黑格爾對基本判斷形式一向持批判態度，他認為主謂詞 的判斷結構片面，不適合用來把握和表述思辯哲學，這種邏輯結構還隱含某種形上學立場，配合以個體為中心的實體論。黑格爾認為一般判斷形式適合描述經驗對象，但用來討論形上學課題卻大有限制，傳統形上學的錯誤很大程度上由於沒有充分反省判斷形式的問題。本文首先討論判斷形式及其形上學意涵的哲學史背景，包括由亞里士多德開始，經過康德到雅可比和謝林的發展；然後整理黑格爾對有關問題的思想歷程，分析他的命題運動理念，以及與之相連的真理整體論和統一主體與實體的觀念論。 Hegel has always been critical of the basic form of judgment, maintaining that the subject-predicate structure is inadequate for grasping and expressing speculative philosophy. The logico-linguistic structure is also laden with metaphysical implications, being closely tied with traditional substance ontology. According to Hegel, subject-predicate judgments are suitable for describing empirical things, but they have limitations in addressing metaphysical issues. Hegel believes that the mistake of traditional metaphysics is, to a large extent, resulted from its failure to reflect critically on the problems related to the subject-predicate structure. This paper will first discuss the philosophical background of the form of judgment and its metaphysical implications, reviewing the positions of Aristotle, Kant, Jacobi and Schelling. It will then trace the development of Hegel’s thoughts on the form of judgment and analyze Hegel’s holism of truth as well as his idealism that unifies substantiality and subjectivity.
