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歐洲研究所
碩士論文

EUROPEAN UNION – NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP:
NATO ROLE IN CSDP

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歐盟與北約的戰略夥伴關係：北約的共同外交與安全政策角色

European Union-North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Strategic Partnership: NATO Role in CSDP

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FOREWORD

Thanks be to God, for his grace and blessings that I can finish this thesis. This thesis was written as a requirement to fulfill Master Degree. During the research and process of writing this thesis, I was given many constructive opinions of various perspectives and point of views, thus I really grateful as with those comments, I have a broaden point of view.

I realized that this research is not fully elaborates the prestigious International political system, as it takes one perspectives of the international relations theory, structural realism. Thus the author will accept any further comments and corrections from fellow researcher in order to make a better understanding of the issue and of course to make the thesis better. It is my hope that this thesis can contribute to the study of international relations mainly focusing on the security issue, and also to be studied from different point of view of various and distinct international relations theory.

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Damai Argakasih Lazuardinur [阿崗]

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ABSTRACT

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Abstract :

The European Union policy concerning security has developed and transformed in recent decades, established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and several new institutions within EU that marked the EU concern in security fields. While, NATO forces as a defence organization during the Cold War is still sustain to exist and developed several policy shifting itself from the collective defence organization. By then also deepened the relationship with NATO extend to the strategic partnership, establish by the two institutions. The joint forces EU-NATO has been carried out in the several areas to provide a comprehensive range of crisis management capabilities. Undertaken civilians and military operations, either with the support of NATO or EU own operations. Yet still being questions whether EU itself has adequate military capacity, to play a full role in international order.

The existence of NATO in the post Cold War era is still in debate, as it already lost its main reason to exist, the Soviet. Moreover, the relation between EU and NATO is yet faces contemporary issues where both have to adapt on each development of the seemingly big difference in policy and military expenditure. However, neorealism perspective elaborates different, it has key elements to explain about the nature of NATO and EU partnership.

Keywords: European Union, NATO, Strategic Partnership, Neorealism.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSCC	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
EAEC/Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMS	European Monetary System
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDI	European Security Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WTC	World Trade Centre

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

A. Background

The greatness of European Union as an international actor is clearly narrated by its successful economic and political development to the new world order. Formerly, this economic and political union began with only six countries in 1952, since then expanding its membership gradually from 1973 to 2007.¹ Yet, still sustain its enlargement until now. The union was materialized and established under several treaty, attempt to unite in diversity. Then finally construct the big and prosperity union known as European Union. And uniquely, the rise and developed of European Union, often became an example of another countries in other region as a model of successful integration.²

However, the attempt to unite European Union (EU) Have a background of long history of relations affinity and wars. In 1945, after two world wars, Europe was left destroyed, poor weak and divided, and *de facto*, or even *de jure*, under the control of two super powers – the United States and the Soviet Union.³ The strength and fortune of Nationalism on Each of European nation had been exalted to a point which had led them to self-destruction.⁴

Then perchance Europe learned their lesson, especially the Western Europe, with the military and financial help from the United States of America USA, organized itself in order to restore its destroyed economy and protect its security, perceived as endangered by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). On the defence side, the Western European Union (WEU) was established in 1948, followed by NATO, under the leadership of the USA, in 1949. The Council of Europe was established in 1949.

¹ Basic information on the European Union, http://europa.eu/abc/panorama/index_en.htm, accessed on January 6, 2011.

² Nuraeni Suparman et al., *Regionalisme: Dalam Studi Hubungan Internasional*, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, Agustus 2010), p. 137.

³ Jean-Claude Piris, *A Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 1-2.

⁴ *Ibid.*

Following the famous speech of Robert Schuman (France Foreign Minister) on 9 May 1950, efforts began to build a smaller and more integrated Europe around France and Germany. The purpose is quite obvious, to avoid the resurgence of another war between them. Then use the so-called “Jean Monnet method”, which consisted in progressively building up ‘through practical achievements which will first of all create solidarity, and through the established of common bases for economic development.’⁵

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established by six founding States, entered into force in 1952, extended in 1957 with the Treaties of Rome.⁶ Then followed, with the same Member States, the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, together with the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, better known as Euratom). That was the start of historic adventure which led to the establishment of European Union.⁷

By now the Union enlarges and expands, European Union (EU) gains more power in the global stage through its instrument of EU interest, such as economy and politics, act as one of the actors in the world order. The wide area of EU is the area of its 27 member states (with exceptions of The Channel Islands, Isle of Man (Crown Dependencies) and the Faroe Islands (territory of Denmark)).⁸ EU primarily occupies a large portion of Western and Eastern Europe, located between the North Atlantic Ocean in the west and Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine to the east.⁹ Represents the 7 largest territories in the world by area. However, despite the prosperity of this great union, it is also confronted by security issues. The internal borders become more porous as the Schengen agreement¹⁰

⁵ Jean-Claude Piris, *Op. cit.*, pp.1-2.

⁶ European Union, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union, accessed on January 12, 2011.

⁷ Jean-Claude Piris, *Op. cit.* p. 2.

⁸ European Union, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm, accessed on January 12 2011.

⁹ CIA The World Factbook, European Union, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html>, accessed on January 15, 2010.

¹⁰ The Schengen Agreements and the rules adopted under them were entirely separate from the EU structures until the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty that incorporated them into the mainstream of European Union law. The borderless zone created by the Schengen Agreements, the Schengen Area, currently consists of 25 European countries, covering a population of over 400 million people and an area of 4,312,099 square kilometers.

implemented, and more over the European Union outside border itself which is adjacent with other countries. And as we know there is a big nation lies in the east of Europe that was once a great power in the World War II, Soviet Union. However, the crumbled Soviet Union, as a main threat upon which the defence planning was based during the cold war, has faded away and again, transformed the global political landscape.¹¹

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is design to maintain EU security and defence diplomacy and action. The CFSP is soft power, resolving conflict and bring about international understanding, with the use of diplomacy, if necessary backed with trade, aid and peace-keepers.¹² However, in 1999 the European Security Defence Policy was launched by the Cologne European Council as a distinctive part of the EU's CFSP. The aim of ESDP is to complete and thus strengthen the EU's external ability to act through the development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management.¹³

In the Treaty of Lisbon, The ESDP changed name to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP),¹⁴ while EU itself has the Mutual Solidarity Clause, according to Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Part V Title VII, article 222, which stated:

The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all

¹¹ Heinz Gartner, *European Security, the Transatlantic Link, and Crisis Management*, in Heinz Gartner, *Europe's New Security Challenges* (Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), pp. 125-6

¹² Foreign and Security Policy, http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm, accessed on January 14, 2011.

¹³ EU Security and Defence Policy, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/eu-security-defence-policy-archived/article-117486>, accessed on January 18, 2011.

¹⁴ Treaty of Lisbon, http://www.iiea.com/blogosphere/lisbon-treaty-enters-into-force-a-brave-new-europe-is-born?gclid=CJmd_-6Sna0CFVCApAodZ14akw, accessed on January 18, 2011.

*the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States.*¹⁵

To give its diplomacy more clout and visibility, the Union created the post of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, who coordinates between EU countries to shape and carry out foreign policy. The High Representative is assisted by a political and military staff. The EU has no standing army. Instead it relies on ad hoc forces contributed by EU countries for peacekeeping, crisis management and humanitarian missions. In order to respond quickly, the EU has established battle groups of about 1500 forces each. Two battle groups are on standby at any given time.¹⁶

Besides the CFSP, EU also joined the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE traces its origins to the Cold War détente of the early 1970s, when the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was created to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between East and West. After the Cold War, the CSCE established a permanent Secretariat in Prague, a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, an Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw, and an Office on National Minorities in the Hague. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, and the accession of Albania, membership in the CSCE increased from thirty-five to fifty-three states. In 1994, it was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Since then, the OSCE has supervised democratic elections, promoted respect for human rights in new laws and constitutions, and negotiated and monitored cease-fires throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.¹⁷

The OSCE was a rather small organization until selected by the international community to provide electoral organization to post war Bosnia and

¹⁵ Gerrard Quille, European Parliament: Common Security and Defence Policy, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do?language=en&id=74&ftuId=FTU_6.1.3.html, accessed on February 27, 2011.

¹⁶ Foreign and Security Policy, http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm, accessed on January 21, 2011.

¹⁷ John Whiteclay Chambers II, *The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*. See, http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Organization_for_Security_and_Cooperation_in_Europe.aspx, accessed on March 11, 2011.

Herzegovina in early 1996. Ambassador Frowick was the first OSCE representative to initiate national election in September 1996, human rights issues and rule of law specifically designed to provide a foundation for judicial organization within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The OSCE had regional offices and field offices, to include the office in Brcko in northeastern Bosnia and Herzegovina which remained in limbo until the Brcko Arbitration Agreement could be decided, finalized and implemented.¹⁸

It is the world's largest security oriented-intergovernmental organization, with 56 states from Europe, Central Asia, and North America. Its mandate includes issues such as arms control, human rights, freedom of the press and fair elections. It offers a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, and puts the political will of its participating States into practice through its unique network of field missions.¹⁹ Security touches on many aspects of the way we live and are governed. The OSCE's comprehensive view of security covers three "dimensions": the politico-military; the economic and environmental; and the human. The OSCE's activities cover all three of these areas, from "hard" security issues such as conflict prevention to fostering economic development, ensuring the sustainable use of natural resources, and promoting the full respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms.²⁰ Yet, rather being an active security organization, the OSCE carried out merely a conference for a discussion term, non with action.

Beside join the OSCE, most of the EU members also maintained cooperation with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO now consist of 28 independent member countries, signed in April 4, 1949, is an

¹⁸ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organization_for_Security_and_Co-operation_in_Europe, accessed on March 11, 2011.

¹⁹ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, see, <http://www.osce.org/who>, accessed on March 11, 2011.

²⁰ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, see, <http://www.osce.org/what>, accessed on March 11, 2011.

international alliances established to ensure the peace and security of the North Atlantic region.²¹

As a political and military alliance,²² NATO constitutes a system of collective defence whereby its member states agree to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. Stated in Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty:²³

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Followed by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, now EU and NATO have 21 members in common. Both EU and NATO commit to cooperate in combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, exchanged information on their in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks.²⁴

Above all the cooperation and the partnership among the EU and other organizations, we have to remember that, EU itself contains of 27 sovereign member states with its own economic, politic and military power, even more the big countries like France, Germany and United Kingdom of Great Britain.

²¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see, <http://future.state.gov/what/special/76741.htm>, accessed on March 11, 2011.

²² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-45246E21-4612E07F/natolive/what_is_nato.htm, accessed on March 11, 2011.

²³ The North Atlantic Treaty, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, accessed on March 11, 2011.

²⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO–EU: A Strategic Partnership, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm, accessed on March 11, 2011.

Additionally, the EU already materialized its own common defence, the so called Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS), by the Council decision act in 2001. The EU has point out its own transformation in the security field. The EUMS is a council secretariat development,²⁵ responsible to supervise the operation on the realm of CSDP,²⁶ it is under the military authority of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC). EUMS has many roles, encompassed to implements the decisions and guidance of the EUMC and supports it in situation assessment and military aspects of strategic planning. This concerns the full range of Petersberg tasks²⁷ including the European security strategy and all EU-led operations.²⁸

This paper will explore security issue, begin from the international system as level of analysis,²⁹ to encompass the interactions which take place between EU and NATO, focusing on the system, to see the patterns of interaction which reveals, and to generalize the phenomena that occurs, the foreign policy and its responsiveness to examine the strategic partnership of the two institutions as a whole in a partial level.³⁰ Focus on the European Union concerning security, comparative of mutual clause between European Union and NATO, EU security development, and the Establishment of NATO-EU strategic partnership, entailed with CFSP, and particularly the mission that has been carried out by the joint forces.

²⁵ Europa: CFSP and ESDP, Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS) http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r00006_en.htm, accessed on April 12, 2011.

²⁶ European Union Military Staff <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-military-staff?lang=en>, accessed on April 12, 2011.

²⁷ The Petersberg tasks were first formulated by the Western European Union in 1992, are a list of military and security priorities incorporated within the European Security and Defence Policy, now called the CSDP as of the Treaty of Lisbon, of the European Union. The tasks are: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, task of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.

²⁸ Europa: CFSP and ESDP, Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS) http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r00006_en.htm, accessed on April 12, 2011.

²⁹ J. David Singer, *The level of Analysis Problem in International Relations*, in *Approach to International Relations, Volume II* (Oliver Yard, London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2009), pp. 5-7.

³⁰ *Ibid*

B. Literature Review

The subject about European Union and NATO already becomes an interest of many international relations scholars. In the cold war period, NATO were known as a collective defence organization, to protect its allies from the eastern Warsaw pact, while, the European Union was still in the process of its integration, then gradually increases its member states by several treaty to manage its relation. But the Cold war has end, and both has transform greatly from their origin institution.

There are numerous books that explain about the EU or NATO, that explain about their transformation in the post cold war, but mostly explain about institutional development of each institution. Therefore, in this thesis the author intend to explore the relation of EU and NATO in the post cold war era, of the structural realism perspectives as a main theoretical approach. There is also an extensive use of books to generate the comprehensiveness of the thesis, those books mostly written in English, and some are in Indonesian language, consider the author native language.

- English Books

To explain the background of the cooperation between European Union and NATO, the author tries to finds the chronological event that lead to the partnership of the two institution, in order so, the author makes use of several books that explain about the European Union itself, such as, the book of Adam Bronstone “European Security into the Twenty First Century”, the works of Helen Wallace “Policy-Making in the European Union”, Heinz Gartner “Europe’s New Security Challenges”, Jean-Claude Piris “A Lisbon Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis”. These books supported the author to explain thoughtfully the background of European Union development particularly in the security issue, reminisced the cold war era system to the post cold war era transformation.

For the cooperation progress and the eventual dilemma of the cooperation between EU and NATO, the author makes an extensive use of

several works of books that explain literally about NATO transformation and the correlation with the European Union. Those works are from several writers as, Thomas Risse “The Crisis of the Transatlantic Security Community”, the works of Stanley R. Sloan “NATO, The European Union, and The Atlantic Community”, Frank Schimmelfennig, “Transatlantic Relations, multilateralism and the transformation of NATO”. These works of several authors mention above, has explain through the process from the establishment, development, and transformation of NATO, shows that from the beginning of its creation, NATO existence was already part of the European countries. Thus, it has a special closeness and circumstances in the area of cooperation.

As to take analysis, and perspectives in this thesis, the author utilize the neorealism approach, mostly from the work of neorealist as well as realist, as Kenneth Waltz in his book “Realism and International Politics”, also Hans J. Morgenthau book “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”. Morgenthau analysis about “balance of power” greatly inspired the author to write a research in the related topic of NATO and EU, yet the world system has turned from bipolar to multipolar, thus, the author employ the neorealism perspectives, where cooperation is made possible option for realist in the multipolar system. These two works has supported the author to explain the theoretical framework and employ those perspectives in the thesis as a motive and goal of the cooperation between EU and NATO.

- Indonesian Books

In this thesis, the use of Indonesian books is mostly for the research methodology sections, to employ the approach of qualitative research. The works of Robert Bogdan and Taylor Lexy in “Metodology Penelitian Kualitatif”, Sutrisna Hadi “Metodologi Research”, and Moh. Nasir “Metode Penelitian”, has define the qualitative research and the use of the research type on the process of the writing of this thesis.

To finish the thesis, the author also makes use of other literatures to support the completeness of the thesis. Relevant books and articles are drawn to show the data and link to each chapter and explain it gradually through the end of the chapter.

C. Main Issues

As the EU enlarged and enhanced, through its political and economic progress, by then also slightly enhancing its policy in security, to create a more secure Europe with the policy that concerns security such as CFSP and CSDP. And also the cooperation especially with NATO made an impression of the great EU is strongly backed with a powerful organization, with NATO then has the mutual defence clause, but on the other side it also points out the EU's need of a vigilant army, as EU itself does not establish its own EU armies.

This Thesis tries to explain epistemologically, the EU's concept of security and its relations with NATO to maintain its security. By then the research starts with the following questions:

1. Why EU and NATO establish a partnership?
2. How this Strategic Partnership can be implemented?
3. What is NATO's Role in EU Security?

Each of these questions will be analyzed and explored, by the explanation in each chapter in the thesis, using the International Relations Theory approach, concerns about European Union Security, Geopolitical aspects, and Foreign Policy.

This research will explain the question from the above aspects of European Union and NATO, through its treaty and implementation which related, whereas the economic, sociology, religions, or environmental aspects are not considered.

