在就業市場中的雇主並無法確實衡量求職者的能力，因此他們會由求職者的教育程度瞭解其能力差異。文獻上認為教育水準受到個人能力影響，能力高者學習力強會有較低的受教育成本，在取得高教育水準時較有優勢。然而，當求職者於市場中應徵工作時若能得知對手的能力，將可得知競爭者的教育決策行為，此時求職者可視競爭者能力再評估是否需要提昇個人教育水準以爭取工作，並非一定要取得高教育水準。但各求職者間未必能確實得知對手的能力，可能存在無法瞭解對手能力的不完全訊息情況。運用實質選擇權法建立求職者在投資教育時的決策模型，假設市場中各求職者將競爭同一工作機會，但最終只有一位求職者可獲得工作。本文以求職者與競爭者間皆能瞭解彼此能力的完全訊息結構為基準，進而分析雙方無法得知彼此能力的不完全訊息結構，討論求職者在此兩種不同結構中，競爭者的能力訊息是否會影響個人對教育的決策行為。 本文發現各求職者在完全訊息結構中競爭工作時，能力高者可選擇取得略高於競爭者的教育程度，避免付出過多受教育成本或投資教育後仍無法得到工作的情況。不完全訊息中各求職者間無法得知彼此能力，只能猜測競爭者能力高低對取得工作的機率分配而定；在只有一位求職者可得到工作的情況下，當求職者猜測競爭對手能力較低時獲得工作的機率較高，此時求職者投資受教育的成本易小於工作報酬，會有較高意願選擇提昇教育水準；若預估對手能力較高則求職者可能會失去工作，將讓求職者選擇受教育的成本較易大於工作報酬，因此他會傾向不改變原有的教育水準。由求職者面對的兩種不同結構可發現，在不完全訊息時求職者為爭取工作會取得個人能力所及的最高教育程度，或許未能如完全訊息中以較少的教育成本取得工作，但在此情況下卻最能突顯個人能力的優劣。 More often the employers are not sure of the ability of job-seeker, and they will regard education as a reference to hire. Most studies have associated the level of education with the individual’s competency. Thus, more competent an individual is, the lower cost he or she will spend on education, he or she will seek for higher education. If a job-seeker knows in advance that the ability of competitors, he or she will assess whether to upgrade their education to compete. However, the market does not necessarily reveal the full information of the competitor’s ability. This study uses the concept of real option to build an investment-education model for job-seeker. Assume that many job-seekers compete for a single position, and only one will get the position. First, we assume that all job-seeker to know the ability of each other and use the information as a benchmark. We further analyze an incomplete information structure by assuming that the job-seeker and competitors do not know each other's ability. The purpose is to understand the level of education a job seeker will choose when facing different competitors. This study finds that all job-seekers in the full information model can clearly determine whether to upgrade education. The more competent a job-seeker would choose slightly higher level of education than the competitor in order to avoid paying too much education costs. In the incomplete information model, job-seeker will assess the ability level of competitors. When the job-seeker finds that competitors have low competency, he or she has higher probability of getting the job. At this time, if the job-seeker knows that he or she can get the position with less cost of education remuneration, he or she will tend to invest in education. If the job-seeker finds that the competitors have higher competency, he or she will have smaller probability of getting the job, and tend not to invest in education. This result suggests that job-seekers will use there as a benchmark acquire the highest education. These two models suggest that job-seeker with incomplete information can bring out the merits of the individual’s ability.
