At the conventional level, the Mādhyamika does not mean to abandon the notion of causation or reduce it to regularity of sequence. Even so, a few difficult issues remain. We now turn to Jizang for further exposition of the Madhyamaka critique of causality.

IV

When we do philosophy, we tend to engage in what is often termed dualistic thinking; we tend to conceptualize in terms of bipolar pairs of opposites as if they were mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. In philosophical thinking about causation, the two notions of necessity and possibility/contingency easily form such a pair, and when we form our philosophical views we privilege one of these mutually exclusive options over the other. However, it is a significant matter of debate whether such abstract notions fit well with the concrete, ever-changing world of everyday experience. In contrast to the dualistic way of thinking, Jizang seeks in his philosophy to transcend all types of dualistic thought. Indeed, his notion of ontic indeterminacy is already a step in this direction. Then, he would very likely form a notion of causation according to which causation is short of necessity but more than merely accidental.

In one of his works, Jizang is asked whether the Madhyamaka critique of causality amounts

'independent existences,' for Buddhists, dependent origination guarantees that *nothing* is an independent existent."

²⁰ This construal of the doctrine of twofold truth is akin to the views held by Siderits (2007: 180–207) and Garfield (2015: 56–68) in spite of their mutual differences. Although, as we shall see, Jizang appears to affirm ultimately reality, both sides can agree that, for the Mādhyamika, the notion of causation applies only to

to denying all forms of causation. His response is that all Buddhist scriptures and treatises propose the negation of causality for three reasons.²¹ Jizang's explications are illuminating in offering a Madhyamaka reading of the critique. Let us now attend to these reasons.

First, according to Jizang, the negation of causality represents the rejection of various views of causation held by heretics and non-Madhyamaka Buddhists. All these views wrongly posit real and determinate natures in the causal nexus. As a consequence, we may add, one tends to see the phenomenon of change in sequential causation either as resulting from the interaction with each other of discrete and independent entities or as a process of transformation in which some nucleus remains invariable. The Mādhyamika would dispute whether these are proper ways of understanding the phenomenon of change. Significantly, Jizang distinguishes causation of real nature from causation of codependence. Causation of real nature supposes that determinate natures are involved in the causal process; for instance, one regards the effect as definitively existent or nonexistent in the cause. Jizang dismisses this type of causation, which is for him the causation denied by Indian Madhyamaka.

The second reason for negating causality is with a view to making known causation of codependence. This is the causation in which all items involved are deemed to be codependent and empty of real and determinate nature. Jizang explicitly affirms this type of causation. Given the absence of real nature, the items are not ultimately real but only seemingly real. Insofar as causal phenomena are completely empty, one can indeed claim that there is *no* (real) causation.

The third reason concerns the Madhyamaka use and understanding of negation. Let us introduce the two terms, 'implicative negation' and 'nonimplicative negation.' If we treat the sentence S, "X is not-P," as involving an implicative negation, then, while denying P of X, S also implies the affirmation of some other property (say, non-P) of X. A statement of S commits one to acceptance of that property in X. In contrast, if we treat S as involving only a nonimplicative negation, it simply negates any substantial relation between X and P without predicating any property of X.²² For Jizang, the Madhyamaka negation is nonimplicative in nature. To speak of a thing as not-existent is to show that it is *not* existent, but not that it *is* nonexistent; to speak of a thing as not-nonexistent is to show that it is *not* nonexistent, but not

conventionally reality.

²¹ *Bailun Shu*, T 42: 293c3–10. Cf. *Shiermen lun shu*, T 42: 207b6–15.

²² Indian grammarians and logicians had long ago noted the distinction of these two types of negation. For the relevance of the distinction to Indian Madhyamaka, see Westerhoff 2009: 68–70.

that it *is* existent.²³ An implicit idea is that the use of positive expressions may bewitch our intelligence into reifying their referents and ascribing to the latter determinate attributes. To counter the bewitchment, we may use negative expressions instead (use, say, “not-nonexistent” rather than “existent”) and construe the involved negation as nonimplicative. Relatedly, the use of such expressions as “indeterminate” and “non-arising” does not commit the Mādhyamika to the positing of anything real and determinate.

On Jizang’s view, for the Mādhyamika to negate the claim that an effect preexists in its cause does not commit them to affirming that the effect does not preexist in the cause, and likewise the other way round. The Mādhyamika can then reject both T_1 and T_2 without contradiction. Thus, the Madhyamaka negation of causality by no means entails its total denial. As a side note, to challenge the view of causation as comprising necessary connection does not mean that one is thereby committed to embracing the alternative that what we are disposed to call causation is, in reality, nothing more than accidental conjunction.

Apart from the above explications, Jizang’s writings on causation are mostly merely exegetical and offer few further suggestions as to the philosophical rationale behind the Madhyamaka critique of causality. However, he does frequently refer to the thesis that all things are empty of determinate nature. In the next section, I attend to his philosophy of ontic indeterminacy to reconstruct a specific Madhyamaka account of causation.

