

南 華 大 學

歐洲研究所

碩士論文

從現實主義之觀點論美國小布希政府與歐盟  
在伊朗核武議題上的合作關係

**A Study on the Cooperation between the United States and  
the European Union toward the Iranian Nuclear Program  
in the George W. Bush Government  
(From a Realist Perspective)**

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中華民國 100 年 6 月 17 日

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基於在國際關係領域內對於安全與外交政策議題的興趣，作者因而以近年來相當重要的伊朗核武議題為本篇論文研究的主要對象。伊朗在中東地區早已存在著相當重大或值得注意的影響，且與亞太地區情況雷同，於中東地區內，國與國的往來及互動，亦涵蓋了戲劇性的起伏與變化。是故，憑藉著歐洲聯盟與美國間的政策關係及相互影響，作者於此面對並嘗試深究伊朗核武議題。

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## ABSTRACT

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Abstract :

The US continues the evolution of its foreign policy in 2001 exactly when George W. Bush took office in White House. Bush has declared that Tehran was a part of the “Axis of Evil.” In 2001 co-operate with EU (United Kingdom, French, Germany), UN, and the IAEA as an effort to against Iran’s intention to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the involvement of the US to deal with this ‘rogue state’ lacked the credibility to coerce the Iranian clerics to stop the nuclear program. By examining this case, this thesis found that differences do exist between the US and the EU over the matter of political change in the region, but they are not as stark as are generally perceived or portrayed. Whatever differences there might have been in this regard, were essentially of a tactical nature. Portraying them as strategic is misconstruing the reality. To ensure the stability in the Middle East region, the transatlantic alliance should strongly implement multilateral strategy approaches to establish direct diplomatic relations with Iran, hence, the US must abandon the Hobbesian behaviours for pure harmonization in this alliance whether now and then. However, this case will be a challenge for transatlantic alliance in the future and affecting many aspects in international relation.

Keywords : Iran, US, EU and Atlantic alliance

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### A. Background Issues

The presence of the Atlantic Alliance had become an important element of the international political system for nearly seventy years ago. During the Cold War, the establishment of NATO had a privileged position within the West. This was an intergovernmental military alliance which has established through under the agreement signed on April 4, 1949. In the NATO, between European and American has pledged that:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”<sup>1</sup>

“Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”<sup>2</sup>

Article V is the Treaty is the key provision and the linchpin binding the United States (US) to its NATO allies. It states, in part that “an armed attack against one or more (allies) shall be considered an attack against them all.” In addition, makes clear that the commitment to assist an ally was unconditional. Rather, each signatory will assist the ally under attack with “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.”

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<sup>1</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949. See, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm), accessed on April 05, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

NATO as well as the organization constituted a system of collective defense whereby its member states agreed to mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party either government or non-government. The task force consists of both Americans and European, this thesis argued that, despite the forces pushing apart the two sides of the Atlantic, the United States and Europe still have compatible interests and complementary capabilities and they should reassess existing principles governing the use of military force and seek the new agreement “rules of the road.” For example, it argue that America and Europe should develop a common policy toward states that possessed or sought to possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or to support terrorism in various ways. The core of transatlantic alliance has important roles and is believe to be able to bring the security mission in this century.<sup>3</sup> However, in 1990, the Transatlantic Declaration on European Community (EC) - US Relations had identified the US and European Union (EU) and its member states solemnly reaffirmed determination to strengthen their partnership for:<sup>4</sup>

- a. Supporting democracy.
- b. Safeguard peace and promote international security.
- c. Pursuing policies aimed at achieving of world economic marked by sustaining economic growth.
- d. Promoting market principles.
- e. Helping developing countries by all appropriate means in their efforts towards political and economic reforms.
- f. Encouraging other countries to their participation on economic and politic reform.

Moreover, both EU and US had adopted a New Transatlantic Agenda on 1995, based on a Framework for Action with four major goals:<sup>5</sup>

- a. Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world.
- b. Responding to global challenges.

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<sup>3</sup> Andrew Cottey, NATO: Globalization or Redundancy? in *Renewing the Atlantic partnership: Report of an independent task force*, Henry Kissinger and Lawrence H. Summers, eds. (US: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), p.5-6.

<sup>4</sup> Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relation 1990. See, [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans\\_declaration\\_90\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_declaration_90_en.pdf), accessed on April 05, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> New Transatlantic Agenda on 1995. See, <http://www.eurunion.org/partner/agenda.htm>, accessed on April 05, 2010.

- c. Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations.
- d. Building bridges across the Atlantic.
- e. Within this Framework, EU- US had developed an extensive Joint EU/US Action Plan: Promoting Peace and Stability, Democracy and Development around the World, Responding to Global Challenges, Contributing to The Expansion of World Trade and Closer Economic Relations, and Building Bridges across The Atlantic.

This research argued that in term of “building bridges” across the Atlantic still have gap inside, such as the policies made by the European and American have differences on how to handle the terrorism or another cases which is related to the security issues. Kagan gave the examples which related with it, the different assessments of outstanding issues on terrorism, nuclear issue and rebellion are sensitive issues for the American, while the European were challenged to solve the ethnic conflict, migration, crime, poverty and the environment.<sup>6</sup>

Therefore, despite their relation had some differences, they would do all efforts to increase cooperation on political and economic growth, promote democracy, combat against social problem and all those kind of threat were threaten common peace stabilization. For example case, in the beginning of the 21st century, the stabilization was threaten after September 11, 2001 (called 9/11) the US was attacked by the terrorists group and this crisis dragged the US to fight terrorism as a payback from the unreasonable treatment.