D. Purpose

The purposes of writing this Thesis are:

- a. For the researchers of international relations, the results of this study is expected to help to analyze the foreign policy of a European Union that is affected by various factors such as domestic political conditions.
- b. Based on considerations of European Union position in the world order, enlargement, and Foreign Policy.
- c. To know the strategies and policies which issued by EU in dealing with its Security.
- d. To analyze the relations of EU and NATO in the security cooperation.

E. Theoretical Frameworks

To analyze and explain the issue above, and elaborate it in the next chapter, the author takes theory and several concepts to assist all chapters in this paper, as giving the framework which the author consider the best to describe this issue. The theory is a set of assumptions, concepts, and definitions to explain international phenomena in a systematic way to formulated then merged among the concepts. While the concept is a word which is could build into the idea.

International Relations theory entails the development of conceptual frameworks and theories to facilitate the understanding and explanation of events and phenomena in world politics, as well as the analysis and informing of associated policies and practices.³¹ In this thesis, the author use Neo-Realism theory, and the concept of Foreign Policy to support the approach.

- a. Neo-Realism

³¹ International Relations Theory, see <http://www.irtheory.com/>, accessed on March 29, 2011.

Neo-Realism or Structural Realism sets out of the Realism perspectives, the very perspectives of power politics, uphold the national security, interest and its survival. Yet, it describe a more variable domain as it liberate the realism of essentials and universal assumption of human nature and provide a deductive science of world politics on the basis of assumptions about the international system, so the means and ends are viewed differently of the realism thought.

Neo-realism sees power as a possible useful means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it. Whereas, excessive weakness may invite an attack that greater strength would have dissuaded an adversary from launching, while excessive strength may prompt other states to increase their arms and pool their efforts against the dominant state. Because power is a possibly useful means, any sensible statesmen would have an appropriate amount of it. In crucial situations however, the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security.³² It presents a systematic portrait of international politics depicting component units according to the manner of their arrangement. For the purpose of developing a theory, states are cast as unitary actors wanting at least to survive, and are taken to be the system's constituent unit.³³

Kenneth Waltz as a contemporary Neorealist thinker, takes out some elements of classical and neoclassical realism as a starting point, but he departs from that tradition by ignoring its normative concerns and by trying to provide a scientific IR theory. He gives no account of human nature and he ignore the ethics of statecraft, yet he seeks to provide a scientific explanation of the international political system. Unlike the realist approach that focus on the states as the main actor, neorealist focuses centrally on the structure of the system, on its interacting units, and on the continuities and changes of the system.³⁴

The new realism begins by proposing a solution to the problem of distinguishing factors internal to international political systems from those that are

³² Kenneth Waltz, *The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory in Realism and International Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 56-57.

³³ Waltz, *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

³⁴ Robert Jackson, Georg Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations Theories and approaches* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 84-85.

external, isolates one realm from others in order to deal with it intellectually. By depicting an international political system as a whole, with structural and unit levels at once distinct and connected, neorealism establishes the autonomy of international politics and thus makes a theory about it possible.³⁵ The Idea that international politics can be thought of a system with a precisely defined structure is neorealism's fundamental departure from traditional realism.

Transportation, communication, and war fighting, strongly affects how states and other agents interact. For example, historically, the introduction of nuclear weaponry was the greatest of such changes. Yet, in the nuclear era, international politics remains a self-help arena. Nuclear weapon decisively change how some states provide their own and possibly for other's security; but nuclear weapons have not altered the anarchic structure of the international political system. There are distinctions of changes in the structure of the system from changes at the unit level. Thus, changes in polarity also affect how states provide for their security. Significant changes take place when the number of great power reduces to two or one. With more than two, states relies their security both on their own internal efforts and on alliances they may make with others. Because in multipolar systems, the competition is much more complex than in the bipolar ones, uncertainties about the comparative capabilities of states multiply as number grow, and because estimates of the cohesiveness and strength of coalitions are hard to make.

The post cold war era has brings the trends of democracy and peace, with the thoughts that "never once has the democracy fought another democracy". However, the democratic countries coexist with undemocratic ones, although democracies seldom fight democracies, but they do fight at least their share of wars again others. Citizens of democratic countries believe that they are good countries, aside of what they do, simply because they are democratic. Then, they also tend to think that undemocratic states are bad, aside from what they do, simply because they are undemocratic. Democratic promotes war because they at

³⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Loc. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

times decide that the way to preserve peace is to defeat nondemocratic states and make them democratic.³⁶

If the world is now safe for democracy, one has to wonder whether democracy is safe for the world. Peace is maintained by a delicate balance of internal and external restraints. States having a surplus of power are tempted to use it, and weaker states fear their doing so. Discern the circle of democratic state, peace depends on a precarious balance of forces. The cause of war lie not simply in states or in the state system, but they are found in both.³⁷

b. Concept of Foreign Policy

Issuance of policy by governments is a common practice. Policies issued with the aim to make something better than before. Nanang T. Basuki defines, policy are written rules that may be the new things that were previously unregulated, as the implementation of higher laws, complementing the previous policy, a change from existing policy, or substitute or revoke the existing policy.³⁸

In security policy-making, problem ownership strategy stems from the idea that national policy objective is to make the country safe. The choice is between taking action to reduce vulnerabilities and work to eliminate or reduce the threat by addressing the causes of the source. Barry Buzan calls the first choice as a national security strategy and the second choice as an international security strategy. If the international security strategy adopted by the security policy its will focus on efforts to reduce vulnerability.³⁹ Foreign policy is all forms of decisions, programs and actions of a country in relation to other countries that aims to meet domestic needs and goals of that State.⁴⁰ Foreign policy was also interpreted as decisions and behaviors that are adopted by countries in their

³⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *Op. cit.*, pp. 198-201.

³⁷ Kenneth Waltz, *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

³⁸ Nanang T Basuki, *Penyusunan Naskah Kebijakan*, (Jakarta: Buletin Varia Statistik, 2003), p. 16.

³⁹ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear, 2nd edition: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (New York: Havester Wheatsheat, 1991), p. 331.

⁴⁰ R. Soeprapto, *Hubungan Internasional: Sistem, Interaksi, dan Perilaku*, (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, 1997), p. 42.

interactions with other countries or in international organizations.⁴¹ It can be concluded that foreign policy is an act or behavior of nations in its efforts to interact with the outside in order to meet the objectives or particular needs of the country.

F. Research Methodology

The methodology is not merely a collection of methods or techniques of research, but a whole foundation of values, assumptions, ethics and norms that become the rules that are used to interpret and conclude the research data. According to Hadi Sutrisno, research is the effort to analyze, develop, and test the truth of knowledge; the effort was done by using scientific methods.⁴²

The method is a set of steps that are systematically arranged. In writing this thesis is use qualitative research approach which using descriptive method. According to Bogdan and Taylor, qualitative methodology is the research procedures that produce descriptive data. Descriptive data is only present and explain the data obtained, and then analyze it based on the concepts or theories, so it would be a scientific writing.⁴³

In addition, descriptive data is also provides a picture or definition about something in words, in order to get an idea about it. Hadari Nawawi argued that qualitative research uses the data in question is a verbal that focused on words. Data as evidence in a hypothesis to test the truth or un-truth, not processed through mathematical calculations with a variety of statistical formulas. However, the data processing carried out in a rational way to use certain thinking patterns according to the laws of logic.⁴⁴

This Thesis is a descriptive analysis which tries to describe Strategic Partnership between European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization in

⁴¹ Paul R. Viotti dan Mark V. Kauppy, *International Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, 3rd edition, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), p. 478.

⁴² Sutrisna Hadi, *Metodologi Research*, (Yogyakarta: Fak Psikologi UGM, 1980), p. 63.

⁴³ Bogdan dan Taylor dalam Lexy J. Moleong, *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif*, (Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosdakarya, 1993), p. 3.

⁴⁴ Hadari Nawawi, *Metode Penelitian Bidang Sosial*, (Yogyakarta: UGM Press, 1990), p. 209.

maintaining European Union Security. Based on dimension of time, this research is also attempt to dissect their policies on security before and after the Treaty of Lisbon, based on research benefits, this study is pure because in academic orientation and science which expected to contribute to the security studies in international relations partcularly in “European Union” and its expected as a base for further research.

1. Research Type

Data data collected in this study only in the form of qualitative data. The qualitative data in the form of official documents the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, concerning general information related to European Union defence, foreign policy, and security.

2. Data techniques collection

Conducted in the form of literature, this type of data collected are as follows:

- a. Secondary data are from the official websites; European Union http://europa.eu/index_en.htm, North Atlantic Treaty Organization <http://www.nato.int/> then the official website of United Nation <http://www.un.org/en>. Writing this thesis is also supported by other websites which are related to academic approach and content of this thesis.
- b. In addition, secondary data was obtained from the books, newspapers, journals, and documents which are related to the European Union policy, related to its treaty. Its data, Author got from 南華大學圖書館, National University, University of Indonesia, 中正大學圖書館, Centre Studies of International Strategy (CSIS) Indonesia, and Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI).

3. Nature of Research

Nature of this thesis is used descriptive, this technique used to describe, illustrate and explore the phenomena existing at the present time with accurate data based on fact then connected to the phenomena investigated.⁴⁵

G. Writing Systematics

Writing Systematics in this paper is divided into five chapters for ease of description and analysis of cases overall..

Chapter I. Contains an introduction that gives the general picture of the overall research. This part are: Introduction, Literature Review, Main Issues, Purpose, Theoretical Framework, Research Methodology, Writing Systematic, and Research Limitations.

Chapter II. Will describe an overview of European Union Enlargement, Decision Making Process, and Defence.

This chapter is divided into nine sub-chapters.

Sub Chapter A: The Civilian Power Concept

Sub Chapter B: European Union's Security

Sub Chapter C: From European Political Cooperation to Common Foreign and Security Policy

Sub Chapter D: EU Military Structure

Sub Chapter E: The 9/11 Tragedy aftermath

Chapter III. Will explain The NATO overview, and Contemporary Issue.

This chapter is divided into six sub-chapters.

Sub Chapter A: The Power of North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Sub Chapter B: The Alliance Enlargement for a Secure Europe

Sub Chapter C: Institutional Overlap

Sub Chapter D: Multilateralism Challenge

Sub Chapter F: The United States Supremacy

⁴⁵ Moh. Nasir, *Metode Penelitian*, (Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia, 1998), p. 63.

Chapter IV. This Chapter explain The Analysis on European Union and NATO Relations on EU Security.

In this chapter is divided into five sub-chapters;

Sub Chapter A: The Post Cold War NATO

Sub Chapter B: The EU-NATO Strategic Partnership.

Sub Chapter C: The Berlin Plus Agreement and CSDP Implementation

Sub Chapter D: The Further Commitment: United States, NATO, and European Union.

Chapter V. Is the essence that explains the previous chapters as well as cover the preparation of the Thesis. Is a conclusion and reaffirmation of the whole answer of the Thesis.

H. Research Limitations

Limitation of writing in a study is needed. This is to avoid any deviations discussion and principal issues that have been proposed. These limits are intended for research object becomes clear and specific. Therefore, in reviewing the cases in this thesis, the authors have limitation on discussion which is not out from the path that has been listed on the title of this Thesis and it has already mentioned on Main Issue.

Even though, EU and NATO relation is far being compared as an institution. On one side, the European Union established a unique organization whereby its member states having created common institutions to which they delegate parts of their sovereignty, particularly in the economic, financial, environmental and even legal sphere. On the other side, NATO is political-military Atlantic alliance which has been in existence for 62 years, which adapting its structure for the new challenge of the century.⁴⁶ Therefore, this paper

⁴⁶ Jean-Francois Morel, *EU-NATO Relations: A European Vision* (Baltic Defence Review No.11 Volume 1/2004), p. 84.

thoughtfully determined the role of the two institutions solely related to the security area.

CHAPTER II

EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

A. The Civilian Power Concept

For the European Union, the term security has a more complicated background. As Juliet Lodge mentions in 1990 Paris Charter of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an effort was-made to give ‘a human face to security’, that is, to move towards ‘a civilianization of security’. The terms security is expanding to include human rights and other elements of international relations, means that security covers more than just military aspects.⁴⁷

Yet, since its creation, the EU is strongly an economic union to be reckoned with, which later began to adopt political instrument into the Union. Historically, many of the development of the EU counted as successful, specifically in the economic area. Thus, the EU is branded as an institution that adopt the so called ‘civilian power’ concept, underlined the economic and political power to promote world cooperation.

Duchene interpretation of civilian power was focused mainly in the future design of the European Economic Community (EEC). He argued that EEC could not, and would not develop into a full federal state with a common army and a common government, or an unarmed (or armed) neutral power. While, he consider the better option would be to promote world cooperation, based on trade and economics-in other word, EEC as civilian power.

According to Duchene, the civilian power has two main characteristic:

- "a civilian group long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces”;

⁴⁷ Stelios Stavridis, *“Militarising” the EU: The concept of civilian power Europe revisited in The International Spectator* (London: Routledge, 2001), p.44.

- “a force for the international diffusion of civilian and democratic standards”.⁴⁸

The first characteristic mentioned above, stated that the armed forces are relatively short but does not mean to eliminate it entirely. The fact that Europe has militarizing the EU in the late 1990 by *de facto*, the subject of the civilian power as long told, might be needed to be supported by the military means. Therefore, the incompatibility of civilian power and military means of Europe should be clarified in the new century, as it was already reiterated constantly in the past with many arguments. Here I quote two views between, Zielonka/Whitman approach of 1998, arguing that the whole concept of a civilian power is regrettably superseded now that military means are being added to the integration process, and the other view, represented by Hans Maull, which argues, based on the case of Germany particularly in the event of Gulf War, and the War of Kosovo, that even with the use of force, it is still possible to use the phrase "civilian power".⁴⁹

Both arguments hold an interesting perspectives yet opposing to each other, Whitman argue that the principal of civilian power might obsolete for the EU, while maull on the other side, thought that it is possible for the EU to as a civilian power institution adapted to international environment yet, use the military force in the foreseeable future.

The main point to be taken into note is, whether the two arguments of Whitman or Maull will emerge in the near future, the civilian power concept of the European Union is not merely an old perspective as in the cold war era, the EU has transform its institution, not only as an economic and political one but also start to establish its military structure. It has developed beyond a passive organization but also an active one. Participates and even play a major role, by implementing missions outside of the border of Europe.

⁴⁸ Francois Duchene, *The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence* in M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community* (London: Macmilan, 1973), pp.19-20.

⁴⁹ Stelios Stavridis, *Op. cit.*, pp. 45-47.

B. European Union's Security

The word "security" means the protection of a person, property, institution, or nation, against threat, danger, natural disaster or human made attack, also it might refers to a more broad construe forms, to means the defence against all forms of insecurity, such as economic security, and environmental security.⁵⁰ Then if we look farther, traditionally, the concept of security in international relations has generally been addressed in the context of national security. During the Cold War era, people followed the decisions of the elite. In the post-Cold War era, however, the character of conflicts has changed and the people have become the determinants.⁵¹

It has become increasingly clear that the successful attainment of national security, or the conclusion of peace pacts, does not necessarily bring security to people, and that people continue to suffer and die from insecurity resulting from war-related effects long after the war itself has come to an end, or national security is seemingly restored. Although the likelihood of large-scale international armed conflicts seems to be receding, another problem of the security might arise.

Indeed the issues of national security were of course fundamental to the developments of the west European integration back then. Europe has feared of insecurity caused by war and the chance it might happens again. By then, since the 1950's, European countries has undergone tremendous changes, from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by conciliate the two big countries that posses a great power, France and West German, then the cooperation developed to the materialization of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in

⁵⁰ Michael Nicholson, *International Relations: A Concise Introduction*, (Houndmills: MACMILLAN PRESS LTD, 1998), p. 137.

⁵¹ H.E.Dr. Kuniko INOBUCHI, Conference on the Implementation, by the Arab States, of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, see, <http://www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/Statement/031218DRR.htm>, accessed on April 10, 2011.