V.

We noted in section I that Jizang would reject the view that things exist independently of our ways of conceptualizing them. In today’s terminology, he would agree that there is no ready-made mind-independent world with a determinate structure that empirical investigation can reveal to us, a world that contains naturally sliced *res* waiting to be captured by human concepts. For him, much of what things are taken to be, as such and such, is relative to human convention and conceptual scheme;²⁴ there is no ultimate, perspective-free determination of things as they really are. The way things normally appear to us is already conditioned by concepts. Such things, *qua* particular objects and subjects, we may say, figure at the conventional or conceptual level.

Nonetheless, Jizang also alludes to the ultimate or preconceptual level at which the real as

²³ *Zhongguan lun shu*, T 42: 72b13–15, *Bailun Shu*, T 42: 306c11–18, *Shiermen lun shu*, T 42: 185c1–2.

²⁴ By “conceptual scheme” I mean a network of basic concepts and beliefs in terms of which people of a society organize, classify and describe their experience. People of different cultures and languages have different (though often overlapping) conceptual schemes.

the way things truly are is revealed to preconceptual awareness. At this level, the conceptual dividing between oneself and the myriad objects, let alone the conceptual dividing among the objects, has not yet occurred, so the (ultimately) real, which is conceptually indeterminable in itself, is experienced as a nondual quiescence in which oneself and the objects are conceptually undifferentiated.²⁵ Herein, what we would normally cognize *as* clouds are not yet cognized as clouds, and rains not yet rains. In this sense, causal phenomena of the conventional level, being conceptually constituted, can only be said to be seemingly real. Put in current philosophical parlance, the real is somewhat like an amorphous lump, to be carved up using our conceptual scheme into the things that we take to be constitutive of our world. It becomes structured into a world of particulars only when it is conceptually articulated by us.

Significantly, the real is not without preconceptual (non-human-made) differences, which go beyond conceptual imputations and contribute to the way the world is experienced. If the sentence “The clouds brought rain” is conventionally true, it is not true by convention. Human convention and conceptual apparatus cannot by themselves make it true that clouds produce rain. Consequently, whereas causal phenomena are not as such found in the real, they still have conventional *reality* and are not simply conceptual constructions.

In any case, in dealing with things of the conventional level, for which alone causation matters, we need to consider two complementary perspectives. On the one hand, the way things appear to us is already conditioned by concepts, through which we further determine things as such and such. On the other, there is no ultimate determination or determinability of things.

Remarkably, for Jizang, concepts are interdependent and complementary, forming such pairs as “one” and “many,” “cause” and “effect,” and so forth. Given any nominal word “X,” we can always coin a word, say, “non-X” to form a codependent pair of concepts. Thus, one cannot introduce one concept without simultaneously introducing another for its opposite. For instance, we can cognize something as a cause, as being something of which the concept of cause can be predicated, only when we are cognizant of something else of which the concept of effect can be predicated. Nothing is intrinsically a cause and independently of its effect. Thus, given our dependence on conceptualization and the codependence of concepts, cause

²⁵ The term “quiescence” indicates the inactivity of conceptualization. Many contemporary philosophers would pooh-pooh the idea of such preconceptual experience. Yet, it seems inappropriate to dismiss *a priori* empirical evidence of the possibility of having the experience that derives from extensive meditation practice. In any case, we may take the notion of the (ultimately) real to be an ontological postulate that cannot be confirmed by everyday experience. Note also that Jizang’s view here negates the Kantian distinction between the empirical and

and effect, as objects of conceptual cognition, are interdependent as well. A cause depends on its effect for being a cause such that there is no cause without effect.

On first thought, the view that there is no cause without effect does not accord well with common sense. You strike a match, and then the match lights. Your striking the match is supposed to be the cause for the match lighting even before the match lights. However, things look differently if we consider the actual cause, not simply a potential cause. Your striking the match may fail to generate the lighting of the match; it may generate an undesired effect, say, the matchstick breaking. In such cases, common sense may agree that the striking is not the cause truly so called for the desired effect. Numerous possible interfering and auxiliary conditions need to be considered. When a putative cause occurs, we do not know for certain whether the effect will follow. Only when the effect arises can we rest assured that it was brought forth by a number of causal factors that include the cause.²⁶ Thus, a cause is a cause truly so called only depending on the presence of its effect. This should help clarify the third issue in section II. Clearly, this account squares poorly with the ideas of constant conjunction and necessary connection, both of which first posit a cause and then suppose that a specific effect will definitely follow.

In this connection, Jizang coins such clumsy terms as “cause-of-effect” and “effect-of-cause” respectively to designate cause and effect. The term “cause-of-effect” indicates that its referent is known as a cause only relative to, dependent on, an effect, that the referent is not intrinsically a cause, nor endowed with any determinate nature of being a cause. A parallel explication can be given for “effect-of-cause.”