“The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism - premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”<sup>7</sup>

The 9/ 11 tragedy has affected to the international political system which also brought significance influenced to the transatlantic alliance policies toward the security threat. Immediately, in 2002, the US has labeled Iran as “Axis of Evil” and it statement has shown the US as the bad cop while Europe served as a

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<sup>6</sup> Robert Kagan, *Power and Weakness in American Power in the Twenty-First Century*, David Held and Mathias Koeniq-Archibuqi (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 135.

<sup>7</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002. p, 5. See, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>, accessed on April 8, 2010.



good cop.<sup>8</sup> *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* by Robert Kagan. He had simplified this pattern of thought as the Americans are viewed as from Mars whereas the Europeans are viewed as the Venus.<sup>9</sup> Referred to this matter, this research will try to show the differences between US as a unilateralist while the EU as a multilateralist through the soft power approach.<sup>10</sup>

Joseph S. Nye also added that the differences between the US and Europe could look from two types of power. First, as more important than the persuasion, the ability of soft power is to shape preference to move or attract people by arguments which were often lead to acquiescence.<sup>11</sup> Second, hard power is the ability to use the carrots and sticks; we known that economic and military means might often get others to change their position or to follow your will.<sup>12</sup> Hard power strategies including a wide range of measures geared toward coercing or threatening other entities into compliance. These measures might include the use of ‘sticks,’ such as the threat of military assault or the implementation of an economic embargo and the use of ‘carrots,’ such as the promise of military protection or the reduction of trade barriers. However, the critics often stressed in other words; the ‘stick’ is often preferred over the ‘carrot.’<sup>13</sup>

The US tended to solve the problem by coercion, haste, and less of patient in carrying out international systemic relations. America saw its division between evil and good, or friends and enemies. The US did not use persuasion and never hesitate to do the coercion and the threat of elimination in the face of potential enemies. With this, the US adopts unilateralism in international affairs, despite the availability of international institutions like the United Nation (UN) or

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<sup>8</sup> Robert Einshorn, Robert. J. *A Transatlantic Strategy on Iran’s Nuclear Program* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004), p. 21-32.

<sup>9</sup> Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: American and Europe in the New World Order* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003), p. 3.

<sup>10</sup> Martin A. Smith, ed. *Where is NATO Going?* (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 5.

<sup>11</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 5.

<sup>12</sup> Joseph S. Nye, *Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization* (London, New York: Routledge, 2004). p, 5.

<sup>13</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *Soft Power, op. cit*, p. 7.

international courts that was tended to work together to achieve common goals.<sup>14</sup> It is different for the EU as the Europeans preferred to soft power and civilian power which was emphasized on diplomacy, negotiation, persuasion to coercion. Ginsberg had mentioned the civilian power by Hans W Maul definition as involving three central criteria's on his book:<sup>15</sup>

- a. Using soft ways to seek common goals and respect to the international regulation.
- b. Maintaining mutual relations and cooperation with other countries.
- c. Using non military or war threats. These meant for every interest of each state could be realizing.

It could be convincingly argued that European Union's 'soft' approach offers a more appealing roadmap forward in a globalized world than the classically realist and forceful "hard" approach of the United States. The European Union itself was created on values of multilateralism which aimed to solve the problems through dialogue and mutual concessions rather than use hard power. Most nations recognized the need for increased cooperation than coercive that could establish unfair.

After the 9/11 of terrorist attacks, the US political level believed that the security interests could not separated from global security situation, hence the US should strengthened the position of US hegemony and extensive involvement in the international political arena. To apply the strengthening, the US had done with two examples: the US responded to terrorism on the general level, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq on a special level. US valuation parameters in the Middle East also shifted to Iran which was developing nuclear technology as alternative energy. Indeed, if ordered from history, after the shah's regime was dissolved in 1970s through the Iranian revolution. Since 1980s, Iran had an ambition to pursue nuclear weapon. However, the nuclear program activities were forced to stop due to the Persian Gulf War that led to multiple sites badly damaged by the bomb. It strengthened Iran to develop nuclear technology in order

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<sup>14</sup> Robert Kagan, *Power and Weakness*, *loc. cit.*

<sup>15</sup> Roy H. Ginsberg, *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire* (New York: Littlefield Publisher, 2001), p. 39.

to protect the country attack by other countries as Israel, trauma when Iraq attacked Iran and the US interference in the Middle East.

Iran<sup>16</sup> was the first example since the days of Cold War II, where security issues become serious matter, Europe jointly played political role with many countries to prevent the security threat from WMD which threaten world peace and it has been produced by Iran since 1988s. A sensitive question is about the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and it would influence on political relations in the Greater Middle East. Exactly, it was very difficult to distinguish functions for civilian nuclear development and nuclear weapons because the program for the military used were very close to develop energy for peace purpose.

In October 2003, France, Great Britain, and Germany (so-called or EU) as the main speaker of EU, had announced to stabilize “effective multilateralism” demands in Europe as an external action. Toward this case, the EU would try to find a peaceful solution to halt Teheran uranium enrichment and reprocessing of plutonium. However, the US and Europe were curious on this case and would never stop to investigate the truth.<sup>17</sup>

## **B. Main Issues**

Power and conflict could not be separated and both of them included important issue in International Relations. The occurrence of conflicts caused by several factors i.e. oil conquest. Iran was a country of the 5<sup>th</sup> largest oil producer in the world which was developing its nuclear program for economic interests and as an energy substituted materials derived from oil. Iran’s nuclear program was initiated since 1960’s and continued to be an international debate especially after the Iranian revolution 1979 until now.