1970,⁵² then Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993, as EU's foreign policy for mainly security and defence, diplomacy and actions.⁵³

The post Cold War era, has conveyed the EU into different perspectives of threat. The terrorism, proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflict, state failure, and even organized crime, is the challenge for EU to play a part as an international actor, as well as to bring security not only on the periphery of Europe, but those outside the continent.⁵⁴

1. The Policy Making in European Union

Since the establishment of European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Ernst Haas already posited a process of functional spill-over, in which the initial decision by governments to place a certain sector, such as coal and steel, under the authority of central institutions creates pressures to extend the authority of the institutions into the neighbouring areas of policy, such as currency exchange rates, taxation, and wages. Which neo-functionalists predicted, sectoral integration would produce the unintended and unforeseen consequence of promoting further integration in additional areas.⁵⁵

The neo-functionalists also identified a second strand of the spill over process, which is the 'political' spill over, whereby both supranational actors and sub-national actors create additional pressures for further integration. Haas also suggested, at the sub-national level, interest groups operating in an integrated sector would have to interact with the international organization charged with the management of their sector, and over time, these groups would come to regard the benefits from their loyalties from national governments to a new centre, those

⁵² William Wallace, et al., *Foreign and Security Policy: civilian Power Europe and American Leadership*, in Helen Wallace, et al., *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 6th Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press 2010), pp. 431-4.

⁵³ Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) http://www.eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/index_en.htm, accessed on April 10, 2011.

⁵⁴ A Secure Europe in A Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.

⁵⁵ Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack, and Alasdair R. Young, *Policy-Making in the European Union: Sixth Edition*, (New York: Oxford University Press 2010), pp. 17-18.

becoming an important element for further integration. While at the supranational level, bodies such as the Commission would encourage such a transfer of loyalties, promoting European policies and brokering bargains among the member states in order to upgrade the common interest. As a result of these sectoral and political spill over, neo-functionalists predicted, sectoral integration would become self-sustaining leading to the creation of a new political entity with its centre in Brussels.⁵⁶

This section will describe the contribution of the neo-functionalists to the study of EU policy-making, and its conceptualization of the community method then later to the challenge of security issue.

The ideal type of Community method was based largely on the observation of a view specific sectors such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the Customs Union during the formative years of the community and presented a distinct picture of EU policy making as a process driven by an entrepreneurial Commission and featuring supranational deliberation among member states representatives in the Council. The Community method then was not just a legal set of policy making institutions but a procedural code conditioning the expectations and behavior of the Commission and the member governments as participants in the process.⁵⁷ These community method characterized EEC decision-making during those period of 1958 to 1963, the example is as the six founding member states met along the Commission to set up the essential elements of the EEC customs union and the CAP. The EEC, which had been scheduled to move to extensive qualified majority voting (1966) in 1966, continued to take most decisions *de facto* by unanimity, the Commission emerged weakened from its confrontation with de Gaulle, and the nation-state appeared to have reasserted itself. Moreover, by the 1970's developments, when economic recession were led to the rise of new non-tariff barriers to trade among the EC member states and when the intergovernmental aspects of the Community were

⁵⁶ William Wallace, et al., *Foreign and Security Policy: civilian Power Europe and American Leadership*, in Helen Wallace, et al., *Policy- Making in the European Union*, 6th Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press 2010), pp. 17-18.

⁵⁷ Wallace, *Op. cit.*, pp 18-9.

strengthened by the creation in 1974 of the European Council, a regular summit meeting of EU heads of state and government. In addition, the committee of permanent Representatives (Coreper), an intergovernmental body of member-state representatives, emerged as a crucial decision making body preparing legislation for adopting by the Council of Ministers. Even some of the Major advances of this period, such as the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1978 were taken outside the structure of the EEC Treaty, and with no formal role for the Commission or other supranational EC institutions.⁵⁸

Akin to the United States, the EU has a horizontal separation of powers in which three distinct branches of government take the leading role in the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government, respectively. None of these institutions has sole control of any of these three functions. To linked with the James Madison conception of the separation of powers ‘requires to a certain a co-mingling of powers in all three areas’. In the case of the EU, for example, the legislative function is shared by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, with an agenda-setting role for the Commission; the executive function is shared by the Commission, the member states, and independent regulatory agencies; and the judicial function is shared by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Court of First Instance, and the wide array of national courts bound directly to the ECJ through the preliminary procedure.⁵⁹

The standard EU’s decision making procedure is known as the ‘codecision’, where the directly elected European Parliament has to approve EU legislation together with the Council (27 EU countries).⁶⁰ The legislature of the European Union is composed of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. Competencies in inquiry and amending legislation are usually divided equally between the two, while the power to initiate laws is held by the

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Wallace, *Op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁶⁰ Europa: Gateway to the European Union, http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-making/procedures/index_en.htm, accessed on August 19, 2011.

European Commission.⁶¹ Legislative proposals need to be approved by the Parliament and the Council.⁶²

Generally, there are two ways of compromising the decision in European Union, the first is the ‘Unanimity’, and the second one is the ‘Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)’. On most issues, the EU takes its decision by QMV, based on the principle of the double majority, Decisions in the Council of Ministers will need the support of 55% of Member States (currently 15 out of 27 EU countries) representing a minimum of 65% of the EU's population. Meanwhile, on taking some sensitive area issues, the EU will apply the unanimity, the Council of the European Union has to be in unanimous agreement, and all countries have to agree. Any disagreement, even by one single country, will block the decision. The unanimity rule now applies only in particularly sensitive areas such as asylum, taxation and the common foreign and security policy.⁶³

2. European Union’s Transform Security Institutions

During the Cold war Era, EU states are still founded on the standing armies that were needed for territorial defense. However, this legacy is unsuited to the operation that may be required under the Common Security and Defence Policy, or even within the Combined Joint Task Force concept of the NATO.⁶⁴ Moreover, the principal role of the armed forces of almost all the EU states was to contribute, through NATO, to the protection of Western European Union from a Soviet Union invasion from the east.⁶⁵

⁶¹ EU Institutions, http://eu.mvr.bg/en/EU_institution/institution.htm, accessed on August 19, 2011.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ Europa: Eurojargon, http://europa.eu/abc/eurojargon/index_en.htm, accessed on August 19, 2011.

⁶⁴ Trevor C. Salmon & Alistair J. K. Shepherd, *Toward A European Army: A Military Power In the Making* (London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), p. 113.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

Nonetheless, the situation has changed. Even more, since the tragic events of 9/11,⁶⁶ the EU states cannot rule out the possibilities of a large-scale terrorist attack on one of its cities, militaries, or a critical part of its infrastructure.⁶⁷ The other security concerns are the area of instability, conflict, and failed states that occupy the region surrounding the EU.⁶⁸

The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was an entirely intergovernmental process, outside the treaties, steered by foreign ministers and managed by the diplomats, functioned as foreign policy coordination, yet excluded the Commission. EPC was managed confidentially, reporting to the national parliaments and little coverage in the press. Henceforth the evolution in the foreign policy since then has moved in cycles, begin with the hesitant steps to strengthen framework, followed by periods of increasing frustration at the extent results achieved, culminating in further reluctant reinforcement of the rules and procedures in the face of external events.⁶⁹

At that time, the foreign policy already, discussing about the Middle East as the most frequent and difficult focus for transatlantic dispute, those the US have been the most important factor here and there, including the evolution process of the Union. However, the France government that can be said as the most strategic actor in promoting a more autonomous European foreign policy, frequently up against American opposition. The concrete example was the war between the Arab and Israeli in 1973, escalated into a bitter Franco-US confrontation, with other west European countries caught in between.⁷⁰ European hoe was drifting of US policy in 1979-1981, over the coup in Poland and the revolution in Iran, as well as at their own failure to concert their response to Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, led to renewed efforts to promote cooperation, left led to the British. By then Western Europe's self image as a 'civilian power' in

⁶⁶ The 9/11 events were a series of suicide coordinated attack upon the United States on September 11, 2001. The terrorist (assumed as Al-Qaeda) hijacked commercial jet airlines, and crashed it to the twin towers of the World Trade in New York.

⁶⁷ Trevor C. Salmon, *Op Cit*, pp. 113-4.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Wallace, *Op. cit.*, pp. 433-4.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

the 1970s and 1980s partly reflected the exclusion of security and defence issues,⁷¹ reinforced by the unresolved Gaullist challenge to US security leadership, as their withdrawal from NATO.⁷²

By then implied the concept as a claim of normative authority, describing Western Europe as a model of peaceful diplomacy, operating through economic instruments. And it appealed to the Commission, which had international capacities in the civilian dimensions of trade and development but was excluded from the harder instruments of foreign policy.

The German unification and rapid revolution in the Central and Eastern Europe, nevertheless, forced foreign and security policy up the EU's agenda. The end of the Cold War brought Germany back to the centre of a potentially reunited continent, and reopen underlying questions about the delicate balance between France and Germany, and about the position of American security as a leader through NATO.⁷³

C. From European Political Cooperation to Common Foreign and Security Policy

In April 1990, German and France jointly proposed that the planned Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)⁷⁴ should formulate a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as a central feature of the EU, alongside the economic and monetary union (EMU). The two countries however, have different perspectives and concepts for CFSP, the France government focused on capabilities, while the German on institution-building. and followed by a distinct dividing lines between defenders of American leadership through NATO, supported by the British, the Dutch, Portuguese, and to some extent the Germans, on the other hand supporters of the greater European autonomy, Belgium, France, Italy, and to some extent

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Geir Lundestad, *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997*, <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=5009>, accessed on August 2, 2011.

⁷³ Wallace, *Op. cit.*, p. 434.

⁷⁴ Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is the formal procedure for negotiating amendments to the founding treaties of the European Union.

Spain; between the defenders of national sovereignty (Britain, Denmark, and France) and proponents of transfer of foreign policy into the Community framework (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg); and between states with the capacity and domestic support for active foreign and defence policies such as Britain and France, and those for which international strategy, above all military deployment beyond national borders such as Germany, was surrounded by political inhibitions.⁷⁵

The treaty on European Union 1992, led the EPC into the second pillar of the European Union structure, the Justice and Home Affairs as the third, and led by the Commission as the first pillar. The CFSP (by the Maastricht Treaty 1992) indeed, are particularly significant in the EU evolution.⁷⁶ The CFSP “shall include all questions related to the security of the European Union, including the eventual framing of a common security policy, which might lead in time to a common defence”.⁷⁷

Which contains the policy includes; safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the union, preserving peace and strengthening international security, and to develop and consolidate the democracy and rule of law, also respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁷⁸ Thoughtfully these objectives are wide ranging and ambiguous, yet in the other hand it also illustrates some of the interest and core values that the CFSP aim to protect and promote.⁷⁹

Policy initiative, representation, and implementation were explicitly reserved to the Council presidency, and assisted if need by the previous and next member states to hold presidency, in what become known as ‘troika’. The Commission was to be ‘fully associated in discussions within the

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Mario Telo, *European Union, Regionalism, New Multilateralism: Three Scenarios*, in *European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era* (England: ASHGATE, 2007), p.299.

⁷⁷ Adam Bronstone, *European Security into the Twenty First Century: Beyond Traditional Theories of International Relations* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2000), p. 162.

⁷⁸ The Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002M/pdf/12002M_EN.pdf, accessed on April 21, 2011.

⁷⁹ Trevor C. Salmon, *Op. cit.* p. 113.

intergovernmental pillar, and the view of the European Parliament duly taken into consideration'.⁸⁰

During that time, there were only few discussions of the strategic implications of the transformation of European order, or of the balance between the civilian and military instruments required for an effective common policy. Henceforth, after the IGC was concluded to the Western European Union (WEU) secretariat, after negotiations with NATO, persuaded the European governments to agree, in the 'Petersburg declaration', which is to define a range of shared tasks in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.⁸¹

2.1. Box: The Petersberg tasks.⁸²

Petersberg Declaration, June 1992, Section II, On strengthening WEU's operational role:

'In accordance with the decision contained in the Declaration of the member states of WEU at Maastricht on 10th December 1991 to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, WEU member states have been examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means covering, in particular, a WEU planning cell and military units answerable to WEU, in order to strengthen WEU's operational role.'

'WEU member states declare that they are prepared to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the authority of WEU.'

'Decisions to use military units answerable to WEU will be taken by the WEU Council in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Participation in specific operations will remain a sovereign decision of member states in accordance with national constitutions.'

'Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peace-keeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.'

⁸⁰ Wallace, *Op. cit.*, p. 345.

⁸¹ Wallace, *Op. cit.*, p. 345

⁸² Documents: Petersberg Declaration – Bonn, 19th June 1992, http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/key/declaration_petersberg.php, accessed on August 9, 2011.

Nevertheless, the creation of CFSP was merely the beginning of a one successful transformation of the European Union, as at first most of the member states has a lot of reluctance to clarify the strategic objectives that CFSP shall serve. By then, the member states has to confront the external crises, the Kosovo crisis in 1997, a Serbian province with an Albanian majority, when in 1998 sent another surge of refugees through neighbouring countries into EU member states. The US administration led a bombing campaign against Serbia targets, while the British and French were willing in addition to deploy substantial ground forces.

Yet, the surprising occurrences, particularly for the British are the number of armies that was deployed by the European countries beyond their border. Big countries as Germany just deployed around 1.000 troops on the neighbouring former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and later participated in the peace keeping force.⁸³ As from this experience and to demonstrate the new government commitment to closer European cooperation, the British then moved from laggard to leader in promoting European defence integration. Henceforth, in the defence realm Britain and France stand apart from the other EU member states. In 2008, both were accounted for 45 percent of defence expenditure in the EU, and 60 percent of spending of defence equipment, Germany and Italy accounted for a further 15 percent and 13 percent of defence spending respectively, though their equipment budgets are much smaller.

In 1998, Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac issued the St. Malo Declaration. Robustly stating that the EU must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, with member governments operating within the institutional framework of the EU, including meetings of defence ministries, within the EU, the German and the Dutch were most closely drawn in.

The Franco-British partnership, with the support of the German council presidency, pushed through some significant innovations, with the strategy to focus on EU military capabilities more than institutional change. By then, they challenge their European partners to reshape their armed forces, in order to enable

⁸³ Documents: Petersberg Declaration – Bonn, 19th June 1992, http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/key/declaration_petersberg.php, accessed on August 9, 2011.

European states to manage peace keeping operations outside their region without depending on the US crucial equipment and reinforcement.

Their initiative was accounted successful as the adoption of the ‘Helsinki headline goal’.⁸⁴ A follow-up Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2000, identified the major shortcomings in weapons and transport systems, and drew up a list of pledges and priorities, intended to spread best practice from the most advance to the laggards, and to shame the most deficient governments into improving their performances. As so often before, the US was sponsoring a parallel process through NATO, the Defence Capabilities Initiative. Neither process, however, made much impact on most governments. Competing pressures on national budgets block any reversal in any reduction on defence spending. In south-eastern Europe, the succession of crises had left behind a much higher level of European political and military engagement. As the pentagon withdrew US troops from deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo, the number of contributing European countries rose.⁸⁵

Only the British and French governments were yet prepared to project military forces beyond Europe for more than UN peace keeping operations. A small British force re-established order in Sierra Leone in 2001, after a UN force of over 17.000 had failed to contain civil conflict. French forces intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. Nordic governments, the Irish and Austrians had long contributed to UN peace keeping in Africa and the Middle East. While EU member states have for decades contributed to UN peace keeping missions, the number of troops deployed rose significantly in the context of the Balkan crises. In 2010, EU member state governments sustain between 60.000 and 70.000 in troops on international crisis management operations. While deployments are conducted through many frameworks, including the UN, ESDP, and NATO remains dominant.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’ was a military capability target set for 2003 during the December 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting with the aim of developing a future European Rapid Reaction Force.

⁸⁵ Documents: Petersberg Declaration, *Op. cit*

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

Furthermore, the building of CFSP and CSDP led to the construction of the new institution within EU, which in turn affecting the policy debate within Europe. The new institutions as mentions are, the High Representatives, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), and European Defence Agency.⁸⁷

D. EU Military Structures

Through the Nice Treaty in 2000, European Union established several permanent political and military structures within CSDP, in order to enable UE fully to assume its responsibilities for crises management:

- The Political Security Committee (PSC)

PSC is based in Brussels consists of ambassadorial level representatives from the EU member states and usually meets twice per week. The functions are to monitor the international situation in the areas cover by the CFSP; to contribute and help to define the policies; and to monitor the implementation of the Council decisions.⁸⁸ The PSC plays a major role in enhancing consultations in particular with NATO and the third dtates involved.⁸⁹

- The European Union Military Committee (EUMC)

EUMC is the highest military body set up within the Council. It directs all EU military activities and provides the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with advice and recommendations on military matters.⁹⁰ The

⁸⁷ Frances G. Burwell et al., *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture* (Policy Paper, 2006), pp. 5-6.

⁸⁸ European Union: Political and Security Committee (PSC) http://www.deljpn.ec.europa.eu/union/showpage_en_union.external.security.psc.php, accessed on September 5, 2011.