This may seem rather easy. While some may posit an uncaused cause, few would think of a thing as always an effect, never a cause. However, as we use nominal words, we tend to take them to identify determinate properties in their referents. We may think that something that can reasonably be expressed by the word “existent” is definitively existent, while that expressed by “nonexistent” is definitively nonexistent, and that the use of the words ascribes to their referents singly determinate and mutually exclusive properties. Yet, the notion of ontic indeterminacy carries the import that things that are conventionally referred to by “existent” are not determined as such by the concept. They are not definitively existent, not things with a

noumenal worlds.

²⁶ As G. E. M. Anscombe (1993/1971: 91) pointed out, it is much easier to trace effects back to causes with certainty than to predict effects from causes. In specifying a causal process, we proceed from an event and ask what caused it. The event can have a multitude of possible putative causes and out of the particular causal nexus that we consider, we single out one aspect of it as being the proximate cause.

determinate property of existence. In a different context, they may well be designated by “nonexistent.”

Similarly, since a concept connects to its opposite concept just as it connects to its intended referent, something is cognized as a seed only in dependence on non-seeds such as sprouts, etc. A seed is only a seed for non-seeds such that it is not definitively a seed. It is not demarcated from other kinds of things, nor is it fittingly determined by the word “seed.”²⁷

These views are unappealing to philosophers who prefer to posit determinate properties in things. Such properties or the like may be thought to ground the laws of nature; without properties and laws, the world is in danger of becoming chaotic. However, it is likely that the properties are conceptual constructions that we project onto things, and the world can function well without them. In Jizang’s picture of the world, what we call *things* are indeterminate, interconnected, ever-changing, and devoid of any fixed identity. They are susceptible of multiple determinations, but none is ultimate and truly fitting. We cannot here argue for the plausibility of this picture; I mention it to place Jizang’s views on cause and effect in a wider context. The currently pressing task is to clarify the Madhyamaka critique of causality in light of Jizang’s notion of ontic indeterminacy.

Of the three main issues in the critique introduced in section II, the first two remain. The first issue concerns whether the sprout, the effect, preexists in the seed, the cause. As seen above, Nāgārjuna rejected both the “yes” and “no” answers. For Jizang, the view that the sprout preexists in the seed and the view that it does not so preexist take the sprout to be definitively existent and nonexistent, respectively, in the seed.²⁸ Yet, both determinative existence and determinative nonexistence lead to difficulties. Thus, the views are to be rejected. Meanwhile, the property of determinate existence and that of determinate nonexistence are incompatible and mutually exclusive, so one cannot claim that the sprout both preexists and does not preexist in the seed.

The point is that one must not take the words used to ascribe determinate properties to their referents. Once this is well understood, I think it makes sense to state that the sprout both preexists and does not preexist in the seed. Insofar as it is wrong to say that the sprout

²⁷ For Jizang, the myriad things are deeply interconnected and without sharp boundaries between them. His notion of the real as a nondual quiescence plays a significant role here given that, for him, there is an intimate relationship between the ultimate and conventional levels. Some may think that if we manage to take concepts out of our experience, the world would reveal itself as a world of discrete objects. Yet, it is more likely that this picture of the world comes from an implausible atomistic understanding of language that takes words to be independently meaningful.

²⁸ *Shiermen lun shu*, T 42: 187b18–24.

definitively does not preexist in the seed, the sprout in its germinal form should somehow preexist therein. However, the preexisting form is embryonic at most. It is not a specifiable portion of the sprout and has no determinate property of being a sprout, so it is also wrong to say that the sprout definitively preexists in the seed.

This idea of germinal preexistence may raise the eyebrows of some modern scholars of Madhyamaka. Surely, the notion of dependent origination entails that an effect arises conventionally depending on various causal factors. Yet, it would be mistaken to take the factors to simply differ from the effect but together explain its occurrence. Nāgārjuna patently repudiated the thesis that a thing arises from other things. If we treat causation as involving a relation between cause and effect, then for Jizang the relation is neither external nor internal. Were the relation external, with cause and effect being mutually distinct, it would be a mystery why it is an apple seed, not a pineapple seed, that produces an apple sprout. Were the relation internal, such that the relata are mutually similar, the effect would hardly count as something freshly arising. The idea of germinal preexistence, when carefully construed, represents the middle way of seeing the relation as neither external nor internal.