The Europeans and US suspected of it program - they recognized that Iran was a terrorist movement state sponsor and there was no security guarantee of


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<sup>16</sup> For official name of Iran is Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran/ Persian: ایران, or Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI).

<sup>17</sup> Robert J. Einshorn, *A Transatlantic Strategy on Iran’s Nuclear Program* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004), pp. 21-32.

Iranian nuclear program which was for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the US worried if its nuclear weapon was misused. Hence, the US and EU reported this issue to the United Nation (UN), and requested to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to keep a full inspection of Iranian reactor functions to prevent further activities. In addition, the hostility between Iran and Israel also opposed the US therefore, Iran nuclear issue included to the International political matters, and was oriented to obtain the power and hegemony toward another country by using nuclear weapon. As a result, nuclear weapon is the one of effective tools to conquer the foe. Further, a map below revealed nuclear sites of Iran which contained exciting debates on the international stage.

Figure 1.1. Map of Iranian Nuclear Sites



Source: Map of Iranian Nuclear Sites. See [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/profiles\\_pdfs/Iran/iran\\_nuclear\\_sites.pdf](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles_pdfs/Iran/iran_nuclear_sites.pdf), accessed on April 13, 2010

The existence of sites had their own function.<sup>18</sup> The US had predicted several sites which were concerned for military rather than for peaceful purposes. US and EU had considered how to deal with Iran's nuclear ambitions remained a challenging test for their abilities to coordinate and implement effective policies. They should accomplish upon their main objective to undermine Iran's clerical regime through isolation and sanctions to prevent Iran from acquiring military nuclear capabilities. Thus, to investigate this case, this research proposed the following questions:

- a. What were the policies and cooperation adopted by the US and the EU toward Iranian nuclear program? Is there any difference between their policies? And why?**
- b. How the two sides cooperated on this issue?**
- c. How would this case affect the long-term transatlantic relation between EU and US?**

This thesis would explore the above questions from the military security aspect without the consideration of the economics, sociology, religions, or environmental aspects.

### **C. Theoretical Framework**

To analyze the problems above and respond the phenomena elaborated in next chapter, it should take a theory and concept to reinforce all series in this exploration. Henceforth, in this research, the Writer adopted the Realist approach and employed perspectives of National Interest, Geopolitical Factor, and Foreign Policy to support the approach. Without such a concept or a theory of politics, international or domestic, it would be altogether impossible. Without it, we could not distinguish between political and non-political facts nor could bring at least a measure of systemic order to the political sphere.<sup>19</sup>

The realist assumed the international system is anarchy. This property asserted that no single rule governing interstate relations. Thus, the possible

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<sup>18</sup> Will be describes on the next chapter.

<sup>19</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Brief Edition (United States: McGraw-Hill, 1985), p. 5

conflict or war among states were very wide open it because of pessimistic in international relation therefore, other actors in world politics such as individuals, international organizations, or NGOs were unable to influence the political constellation of the world. State as the main actor which was concerned to preserve and defend its national interests in international politics as power, security and material wealth. Related to the power, In *Politics among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace*, Morgenthau had written down of six principles of political realism:<sup>20</sup>

- a. Self-centered, self-regarding, and self-interest (human nature) had always struggle for his interests, it is reflected a state relation with other countries.
- b. In international relation, Power are the struggle to achieve the national interests were solely to achieved the power. Power defined by Morgenthau was not only as targets but also as a destination. For example, the enlargement of power, should used force. Physical, and psychological threats or pressure can also regarded as a power.
- c. National interest defined as power means could be changed depending on the time and situation. This was shown relevance when observing the changes of a country's foreign policy towards other countries.
- d. Universally moral principles could not be applied to the actions of states.
- e. Political realism refused to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.
- f. The autonomy of the political sphere.

The issue of Iranian nuclear weapons was invited many reactions particularly from US, European, Israel, China, and Russia. For instance, Stephen Walt's theory of alliance argued that states balance against the threat presented by "other" states which might be aggressive in order to improve their security.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, the US and EU should have appropriate solution or the policy to halt Iranian nuclear program as soon as possible to reduce the tension in Middle East.

Realism focused on its analysis to pursuit of power and autonomy in international interactions and the absence of harmony of interest between countries, thus, the 'self-help,' is important and most relevant is in military field.

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<sup>20</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 4-16.

<sup>21</sup> Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relation* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 16.

Realists do not deny moral principles, only in practice, individual morality was defeated by the survival of the state and its inhabitants as well as the achievement of national interest. Morgenthau has put the basic understanding about the whole of realism with the main characteristics of the power concept. The power shape is coercion either militaristic or non-militaristic (sanctions or blockades). The shapes of power also including psychological relationship through the ability to influence the other to act consciously in accordance with the expected.

Realism predicts that anarchy fosters hostile conditions in which states must inevitably merge into alliances with or against each other in order to balance asymmetrical power. This key concept known as the balance of power and is fundamental to Realism as a theory. These elements of Realism are at the root of its logic and are keys to understanding realist's theory.

a. National Interest Concept

The national interest was a tool for analyzing foreign policy objectives of a country. The national interest is the main pillar of foreign policy and national interests determine political actions of a country.