⁸⁹ Official Journal of the European Communities: Council Decision of 22 January 2001, setting up the Political and Security Committee. (2001/78/CFSP)

⁹⁰ European union Military Committee [http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-military-committee-\(eumc\).aspx?lang=en](http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-military-committee-(eumc).aspx?lang=en), accessed on September 5, 2011.

EUMC is chaired by General Officer, such General or Admiral of four star-level appointed by the Council of the EU for a term of three years.⁹¹

- The European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

EUMS responsible for supervising operations within the role of CSDP, its main tasks is to perform “early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for Petersberg Tasks”, and to implement CSDP missions as directed by EUMC.”⁹²

- The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

CPCC is a permanent structure of CSDP operations, has a mandate to conduct civilian operation under the political control and strategic of PSC. To direct, coordinate, advice, support, supervise, and review the CSDP missions.⁹³

These four structures cover the whole agenda of CSDP, to remit the EU external actions particularly in security issue. Through the Nice treaty, the EU showed another enhancement of its institutions, to play as an international security actor.

The European Union military capability comprises of its 27 member states, which the capacity, expenditure, and type are variant from each others. Which can be rated as an asymmetric between each others, for example, among the 27 member states country within the EU, the country with the highest military expenditure is the Great Britain, with their military expenditure that almost reach US\$ 60 billion, on the other side, the military expenditure of Malta are just US\$ 57 million.

⁹¹ The Chairman of EUMC [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-military-committee-\(eumc\)/chairman-eumc.aspx?lang=en](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-military-committee-(eumc)/chairman-eumc.aspx?lang=en), accessed on September 5, 2011.

⁹² Europa EUR-Lex Access to European Union Law <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32005D0395:EN:NOT>, accessed on September 5, 2011.

⁹³ European Union External Action: The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) <http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/cpcc.aspx?lang=en>, accessed on September 6, 2011.

2.2. The European Union Military Expenditures table.⁹⁴

No.	Country	Defence Budget (\$)	% of GDP	Year
1	European Union	\$284,957,600,000	1.63%	2010
2	UK	\$59,598,000,000	2.32%	2010
3	France	\$59,322,000,000	2.32%	2010
4	Germany	\$45,152,000,000	1.27%	2010
5	Italy	\$36,972,000,000	1.44%	2010
6	Spain	\$15,359,000,000	1.16%	2010
7	Netherlands	\$11,207,000,000	1.43%	2010
8	Greece	\$9,354,000,000	3.30%	2010
9	Poland	\$8,902,000,000	1.66%	2010
10	Sweden	\$5,641,000,000	1.23%	2010
11	Belgium	\$5,244,000,000	1.24%	2010
12	Portugal	\$5,040,000,000	1.53%	2010
13	Denmark	\$4,472,000,000	1.41%	2010
14	Finland	\$3,588,000,000	1.32%	2010
15	Austria	\$3,343,000,000	0.94%	2010
16	Czech Republic	\$2,558,000,000	1.44%	2010
17	Romania	\$2,202,000,000	1.24%	2010
18	Hungary	\$1,350,000,000	1.22%	2010
19	Ireland	\$1,279,000,000	0.58%	2010
20	Slovakia	\$972,000,000	1.53%	2010
21	Slovenia	\$766,000,000	1.48%	2010
22	Bulgaria	\$681,000,000	2.34%	2010
23	Cyprus	\$497,000,000	1.78%	2010
24	Lithuania	\$412,000,000	1.12%	2010
25	Luxembourg	\$406,000,000	0.53%	2010
26	Estonia	\$330,000,000	1.85%	2010
27	Latvia	\$253,000,000	1.60%	2010
28	Malta	\$57,600,000	0.50%	2010

As a consideration, we look at the military expenditure of European Union, as estimated in 2010 was \$284 billion, meanwhile, the United States as a

⁹⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>, accessed on December 25, 2011.

dominant actor in NATO military expenditure was estimated \$698 billion.⁹⁵ It is not only EU arsenals are now on the verge of technological incompatibility with those EU's main NATO ally, the USA,⁹⁶ but also has a less military expenditure and lack of vigilant army, as in record the biggest EU operation was its peace-keeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2005, with the deployment of 7.000 soldiers.⁹⁷

E. The 9/11 Tragedy aftermath

During the Bush regime in 2001, a tragedy was taken place in the World Trade Centre (WTC), which the assumed particular terrorist force hijacking airplane and crash the building to the ground. Following the attack, the Bush administration delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan, demanding they hand over Osama bin Laden, or face an attack by the United States.⁹⁸ As the diplomatic way cannot solve the matters, Bush administration find it no other way than to attack.⁹⁹ As a result, invoking for the first time ever article 5 of NATO collective defence clause.

On the other side, in June 2003, Javier Solana's secretariat produced a draft of European Security Strategy (ESS), A secure Europe in a better world, partly as a response to the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy, but also a means of stimulating an EU wide debate. The British and French governments were pushing the ESDP agenda forward together, a month after the invasion of Iraq. Frustrated at the failure of other governments in the multilateral capabilities-pledging process to achieve the Helsinki goals, they declare in February 2004 that they would advance in defence through enhanced cooperation,

⁹⁵ Background Paper for SIPRI Military Expenditure Data 2010: Regional Trends <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010>, accessed on April 20, 2011.

⁹⁶ Renata Dwan and Zdzislaw Lachowski, *The Military and Security Dimension of European Union*, <http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2003/06>, accessed on April 20, 2011.

⁹⁷ Jean-Claude Piris, Op cit, p. 268.

⁹⁸ *The attack on Afghanistan*, <http://911research.wtc7.net/post911/attacks/afghanistan/index.html>, accessed on August 8, 2011.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

and they announced that they would provide ‘battle groups’ in response to international crises, and invited other members which could demonstrate a comparable capability to join them. Henceforth, the German government announced its commitment to join them the following day. The battle groups concept was adopted at EU level in May 2004 within the framework of the military headline Goal 2010.¹⁰⁰

This chapter explains about the security issues, agenda, as well as military capabilities of EU. Generally, the European Union agenda concerning security has transformed and developed as it had much more substance. In the same guideline also creates the EUMS and EUMC, marked that EU moving towards the development of European Army. CSDP not only to develop military capacity but also to further European integration, there may be even more pressure for progress with CSDP, especially if integration in other areas is blocked. Yet, the CFSP is an intergovernmental institution, agreements require unanimity and there is no mechanism to enforce member states even when agreement is reached,¹⁰¹ and within the EU’s member countries, by then, consists their own national interest, foreign policy priority, making it an inefficient decision-making system in CFSP.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Wallace, *Op. cit.*, pp. 445-6.

¹⁰¹ Neil Winn and Christopher Lord, *EU Foreign Policy beyond the Nation-State: Joint Actions and Institutional Analysis of the Common Foreign and Security Policy* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: PALGRAVE, 2001), p.48.

¹⁰² Gisela Muller-Brandeck-Bocquet, *The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of the European Union*, in Wyn Rees and Michael Smith, *International Relations of the European Union Volume III* (London, UK: SAGE, 2008), p. 267.

CHAPTER III
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION-
EUROPEAN UNION:
THE OLD PLEDGE AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

A. The Power of NATO

The end of the world war two had brought the Western Europe economically exhausted and military weak. Yet, newly powerful communist parties had arisen, particularly in France and Italy. Moreover the Soviet Union had emerged and gained control over the Central and Eastern Europe, and suppress all the non communist party activity. In 1948 the European Recovery Program or best known as Marshall Plan was launched by the US, greatly aid the economy in Western and South Europe planning to hasten their recovery. As for the military recovery, the Brussels Treaty has created a collective defence agreement, the so called Western Union Defence Organization.¹⁰³ Soon after however, it realized it need more adequate military power to counter the Soviet.¹⁰⁴

In the mean time, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada were engage an exploratory talks on security arrangements that would serve as an alternative to the United Nations. The discussion was eventually joined by the French, Norway, and 'low countries' in 1949, resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty, the Alliance remains open to accessions by other European states in a position to further its principles and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Hanns W. Maull, *The European Security Architecture: Conceptual Lessons for Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation*, in, *Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Competition Congruence and Transformation* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007), p. 261.

¹⁰⁴ NATO, <http://www.history.com/topics/north-atlantic-treaty-organization-nato>, accessed on August 1, 2011.

¹⁰⁵ NATO Handbook, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf>, accessed on August 1, 2011.

The alliance sustained to exist during the period of cold war, without any action of collective defence, until an attack to the World Trade Centre in 2001, by the presumed terrorist group, Taliban. Henceforth, invoked the article 5, resulting in an attack against Afghanistan, showing the capability of the Organization in a full military action.

1. Alliance from the Past

Perceived the great power of the Warsaw Pact, United States and 11 member countries¹⁰⁶ established the 1949 alliance, an Alliance for collective defence as defined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The Treaty is of indefinite duration. At that time, the sole purpose of the so called NATO is to act as a collective defence organization, to defend the member states from the vivid enemy, the Eastern Block.

First few years of its creation, the alliance was nothing more than a political association. A doubtful of strength in the relation between the Americans and Europeans, along with the credibility of the alliance defence against a prospective Soviet Union invasion, yet, the alliance doubt of the French independent nuclear deterrent, and their withdrawal from NATO military structure in 1966.¹⁰⁷

The North Atlantic Alliance was founded on the basis of a Treaty between member states entered into freely by each of them after public debate and due parliamentary process. The Treaty upholds their individual rights as well as their international obligations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. It commits each member country to sharing the risks and responsibilities as well as the benefits of collective security and requires of each of them the undertaking not to enter into any other international commitment which might conflict with the Treaty.

¹⁰⁶ Member states of NATO: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom.

¹⁰⁷ NATO, <http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/USAnato.htm>, accessed on August 1, 2011.

2. The Changing Role

As the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Collapsed in 1990, NATO lost its most important reason to exist, which is to counter the communist military threat, and to deter a possible attack on, Western Europe. The situations affect the alliance to redefine its relationship to the former enemy, to reappraise its security environment, and to review its organizational set-up, its force structure, and its security strategies and policies.¹⁰⁸

By then, the NATO transformation has two main dimensions. Externally, NATO introduced partnership organizations for cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and open the door for new members for this region. And internally, as also a respond to the disappearance of the common Soviet threat, and the rise of the new, more diverse and unpredictable risk and challenge to the security of its members by developing more flexible and diversified structures, such as the creation of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 1994 through the Brussels Summit, for easily deployable, multinational, multiservice military formations tailored to specific kinds of military tasks.¹⁰⁹ And the creation of European Security Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO in 1996, to permit and support autonomous military operations led by the EU. Also at the Washington summit of 1999, NATO launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative to equip its forces for new tasks of crisis management and intervention. Continue to the Prague summit in October 2002, which gave new impetus to the transformation of NATO. In June 2003, NATO defence Ministers agreed on a new and streamlined command structure with a single command (Allied Command Operations) with operational responsibility and another command (Allied Command Transformation) responsible for overseeing the transformation of NATO forces and capabilities. Then in 2003, NATO inaugurated a highly

¹⁰⁸ Frank Schimmelfennig, *Transatlantic Relations, multilateralism and the transformation of NATO*, in *Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 183.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

flexible, globally deployable and interoperable NATO response force based on a pool of troops and military Equipment.¹¹⁰

To be paradox, since the creation of NATO, most of the European countries already joined and become a part of it, hence back then NATO already play an important part in European continent, represent the broad transatlantic community of shared values and shared threat perception.¹¹¹ And it was only after the end of the Soviet threat, that NATO became involved in actual warfare, invoked the mutual assistance and consultation articles of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT),¹¹² and sent troops outside the North Atlantic region, for the first time in its history. In 1995 NATO used its airpower to intervene Bosnia and Herzegovina to undermine the military capability of the Army of the Republika Srpska, and in 1999 they launched a humanitarian war in Kosovo to put an end to ethnic violence in these parts of former Yugoslavia.

3. NATO Transformation

In 1990, NATO held its London summit, to build a structure of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of NATO's shared sense in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.¹¹³ The declaration underlined the significance of German Unification, as a great factor of stability in the heart of Europe. And it was being acknowledge by the alliance that the security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, by then it change the political dimension of the alliance also.¹¹⁴

The summit elaborates the NATO partnership with other region, as it recognized that the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbors. Hence, the NATO should become an institution to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. In a reflection of its changing

¹¹⁰ Schimmelfennig, *Op. cit.*, pp. 183-4.

¹¹¹ Maull, *Loc. Cit.*, p. 258.

¹¹² The North Atlantic Treaty is the treaty that brought NATO into existence, signed in Washington, D.C. on April 4, 1949.

¹¹³ London Declaration On A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm>, accessed on August 19, 2011.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

political role, the alliance invited the Soviet Union and all the East European countries to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with Brussels. Henceforth, declared its readiness to intensify military contacts with Moscow and other East European Capitals.¹¹⁵

As the Soviet forces had withdrawn, the alliance then reduce its nuclear weapon reliance, henceforth, the alliance will continue to fulfill an essential role in the overall strategy to preventing war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. Yet, in the transform Europe, they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.¹¹⁶ In the context for defence and arms control, NATO prepared a new allied military strategy, from “forward defence” towards a “flexible response” to reflect a reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.¹¹⁷

Another important element of the London declaration was the adoption of the Extended Hand Friendship Statement. To cooperate with former communist countries, hence the North Atlantic Cooperation and Security Initiative were established. It was later renamed as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), with a basic mandate to overcome adversarial relationships stemming from the cold war period. NACC laid the groundwork for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program which was launched in 1994, and by 1997 the NACC had played a significance role in overcoming the suspicion of Cold War and moved forward in establishing the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, with the objective to assure increased engagement by all the partners in this new framework.¹¹⁸

4. Strategic Context

The end of Cold War had brought Europe into a new direction of political as well as security challenge. Since the Soviet forces has left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and complete withdrawal from Poland and Germany in 1994, all

¹¹⁵ Assenova, *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹¹⁶ London Declaration On A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm>, accessed on August 19, 2011.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

the countries that were formerly adversaries of NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and discarded the old political hostility to the West. Henceforth, by varying degrees they embraced and adopted policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and market economy. The political division as the main cause of the military confrontation thus has been overcome.¹¹⁹

The Western Europe also showed significant changes. The unification of West and East Germany remains a full member of the alliance and the European institutions. At that time the European community working together towards a political union, and development in European security identity, which the Western European Union (WEU) role were being enhanced as an important factor for the European security. as “The strengthening of the security dimension in the process of European integration, and the enhancement of the role and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive and mutually reinforcing”, thus not only serve the interest of European states, but also in regards to the effectiveness of the alliance.¹²⁰

And for the defence strategy, the alliance adapt to the new world system, as there were no threat as in the Cold War period where the alliance has to anticipate the chance of full scale attack. The alliance’s strategy then change by nature, and in contrast the threat are multi faceted in nature and multi-directional which become harder to predict. Therefore, NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved.¹²¹ The alliance yet well aware, that the risk of security are likely to be resulted from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic

¹¹⁹ The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm>, accessed on August 3, 2011.

¹²⁰ The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm>, accessed on August 3, 2011.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. And for the relation in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East, the allies wish to maintain peaceful and non adversarial relations. However, it remains underlined that the stability and peace on the southern periphery of Europe are important to the security of the alliance. Thus, in the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the alliance declares a new strategic concept 'Comprehensive Approach', comprehend that military means are essential, yet not enough on their own to meet many complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security. Hence, the alliance improves several key areas of works, such as Planning and conduct of operation; lessons learned, training, education and exercises; enhancing cooperation with external actors; and public messaging. The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.¹²²

With this approach, the alliance could cooperate in a wider and thorough cooperation with its partner, especially EU. Hence, two points can be concluded from the strategic concept of the alliance in the post Cold War. The first is that the new environment of world order does not change the purpose neither the security functions of the alliance, yet enhance it. The second, the new concept from the alliance offers a new concept of security for a broader framework, with a broad approach.¹²³

5. The Funding Issue

As to consider, it drains military funding of its member states, exceptionally the United States, as the country with the biggest military expenditure in the alliance.