The second issue is reminiscent of some difficulties faced by the mainstream view of causation in Western philosophy that takes causation to be an asymmetrical (effects follow causes), sequential relation between distinct events. The difficulties surround the question of whether the causing event expires before the onset of the effected event. If the answer is “yes,” one wonders how an event that has run its course does anything. If the answer is “no” and the two events overlap temporally, then, given that by definition they are not completely temporally coextensive, some portion of the effect would not be caused by any portion of the cause. Recently, Heil notes these difficulties, but contends that they would not arise if we think, as he recommends, of causation in terms of causings, that is, as mutual manifestings of reciprocal powers. You stir a spoonful of salt into a glass of water, and the salt dissolves to produce salt water. Here, certain chemical features of the salt continuously interact with certain chemical features of the water, and the process can be understood as mutual manifestings of the salt’s and the water’s powers that finally yield a new kind of manifestation, or something with new powers, the salt water.²⁹

The Buddhist would agree that the generation of an effect is a cooperate endeavor that involves the interaction of many causal factors. In addition, Jizang’s notion of mutual-supporting causation acknowledges that cause and effect can be simultaneous and symmetrical. Clearly, the seed should not perish before the sprout arises. It is also problematic

²⁹ Heil 2012: 118–123. For Heil, causation basically involves a symmetrical, continuous, and interactive process.

that the seed perishes after the sprout arises. Then, it seems advisable to hold that the seed perishes at the same time as the sprout arises. Heil's view that a causal process is continuous appears to point in this direction.

The problem of a double substance is easily solved if we do not regard the cause as a genuinely unitary substance or possessing an intrinsic nature of unity. Yet, how are we to tackle the problem that one and the same thing is both the seed and the sprout, both arises and perishes? Using Heil's language, we can say that the occurrence of the sprout is a new kind of manifestation that arises from the interaction of features of the seed with features of other causal factors. However, in the process, there would be a time when the same thing both arises and perishes, or is both having new powers and not having new powers. This problem remains unresolved.

Indeed, there is in the causal process a modicum of time when it is not clear whether to classify the thing as a seed or a sprout. We are accustomed to discriminating between things and determining them as definitively this or that, but not both together. Then, a thing cannot be both a seed and a sprout, nor both arise and perish. Yet, this poses no difficulty for Jizang, for whom such habitual discrimination and determination is to be abandoned. Since things are indeterminate, what we conventionally take to be a seed can change to become a sprout. As the seed is not definitively this or that, not having any fixed identity, it can, at some points of the changing process, be both a seed and a sprout, both arise and perish, insofar as we do not take these words to predicate of it determinate and mutually exclusive properties. If we prefer, we may take the thing to be neither a seed nor a sprout, neither arising nor perishing. In any case, the perishing of the seed and the arising of the sprout can well occur simultaneously.

Can we resolve the problem linguistically? Suppose that one coins the word "seed-sprout" to designate the thing concerned, which exists after the perishing of the seed but before the arising of the sprout. Even so, questions arise: how does the seed give rise to the seed-sprout, how can something be both a seed and a seed-sprout, both arising and perishing? The strategy would result in a regress *ad infinitum*. To assign a designation to a thing is to attribute to it an identity. This is all well and good. However, the attributed identity may be thought, mistakenly, to give the thing a determinate nature and boundary and demarcate it from other things. Once a thing is demarcated from others, there are difficulties in explaining its causal relations to them. Significantly, whereas we should not thus demarcate cause from effect, neither should we swing to the other extreme and take causation to involve an invariable nucleus that endures amid all changes such that there is an internal relation between cause and effect. This alternative, it seems, fails to capture the free flowing, ever-changing character of

causal processes.

In a now classic passage, Anscombe, arguing that causation should not be identified with necessity and universality, thus wrote:³⁰

There is something to observe here, that lies under our noses. ... causality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes. This is the core, the common feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive from, arise out of, come of, their causes. For example, everyone will grant that physical parenthood is a causal relation. Here the derivation is material, by fission. Now analysis in terms of necessity or universality does not tell us of this derivedness of the effect; rather, it forgets about that.

Anscombe's point that we should focus on the core issue of cause as source of effect rather than the peripheral issue of necessitation is instructive. However, the imports of "derive from" and "come of/from" are too broad for explaining causation. The conclusion of a sound argument derives from its premises yet is not caused by them; all humans come from Africa but are not caused by Africa. For the Mādhyamika, instead, causality consists in the dependent origination of an effect from its causal factors. Let us briefly look at the two conjunctive notions of "dependence" and "origination" to sum up and conclude our discussion.

Here "dependence" surely does not mean counterfactual dependence between distinct events or things such that the effect would not have occurred had the cause not occurred. For the Buddhist, an effect can have various causes: the match may light even if none strikes it. Rather, to say that the effect *B* depends on the cause *A* for its occurrence is to imply that *A* renders some substantial services in contributing to the generation of *B* and their relation is neither internal (*B* preexists in *A*) nor external (*B* does not preexist in *A*). As *B* thus depends on *A*, causation is not simply a matter of *B* following *A*. In addition, the dependence does not require that whenever an *A*-type thing occurs, a *B*-type thing follows. Hence, the Madhyamaka dependence is short of necessity but more than merely accidental.

