本研究旨在探討董事會特徵對越南上市公司盈餘管理的影響。本研究使用可自由支配的應計（DA）作為盈餘管理的代理變數與使用經過調整的Kothari的瓊斯模型分析2013年至2017年越南上市公司。本研究採用Panel data之固定效應模型，研究發現，董事會規模與盈利操縱有正向關係。董事會獨立性和董事會股份所有權與收益操縱負向關係。然而， CEO二元性與盈餘管理之間存在負向關係，董事會金融專業知識與盈餘管理之間存在正向關係，並未獲得支持。上述研究結果對政策制定者和投資者來說非常重要，他們可以通過本研究結果提供明確的政策，與有用的資訊來評估公司的績效，進而監督管理人員的盈餘管理行為。 This study aims to examine the impact of board characteristics on earnings management of listed companies on Vietnamese stock market. This research has employed a sample of Vietnamese listed companies in the period from 2013 to 2017 listed on Vietnam stock market. The study use discretionary accruals (DA) as a proxy for the earnings management. The adjusted Jones model of Kothari et al. (2005) was applied to recognize DA of these companies. The study also employes fixed effect model through using panal data framework in order to control for time-variant endogeneity. The study found that board size has a positive relationship with earnings manipulation. Board independence and board share ownership are negatively associated to earnings manipulation. However, the study figured out a negative association between CEO duality and earnings management along with a positive association between board financial expertise and earnings management, which are not supported in our research hypotheses. The findings are important to policy-makers and investors by providing them a broaden viewpoints of producing well-defined policies, using useful information to evaluate the firm's performance, and monitoring the earnings management actions of managers.