¹²² NATO: A "Comprehensive Approach" to crisis management
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm, accessed on September 30, 2011.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

The majority of NATO-related expenses incurred by member states arises from the deployment of their own armed forces.¹²⁴ However, there are certain types of expenses that cannot reasonably be allocated to particular member states, which are therefore shared as NATO common costs. These common costs divided into three main accounts:¹²⁵

- The Civil budget
- The military budget
- The NATO Security Investment Programm (NSIP)

The civil budget funded primarily from the appropriations of ministries of foreign affairs from member states, to support NATO Headquarters in Brussels, dealing with all the non-military aspects, associated with maintaining a large, multilateral political organization. The military budget is financed mainly by the defence ministries of member states, covers all expenses related to operating and maintaining NATO military headquarters around the globe. The NSIP is designed to improve the security infrastructure in NATO member states and to help fulfill NATO's strategic vision of broad military readiness.¹²⁶

In the beginning, the European security is assured through collective defense and the U.S. as nuclear Umbrella, with the expectation that the European states could progress its economic welfare. Rather than share collective defence equitably, member states attempted to shift security burdens subtly to other members. Therefore, the U.S as the superpower in the bipolar system accepted this behavior because the larger goal of peace in Europe remained intact.¹²⁷

As for the EU countries, according to articles 28 of the Treaty on European Union, military budget are finances by the member states outside the

¹²⁴ Carl W. Ek, *NATO Common Funds Burdensharing: Background and current issues*, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA486001>, accessed on September 19, 2011.

¹²⁵ Kees human, *NATO, Common Funding and Peace Support Operations: A Comparative Perspective*, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20061000_cscp_art_homan.pdf, accessed on September 19, 2011.

¹²⁶ Kees human, *NATO, Common Funding and Peace Support Operations: A Comparative Perspective*, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20061000_cscp_art_homan.pdf, accessed on September 19, 2011.

¹²⁷ Nanne Zwagerman, *NATO Burden Sharing*, <http://atlanticreview.org/archives/1074-NATO-Burden-Sharing.html>, accessed on September 20, 2011.

community budget.¹²⁸ Then, it explains that the costs incurred by EU for military operation are not funded through the regular EU budget. Instead, participating states agreed to undertake the mission, based on GNP, which dictates the percentages of the costs each is to contribute, those states that opting out of an operation, do not incur any of the cost.¹²⁹ In 2004, the EU has a permanent mechanism for managing the operational costs of military operations of any scale, complexity or urgency. It is the ‘Athena’ mechanism for handling the common costs of EU’s missions, the funding is depends on each member states, calculated by each GNP scale.

That is why, the funding disparities still persist until the post cold war era, and as I already mention in chapter two, the military expenditure and capability within the European states still consider as low of their GDP compare to the U.S.

B. The Alliance Enlargement for a Secure Europe

Since its Founding in 1949, NATO has added new members for six times. The twelve countries as a founding of NATO, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in the beginning, constitute this collective defence organization, standing up together in the Cold War era.

The first round of enlargement was in 1952, brought Turkey and Greece into the alliance. At that time, the strategic point for the alliance to expand to the South Eastern Europe with these two countries accessions are not only to restrain communist influence in Greece that just recovering from civil war, but also to relieve Turkey from Soviet pressure for access to key strategic maritime routes.¹³⁰

The second round of enlargement was by the accession of the West Germany in 1955. From the beginning of the cold war, ways of integrating

¹²⁸ Antonio Missiroli, *Euros for ESDP: Financing EU Operations*, Occasional papers no. 45, The European Institute for Security Studies, Paris, June 2003.

¹²⁹ Antonio Missiroli, *Euros for ESDP: Financing EU Operations*, Occasional papers no. 45, *Op. cit.*

¹³⁰ NATO: Member Countries, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm, accessed at August 3, 2011.

Germany into the West European Defence was priority. However, when the WED failed, Germany the joined the Western European Union, soon adhered to the organization, as a mark that it was no longer an occupied territory and a stepping stone to join NATO. And the reunification of Germany in 1990 completed the accession.¹³¹

The third round was the accession of Spain in 1982. It fully participate in every political instances inside the organization and later integrated into the military structure, Spain has significant geographical position, astride some of the world's major sea, air, and land communication routes, made it a valuable potential partner for the alliance.¹³²

The fourth round of enlargement consists of Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999, as the first enlargement in the post cold war period. After the reunification of Germany, many Central and Eastern European countries were eager to become a part of the Euro-Atlantic institution. In order to enhance security and stability for all, the alliance sustained the enlargement, by inviting these three countries in the accession talks in 1997, and as a result, two years later they were the first of the Warsaw Pact that joined the alliance.¹³³

The next round was the accession of seven countries in 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia and Slovenia, making this the largest wave of enlargement of NATO history. And the sixth round of enlargement was the accession of Albania and Croatia in 2009, making a total of 28 member countries until 2011.¹³⁴

There lies a debate of NATO enlargement, whether, the bigger NATO will make a stronger ally or rather it will become a cumbersome in decision making, both has a strong supporter within the US and Europe. As Javier Solana stated at the Wehrkunde conference in May 1998: "Clearly Europe is not a strategic actor it wants to be, nor the global partner the US seeks. But these shortcoming do not

¹³¹ *Ibid*

¹³² Spain and NATO, <http://countrystudies.us/spain/88.htm>, accessed on August 16, 2011.

¹³³ NATO: Member Countries, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52044.htm, accessed at August 3, 2011.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

result from ‘too much United States,’ but from ‘too little Europe.’ That is why the European integration process is not only relevant for Europe’s own identity, but for a new transatlantic relations as well.”¹³⁵

In reality, Europe did not have much to offer in terms of military power to engage in a complex operation on the territory of non-NATO countries. With the exception of Great Britain’s air force and France’s special forces, the rest of the allies were not in a position to mobilize appropriate military force. However, as the article V invoked for the first time, the Washington welcome them to participate in the peacekeeping and operations after the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Realizing that Europe needs to develop its defence capacities, the efforts to strengthen Europe’s role began in 1994. The alliance committed itself to supporting the development of a much stronger European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). NATO started working with the Western European Union (WEU), which existed as a European security organization until 2000. The WEU was allowed to use NATO assets and capabilities for WEU-led operations. These arrangements were made to allow the European allies to take greater responsibility in European security affairs, especially in circumstances that did not need to involve the entire alliance. The role fulfilled by the WEU was increasingly blending with the structures of the EU itself, enabling a more comprehensive development of European identity in security-related issues.¹³⁶

Hence, the NATO states initiated discussions to address:¹³⁷

- The means to ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation, and transparency between the EU and the alliance, based on the mechanisms established between NATO and the WEU;
- The participation of non-EU European allies; and
- Practical arrangements for EU access to NATO planning capabilities and NATO’s collective assets and capabilities.

¹³⁵ Javier Solana, “The End of the Post–Cold War Era,” May 8, 1998, NATO On-line Library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/articles/1998/a980508a.htm>, accessed on September 3, 2011.

¹³⁶ Margarita Assenova, *The Debate on NATO’s Evolution: A Guide*, http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/NATO_Debate_guidebook.pdf, accessed on September 5, 2011.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

The alliance is committed to strengthen European ally, through the development of an effective ESDI which could respond to European requirements and at the same time contribute to Alliance security. By assuming greater responsibility for their own security, the European member countries will help to create a stronger and more balanced transatlantic relationship which will strengthen the Alliance as a whole.¹³⁸

An essential part of the development of ESDI is the improvement of European military capabilities. The Alliance's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), launched in Washington, is designed to ensure the effectiveness of future multinational operations across the full range of NATO missions and will play a crucial role in this process. Objectives arising from the DCI and the efforts of the EU to strengthen European capabilities are mutually reinforcing.¹³⁹

Developing the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO is an integral part of the adaptation of NATO's political and military structures. At the same time, it is an important element of the development of the European Union (EU). Both of these processes have been carried forward on the basis of the European Union's Treaties of Maastricht in 1991 and Amsterdam in 1997, corresponding declarations made by the Western European Union and the European Union, and decisions taken by the Alliance at successive Summit meetings held in Brussels in 1994, Madrid in 1997 and Washington in 1999, as well as in NATO Ministerial meetings.¹⁴⁰

Together, they worked within NATO in a wide range of areas, with particular emphasis on defence and security sector reform. The enlargement at least underlined four strategic points; the enlarging will make NATO stronger, to secure the democratic gains in Eastern Europe, will foster regional security, also will erase Stalin's artificial dividing lines.¹⁴¹ Hence, the enlargement not only

¹³⁸ NATO Handbook, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/pdf/handbook.pdf>, September 11, 2011.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ NATO Enlargement, <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/natoindex.html>, accessed on August 20, 2011.

widening the alliance capacity but also, broaden the frameworks, brought up several planning policy for further development.

The cooperation between NATO and EU began in 1992, when the European Union began to materialize the CFSP, as the second pillars of the EU through the Maastricht treaty as a realization of Europe to assume greater responsibility for their common security. In the same year, the alliance recognized the need to develop a “European Security and Defence Identity” within the organization that would be both an integral part of the adaptation of NATO’s political and military structures and an important contributing factor to the development of European defence capabilities, making the WEU as the defence component.¹⁴² Followed up, by the ‘Petersberg Tasks’ creation as the basics concept of the cooperation.

In 1994, the alliance endorses the concept of Joint Tasks Forces, for WEU operations undertaken by the European allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy for “separable but not separate” deployable headquarters that could be used for European-led operations and is the conceptual basis for future operations involving NATO and other non-NATO countries.¹⁴³

Two years later, NATO foreign ministers agree for the first time to build up European Security Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO, with the aim of rebalancing roles and responsibilities between Europe and North America. An essential part of this initiative was to improve European capabilities. They also decide to make Alliance assets available for WEU-led crisis management operations which lead to the introduction of the term "Berlin-Plus".

The France and Britain, in 1998, initiate a joint statement, known as Saint Malo declaration, affirming the ESDP, a defence institution solely under the jurisdiction of EU itself, including the countries with no ties to NATO, marking the European Union own military institution as the successor of ESDI.

The year 1999 was crucial for ESDP evolution, at the Washington summit the Berlin Plus Agreements were outlined, providing European Union with NATO

¹⁴² The Evolution of NATO-EU Relations, <http://www.1389.org.rs/evolution-of-nato-eu-relations.html>, accessed on September 12, 2011.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

structures, military capabilities when NATO refuses to act, because the Berlin Plus Agreements did not come in effect until 2003. Furthermore the European Council decided to provide to EU and consequently settled “Headline Goals” of which target was to create by 2003 a military force of 60 000 troops deployable for one year for the purposes of crisis management operations. Moreover the EU decided to establish Political and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff to guarantee political guidelines and strategic directions, and in the same year all WEU defence responsibilities were transferred to European Union.¹⁴⁴

Finally, in 2001 the relations between NATO and EU were institutionalized and the first joint NATO-EU council was held. Year later the two organizations issued joint declaration on ESDP, affirming that non-EU members will be granted the most possible involvement in ESDP and that NATO planning capabilities will be accessible to EU. The declaration was latter in 2003 followed by the “Berlin Plus” Agreement.¹⁴⁵

Yet, even though the two organizations relations had been formal and contain more substance, also constituted the core of intra-European and Euro-Atlantic relations, yet they largely existed as separate, disconnected organizations with bureaucracies and political cultures, particularly on EU sides,¹⁴⁶ that were interested primarily in keeping a safe distance.

C. Institutional Overlap

Institutionalized co-operations between EU and NATO have promotes European responsibility in defence matters. Yet the quite interesting facts are that the EU and NATO have 21 member countries in common.

¹⁴⁴ NATO-EU Relations, <http://www.studentsummit.cz/data/1290640962171NATO-EU-Relations.pdf>, accessed on September 18, 2011.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union, and The Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered* (Maryland, USA: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group Inc., 2003), p. 176-7.

3.1. Box: NATO¹⁴⁷-EU¹⁴⁸: Overlapping Member Countries.



Both Institution act upon the Berlin Plus Agreement, while ESDP have the Rapid Reaction Force, the NATO established NATO Respond Force. What makes it more unique is both are based on the same source of national force, in other world the EU and NATO member countries has major overlapping.¹⁴⁹

The other points to consider are the mutual defence clause within each of the organization. To ensure its security, according to the article 222, part V Title VII in Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, called the Solidarity Clause, which stated:¹⁵⁰

“The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States.”

While within the NATO, entitled the mutual defence clause, according to article 5 of NATO, which stated that:¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ NATO member countries, <http://www.nato.int/structur/countries.htm> accessed on March 24, 2011.

¹⁴⁸ European Countries, http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm, accessed on March 24, 2011.

¹⁴⁹ Stephanie C. Hofmann, *Institutional Overlap in the Realm of Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP*, pp. 3-4.

¹⁵⁰ Gerrard Quille, Fact Sheet on the European Union, Common Security and Defence Policy, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do?language=en&id=74&ftuId=FTU_6.1.3.html, accessed on April 17, 2011.

¹⁵¹ The North Atlantic Treaty, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, accessed on April 17, 2011.

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations¹⁵², will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

There are two types of solidarity clause within the EU to be considered, and whether either should be included in the future constitutional treaty. The first one is the ‘mutual defence clause’ article 42 (7); to commit EU member states to solidarity in the event of ‘armed aggression’, similar to the clause in the WEU Treaty (which some leaders hoped to fold into the Constitutional Treaty).¹⁵³ The second one is the solidarity filled with a broader concept in which covers the lacks in mutual defence clause, that only to act based on intentional threats, but also in managing unintentional disasters, both man-made and natural.¹⁵⁴ If we probe deeper, indeed the EU consist of 27 sovereign member countries, yet, the substance of the solidarity clause within the EU has not been tested, and most of all the treaty of Lisbon assert that in terms of assistance to a stricken member states, it depends on each member countries, means the assistance by the other

¹⁵² The article 51 in the United Nations stated, nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

¹⁵³ Wolfgang Wessels and Franzisca Bopp, *The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – Constitutional Breakthrough or Challenges ahead?*, in Johan F.M. Swinnen, *The Perfect Storm: The Political Economy of the Fischler Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009), pp. 9-10.

¹⁵⁴ Sara Myrdal and Mark Rhinard, *European Union’s Solidarity Clause: Empty Letter or Effective tool?* (Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2010), pp. 2-4.

member states has a wide meaning and might not necessary a military assistance.¹⁵⁵

Meanwhile, the NATO mutual defence clause has shown its competence, by the event of 9/11, when the U.S World Trade Center building was crashed by the airplanes hijacked by the group of people assumed as a terrorist. Then the article 5 of NATO were invoked, and member countries shown their solidarity to US and condemned the terrorist attack, by the strongest means.¹⁵⁶

The *sui generis* EU and NATO overlapping members henceforth has a similar clause; the NATO article 5 mutual defence clause limited to an “armed attack” as a basis of mutual defence, while the EU mutual defence clause and solidarity clause literally offer a more expanse of solidarity that NATO does not provide. The other thing to look up is the delineation between the two institutions treaty responses in time of arms attack, as both using almost the same resources.

D. Multilateralism Challenge

NATO moving towards a new paradigm of institutional form to international interaction, by then the alliance is more than just a military institution in post Cold War era. The enlargement, military intervention, and operations in several areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Darfur, marked the new capabilities of the new alliance.¹⁵⁷ To be analytical, within this new development of policies, lies varying multilateralism level among the member countries, narrated by the action which the alliance taken, peacekeeping operation, joint military combat, training of police forces, all are taken into note.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Sara Myrdal and Mark Rhinard, *European Union's Solidarity Clause: Empty Letter or Effective tool. Op. cit.*, pp.2-4.

¹⁵⁶ What is Article 5? <http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm>, accessed on April 20, 2011.

¹⁵⁷ Schimmelfennig, *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

3.2. Table: Multilateralism in post Cold War NATO cooperation in the early stage

Policy	Participation	Resourcing	Multilateralism
Eastern enlargement	Consensual decision	Treaty commitment	Strong
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Consensual decision, NATO operation	Joint military combat and peacekeeping Operation	Strong
Kosovo	Consensual decision, NATO operation	Joint military combat and peacekeeping Operation	Strong
Afghanistan	NATO sidelined by US-led coalition of the willing	Joint peacekeeping with comparatively weak Resources	Medium weak
Iraq	Decision Blockade, partial participation in war	Training of police Forces	Weak

In 1991, when the Central European countries began to express their interest to join the alliance, they were confronted with the reticence among the member states. Hence, the expansion of NATO membership for the former member of Warsaw Pact was rejected. Two years later the Germany and USA began to advocate the expansion of NATO against the overwhelming majority of member governments, then, it took until the end of 1994 to make the enlargement official NATO policy, which is to be underlined that the enlargement requires the consensus of all member states.¹⁵⁹

As for Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO decided to exclude the United Nation from participating in NATO military decision and initiated its Operation Deliberate Force. NATO intervention in these area constituted the first active combat mission since its establishment and its first large scale operational peacekeeping mission, indicates a high level resourcing.¹⁶⁰ With the 60.000 IFOR,

¹⁵⁹ Schimmelfennig, *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

and SFOR as a peace support operation,¹⁶¹ involved almost all member states and up to twenty two partner countries. Overall, multilateral cooperation was strong on both accounts.