Meanwhile, "origination" concerns the generation of the effect. A sequential causal process involves changes of cause and effect in that the originally existent *A* perishes (or becomes integral and subordinate to *B*), while the previously nonexistent (or rather, *not*-existent) *B* arises. In the process, *A* perishes neither before nor after *B* arises. There will then be a time when one and the same thing is paradoxically both *A* and *B*, both arises and perishes. As pointed out above, this problem can be resolved by Jizang's notion of ontic indeterminacy.

³⁰ Anscombe 1993/1971: 91–92.

VI.

In an anti-realist vein, Jizang denies the ultimate reality of causal phenomena. At the conventional or conceptual level, where particular things figure in our daily experience, causation remains a pervasive and seemingly unavoidable phenomenon that cries out for explication. In a causal nexus, an effect arises depending on numerous causal factors and their wide-ranging interactions as well as on human convention and conceptual apparatus. For Jizang, sequential causation is short of necessity but more than merely accidental. On the one hand, his notion of causation is nondeterministic in that no pre-given set of causal factors can necessitate the effect and no determinate alternative ground for causation is posited. On the other, he does nothing to reduce causation to contingent regularity, while his worldview differs significantly from the one on which the Humean account is based. What must a world be like to embody causal phenomena? On Jizang's view, what we call the world should consist of *things* that are empty of determinate properties. The notion of ontic indeterminacy fits well with what we are wont to identify as changes of things, which lie at the root of causal processes.

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赴國外研究心得報告

計畫編號	NSC 102-2420-H-343-001-MY3
計畫名稱	緣起、無執與空之倫理：印度與中國中觀哲學的批判研究
出國人員姓名 服務機關及職稱	何建興；南華大學宗教學研究所教授
出國時間地點	2015年8月30日-9月6日；美國洛杉磯、舊金山
國外研究機構	Occidental College、加州柏克萊大學

此移地研究前往美國加州，分別至洛杉磯的 Occidental College 以及舊金山灣區的加州柏克萊大學，拜訪 Dale Wright 與 Robert Sharf 教授，另外也於柏克萊會晤日本東北大學的齋藤智寬教授。我與他們討論中國禪宗思想以及佛教倫理學等議題，相關討論內容頗豐富，對個人饒有裨益。

Dale Wright 教授是重要的禪宗哲學學者。最近轉而研究印度大乘佛教的六波羅蜜。我問他是否對於禪宗有所不滿。他回答時表示，後世的禪宗，尤其是日本禪宗不重視倫理議題，只是強調超越善與惡，但這種超越善惡的論點易引生問題。譬如，不少日本禪宗學者、僧人支持二戰時期的日本侵華。他同意說，《六祖壇經》相當重視道德倫理，但認為之後則不同。他提及，他目前正在寫一本有關尼采與大乘佛教的想像性對話的書。於印度大乘，道德修持是成佛的要門，佛陀雖在某意義超越善惡，但是他有慈悲心，也能做適切的道德判斷，而不是真的取消善惡的差異，日本禪則有該傾向。不過，他的進路是哲學性的，關切當代的佛教哲學應當如何提出其哲學觀點，即使不同於傳統的見解。

我問他對於 fusion Philosophy 的看法。他認為，哲學是普遍的，傳統東方哲學是可能協助解決當代西方哲學的問題。在此，他提及 Jay Garfield 的看法。後者不完全認同 fusion Philosophy 一詞，偏好跨文化的哲學論述或對話。他提及 Garfield 的 *Engaging Buddhism: Why it matters to philosophy* 一書，頗認同該書的進路。

不過，他不認為，大乘佛教如禪宗等真正的違反矛盾律。我問他，他解釋華嚴的弔詭語用，認為這與終極真理的性格有關，則弔詭語辭根源於吾人對於終極真理的經驗。他認為，可以說，終極真理是弔詭的，但不是嚴格意義的矛盾的。於禪宗，他認為，禪宗的弔詭語與「空」有關。在此，他將「空」理解為 contextually dependent。禪師可能於不同場合說不同的話，看似矛盾。他也同意，基於空，相關話語所指稱的事物並無自性。我跟他談我論文的進路。其一討論唐代禪宗，於此，禪弔詭語的因由與華嚴或三論等類似，這階段的禪宗較理性，有些

禪師甚至有哲學陳述。其二，於後世的機鋒對話中，禪師可能真的要說矛盾的話，但是不以為之為真，這話語的功用是 evocative，在於喚起禪悟經驗。對我的看法，Wright 頗表認同，提及「真」一字於西方哲學有不同用法，提及海德格對於真理的特殊解釋，也認為愈後世的禪宗愈重視語言的喚起效用。他也問我，錯的陳述是否有此效用，我回答有的，但是通常禪師偏好用弔詭語。