- a. To improve the industry and technology development i.e. nuclear energy.<sup>22</sup>
- b. To protect the country from threat (ideology influence, physics or war).
- c. To maintain fossil energy hence, Iran should develop nuclear energy as alternative energy.

Anthony Lake added his opinion to the US government in a necessary to find new components for its national interests. Lake outlines seven aspects of US national interest:<sup>23</sup>

- a. To defend US citizens at home and abroad from various forms of direct attack.
- b. To prevent the onset of aggression that could disrupt international peace to defend US economic interests.
- c. To preserve and disseminate the values of democracy.

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<sup>22</sup> K. J. Holsti, *Politik Internasional: Kerangka untuk Analisa*, Trans. M. Tahir Azhari, Jilid. 1 (Jakarta: Erlangga, 1988), p. 136.

<sup>23</sup> Indraya Smita Notosusanto, *Politik global Amerika Serikat Pasca Perang Dingin* (Jakarta: Pustaka Jaya, 1996), p. 177.

- d. To prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons.
- e. To maintain international confidence.
- f. Long-term goals to be achieved by the US, has been outlined on “United States National Policy Strategy 2003 and 2006,” to create a world in safe, economic and political freedom, harmonious relations with other countries, award on human values.

To handle international laws violator such as, the nuclear treaty violation until against the human rights, US would cooperate with EU that also was developed European Security Strategy (ESS) to avoid regional conflicts, creating a new era for global economic growth through free markets and trade, and other threats.

b. Geopolitical factor

The realism was also strengthened by geopolitics. Generally, geopolitics defined by geographic region, due geographical factors has considered as a permanent factor than other. To measure the ability of a country in the analysis of state level recognized as geography. The physical conditions of geography could affect the relationship of states, the struggle for world domination also influenced to formulate the policy of a country. Geography was also associated with the content of the natural resources of a country as diplomatic tool that had a high value.

Geopolitics traditionally understood as the (scientific) assessment of geographic conditions underlying either the power (security) of a particular state or the balance of power in the global configuration of continents and oceans. Founders of classical geopolitics like Ratzel, Mahan, Kjellén, and Mackminder had emphasized the natural advantages of certain locations in terms of land and sea power, or the biological necessities in the spacial form and growth of states.<sup>24</sup> According to Haushofer thought and his disciplines, geopolitics were transformed

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<sup>24</sup> Gertjan Dijink, *National Identity and Geopolitical Visions, Maps of pride and pain* (Canada: Routledge, 1996), p. 3.



into a kind of political metaphysics to be used as an ideological weapon in the service of the national aspirations of a state.<sup>25</sup>

c. Concept of Foreign Policy

Issuance of policy by governments was a common practice. Policies issued with the aim to make something better than before. Nanang T. Basuki defined that policy is the written rules that might unregulated previously and as the implementation of higher laws, complementing the previous policy, a change from existing policy, or substitute or revoke the existing policy.<sup>26</sup>

In security policy-making, the ownership of strategy problem carried by the idea of national policy objective to make the country safe. The option was between taking action to reduce vulnerabilities and work to eliminate or reduce the threat by addressing the causes of the source. Barry Buzan called the first choice as a national security strategy and the second choice as an international security strategy. If the international security strategy adopted by the security policy, it would focus on efforts to reduce vulnerability.<sup>27</sup> Foreign policy of a country of forms of decisions, programs and action to create the relation with other countries that aims to meet domestic needs and goals.<sup>28</sup> Foreign policy was also interpreted as decisions and behaviors which were adopted by countries in their interactions with other countries or in international community.<sup>29</sup> Related to Iran's nuclear program, to maintain the energy program was part of Iran's foreign policy interactions with other countries.

Formulate a strategy means taking into account all the situations today that might be encountered on the next day, which actions to be taken or will be

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<sup>25</sup> Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson ed. *Compass of the World* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), pp. 89-108.

<sup>26</sup> Nanang T Basuki, *Penyusunan Naskah Kebijakan* (Jakarta: Buletin Varia Statistik, 2003), p. 16.


<sup>27</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: an Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (New York: Havester Wheatsheat, 1991), p. 331.

<sup>28</sup> R. Soeprapto, *Hubungan Internasional: Sistem, Interaksi, dan Perilaku* (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, 1997), p. 42.

<sup>29</sup> Paul R. Viotti dan Mark V. Kauppy, *International Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), p. 478.

selected in order to face the realization of each possibility.<sup>30</sup> Decision makers was established a strategy to deal with other country and to achieve the specific national goals stated in terms of national interests, foreign policy, though not be separated from domestic policy, had a major role in the process of making the national interest in most countries in the world.<sup>31</sup> In dealing with Iranian nuclear case, the US and the EU had different views to estimates the results of their efforts in preparing a strategy to stop Iranian nuclear program which was considered to threaten regional security. At the same time, political realism considered a rational foreign policy to be good foreign policy; for rational foreign policies were to minimize risks and maximize the benefits.<sup>32</sup> It should to be concerned that the threat come was never same. Therefore, the policy should be changed to the new one if the potential threats were increased.

Table 1. Foreign Policy Decision Making Process



Source: William D. Choplin, *Pengantar Politik Internasional: Suatu Tela'ah Teoritis*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Trans. Marsedes Marbun, (Bandung: Cv Sinar Baru Offset, 1992), p. 101.

<sup>30</sup> Daoud Joesoef, *Dua Pemikiran Tentang: Pertahanan, Keamanan dan Strategi Nasional* (Jakarta: CSIS, 1973), p. 61.

