近年來，台灣有不少企業選擇以併購的方式來快速強化自身競爭力，但一直以來，國內探討薪酬與績效關聯之研究眾多，但鮮少加入併購之議題加以探討。本文以主併公司觀點切入，將CEO (Chief Executive Officer)薪酬、併購活動與公司績效做一結合探討，不僅補足國內此部分缺乏的研究，也有助於了解台灣目前活絡的併購行為下，CEO薪酬與公司績效間的影響程度，本文除了考量激勵的因素之外，也將深入了解在併購活動時，主導併購的CEO的薪酬與公司績效的實際連結程度。本文以2000年到2004年間台灣進行併購活動的上市公司為研究對象，探討握有主併公司決策權力的CEO，在主導公司併購決策時，其薪酬是否產生改變；並進一步研究主併公司在併購後之公司三年之長期績效與其CEO薪酬的關聯。研究結果顯示，公司進行併購活動時，有明顯對其CEO發放獎勵的行為，因此併購活動與CEO薪酬之間存在正向關係，但併購前的公司績效對CEO的薪酬似乎無顯著影響，然而併購後若公司績效為負，則公司將會減少CEO的薪酬。 Today many enterprises choose Merger and Acquisition (M&A) to lower costs and increase market shares. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that a firm’s compensation policies align the interests of managers and shareholders. Moreover, enterprises pay additional incentives to managers in M&A deals. In Taiwan, there are a lot of M&A deals recently. Although many studies address the relationship between CEO (Chief Executive Officer) compensation and firm performance, or between M&A deals and firm performance, few of them consider these three aspects all together. This paper focuses on CEO compensation of the acquiring firm in M&A events from year 2000 to 2004 in Taiwan to investigate how M&A activities affect firm’s long-run performance and CEO compensation. The results show that CEO compensation is positively related to M&A activities while CEO compensation is not significantly affected even when the firm performs worse before M&A. However, when the firm performs worse after M&A, CEO compensation will be reduced.