我對於他的看法較有意見的是，他從當代哲學立場，包括解構主義、歐陸哲學以及腦神經科學的研究，認為語言深入於我人心靈與大腦，很難有無分別的經驗。我認為，他的說法對於禪宗較無問題，例如大珠慧海以離言語無心。但是印度大乘似乎主張某種無分別的經驗，人因此而得覺悟與解脫。我也指出，這樣的純粹經驗與緣起性空未必衝突，人也可以以其為依待的、無常的。Wright 的看法認為，主張無分別經驗者需要為其主張提出哲學論證，不能僅僅訴諸經驗，或以權威方式論斷。

也討論禪宗是否是唯心論。他認為，禪不是西方哲學的唯心論，接近現象學觀點，以萬物需透過心靈而呈現，但此說不能解決萬物出於本心之說。對此，他以為依某義萬物是心的投射，但似乎也同意我之以「投射」一詞過強，外在事物不能都歸因於心靈。他認為這與 Advaita Vedanta 有相近之處，我則略舉其差異。他稱讚我的一些論文，認為文筆流暢等。

此外，也與 Robert Sharf 討論佛學與禪宗。他的思想立場接近 Mark Siderits 與 Jay Garfield，認為並無獨立於世俗諦的勝義諦，所謂的勝義諦無非僅是說，一切都是世俗諦。一切皆空，僅有這個無常變化的世界，並無超越的佛性或真實。這接近西藏佛教的中觀應成派。連帶地，他對於批判佛教的立場頗為同情，他也認為道元禪師有類似的看法。值得注意的是，他認為神會與《六祖壇經》與此立場相近，不同於一般的北宗與南宗禪。特別地，他認為洪州禪將佛性視為是萬有的基體，我則對於這一說法頗感懷疑。

他認為，南宗禪與北宗禪差異不大，南宗在語言使用上與北宗不同，但是其思想其實並未真的超出北宗。由於我對於北宗禪不熟悉，雖然懷疑他的看法，但是沒有進一步質疑他的看法。

在佛教認識論議題上，他認同如一些西方哲學家，反對有所謂的無分別知覺，以無分別最多屬於潛意識或前意識的狀態，某些阿毗達磨學派可以接受後者。我也與他討論他有關正念與無心的近作，以及詢問他《碧巖錄》與《無門關》的差異。

與日本東北大學齋藤智寬教授的晤談中，他認為，南宗禪與北宗禪的文字表達不同，但思想其實相近。北宗已強調無心以及心如虛空。神會僅強調北宗的某個面向。北宗重視《楞伽經》，但是後來的馬祖道一也重視此經與《楞嚴經》、《起信論》等。神會雖然批評北宗，但也承襲其思想。不過，他也認為，真正的禪宗始於神會與《六祖壇經》。後來，他也寄給我他的兩篇論文。

二、研究成果

本次出國係於與國外學者晤談、請益，尚無特別的研究成果。

三、建議

無

科技部補助專題研究計畫出席國際學術會議心得報告

日期：105年3月25日

計畫編號	NSC 102-2420-H-343-001-MY3		
計畫名稱	緣起、無執與空之倫理：印度與中國中觀哲學的批判研究		
出國人員姓名	何建興	服務機構及職稱	南華大學宗教學研究所教授
會議時間	2015年4月22日至4月26日	會議地點	中國大陸上海
會議名稱	(中文)「文獻、歷史、思想與文化—現代視野下的佛學研究」學術研討會 (英文)		
發表題目	(中文) (英文) Causation and Ontic Indeterminacy		

此次出國主要參加華東師範大學哲學系與普陀山佛教協會合辦的「文獻、歷史、思想與文化—現代視野下的佛學研究」學術研討會，另外也順道去復旦大學哲學學院進行英文演講。

24日下午前往復旦大學哲學學院，針對其英文的中國哲學學程的學生與老師進行英文演講，講題是“Resolving the Ineffability Paradox”。演講海報上的摘要為：A number of contemporary philosophers think that the unqualified statement “X is unspeakable” faces the danger of self-referential absurdity: if this statement is true, it must simultaneously be false, given that X is speakable by the predicate word “unspeakable.” This predicament can be formulated as an argument that we may term the “ineffability paradox.” In this talk, I resort to a few Chinese Buddhist and Hindu philosophical materials to rationally reconstruct a strategy for resolving the paradox. By introducing the mode of expression termed “indication,” together with the relevant notions of superimposition and of gesturing beyond the horizon, I attempt to show that expressing the ineffable does not necessarily involve irresolvable contradiction. It is also suggested that philosophers may need to acknowledge the relevance of the notion of ineffability for contemporary philosophizing。此篇論文經修改後，後來刊登於 *Comparative Philosophy without Borders* 一書 (Bloomsbury Academic 2015年11月出版)。