<sup>31</sup> Teuku May Rudi, SH. *Studi Strategis; Dalam Transformasi Sistem Internasional Pasca Perang Dingin* (Bandung: Refika Aditama 2002), p. 27.

<sup>32</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *op. cit*, p. 8.

The table above was used to explain how domestic economic-political and external situation in determining its foreign policy. The policy started from the condition of the Iranian economic problems. This required the further solution by tried to pursue nuclear energy to provide the benefits for Iran. At the domestic politics level, marked by the victory of Ahmadinejad particularly was tried to resisted western pressure on Iran's nuclear program. His government tried to show the ability to maintain the nuclear program despite pressure from the western were strict toward Iran's government and citizen.

#### **D. Purpose of Study**

The purposes of writing this thesis are:

- a. To understand the international relations knowledge and to dissect dynamic Iranian politics since 'Iranian revolution 1979' until Ahmadinejad had brought the controversies to the US and EU.
- b. Concern how the Atlantic alliance works to deal with international crisis.
- c. To analyze the strategy, cooperation and policies which were issued by the US and EU toward Iranian nuclear program.
- d. To know the dynamics of international politics particularly among the US, EU, UN, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) toward Iranian nuclear program as well as to comprehend the international reactions.

#### **E. Research Limitations**

Although this research was carefully prepared, the writer still awarded of this limitations and shortcomings on this thesis as the following:

- a. Within this research, the writer was aware of the lack of proficiency in English. Recalling that, the writer is an Indonesian citizen and English was not the native language as well.
- b. The writer did not use the primary data which obtained through the respondents and interviews directly to the object involved.
- c. The lack of knowledge that the writer had.
- d. Considering that, the writer had limited time to take study in abroad.

#### **F. Research Methodology**

The methodology was not merely a collection of methods or techniques of research, but a whole foundation of values, assumptions, ethics, and norms that become the rules used to interpret and conclude the research data. According to

Hadi Sutrisno, a research was the effort to analyze, develop, and test the truth of knowledge; the effort was done by using scientific methods.<sup>33</sup>

Method was a set of steps that had systematically arranged. This thesis employed qualitative research which using descriptive approach. According to Bogdan and Taylor, qualitative research is a procedure to produce descriptive data. Descriptive data was only to present and explain the obtained data, and then to analyze based on the concepts or theories, so it would be a scientific writing.<sup>34</sup> In addition, Hadari Nawawi emphasized on qualitative data which merely focused on words only. Data as evidences in a hypothesis to test the truth or un-truth not processed through mathematical calculations or with a variety of statistical formulas. However, the data processing carried out in a rational way to use certain thinking patterns according to the laws of logic.<sup>35</sup>

This thesis is a descriptive analysis which tried to describe the cooperation among the US and the EU to deal with Iran's nuclear case as well. Based on dimension of time, this research also attempt to dissect their policies since 2001-2008 in Bush government. Based on research benefits, this study is pure of academic orientation and science that expected to contribute to the security studies in international relations partcularly in 'Greater Middle East' and as a base for further research.

Another research methods which was also used in this thesis is documentary research and also emphasized on qualitative research. In this thesis demonstrates how documentary research can be used in stand alone projects and, also, as the one approach in multi-method projects.<sup>36</sup> The contribution and potential of documentary research have often been overlooked in education and social science.

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<sup>33</sup> Sutrisna Hadi, *Metodologi Research* (Yogyakarta: Fak Psikologi UGM, 1980), p. 63.

<sup>34</sup> Bogdan dan Taylor dalam Lexy J. Moleong, *Metodologi Penelitian Kualitatif* (Bandung: PT. Remaja Rosdakarya, 1993), p. 3.

<sup>35</sup> Hadari Nawawi, *Metode Penelitian Bidang Sosial* (Yogyakarta: UGM Press, 1990), p. 209.

<sup>36</sup> Wendy Robinson, *Documentary Research in Dimitra Hartas* (ed), *Educational Research and Inquiry, Qualitative and Quantitave Approach* (London: Continium International Publishing Group, 2010), p. 186.

Documentary research involves to the coalition and analysis of written documents such as official reports, textbooks, newspapers and novel; and visual and auditory material, such as films, speech, and radio and television programs. Pamphlets, timetables, map, posters, painting and photographs can all be used in documentary research.<sup>37</sup> In this thesis also will deal with practicalities of undertaking documentary research, including issues of access to documents, the selection of documents and the critical analysis and interpretation of documentary material.<sup>38</sup> The process is utilized in most academic work (in fact, most high school and certainly college level courses would insist on references in academic work) in supporting the academic prose of the writer.

#### 1. Research Type

The data collected in this study is only in the form of qualitative data. The qualitative data took from the official documents of the Iranian government, US and the European Union, concerning general information related to foreign policy, geographical, geopolitical and nuclear program of Iran.

#### 2. Data techniques collection

As a note, before taking steps further in this part, in this thesis is not used primary data<sup>39</sup> to collect the information for supporting the content, this thesis had conducted through literature review and the type of data collected were as follows:

- a. Secondary data were from the official websites; Iran, <http://www.mfa.gov.ir/index.jsp>, United States, <http://www.state.gov>, European Union; [http://europa.eu/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/index_en.htm), then the official website of United Nation <http://www.un.org/en>, IAEA; <http://www.iaea.org>. Writing this thesis was also supported by other websites which were connected to the academic approach and the content of this study.

