本研究以1995年至2017年間台灣地區的銀行業為研究樣本，實證探討銀行競爭對不透明度的影響。實證結果指出當銀行市場力量愈大，即銀行競爭愈低，會顯著降低備抵呆帳的提列，意謂當銀行市場愈趨向於不競爭，會顯著降低銀行的透明度。此外，當銀行為金控銀行時，對銀行透明度的影響差異性為何？結果指出不論銀行為金控或非金控時，逾期放款比率愈高時，則會顯著提高銀行的備抵呆帳的提列。最後，當銀行為金控銀行時，其市場力量愈高會顯著較非金控銀行降低透明度。 This thesis uses the Taiwan banking industry over 1995 to 2017 as a sample to empirically explore the impact of banking competition on opacity. Experimental results indicate that improving bank competition will improve financial statement quality which in turn reduce bank opacity. If banks are financial controllers, their bank transparency is higher than that of non-financial controllers. Last , banks set up audit committees and the higher bank competition, it significantly improve the greater quality of financial statements and reduce bank opacity.