With the experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO reacted quickly to the outbreak of violence in Kosovo. Consensual decision of NATO resulted in the Operation Allied Force that directed by the NAC. Although the US provided most of the military equipment and conducted most of the military operations by far, other allies contributed according to their capabilities. The KFOR carried out the mission with approximately 50.000 troops.¹⁶²

The other cases, such as on Afghanistan, Iraq, and Darfur, the multilateralism policy was seen much weaker compare than before. Following the attack on the WTC in September 11, 2001 and the invoked article 5 of NATO, the alliance worked in concert as a solidarity and sympathy for the US. However, in terms of practical policy convergence, the effect was weaker.¹⁶³ It cannot be deny that the US plays a major role in NATO, as well a significant influence as the US has the biggest military force among the other member, hence, it was only natural for the US led the NATO forces to counter presumed terrorism in Afghanistan. Yet, until the alliance support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the alliance officially provided logistical support to a 'coalition of the willing'.¹⁶⁴

According to Schimmelfennig, the level of multilateralism in this operation was considered medium weak, as the US combat forces that are still active in Afghanistan remain outside the command of NATO, and the other fact that considered the area of Afghanistan that is 60 time wider than Kosovo, but the number of army that were deployed only in a sum of 9000 troops, tallied only 15 percent of KFOR troops.

¹⁶¹ Implementation Force, <http://www.nato.int/issues/ifor/index.html>, accessed on August 15, 2011.

¹⁶² NATO Role in Kosovo, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm>, accessed on August 15, 2011.

¹⁶³ Schimmelfennig, *Loc. cit.*, p. 194.

¹⁶⁴ International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), <http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html>, accessed on August 19, 2011.

As for Iraq cases, since the beginning the US administration case and plan for war with Iraq had divided the NATO allies. And there was an argument within the issue about the safeguard of Turkey in time of possible Iraqi counterattack, which in the Defence Planning Committee the France does not sit, as a result, excluding France from the decision. In the end, the forces of NATO that supported the Turkey government did not fought side by side with the US government.¹⁶⁵

Hence, the might of NATO as the new security alliance has sustained to develop, enlarging its member, widening its framework and deepening its function. Though, in the early post Cold War period, the alliance underlined the multilateralism concept that brought about the enlargement, however, the mission that has been carried out in terms of security was not as successful as it expected, as some of the members has different priority as well as perspectives, bearing the alliance towards a more complex circumstances in its early stage.

E. The United States Supremacy

The supremacy of United States became the question after the post cold war, as the bipolar order in international system comes to an end. The single country with a great force, military, economy, and politic, does no longer requires allies to pursue it goals and can go alone.¹⁶⁶ Kagan argued in this context that the US lives in a Hobbesian “dog-eat-dog” world and sees itself as the world policeman, while Europeans have made themselves comfortable in a Kantian world of peace and multilateralism.¹⁶⁷

These claims inherent various problem and contradiction, as it has to answer whether is it adequate to consider this world system as unipolarity or multipolarity, as a concept to describe globalize world in which state are all but one among many sites of power, or rather moving towards nonpolarity order,

¹⁶⁵ Schimmelfennig, *Loc. cit.*, p. 195.

¹⁶⁶ Thomas Risse, *The Crisis of the Transatlantic Security Community in Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 82.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

whereby the world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozen of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power as a representation of tectonic shift from the past.¹⁶⁸ As for the economic power, the EU is the highest among other nation, only due to it twenty seven member states.¹⁶⁹ The fact, it is certainly true that we live in a unipolar world when it comes to military power, yet, concerning a 'soft power', it is rather unclear whether the US is in a league of its own, since the 'soft power' seems to be rather diffuse and more widely spread in the contemporary world system.

The next point is the hegemony of the United States, whereby the power rest on the willingness of the US as superpower to sustain an international order, on its preparedness to commit itself to the rules of its order and on the smaller states acceptance of the order as legitimate.¹⁷⁰ Though all the NATO decisions are made by consensus, an agreement that reached by common consent, a decision that is accepted by each member country, but it could makes a great difference of bargaining power, to decide the policy.

When a NATO decision is announced, it is the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the alliance.¹⁷¹ There are no votes in the decision making, and a consultation take place until the decision that is acceptable to all is reached. However, this negotiation process is rapid since members consult each other on a regular basis and therefore often know and understand each other's positions in advance.¹⁷²

Yet, US hegemony and leadership have been readily accepted by the European allies throughout the post World War II period. Henceforth, the 9/11 tragedy and US reactions to retaliate the presumed terrorist in Afghanistan,

¹⁶⁸ Richard N. Haass, *The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow US Dominance* (2008), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63397/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity>, accessed on August 16, 2011.

¹⁶⁹ International Monetary Fund: Data and Statistic, <http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>, accessed on August 17, 2011.

¹⁷⁰ Thomas Risse, *Loc. cit.*, p. 82.

¹⁷¹ Decision Making at NATO http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49178.htm, access on September 17, 2011.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

invoking the article 5 of the alliance for the first time, again became a leadership in search of Al-Qaeda.

In this chapter, I try to explain the capability of NATO, the United States, and its correlation with the EU, through its brief history during the cold war to the post cold war period. Which mentions that the alliance has exists in the European continent to be a great security organization, maintaining the security through the transatlantic area and European lands to be precisely. As the assertion of the neorealist concept of Morgenthau's 'balance of power' which mention that within a balance of power system the state may choose either to balancing or bandwagoning, to determine the survival of the states. Therefore, the system compels the states to act as they do, and as a result, the European countries and the United States decided to create an institution with strictly military means capability to balance the power of their main rival. And to be taken into note, many of the European countries already became an important part since the first creation of the organization, working side by side through the cold war period.

The contemporary issues mention above is the development as well as challenge that the alliance and the EU have to overcome, particularly in the post cold war era. Generally, the post Cold War period nor the US unipolarity, nor new threats of terrorist networks had constitutes changes in world politics, yet, would not bring an end to the transatlantic community. The US and European countries relation is endure and even developed to some degree, and the NATO is still standing.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS ON EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO RELATIONS ON EU SECURITY

A. The post-Cold War NATO

The end of cold war also marked the end of the bipolar international system that would lead to a decline of the western alliance. The realist argued that the alliances are partnership of convenience and joint interest to balance the power of an adversary. Once the power of the adversary has collapsed, the forces decrease that bind an alliance together, and NATO are no exceptions. However, the neorealist elaborates different, as it taken the perspectives of the international systems, of a wider range and circumstances.¹⁷³

According to Hans J. Morgenthau, alliances are, “The historically most important manifestation of the balance of power.”¹⁷⁴ The necessary function of the balance of power is the operating alliances in the multiple state systems.¹⁷⁵ The idea of this term is that only force can counteract the effect of force, and that in an anarchical world, stability, predictability and regularity can only occur when the forces that states are able to exert to get their way in the world are in some kind of equilibrium.¹⁷⁶ Between the allying nations, competing with each other, henceforth have three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions, one shall increase their own power, or they can add the power of other nations as their own power, or they can withhold the power of other nations from the adversary.¹⁷⁷ Related to the NATO and European countries connections,

¹⁷³ Thomas Risse, *The Crisis of the Transatlantic Security Community*, in Dimitris Bourantonis, Kostas Ifantis and Panayotis Tsakonas, *Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 81-82.

¹⁷⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Brief Edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (USA: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 197.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ Alaa A.H. Abd Alaziz, *Balance of Threat Perception and the Prospects of NATO Mediterranean Dialogue*, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/alaziz.pdf>, accessed on April 19, 2011.

¹⁷⁷ Morgenthau, *Op Cit*, p. 197.

the concept has shown an example as what happens in the cold war era, whilst the bipolarity distributes between the United States influence and on the other side, the Soviet Union.

Underlined Lord Hasting Lionel Ismay the first Secretary General of NATO stated the NATO Purpose, “To keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”.¹⁷⁸ Distinctly explain what the purpose of the institutions at that time. But to answer whether the alliance still held the purpose as Lord Ismay mentioned, further explanation is required. Thus, I utilize Robert Jervin concept, ‘From balance to Concert’ which mention:

*“Cooperation is made more likely are not by changes in payoffs, but also by increases in the state ability to recognize what others are doing called transparency..., Transparency can facilitate only if the information it provide can be used to avoid or mitigate the consequences or other defections”.*¹⁷⁹

– Robert Jervis-

Jervis mentions that the cooperation of realist thought of balance of power concept which occurred during the cold war era might transform of what then he mentioned the ‘concert’ system. In the cold war era, NATO and the Warsaw Pact races for the preeminence of military power. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO as a military organization remains intact. Thus, the transparency among the member states is the crucial thing for the NATO members to be maintains. Considering, the past enemy will not again gains dominance, can be reach only by the cooperation, especially if they think they may again have to contain the enemy. Thus, they are positively linked, one is getting payoffs by the transparency of the member states whereby exists the big countries as Germany, United Kingdom and France, and on the other side, the member states gaining advantages of the security with the minimum budgets. Hence, the existence of NATO in the contemporary world system remains evident.

In the theory of neo-realism, collective defence becomes increasingly apparent when dealing with the balance of power or even bandwagoning.

¹⁷⁸ Dave Schuler, *Does U. S. Support for NATO Serve a Strategic Purpose?*, <http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/does-u-s-support-for-nato-serve-a-strategic-purpose/> accessed on September 16, 2011.

¹⁷⁹ Robert Jervis, *From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation in World Politics Vol. 38, No. 1* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 73-76.

However, the collective security is a specialized instrument of international policy intended to forestall arbitrary and aggressive use of force. It means that, the collective security is focus purely on the premise of state security, which is the goal in neorealism.

The Brussels summit in May 1989, before the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, served significant attention to issues off limiting arms, and nuclear proliferation, ongoing or anticipated, as the result of the start in relations with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, the alliance long-term objectives defined in Brussels were following:

- “To ensure that wars and intimidation of any kind in Europe and North America are prevented.
- To establish a new pattern of relation between the countries of East and West, in which ideological and military antagonism will be replaced with cooperation, trust, and peaceful competition and which in human rights and political freedoms will be fully guaranteed and enjoyed by all individuals.”¹⁸⁰

Based on that basis, constructive dialogue and military cooperation were pursued, through such mechanism as arms control, as a means of bringing long lasting peaceful Europe. The Brussels summit was the first substantial step toward NATO cooperation in the east, and when the Communist regime had collapsed with the dissolution of Warsaw Pact, NATO already exploring policy of Eastward expansion to include some of the new democracies. The collapsed of Soviet Union marked that the former Communist empire no longer had the resources to feed its military ambition, hence, the existence and the fundamental change in NATO’s post Cold war world came with the realization that the alliance remained the only credible military structure in Europe.¹⁸¹

The post cold war NATO has not been confronted with common or clearly identifiable threats. Within NATO, the core cooperation issue was potential deadlock caused by consensual decision making under the condition of heterogeneous strategic views, threat perception, and security interest. As for

¹⁸⁰ North Atlantic Council Declaration, <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c890530a.htm>, accessed on August 30, 2011.

¹⁸¹ Margarita Assenova, *The Debate on NATO’s Evolution: A Guide* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2003), pp. 1-2.

better response to this issue was the institutional flexibility. With regards of the former Warsaw Pact countries, the main problems in the region are from lack information on security problems. Under this condition, high flexibility made sense in order to gain knowledge and create trust, to overlook any incoming threat for the alliance.¹⁸² Thus, NATO transform from the so called collective defence organization to a collective security organization.

B. The EU-NATO Strategic Partnership

“...we launch a strategic partnership that will bring our organizations closer together. In full transparency, we are ready as of today to start a new era of co-operation. We will continue to work with NATO in the same spirit of co-operation: the mission continues.”

Javier Solana, Brussels, 2002.¹⁸³

The increased readiness of states to take part in joint security management is one of the formative features of the international order in the post Cold War era. Disputes, unresolved conflict, terrorism, as well as other phenomena that might disturb the European security, becomes the main concern of the alliance, particularly European countries. Thus, the European Union and NATO aim to shaping and controlling security, by preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts and crises by collective action as they appear especially in more unstable regions.¹⁸⁴

The partnership is founded on shared values and on the indivisibility of the security dimension that transform in the 21st century. Whereas NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members, while the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) added an instrument to conduct crisis

¹⁸² Schimmelfennig, *Op. cit.*, pp. 184-185.

¹⁸³ EU NATO Declaration Remarks by Javier Solana
<http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/73803%20-%20Solana%20-%20Permanent%20arrangements%20+%20NATO%20declaration.pdf>, accessed on August 24, 2011.

¹⁸⁴ Karl Mottola, *The Challenge of Collective Action: Security Management in European and Regional Contexts in Europe's New Security Challenges* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), p. 302.

management operations independently. NATO and the EU reaffirm their determination to strengthen their capabilities: for NATO, reserving a stronger role for Europe will take the form of increased vitality, specifically in the field of crisis management. Thus, the basic principle of the partnership is arranged in the European Union-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the Berlin Plus arrangements.¹⁸⁵

With the objectives that, the European Union will ensure the fullest possible involvement of the non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP, NATO will support ESDP and give the European Union assured access to NATO's planning capabilities, and both organizations will adopt arrangements to ensure the coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of their common capability requirements. By the principles:¹⁸⁶

- partnership, which mutually reinforces two organizations of a different nature;
- effective mutual consultation, dialogue, cooperation and transparency;
- equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO;
- respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and NATO;
- respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organizations.

The objectives and principles of the mention explain the basic standpoint between the institutions, stated clearly that both are an institutions of different nature, but standing equal in every manners of decision making. As for the further information of the implementation of ESDP will be explain in the Berlin Plus agreement.

¹⁸⁵ Europea, Summaries of EU Legislation: Cooperation with NATO, http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/133243_en.htm, accessed on September 29, 2011.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

C. The Berlin Plus Agreement and CSDP Implementation

NATO and the European Union are both engaged in a process of seeking to enhance capabilities and improve force generation for expeditionary operations. Both organizations have a global outlook and aspire to act in a wide variety of circumstances. Their threat assessments are very similar and they share a common security agenda. They are both currently seeking to define their role and purpose in the context of a changed strategic environment. Moreover, the two organizations have an overlapping membership with shared common interests; 21 countries are members of both NATO and the EU.

Since the Cold War era, NATO already plays an important role in European continent, the first creation of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to unify the Western Europe in 1952 to the end of the Cold War era, the creation of three pillars of European Union in 1992 of Maastricht, to the establishment of European Security Defence Identity, NATO been participated in the European Union Security Architecture. Feature the mutual defence clause in the cold war era, and promote European Security and Defence Identity while participate in the various military missions.

Though, the EU has cling to NATO military defence for more than 50 years since the early Cold War, the EU has gradually developed its security institution as well as enhanced its security frameworks, making it an even developed institution. As the security risks in the modern world are increasingly characterized by phenomena such as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, intractable conflicts, organized crime, or even cyber threats, the relationship of EU and NATO are developed as well. Concentrate on these new issues and strengthening the core capabilities of the EU and NATO, and closer coordination in the areas of planning, technology, equipment and training.

Both institutions Emphasizes the importance of ESDP, to improve the EU's ability to confront new security threats particularly in joint civilian-military operations and crisis- management measures ranging from intelligence-driven

crisis-prevention actions to security-sector reform, reform of the police and judiciary and military action.

Affording the European Defence has been one of the biggest assistance from NATO for many years. From the cold war era the United States as the NATO main actor already spent its military expenditure highly. It is true that expenditure the Americans have cast themselves in the global role (ex: Iraq and Afghanistan) while the European efforts remain focused upon the European theatre, building its security institution. Then the more accurate comparison would be the portion of US defence expenditure that goes into the European defence and that of its European allies, which has taken into note, that the U.S. initiation on the mission in Afghanistan and Iraq is costly).

However, we also should realize that U.S through NATO already given a sum of dim through military aid since the cold war period. Yet, the European military capability is still low, discerned by its low military expenditures, the European has been slack on its defence spending. For the whole budgeting of the civil to the military budget, which mostly cover by the United States, EU automatically get the benefit by joining NATO, an organization act as an umbrella for the nuclear power during the Cold War era and from military security issues.