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<sup>37</sup> Sally French, Frances Reynolds, Jhon Swain, Practical Research, A Guide for Therapists, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed, (Oxford: butterworth-heinemann, 2001), p. 178.

<sup>38</sup> Wendy, *loc. cit.*

<sup>39</sup> Primary data is data derived from original or first. This data is not available in compiled or files. The primary data is acquire through the sources or in the technical term is the respondent is the people who we used as an object or person that we used as a means to obtain information or data for research.

- b. In addition, secondary data was obtained from the books, documents, journals, and newspapers which were related to the Iranian nuclear issue, and the US - European Union with their cooperation and policies toward Iran. Its data the writer got from 南華大學圖書館, National University, University of Indonesia (Mariam Budiarjo Library), 中正大學圖書館, 國立臺中圖書館, 國立永安圖書館, Centre Studies of International Strategy (CSIS) Indonesia, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI) and the Indonesia Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Middle East division.

### 3. Research Nature

This study contained description and narration, the technique was used to describe, illustrate and to explore the phenomena existing, appropriate with the time and accurate data based on fact then connected to the phenomena investigated.<sup>40</sup>

## G. Thesis Structure

This thesis was divided into six chapters. The purpose of this part is to simplify the content.

Chapter I. Contained an introduction that gives the general picture of the overall research. These part were: Introduction, Main Issues, Theoretical Framework, Purpose of Study, Research Limitation, Research Methodology and, Thesis Structure.

Chapter II. Provides an overview the Issue of the Iranian Nuclear Program. In this chapter was divided into four sub-chapters, which includes the background of Iranian Nuclear Program, Capability of Iranian Nuclear Program and its significance, Iran's Security Concerns and Iran Official Position.

Chapter III. Explain The US Policy towards the Iranian Nuclear Development. In this chapter was divided into two sub-chapters, which includes the Viewpoint and Concerns of the US, The US Policy Responses under the Bush government.

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<sup>40</sup> Moh. Nasir, *Metode Penelitian* (Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia, 1998), p. 63.

Chapter IV. This Chapter explain The EU Policy Towards the Iranian Nuclear Development. In this chapter was divided into two sub-chapters which introduced the Viewpoint and Concerns of the EU and The Policy Responses of the EU.

Chapter V. Analysis on the cooperation between the US and EU on the Iranian Nuclear Issue under the Bush Government. In this chapter was divided into three sub-chapters, which includes the Debate between the US and EU on the Iranian Nuclear, the Diplomacy Efforts, Consultation and Compromise, Implications on the Atlantic Alliance.

Chapter VI Offers a conclusion of the expalinations at the previous chapters as well as cover the preparation of the Thesis and reaffirmation of the answers of the questions that exist at the point.

References.

Appendix.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THE ISSUE OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM**

The presence of nuclear weapons makes the world less safe. Defensive and offensive realists claimed the same thing, “nuclear weapons are for offensive purposes,” i.e. if two countries were in conflict or war, nuclear weapons could be used for sudden attacks. However, the effect of nuclear danger threatened many lives and nuclear radiation effects spread the poison.

NPT came into force on March 5, 1970 which had consent of five major nuclear powers because it accommodated their interest. Apart from the five declared nuclear weapon countries, namely Russia, US, China, France, and Britain, currently there are 189 states that have joined the treaty. Have three principles of or called as ‘pillar’; non-proliferation, disarmament, the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, making Iran’s nuclear program obedient to the International Atomic Energy Agency verification.<sup>1</sup>

Iran’s military strength increased after the Iran-Iraq war. Iran’s conventional force increasingly posed a serious threat to the security of Gulf. Iran’s conventional weapons capability was incredible. The assistance of European Union (EU) engaged in prolonged negotiations with Iran to verify adherence to its NPT commitments. In short, the Iranian case represented one of the most serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime and posed threats to the international society.

#### **A. The background of the Development of Iranian Nuclear Program**

Before 1964, most electric power facilities in Iran were small diesel units owned by local private and municipal companies or attached to industrial installations and Iranian nuclear technology interest intended since 1950’s, when the Shah began receiving American assistance through the US Atoms for Peace

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<sup>1</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), July 01, 1968. See, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf>, accessed on April 15, 2010.



program.<sup>2</sup> Since 1970, Iran had built a nuclear reactor and guided by United States, Germany, Great Britain and France.

The existence of the nuclear site in a country could be considered to gain recognition, as a method of bargaining and took the prestige in order to show the ability, either in economic or energy saving, and military aspect. If it functioned as a military device, it could exclusively prevent the threat or desire to establish the power and hegemony. Henceforth, many developed countries have succeeded to build a nuclear facilities and uranium enrichment sites that contained possibility to produce WMD and in the future there will be many powerful countries.

The interests of the Islamic Umma (the nation of Islam) and the national interests of Iran have been influenced under different presidents and policies. This could be seen through the theoretical approaches such as realist approach adopted by Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, ideological approach by Khamene'i, the pragmatic approach implemented by Rafsanjani, Reformist approach begun with the presidency of Khatami and Achmadinejad was a Principlist.<sup>3</sup>

Based on the third points in the NPT the states had been granted the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, it could be concluded that Iran did not violate this agreement. However, though the Iranian government had repeatedly explained that Iran's nuclear program was mainly for the benefit of peace and progress of the Iranian nation, the attitude of Americans continuing to pressure Iran to made Ahmadinejad question the motive of the US, was so enthusiastic to invite the international community to condemn and force Iran to halt its nuclear development.