演講之後的發言還頗踴躍。主持人劉宇光教授提問認為，佛教對於之所以說「不可說」的緣由，或與其他宗教哲學不同，例如佛陀的沉默等。回應時，我強調我的進路較不涉及「不可說」的理由，而是要處理相關的弔詭難題。其他有聽眾認為，我似乎強調現在實在的不可說性，這也為法國哲學家柏格森、德勒茲等人所強調。我們如何說一指示語是不正確的，其判准為何？是否隱喻可解決相關的不可說問題？我對於這些問題，都就我所知一一說明。

有學生說他的論文與此有關，我建議他閱讀我另一篇相關論文。基本上，與會學生頗有哲學根底，問相當不錯的問題。但是，復旦哲學系的教師參與者較少。

一、參加會議經過

華東師範大學的研討會，於4月25日周六舉行。我個人的論文發表場次是下午最後一場次。大會僅給發表人十六分鐘的發表時間，雖然是英文論文，但是以中文 powerpoint 發表。現場可見，與會學者對於中觀哲學較為陌生。由於時間有限，同場次有多達六位學者發表，主持人話又多，就沒有開放給參與者提問，因此較為可惜，無法得到與會聽眾對拙文的回饋意見。

二、與會心得

如前述，較為可惜的是，無法得到與會聽眾對拙文的回饋意見。

三、發表論文全文或摘要

Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE) was the purported founder of Madhyamaka, a prominent philosophical school of Buddhism. For him and other Indian Mādhyamikas, all things originate dependently, because their arising and perishing depend on various causes and conditions. They are devoid of any independent, unconditioned, and permanent nature or existence, or, in brief, intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). Consequently, all things are said to be empty. Here, the relationship of dependence in the key notion of dependent origination includes sequential causal relations, simultaneous reciprocal dependence relations, relations between a whole and its parts, and even relations of being dependent on human conceptualization. Oddly, Nāgārjuna criticized various alternative views on causality and arrived at the conclusion that things do not really arise. This, it seems, amounts to repudiating the existence of causation.

Of course, the fundamental thesis for Madhyamaka is that all items involved in a causal nexus are empty. It is, for instance, because all the casual factors are empty that they can interact, or even interfuse, with each other to generate the effect, which, being causally dependent and impermanent, cannot but be empty too. Beyond this, however, contemporary scholars differ on how best to understand Nāgārjuna's critique of causality. For our purposes, I shall attend to Jizang 吉藏 (549–623), the foremost exponent of Chinese Madhyamaka, to consider his exposition of the Indian Mādhyamika critique of causality. Jizang's philosophy of emptiness somehow differs from that of Nāgārjuna, so I am not here concerned with the faithfulness to Indian Madhyamaka of the exposition. Instead, my aim is to rationally reconstruct Jizang's thought on causation to make it accessible and relevant to contemporary readers. There have been many fine studies of causation in modern Anglo-American philosophy. Given the universality of philosophical rationality, however, it is worthwhile to ponder whether the ancient Buddhist thought may broaden our perspective and inject a fresh way of thinking into our contemporary philosophizing on the nature of causation.

三、建議

無。

五、攜回資料名稱及內容

六、其他

科技部補助專題研究計畫出席國際學術會議心得報告

日期：105年3月25日

計畫編號	NSC 102-2420-H-343-001-MY3		
計畫名稱	緣起、無執與空之倫理：印度與中國中觀哲學的批判研究		
出國人員姓名	何建興	服務機構及職稱	南華大學宗教學研究所教授
會議時間	2015年7月8日至7月13日	會議地點	澳洲墨爾本
會議名稱	(中文) (英文) Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Conference		
發表題目	(中文) (英文) Resolving the Ineffability Paradox		

一、參加會議經過

此次出國係參加 Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy 主辦的 Australasian Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy Conference，會議地點是墨爾本的 Monash 大學，會議日期為 7 月 10 日至 7 月 12 日。會議之後，由於個人的助理暑假期間未到校以及疏忽，未及時處理相關報帳資料，以致此次出國費用實際上為個人自行負擔。

本會議除三場 keynote speech 以外，每時段有兩場次。我的論文發表場次是第一天上午，發表論文題為 Resolving the Ineffability Paradox。

為了引領聽眾進入「不可說」一概念，我先論及學界對於《道德經》第一句「道可道，非常道」的標準翻譯，其後進入主題。演講之後，學者們的問題頗踴躍。我在演講中對比描述語句與指示語句；一資深女性學者問有關「指向」、「指示」概念是否會出現錯誤。我回覆說，指示性語句一如一般的描述語句，是可能出錯的。但這本來就很正常，語言表達總可能出錯。我在回答主持人 Peter Wong 的提問時也說，指示語詞所指涉的對象可能不存在：假設老子的道不存在，則「道」字即無指涉對象，但這並不影響我的基本論述。年輕學者 Sydney Morrow 問有關我演講中某個否定的意義，她建議採康德的看法理解該否定。

由於我提及地平線的譬喻，有學者以為，指示語僅能指出不可說事物的存在，不能說明其屬性。我回答時強調，任何用來表達不可說者的語詞都可以視為指示詞。另一方面，Graham Priest

