南華大學機構典藏系統:Item 987654321/16962
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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nhuir.nhu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/16962


    Title: 食品效期影響需求售價控制模式及劣質混充優質分食模式
    Other Titles: The Optimal Price Control Model of Food Demand in the Validity Dates and Model of Cannibization for Sales of Non-Harmful Low-Quality Products Mislabeled as High-Quality Products
    Authors: 陳怡君
    Chen, I-Chun
    Contributors: 企業管理系管理科學碩博士班
    陳淼勝
    Miao-Sheng Chen
    Keywords: 分食;混充;最佳控制;新鮮;市場均衡
    Freshness;Cannibalization;Mislabeling;Optimal Control;Market Equilibrium
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2014-11-20 11:44:41 (UTC+8)
    Abstract:   對食品的銷售而言,食品的製造日期及有效食用的截止日期,是消費者進入商店站在貨架前,決定是否購買與決定購買多少數量的參考指標。本研究站在某新鮮性食品銷售商利潤最大化立場,考慮:應如何決定銷售期間每一時點售價問題。模式之最佳售價函數的性質及其敏感度分析的管理意涵,為本文模式1的主要內容。  在市場上,同一類產品之劣質品混充優質品的銷售標示不實問題,已是常見的現象。此欺騙消費者行為,又約可分為二種。一種是其混充的劣質品對人體健康有害;另一種則是對人體健康無害。本文稱後者問題為純混充問題,並稱其產品為純混充產品。本文模式2 係針對:純混充問題所涉及的因素,製作成一個可具體討論的型態。透過此模式進一步了解,在某一時點廠商利潤最大化之混充比例值是如何影響分食市場產品的價格與售量;以及受影響的產品價格與售量,在下一時點又如何回頭來影響廠商利潤最大化之混充比例值。應用前述隨時間而互相影響的關係,可以了解政府衛生機構之稽核廠商混充行為的預算(單位時間之稽核次數),是否足以遏止廠商的不法混充行為發生。
      For food sales, the date of manufacture and the date of expiry are two reference indices for consumers in deciding whether to purchase a particular food product and the quantity to be purchased when they are in front of the shelves in a store. This paper looks at pricing of food products from a profit maximization perspective, and considers how a fresh food vendor should determine prices at each point in the sales period. The main content of Model 1 consists of the management implications of the nature and sensitivity analysis of the optimal price function of the model.  In the market, the problem of false labeling, where inferior products are passed off as superior products of the same type, is a commonly observed phenomenon. This form of consumer fraud can be generally divided into two types. In the first type, the inferior products are harmful to human health, whereas in the second type, the products pose no harm to human health. This paper refers to the latter as a “pure mislabeling problem” and the products involved as “pure mislabeled products.” This paper proposes a model (Model 2) that can be discussed specifically based on the factors that bring about or affect the problem of pure mislabeling. This model is used to facilitate further understanding of how the vendor’s profit maximizing ratio of mislabeled products affects prices and sales volumes in a cannibalized market at given points in time. Model 2 also shows how the changed product price and sales volume in turn influence the profit-maximizing ratio of mislabeled products at a subsequent point in time. The above mentioned relationship of mutual influence over time facilitates the understanding of whether a governmental health organization’s budget for vendor mislabeling inspection (i.e., the inspection frequency per unit time) is sufficient for preventing the occurrence of illegal mislabeling among vendors.
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Business Administration, Master/Ph.D Program in Management Sciences] Disserations and Theses(Master and Doctoral Program in Management Sciences)

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