Topic discussions about Iran's nuclear which were attractive and given own dynamics on international politics, it should be pointed out that the technology was due to being run by Iran is to create weapons or nuclear bombs have been considered by some quarters as a form of threat for peace stability,

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<sup>2</sup> Nuclear Chronology. See, [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/profiles/iran/nuclear/chronology.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/iran/nuclear/chronology.html), accessed on April 03, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> Fakhreddin Soltani and Reza Ekhtiari Amiri, *Foreign Policy of Iran after Islamic Revolution, Journal of Politics and Law*, Vol. 3, No. 2; September 2010 (Canada: Canadian Center of Science and Education, 2010), pp. 199-200.

although on the other hand, insisted that Iran's nuclear development program ongoing solely for civilian interests of the present and hereafter. Large-scale modernization programs from the military also were carried out by Reza Shah's regime, including on education, industry, and agriculture. Looking at the social structure in Iran, it was relatively weak in its low purchasing power of the community and thus, the state eventually became the initiator the most decisive in the economic development, welfare, and social modernization.<sup>4</sup>

### **1. Shah Reza Pahlevi Regime (1941-1979 and 1979-1980)**

Since the 1950's, Iran has intended to develop nuclear technology. According to the Article IV of the NPT, the content had recognized Iran's "inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful proposes without discrimination, and the acquirement of equipment, materials, and scientific or technological information."<sup>5</sup> Although Iran signed the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, but in 1970s, Tehran begun to pursue an ambitious nuclear power program.

Entering into March 1974, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) as the main official body responsible for implementing regulations and operating nuclear energy installations in Iran. AEOI was established by Shah and as part of his long-termed development program, Shah announced the building of 23.000 Mwe nuclear power plants, to be immediatiately finished in 1994 but in 1979, the contract was stopped because of government reforms, such as:<sup>6</sup>

- a. The US stopped to sending the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
- b. Iran broke the contract with the Eurodif consortium
- c. Iran cut cooperation with the French for the Karun River nuclear power plant which was placed in Darkhovin
- d. Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan cancelled the contract with the Framatome French company after the Islamic revolution (to build two 950 megawatt pressurized reactors at that site)
- e. Iran cancelled the construction of two French power plants. The two power plants built by a West German company were closer to be

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<sup>4</sup> Amin Rais, Pengantar, dalam Syafiq Basri, *Iran Pasca Revolusi: Sebuah Reportase Perjalanan* (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1987), p. 13.

<sup>5</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *loc. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> Nuclear Chronology, *loc. cit*

finished than the French plants, and were supposed to be done on time.

- f. The German Siemens subsidiary Kraftwerk Union (KWU) decided to formally end its contract with Iran to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant
- g. Approximately one-tenth of the tonnage of plant equipment for the Iranian reactor at Bushehr was shipped from West Germany before the project was halted.

Islamic Revolution toppled the Shah's government in February 1979, at that time, Bushehr-1 (reactor 1) was 90% complete and 60% of its equipment had been installed while Bushehr-2 was 50% complete. The Kraftwerk Union would continue its work in all likelihood with the cooperation of the US Corporation Bechtel Power if the joint-venture partners of Islamic revolution in many power plant projects around the world not happened. The government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan had decided that Iran did not need nuclear energy, and therefore the work at Bushehr was halted after the victory of the Revolution in February 1979. The German firm also had left Iran earlier.<sup>7</sup>

#### **1. Seyed Khamene'i (1981-1985 and 1985-1989)**

When the Shah regime was no longer to lead Iran, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Hoseyni Khāmene'i was the new leader of Iran to replace Shah Pahlavi after the Iranian revolution. He took power in Iran and tried to minimize relations with the West, and closed all nuclear energy business. All projects and contracts associated with the Shah's cooperation were no longer valid and all agreements with the US and other foreign companies were cancelled, including the development plans of the 23 remaining nuclear plants. Although the reactor complex at Bushehr was 90% complete but the project experienced technical difficulties and financing. These brought the controversy which experienced significant domestic political change or changes in its regional environment.<sup>8</sup> In the internal debate, several

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<sup>7</sup> Nuclear Overview. See, [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/profiles/iran/1819.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/iran/1819.html), accessed on April 03, 2010.

<sup>8</sup> Patrick Clawson and Michael Eisenstadt, *Agenda: Iran: The Last Resort Consequences of Preventive Military Action against Iran* (Washington DC, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008), p. 6.

parties agreed to construct its nuclear program but not with a large scale, and the reason that another opinion was agreed to develop its program, is because contrary to religious teachings and moral humanity.

When Iran-Iraq war occurred, Iraq bombed Iranian nuclear site to destroy the entire core area of both reactors in Bushehr six times (in March 1984, February 1985, March 1985, July 1986, and twice in November 1987). According to officials of Technischer Ueberwachungsverein Germany's National Reactor Inspectorate, before the bombings, Bushehr-1 would have been complete in about three years. Note, at the time of the bombings, the main equipment was still not installed, and in fact, two steam generators - the heat from the reactors produce steam to use on power generators, were stored in Italy and the pressure vessel for Bushehr-1 was stored in Germany.<sup>9</sup>

## **2. Rafsanjani (1989-1993 and 1993-1997)**

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was new Iranian leader who replaced Khamene'i regime was re-considered the development of nuclear energy as well as re-construction of the sites that had been destroyed in the eight-year war with Iraq. This led to Iran's chronic of electricity deficiency to resume daily activities. Reengineering started from the Buser site but, the presence of US pressured to Kraften company, Argentinian companies, Germany, Spain caused them to refuse a proposal offered by Iran to re-establish cooperation for the completion site in Buser. In 1990, Spain's National Institute of Industry & Nuclear Equipment continued the Buser project.<sup>10</sup>

In the midst of the construction of Iran 1991, the US had expressed concerns over Russia, which had economic relation with Iran and would help to build two reactors and each of them included 440 Megawatt. Since the Iranian-Russian cooperation, the US has never stopped to pressuring Russia to cancel that agreement. In 1994, Iran had cooperation with China to build a reactor with 300

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<sup>9</sup> Muhamad Sahimi, Iran's Nuclear Program, See, <http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/03sahimi.html>, accessed on April 03, 2010.