教授認為，若考慮王弼對於《道德經》的解釋，則《道德經》或這解釋很難說是指示語。John Makeham 則以為，我所說的標準翻譯是有問題的，道其實應理解為多數的，而非單數的。我在回答中強調，我提及「道可道，非常道」僅是作為不可說的例句，我不需要為老子辯護，而我的進路也未必為老子所接受。重點是老子似乎提及不可說的事物，不論其為單數或多數。會議後，另有一位博士生與我討論演講細節。

我也參加部分其他場次的論文發表。於咖啡時間，有機會與 Arindam Chakrabarti, Graham Priest, John Makeham 三位 keynote speakers 私下討論。Leesa Davis 論文討論禪宗對於弔詭與否定的看法，我請她提供其論文檔案。年輕的日本學者 Takaharu Oda 對禪宗與井筒俊彥的著作很感興趣，他表示希望未來能與我合作研究禪宗。

二、與會心得

無。

三、發表論文全文或摘要

A number of contemporary philosophers think that the unqualified statement “X is unspeakable” faces the danger of self-referential absurdity: if this statement is true, it must at the same time be false, given that X is speakable by the predicate word “unspeakable.” This predicament is in this paper formulated as an argument that I term the “ineffability paradox.” To cope with this paradox, I first examine the Buddhist semantic theory of *apoha* (exclusion) and an *apoha* solution to the issue. Then, I attend to a few passages in the works of the two Chinese Mādhyamika philosophers, Sengzhao (僧肇, 374?-414) and Jizang (吉藏, 549-623), and of the fifth-century Hindu grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari to rationally reconstruct a strategy for resolving the paradox. By introducing the mode of expression termed “indication,” together with the relevant notions of superimposition and of gesturing beyond the horizon, I attempt to show that expressing the ineffable does not necessarily involve irresolvable contradiction. It is also suggested that philosophers may need to acknowledge the relevance of the notion of ineffability for contemporary philosophizing.

四、建議

五、攜回資料名稱及內容

六、其他

科技部補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2016/03/25

科技部補助計畫	計畫名稱: (子計畫七)緣起、無執與空之倫理：印度與中國中觀哲學的批判研究
	計畫主持人: 何建興
	計畫編號: 102-2420-H-343-001-MY3 學門領域: 全球架構下的臺灣發展
無研發成果推廣資料	

102年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表

計畫主持人：何建興		計畫編號：102-2420-H-343-001-MY3				計畫名稱：(子計畫七)緣起、無執與空之倫理：印度與中國中觀哲學的批判研究	
成果項目		量化			單位	備註(質化說明： 如數個計畫共同成果、成果列為該期刊之封面故事...等)	
		實際已達成數(被接受或已發表)	預期總達成數(含實際已達成數)	本計畫實際貢獻百分比			
國內	論文著作	期刊論文	0	0	100%	篇	
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	0	0	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%	章/本	
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力(本國籍)	碩士生	2	2	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
博士後研究員		0	0	100%			
專任助理		0	0	100%			
國外	論文著作	期刊論文	0	0	100%	篇	
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	1	1	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%	章/本	
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力(外國籍)	碩士生	0	0	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
博士後研究員		0	0	100%			
專任助理		0	0	100%			
其他成果 (無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)		計畫執行人於本執行年度獲得科技部103年度傑出研究獎。					

	成果項目	量化	名稱或內容性質簡述
科 教 處 計 畫 加 填 項 目	測驗工具(含質性與量性)	0	
	課程/模組	0	
	電腦及網路系統或工具	0	
	教材	0	
	舉辦之活動/競賽	0	
	研討會/工作坊	0	
	電子報、網站	0	
	計畫成果推廣之參與(閱聽)人數	0	

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

達成目標

未達成目標（請說明，以100字為限）

實驗失敗

因故實驗中斷

其他原因

說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

論文： 已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

專利： 已獲得 申請中 無

技轉： 已技轉 洽談中 無

其他：（以100字為限）

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以500字為限）

所撰寫的英文論文“Causation and Ontic Indeterminacy: A Chinese Madhyamaka Perspective”，約有九千兩百字，以英文論文而言篇幅頗多。這論文的撰寫相當費時，雖已完成，個人仍打算再次修改，之後投稿國際英文期刊。文中批評Jay Garfield對於龍樹因果批判的詮釋，應該具有說服力。此外，訴諸吉藏的「存在的不定性」概念以闡明、抉發其因果思想，相信具有創新性與適切性。另一方面，本文並非只是中觀哲學論著的詮釋。文中進行與西方因果理論的比較，試圖顯示吉藏的因果思想具有現代意義，中觀的「緣起」概念也頗適切地顯示因果關係，這些都值得當代哲學家措意。當然，文中的論述是否的當，還需要國際學界的評估。就本年度計畫而言，此計畫執行已達成預期的目標。