The enhanced relationships give benefits for the two institutions, particularly EU, as the Berlin Plus Agreement has allow EU to have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, however, it need to be improved in order to allow the two organizations to intervene and effectively deliver relief in current crises which demand a multi-task civilian-military response.

Eventually, the provisions for permanent structured cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty promise to enhance European defence capabilities and expenditure. Treaty can deliver such long overdue improvements, which can be called on for EU and NATO missions. Improving military capabilities throughout Europe is in the interests not only of the EU but also of NATO. With regards the European Union can play its role fully as an international actor.

Indeed, the Berlin Plus arrangements has developed the EU-NATO relations, in military to-military contacts and expert consultations between

civilians from the two headquarters.¹⁸⁷ Establish the basic principles for collaboration between the EU and NATO in the event that the EU seeks NATO planning support and relevant assets and capabilities for carrying out military operations. The components of the arrangements are:¹⁸⁸

- a. NATO - EU Security Agreement.
- b. Assured Access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (CMO).
- c. Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led CMO.
- d. Procedures for Release, Monitoring, Return and Recall of NATO Assets and Capabilities.
- e. Terms Of Reference for Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR) and European Command Options for NATO.
- f. EU - NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led CMO making use of NATO assets and capabilities.
- g. Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing Capability Requirements.

The coordination mechanisms between NATO and the EU are backed by meetings between various bodies of the two organizations. The most important meetings involve the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO's principal decision-making body, and the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU's coordinating body for ESDP-related issues. NATO's Secretary-General and the High Representative for the CFSP of the EU attend these meetings, at which a range of security.¹⁸⁹

In 2004, within the creation of European Defence Agency (EDA), both EU and NATO committed to work on development of defence capabilities, armaments cooperation, acquisitions and research, EDA experts to contribute to the work of the capability group. As well as committed to combat terrorism and weapon of mass destruction proliferation.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Frances G. Burel, et al., *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture* http://www.acus.org/docs/0603-Transatlantic_Transformation.pdf, accessed on April, 19, 2011.

¹⁸⁸ NATO, Berlin Plus Agreement http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm, accessed on April 12, 2011.

¹⁸⁹ International Relations and Security Network and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, *EU-NATO Relations* (January 12, 2006), pp. 4-5.

¹⁹⁰ NATO – EU Strategic Partnership http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm, accessed on April 12, 2011.

The Crisis Management Operations that carried out by EU-NATO are derivative; military, political, or humanitarian, not strictly refers to a peace-keeping missions, as the objectives and mandates are more specific, considering the impact, limitation, and contours of an operation.¹⁹¹ And here, the Berlin Plus Agreement serves as the foundation for practical work between EU and NATO. In that, the view of EU-led CMO makes use of NATO planning support with several arrangements.¹⁹² These arrangements cover three main elements that are directly connected to operations and which can be combined: EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities. The DSACEUR is the operation commander of the operation, uses the force generation and planning capacities at SHAPE.¹⁹³ But political control of the operation remains with the EU, once NATO members have agreed to the operation.¹⁹⁴

The first implementation of ESDP was in 2003, when the EU formally took over command of the modest civil and military operations in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Afterwards, in December 2004, EU took over military responsibility from NATO for much larger mission in Bosnia. By 2009, twenty three missions had been carried out, almost all small and most of them civilian in nature.

ESDP Operations.¹⁹⁵

Six Military Operations:

- ‘Concordia’, March – December 2003. FYROM.

The operation aimed at contributing further to a stable secure environment in FYROM. The operation were Carried out of ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements with NATO assets and capabilities.

¹⁹¹ Crisis Management, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49192.htm, accessed on april 20, 2011.

¹⁹² *Op. cit.*, Berlin Plus.

¹⁹³ SHAPE is an abbreviation for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.

¹⁹⁴ Background: EU-NATO Frameworks

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf>, accessed on April 19, 2011.

¹⁹⁵ Jean-Claude Piris, *The Lisbon Treaty*, *Op. cit.*, pp. 269-273.

- ‘Artemis’, June – August 2003. Democratic Republic of Congo.
It was aimed, *inter alia*, at contributing to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of humanitarian situation in Bunia. The operation was in accordance with UN (without NATO assets), a fully autonomous EU crisis management operation.¹⁹⁶
- ‘Althea’, December 2004 – end of 2007. Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).
The operation aimed to contribute to a safe and secure environment. With UN mandate, and make use of NATO assets and capabilities. The operation is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements.¹⁹⁷
- ‘EUFOR RD Congo’, June – November 2006. DR Congo.
Adopted the UN resolution 1671, the autonomous EU-led operation was conducted in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).¹⁹⁸
- ‘EUFOR Tchad/RCA’, early 2008 – March 2009, Chad.
To protect civilian, facilitate humanitarian aid, to contribute to protecting UN personnel, with autonomous EU led operation.¹⁹⁹
- ‘Atalanta’, mid 2008 – December 2008, Somali Coast.
To contribute to the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP), to the deterrence, and prevention of an act of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, with autonomous EU led operation.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁶ Kees Homan, *Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in European Commission: Faster and more United? The Debate about Europe's Crisis Response Capacity* (Netherlands: Clingendael, 2007), pp. 151-152.

¹⁹⁷ European Security and Defence Policy: EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080929%20Althea%20update%2011_EN.pdf, accessed on September 10, 2011.

¹⁹⁸ ESDP: EUFOR RD Congo, <http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eufor-rd-congo.aspx?lang=en>, accessed on September 10, 2011.

¹⁹⁹ EUFOR Tchad/RCA <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eufor-tchadca?lang=en> accessed on September 10, 2011.

²⁰⁰ CSDP: EUNAVFOR Somalia <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eunavfor-somalia.aspx?lang=en>, accessed on September 10, 2011.

Three mixed military – civilian operations:

- ‘Eusec – RD Congo’, June 2005, Democratic Republic of Congo
Is a small EU advisory and assistance missions for security reform to the Congolese authorities, while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, transparency and observe of the rule of law.²⁰¹
- ‘Amis EU Supporting Action’, July 2005 – December 2007, Sudan.
To ensure effective and timely EU assistance to the African Union’s enhanced AMIS II mission and to back the African Union and its political, military and police efforts aimed at addressing the crisis in Darfur.²⁰²
- ‘EU SSR Guinea-Bissau’, June 2008 – May 2010, Guinea-Bissau.
The mission was undertaken in partnership with the Guinea-Bissau authorities. It was conducted under the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) to support local authorities with advice and assistance on security sector reform.²⁰³

Fourteen civilian operations:

- ‘EUPM’, since January 2003, Bosnia-Herzegovina.
It is composed of some 500 police officers and aimed at establishing sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice. The European Union Member States contribute to the

²⁰¹ Common Security and Defence Policy: EU Mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD CONGO) [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110711%20Fact%20sheet%20EUSEC%20DR%20Congo%20\(v%2013\).pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/110711%20Fact%20sheet%20EUSEC%20DR%20Congo%20(v%2013).pdf), accessed on September 11, 2011.

²⁰² Jean-Claude Piris, *The Lisbon Treaty*, *Op. cit.*, p. 270.

²⁰³ EU SSR Guinea-Bissau <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau.aspx?lang=en>, accessed on September 11, 2011.

Mission alongside some countries, such as Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.²⁰⁴

- ‘Eupol Proxima’, December 2003 – December 2005, FYROM.
Police experts, monitored, mentored and advice the country’s police fighting organized crime as well as promoting European policing standarts.²⁰⁵
- ‘Eujus Themis’, July 2004- July 2005, Georgia.
The first Rule of Law operation, with some ten senior and highly qualified experts supported, mentored, and advised ministers, senior officials and appropriate bodies at the level of the central government. EUJUST THEMIS was designed to support the Georgian authorities in addressing urgent challenges in the criminal justice system, assisting the Georgian government in developing a co-ordinated overall approach to the reform process.²⁰⁶
- ‘Eupol Kinshasa’, January 2005 – mid 2007, DR Congo.
It was aimed at assisting in the setting up of an integrated police unit in order to contribute to ensuring the protection of states institutions and reinforcing the internal security apparatus.²⁰⁷
- ‘Eujust Lex’, July 2005, Iraq.
Eujust Lex is a civilian crisis management operation under the auspices of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy. It aims at improving the Iraqi criminal justice system by providing training

²⁰⁴ Europa, Summaries of EU legislation: European Union missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/ps0008_en.htm, accessed on September 6, 2011.

²⁰⁵ CSDP: EUPOL Proxima <http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/proxima.aspx?lang=en>, accessed on September 7, 2011.

²⁰⁶ CSDP: EUJUST THEMIS <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/completed-eu-operations/eujust-themis.aspx?lang=en>, accessed on September 10, 2011.

²⁰⁷ EU Missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/ps0005_en.htm, accessed on September 7, 2011.

for officials in senior management and criminal investigation, primarily from the police, Judiciary and penitentiary services.²⁰⁸

- ‘Aceh Monitoring Mission’, September 2005 – December 2006, Aceh. Conducted by EU and ASEAN five, monitored the commitments undertaken by the governments of republic of Indonesia and the free Aceh movement in the framework of their peace agreement.²⁰⁹
- ‘EUPOL COPPS’, since January 2006, Palestine. It was aims at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordance with the best standards.²¹⁰
- ‘EUPAT’, December 2005 – June 2006, FYROM. It was the EU police advisory team, as a follow on mission after Concordia and Proxima, which aimed at further supporting the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standart of policing.²¹¹
- ‘EU BAM Moldova-Ukraine’, October 2005 – June 2006. It was an EU support for border management, including the border between Ukraine and the separatist Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.²¹²
- ‘EU BAM Rafah’, November 2005. It was an EU Border assistance mission in Rafah, providing a third party presence at Rafah crossing point between Egypt and the Palestinian territories, to build confidence between the government of Israel and the Palestinian authority.²¹³

²⁰⁸ EUJUST LEX/IRAQ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eujust-lex.aspx?lang=en>, accessed on September 7, 2011.

²⁰⁹ Aceh Monitoring Mission http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aceh_Monitoring_Mission, accessed on September 9, 2011.

²¹⁰ EUPOL COPPS <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eupol-copps.aspx>, accessed on December 21, 2011.

²¹¹ EUPAT FYROM http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Factsheet_EUPAT_fYROM_051215.pdf, accessed on September 21, 2011.

²¹² EUBAM Impact <http://www.eubam.org/en/quick/impact>, accessed on September 21, 2011.

²¹³ EUBAM Impact <http://www.eubam.org/en/quick/impact>, accessed on September 21, 2011.

- ‘EUPOL Afghanistan’, June 2007 for three years period.
The EU police mission in Afghanistan, aims at contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards.²¹⁴
- ‘EUPOL RD CONGO’, July 2007 – June 2009.
It was the EU police mission undertaken in the framework of reform of the security sector and its interface with the system of justice in the Democratic Republic of Congo, succeeded EUPOL Kinshasa.²¹⁵
- ‘EULEX Kosovo’, February 2008 – end 2009.
The EU rule of law mission to assist the local institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and a multi-ethnic police and customs service.²¹⁶
- ‘EUMM Georgia’, September 2008.
It is an autonomous mission led by EU, the objectives are to contribute stability throughout Georgia and surrounding region and, in the short term, to contribute to the stabilization of the situation.²¹⁷

Statistically, the overall deployment of European troops on operations outside the boundaries of the EU and NATO rose from 40 – 50.000 in the late 1990s to over 70.000 from 2003, which surpassing the target of the headline goals even as they missed their formal deadline. Yet, most of the missions were committed to NATO operations, or were part of UN peacekeeping missions. Those missions were limited to the lower end spectrum of military tasks and even

²¹⁴ EUPOL Afghanistan <http://81.17.241.206/?q=node/4>, accessed September 21, 2011.

²¹⁵ EU Police Mission for the DRC
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/090923%20Factsheet%20EUPOL%20RD%20Congo%20-%20version%206_EN11.pdf

²¹⁶ EULEX Kosovo <http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/front/>, accessed on December 21, 2011.

²¹⁷ CSDP: EUMM Georgia, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eumm-georgia.aspx?lang=en>, accessed on August 13, 2011.

then they relied on NATO assets for logistical support, and were deficient in command and control, and operational planning capabilities, as well as in tactical airlift.²¹⁸

Operation Concordia was the first EU-led as well as 'Berlin Plus' operation, in which NATO assets were made available by the EU, aim to contribute to a stable and secure environment, based on explicit request from the government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).²¹⁹ The operation started since May 2003 and completed on December 2003. The second mission that was undertaken is Operation EUFOR Althea, (December 2004-Present) The EU-led military mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The mission was carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Has a mandate to UN Charter, Chapter VII, under UNSC resolutions no. 1551 and no. 1575. The objectives of the mission are to contribute a safe and secure environment, as part of global policy aimed to stabilize the country.²²⁰

From the twenty three missions undertaken by European Union since 2003 to 2009,²²¹ only two operations have been conducted under Berlin Plus agreement. And when the EU and NATO carry out two simultaneous but separate land or sea operations in parallel, the Berlin Plus arrangements do not entitled. Although there are several operations that they work together, such as EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, where worked in the same team to support the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Martti Ahtisaari, in negotiations on the future status of the province of Kosovo.²²² Henceforth, the cooperation in other regions such as in Afghanistan, the NATO led mission to extend the rule of law and reconstruct the country, and EU launch European Union Police (EUPOL) in 2007. The anti-piracy mission in 2008, Somalia, where NATO and EU Naval

²¹⁸ Wallace, *Op. cit.*, p. 448.

²¹⁹ Annalisa Monaco, Operation Concordia and Berlin Plus: NATO and the EU take stock, <http://www.concordantia.com/sfm2007/files/Literature/Foreign%20Policy/fyROM%20assessment%20short.pdf>, accessed on April 18, 2011.

²²⁰ European Security and Defence Policy, EU Military Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080929%20Althea%20update%2011_EN.pdf, accessed on April 17, 2011.

²²¹ Jean-Claude Piris, *Op Cit*, p. 269.

²²² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO-EU: a Strategic Partnership http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm, accessed on April 20, 2011.

forces are deployed side by side. And the EU-NATO support to the African Union's mission in Darfur, regarding to airlift rotations.²²³ Those missions where NATO and EU carried out simultaneously but separate land or sea operations by parallel, the Berlin Plus arrangements do not apply.

NATO could in principle carry out any necessary military operation without the help of the EU, provided that its individual members support the operation. But most of NATO's members are also members of the EU, and the European states are determined to build the capability of the EU to act on behalf of its member states. Thus, if the United States wants a NATO consensus for an operation, it will in most cases need the support of both the EU as an institution and its member states. This will require accommodating the EU's need for involvement in the decision making process, and perhaps in the operation itself. The EU, on the other hand, will need NATO assets to carry out even medium-sized military operations, and therefore must accommodate NATO's role.²²⁴ However, in the same context, the EU could carry out any of the civilian missions without the help of NATO. The fourteen civilian missions have proven that EU already dominates this field of missions.

The limitations of Berlin Plus, along with the failure of NATO and the EU to agree to cooperate in the Darfur operation, demonstrate the weakness of continuing in the current mode of NATO-EU relations, or of making only minor, incremental adjustments. Continuing down that path will lead to further drift across the Atlantic as NATO and the EU jostle for primacy and the United States looks for decisive partners to help with its global agenda. Instead, it is time to rethink the existing transatlantic security relationship.

The first step has been taken: the United States, in its National Security Strategy of 2002, and the European Union, in its European Security Strategy of 2003, identified a range of shared security challenges. These include global terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and instability arising

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ Frances G. Burwell, *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture* http://www.acus.org/docs/0603-Transatlantic_Transformation.pdf, accessed on September 30, 2011.

from regional conflicts and failed states. The next step is to build a new transatlantic security arrangement capable of acting together to counter these threats. The aim of that structure is to protect Europe and the United States within their borders, and enable them to reach out in combined operations to meet these threats at their origins.

The Rule of law, monitoring, and police mission, carried out by EU, shows that the EU has the capacity to conduct civilian mission on their own without the assistance of NATO, reason of they conduct it by their own forces. But, when they conduct big military operations, they still remain connected to UN accordance or rather NATO military assets, demonstrate the inability of conducting the operation own its own.

