本研究在於探討監督對公共預算執行之影響，研究中以我國中央部會為探討對象，採用追蹤資料進行分析。實證結果發現，預算執行監督頻率增加可顯著改善經常門預算執行落後問題；然並無證據支持，增加監督頻率可改善資本門預算執行情形。此實證結果顯示，裁決性較高之經常門預算執行過程存在代理問題，而增加監督頻率可降低此問題之嚴重性。 This study aims to examine the impact of monitoring on public-sector budget execution patterns. Using panel data for ROC central government units, we find that government agencies subject to higher-frequency monitoring have less delays in executing current operating expenditure budgets. However, no evidence shows that increasing monitoring frequency can improve the budget execution patterns of capital investment budgets. Based on such findings, we argue that agency problems exist in the execution process of current operating expenditure budgets and such problems can be mitigated by closer monitoring.
