南華大學機構典藏系統:Item 987654321/25802
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    Title: 高階經理人的權力與政府監督對銀行股利之證實分析
    Other Titles: The Influences of CEO Power and Government Supervision on Bank Dividends
    Authors: 林宥君
    LIN, YU-CHUN
    Contributors: 財務金融學系財務管理碩士班
    陳昇鴻
    CHEN, SHENG-HUNG
    Keywords: 政府監督;高階經理人權力;銀行股利
    CEO Power;Bank Dividend;Government Supervision
    Date: 2017
    Issue Date: 2017-12-08 13:15:55 (UTC+8)
    Abstract:   過去文獻指出強化銀行股利發放的機制,可有效地降低銀行高階經理人(CEO)將內部資金挹注在非極大化公司價值的投資方案上,因此做法可被視為是一種保護股東所採行的措施,也會提高外部投資人對CEO行為監督與審視。有鑑於此,本研究使用1997年到2016年之台灣地區銀行業年資料,實證探討高階經理人的權力與政府監督對銀行股利的影響。實證結果指出當高階經理人持股比率與資產成長率愈高時,則會顯著地降低銀行的現金股利率,但是董事長兼任高階經理人與國內政府持股比率愈高,則對銀行發放現金股利不具統計上的顯著性。其次,當國內政府持股比率愈高,則會顯著提升銀行的股票股利的發放率,然而此時高階經理人持股比率和董事長兼任高階經理人對股票股利的發放不具統計的顯著性。
      Previous studies indicate stronger mechanism on bank dividend policy would significantly mitigate bank CEO to inject internal resources into the non-maximum investment of corporate valuation whereas serving as the measure for protecting the shareholder's right. Based on this view, using annual data on Taiwanese commercial banks over 1997-2016, this paper empirically investigating the impacts of CEO power and government supervision on bank dividend. Our empirical results show that banks with higher CEO ownership and ROA growth significantly reduce the cash dividend ratio while there is insignificant relationship between board of director as CEO and government ownership and cash dividend ratio. Moreover, banks with higher government ownership significantly increase the stock dividend ratio, while there is insignificant relationship between board of director as CEO and CEO ownership and stock dividend ratio.
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Finance, The M.A. Program of  Financial Management] Disserations and Theses

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