The establishment of the partnership has remark EU in one side as an institution to play a role in the world order as a global actor, while the other perspective is weather EU does not has the capacity and capability as its own military. That might underlined that EU still greatly depends on NATO, as Giles Merritt, director of the Security and Defense Agenda said. “The Europeans’ lack of resources, that’s the major problem,... The Europeans are going to wake up to the resource gap on their defense spending and ensure that more than 2 percent of people in uniform are deployable to combat.”²²⁵ Also the statement from Jacques Lanxade,²²⁶ as he pointed out that NATO lacks the non-military means the EU has in abundance, while the EU lacks military capacity. “It’s therefore vital to reduce the lethal political rivalry that characterizes relations between the EU and NATO and resolutely coordinate their cooperation.”²²⁷

The readiness of EU and NATO to cooperate in military field might just be a beginning for a further relation of more successful military missions in the future. As Waltz stated of neorealism in the post cold war of democratic countries

²²⁵ Euro Force, NATO Overlap <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/may/28/euro-force-nato-overlap/?page=2>, accessed on April 14, 2011.

²²⁶ Jacques Lanxade is a French admiral and former navy chief, and co-author of a recent proposed reform of NATO.

²²⁷ Johannes Gernert, EU and NATO http://www.eurotopics.net/en/archiv/magazin/politik-verteilerseite/nato_2007_11/debatte_nato_2007/, accessed on April 20, 2011.

context,²²⁸ that although NATO and EU states are both democratic countries and they are not fight and probably will not confront each other in a war, but both fight their share in a war against other ‘undemocratic countries’. Historically, NATO already takes part in several wars outside the European continent, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, its transformation to a collective security organization has adds the probability that it would do its part to maintain the security of transatlantic area.

Regarding ESDP implementation of EU’s operation in accordance to protect its security, as well as maintaining the world order, the collective security of EU-NATO provides restraint of military action instead of guaranteeing respect for international law. Using NATO assets and plan capabilities, especially in their military missions, and though they did not include NATO yet in their civilian missions, the article 5 of the mutual defence clause of NATO has given them a secure condition. Thus, it means the collective security undertaken by EU is a tool in an anarchic system to help provide security, as they are incapable of dealing with their threat on their own.

Generally, the Berlin Plus agreement between EU and NATO, comprises developed substances, yet does not wholly in compliance, as EU has undertaken several mission without conducted in the Berlin Plus, such as the civilian operations that has been undertaken. While another concern within EU is whether EU keeps focusing on its civilian operations or change and moving forwards to the direction towards more military operations. Because the fact in the field shows that EU lacks of vigilant army, and low military expenditure.

²²⁸ Waltz, *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

D. The Further Commitment: United States, NATO and European Union

“It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world... American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power... It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.”

Robert Kagan.²²⁹

The United States as the dominant actor in NATO play a significant role in the alliance, and also an important actor, in the pursuit of global peace and stability outwards the continent. Thus, it will not be possible to master the great challenges of global security without the closer operation with the U.S.²³⁰

Yet, the perspectives of the U.S. and NATO stands on a different ground, where EU moving into self-contained laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation, while the U.S. utilize the morality of power and military might. As a comparison, the two are diverging, hence, on the major strategic and international questions, Kagan refers the European are from Venus, and the American are from Mars: they are agreed on little and understand on another, less and less.²³¹ He then mentioned the U.S. is resorts to force more quickly, compare to Europe that is more patient with diplomacy. And the U.S. see the world divided between good and evil, between friends or enemies, while Europeans see with a more complex picture.

On the decision making level, the US prefers policy of coercion rather than persuasion, emphasizing punitive sanction over inducement to better behavior, the stick over the carrot. They want problem solved, eliminated. While

²²⁹ Robert Kagan, *Power and Weakness* (Policy Review, June-July 2002) <http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/zselden/Course%20Readings/RKagan.pdf>, accessed on October 1, 2011.

²³⁰ The European and Security Defence Policy <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/382788/publicationFile/4268/ESVP-EN.pdf>, accessed on November 14, 2011.

²³¹ Robert Kagan, *Power and Weakness*, *Loc. cit.*

the Europeans insist they approach the problems with greater nuance and sophistication, with a more subtle approach. They are more tolerant of failure and more patient when solutions do not come quickly. Their policies favor peaceful response to problems, preferring negotiation, diplomacy and persuasion rather than coercion.

However, the recent development shows that the two actors, European Union and United States particularly through NATO has been working together in several military operations, even more on the ESDP declaration, the two actors arranged a permanent military liaison arrangements to facilitate cooperation in the operational level. And on the Lisbon Summit November 2011, both have agreed for a more 'Comprehensive Approach' to crisis management and operations.²³²

Thus, the political leadership on both sides of the Atlantic is obligated to be committed to a major revision of the transatlantic security architecture. According to Frances G. Burwell the commitment of the two institutions must be demonstrated practically by a willingness to make compromises on both sides of the Atlantic. In particular:

- The United States should respect the judgment of its European allies that also belong to the EU when they conclude that a particular operation should be EU-led. In return, those same allies should fully support NATO as the lead institution for an operation when the United States must be significantly involved over a sustained period of time.
- The United States must be prepared to commit its military forces to NATO operations and to those EU operations where its resources would be useful and it serves U.S. interests. In return, EU members must be willing to make their forces and their civilian stabilization and reconstruction assets available to support NATO.
- Europeans should actively engage in NATO's military transformation, thus contributing to making the Alliance as effective as possible. In return,

²³² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49217.htm, accessed on September 24, 2011.

the United States will accept the EU as a military actor that does not need U.S. concurrence to launch operations, and will also deepen the U.S.-EU relationship on security issues.²³³

There is much room for EU-NATO co-operation at the operational level. As both the EU and NATO continue to expand their operational reach across the globe, the benefits of information sharing and joint lesson-learning becomes evident. Beyond learning, there is a strong rationale for greater coordination between the two organizations at the level of planning, particularly in those cases where they are both likely to be involved in the same theatre of operations, and most crucially, there is a need for the EU and NATO to co-ordinate their strategic outlooks; the whole infrastructure of EU-NATO relations depends on this very point. In this regard, the forthcoming NATO Strategic Concept should be tied into the evolving European Security Strategy to make sure that the fundamentals of EU-NATO relations are on a firm basis.²³⁴

The Strategic Concept underlines the need for an appropriate civilian crisis management capability for NATO to interact effectively with civilian partners and to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors. Such a capability has also been described as an interface to make civilian culture more comprehensible to the military HQ and vice-versa. Thus, NATO headquarters has reorganized its civil-military planning and support section, and within SHAPE, a high-ranking military interface advisor has been hired who will be complemented by a team of civilian analysts, planners and other experts, an improving commitment.²³⁵

These three points is remitting the relations of US and EU and the possible future cooperation of NATO and EU, considering both of the institution lack capabilities to carry out missions in accordance to a different nature of the

²³³ Frances G. Burwell, *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a EU-NATO Security Architecture* (Policy Paper, March 2006), p. 21.

²³⁴ Alastair Cameron, et. al., *European Defence Capability: No Adaptability Without Cooperation*, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/European_Defence_Capabilities.pdf, accessed on September 19, 2011.

²³⁵ *NATO Operations Under A New Strategic Concept and the EU as An Operational Partner* <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2592>, accessed on November 2, 2011.

institution. The EU lacks the military capabilities to support NATO missions while NATO agenda is deficient for EU's civilian missions. Thus, by considering these points the EU and NATO would cover each other in their future agenda.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The end of Cold War has render European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization into a new perspective of security and sets out new strategies to enhance their policies into a new strategic field and issues. Just as the threat from Soviet Union is gone, both NATO and EU face the same threat of international security issues, terrorism, proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflict, state failure, and even organized crime. Thus, the NATO would not merely cling on as the collective defence organization, and EU has evolve to more than just a purely economy and politic institution.

The well known EU as a civilian power which in the beginning unite its member in economic and political cooperation, through the Maastricht Treaty has establish the security institution, the CFSP that deals with specific part of the EU's external action such security and defence actions. And establish the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) with its military structures, PSC, EUMC, EUMS, and CPCC, to remit the EU external actions particularly in security issue which conducts several military missions to maintain international security in several regions. The image of EU as an economic and political institution has gradually changes within the development of the military structures in EU. The EU has moved towards developing its own identity and capabilities in the security field, and is developing a significant reservoir of experience in the deployment of its nascent security forces.

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) open up its door to the new member of the East European region, and later enhance its course from a collective defence organization to a collective security organization, active in the international security missions, while still maintain its defence clause treaty. NATO as a military organization has plays an important role in the European continent since its creation. Since the beginning most of the Western Europe countries are already a part of NATO, and until 2011, from the total 28 member states of NATO, 21 member states are also member states of EU, the two

institutions have an institutional overlapped, working together particularly in security field, yet still separate its institution. It has definitively moved beyond the debate on out of area operations and, as demonstrated by current discussions on the "Comprehensive Approach", has recognized that the Alliance will be called on to perform tasks from high-intensity combat all the way to the more wider policy of political and civilian instrument.

NATO consistency to exist has shown that the alliance is an enhanced organization, no longer as a merely defensive military organization, it change its policy to a collective security alliance while still maintaining its mutual defence clause. The alliance has emerged as there is a change in the international structure, whereas there are new security challenges to face.

The Berlin Plus agreement as a basic principle of EU-NATO strategic partnership has reserving a stronger role for EU specifically in the field of crises management. Yet since the establishment of the agreement up to now, the EU-NATO only conducted two missions under that agreement, because when the EU and NATO conduct two simultaneous but separate land or sea operations the Berlin Plus do not applies, and it not provide the possibility of combining civilian and military instruments until the Lisbon Summit.

Historically, the EU has a low military expenditure, especially in the cold war era, and it is a rational choice to establish a closer cooperation with the alliance. On the other side, the alliance has proven to help to maintain stability especially in the Cold War, and way out continent in the post Cold War era. The alliance also has a big role in the establishment of European Security Identity, and the later development of Security institution within the EU. The cooperation has given the EU chances to play as an international security actor in the post Cold War era. The implementation in the cooperation has an interesting condition; the first is 'right of first refusal': that NATO must first decline to intervene in a given crisis.

There are limitations of the current cooperation of EU and NATO, both institutions works together in the security field, progressing its cooperation one another, yet still exist the limitations between the two:

- EU's Military Capability

The low military budget of European Union might be the main issue in the European military capability as the military expenditure of European Union, as estimated in 2010 was \$382 billion (having a decline for 2.8% since 2009 with \$406 billion), meanwhile, the United States as a dominant actor in NATO military expenditure was estimated \$698 billion.

- EU's Decision Making

The CFSP is a governmental institution which the unanimity decision or Qualified Majority Voting is required among member states to reach an agreement.

- The Berlin Plus Agreement

Although the Berlin plus comprise substances of the two institutions, it is also become the limitation, especially the condition of the 'right of first refusal' of NATO, which makes the cooperation deferred to correspond with.

The military expenditure of EU shows that it lacks military capability to be lined up with NATO, as the military missions that have been carried out by EU-NATO are conducted with the assets of NATO military plans and capabilities. Thus, in order to play a full role, the EU needs to improve its military expenditure to raise its military capabilities. The second point is the issue concerns the CSFP, while EU is a big institution of 27 countries, but when it comes to the decision making, it comes to required unanimity else qualified majority voting, where the members is not obliged to abide.

Yet the alliance and EU adopted new strategic concept at Lisbon Summit 2010, determine to improve their partnership. For a more compatible of the cooperation, whereas NATO could affiliate not only in military missions with EU, but also another area of policy, the diplomatic missions: such as Joint forces for peacekeeping or a police missions.

As mentioned in neorealism perspectives, power is possibly a useful means, that's why European Union join in the balance of concert to have an

appropriate amount of it, with the ultimate concern of its security. Logically, building a relationship with the alliance is the most beneficial solution for the European Union for now, as it is not using much of its sum to the military expenditure, while the relationship is continue, EU can gradually, improving its own military capability. By doing so, the European Union might stay active in the world order as a security actor. While, the alliance as the main institution that holds the power, can keep a watch of EU member states military capability.

Though, the member states of EU did not and probably would not collide against NATO member states as both hold the principal as democratic countries, however, both shared the same war, against undemocratic countries, the mission to Afghanistan and Iraq are the example of NATO member states share of war, and the missions as Operation Concordia and Eufor Althea has shown that both EU and NATO share their values of military mission.

In overall, the cooperation of EU-NATO has developed well within the past decades, bringing the two institutions to a closer cooperation, gradually improving the inadequacy of each policy area to make it compatible to each other, indicates not only the development of the cooperation but also the development of both institutions.

However, there are many possibilities to the future development of European Union and NATO relations such as, whether the NATO article 5 of mutual defence clause and EU article 222 of solidarity clause remains separate as the institution is overlap, or whether the cooperation will develop to a more than just crisis response but to be an active role of crisis prevention. The discussion will keep continues. Therefore, the writer expects that this research can contribute to international relations study, particularly in security issue of EU and NATO through its development and by a different approach and perspectives.

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APPENDIX

I

The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty :

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it

deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security .

Article 6 (1)

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the

United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

(3)

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

II

European Union: Lisbon Treaty Article 222

1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

(a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;

- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;

- assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;

(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.

3. The arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Council shall act in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Treaty on European Union where this decision has defence implications. The European Parliament shall be informed.

For the purposes of this paragraph and without prejudice to Article 240, the Council shall be assisted by the Political and Security Committee with the support of the structures developed in the context of the common security and defence policy and by the Committee referred to in Article 71; the two committees shall, if necessary, submit joint opinions.

4. The European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action.

III

S0240/02

Remarks by Javier Solana,

EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

following the agreement on the establishment of EU-NATO permanent arrangements

Brussels, 16 December 2002

I am very pleased that we have agreed the EU-NATO framework for permanent relations. It is a clear milestone in our joint efforts in order to face the challenges of the new century. In today's world, security and stability are a collective endeavour. Our security will be best guaranteed by the collaboration of all of us. The agreement we are celebrating today is therefore important not only in itself but also for the people of Europe and beyond. This comes just after, in Copenhagen last Friday, the European Union decided to enlarge and, not long ago in Prague, NATO had also decided to expand. It is the reunification of Europe but also of a Europe which is availing itself of the means better to contribute to security and stability.

In December 1999, the EU said in Helsinki that in 2003 it was going to be fully ready to act in crisis management operations with military capabilities. Three years after Helsinki, we are going to be ready. We have worked extremely hard to reach this moment and we have succeeded. Today, we launch a strategic partnership that will bring our organisations closer together. In full transparency, we are ready as of today to start a new era of co-operation. We will continue to work with NATO in the same spirit of co-operation: the mission continues.

We are going to concentrate our efforts in particular on three areas:

- The EU's readiness to take over the military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in total co-operation with the authorities in Skopje. We aim to be ready by the end of February for such an operation.
- Together, we are going to analyse the possibilities for an EU military role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after the SFOR mission, following the willingness expressed by the European Council in Copenhagen. In two weeks we are going to take over the police mission in Bosnia from the UN. The EU is ready to play its part in Balkans in all the forms needed.
- Together with NATO we are going to prepare for a Joint Exercise in November 2003.

EU-NATO declaration on ESDP

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION,

- Welcome the strategic partnership established between the European Union and NATO in crisis management, founded on our shared values, the indivisibility of our security and our determination to tackle the challenges of the new Century;
- Welcome the continued important role of NATO in crisis management and conflict prevention, and reaffirm that NATO remains the foundation of the collective defence of its members;
- Welcome the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), whose purpose is to add to the range of instruments already at the European Union's disposal for crisis management and conflict-prevention in support of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the capacity to conduct EU-led crisis-management operations, including military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged;
- Reaffirm that a stronger European role will help contribute to the vitality of the Alliance, specifically in the field of crisis management;
- Reaffirm their determination to strengthen their capabilities; Declare that the relationship between the European Union and NATO will be founded on the following principles:
 - Partnership: ensuring that the crisis management activities of the two organisations are mutually reinforcing, while recognising that the European Union and NATO are organisations of a different nature;
 - Effective mutual consultation, dialogue, co-operation and transparency;
 - Equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy and interests of the European Union and NATO;
 - Respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and NATO;
 - Respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, which underlie the Treaty on European Union and the Washington Treaty, in order to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment, based on the commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any other through the threat or use of force, and also based on respect for treaty rights and obligations as well as refraining from unilateral actions;
- Coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations.

To this end:

- The European Union is ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing the relevant Nice arrangements, as set out in the letter from the EU High Representative on 13 December 2002.
- NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevant Washington Summit decisions, and is giving the European Union, inter alia and in particular, assured access to NATO's planning capabilities, as set out in the NAC decisions on 13 December 2002.
- Both organisations have recognized the need for arrangements to ensure the coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to the two organisations, with a spirit of openness.