<sup>10</sup> Middle East Defense News, "The China-Iran Nuclear Cloud," 22 July 1991. See, <http://isis-online.org/country-pages/iran>, accessed on April 13, 2010.

Megawatts. Iran also bought 2 nuclear reactor water power with the power of 300 Megawatts of Esteqlal project.<sup>11</sup>

### **3. Khatami (1997-2001 and 2001-2005)**

Major victory in the presidential election in Iran achieved by Mohamad Khatami in May 1997 was a very extraordinary thing. Mohamad Khatami was a moderate figure, liberal, and open to the west. In 2001, He won the presidential re-elections to strengthen its position in the international arena as well as domestic. Khatami's foreign policy-oriented "Confrontation for Conciliation" and changed the "War of Civilizations" into "Dialogue of Civilizations."<sup>12</sup>

Since May 2003, the Iranian nuclear issue appeared, the Minister of Defence of US accused Iran of having potential to produce many nuclear weapons in the near future. Iranian mass media replied that US was applying double standard on nuclear policy to Iran, because the US and the international community allowed Israel's possession of weapons that threatened the security stability in the Middle East.

The International Atomic Energy Agency had conducted inspection of nuclear reactors in Iran since 1990s, but the IAEA found no evidence of nuclear weapon. Similarly, at the time of examination in 2003 and the IAEA found no signs of Iran producing nuclear weapons. In October of 2003, as the EU and IAEA negotiation, Iran suspended those activities. The situation did not last long, since around July 2004, Iran's known return to uranium enrichment for peaceful purposes to be used to produce electricity for its citizens and not intended to create nuclear weapons.

### **4. Ahmadinejad (2005-2009 and 2009-Now)**

He took a populist approach and was a "principlist" acting politically based on Islamic and revolutionary principles. He said that he would re-start

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<sup>11</sup> Chronology of Iran Nuclear Program, 1957-2007. See, [http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/work/middle\\_east/iranchronology.php](http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/work/middle_east/iranchronology.php), accessed on April 13, 2010.

<sup>12</sup> Laura Neack, *The New Foreign Policy: US and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century* (USA: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 195-196.

uranium enrichment. The Iranian government was steadily continuing its nuclear program because domestic public opinion supported the business development of nuclear technology. Iran had recognized that nuclear weapon was related to national pride, sovereignty and enhance legitimacy. One of Iran's uranium enrichment facility in Natanz area was located approximately 322 kilometers from Tehran.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that Iran had been incorporated into the group of countries that had nuclear technology. Ahmadinejad asked Iranian scientists to immediately conduct uranium enrichment on a massive industrial scale. At the same time, Achmadinejad urged the Western countries to respect Iranian policy to have right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. To convince the West, He also emphasized that there was no evidence showing that Iran's nuclear development program was aimed at developing weapons. There was no agency or other governmental authority and sufficient expertise to investigate this program objectively and impartially. The IAEA had checked Iran's nuclear facilities on a weekly basis, and they did not find anything suspicious.<sup>13</sup>

In addition, none of foreign countries had the right to interfere in Iran's nuclear program because it was entirely a domestic matter. Unlike the US, while the EU and other countries did not feel threatened by the possibility of Iran to developing nuclear technology in dual function, namely to meet the needs of civilian and military. Other countries understood enough that the accusations against Iran did not have a real reason. Developed countries were allowed to build nuclear technology, while Iran was prohibited, this led an injustice for developing countries who intended to enhance in science and technology.

## **B. Capability of Iranian Nuclear Program and it's Significance**

One of Iranian purpose was energy interest and had declared to the public that Iranian nuclear reactors were solely for civilian purpose. Considering the

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<sup>13</sup> Iran declares key nuclear advance. See, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4900260.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4900260.stm), accessed on May 27, 2010.

energy needed for the future, Iran had been thinking about the condition when they no longer depended on energy derived from nature. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton stated concept for national interests: national interests were aims of a country to maintain their survival, independence, and state sovereignty, military security, political, and economics.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, energy in the earth was limited - Iran built nuclear energy as a substitute fuel to support industrial purposes, electricity and energy saving.

To formulate a strategy means considering all possible situations that could be encountered at any time in the future and since had been set and what strategy was to be taken in order to face the realization of any potential problems. As the result of strategy, Iran has accounted all of the risk to protect the country from threats from other country, In the Persian Gulf region, threat perceptions have two categories; first, power capabilities from the military strength of neighbors. Second, threats toward domestic security and stability of the ruling elite emanating from abroad.<sup>15</sup>

Since 1980, Iran has been surrounded by three major international wars in the Middle East (Iran-Iraq in 1980-1988, the Gulf War in 1990-1991, and the Iraq War in 2003). During the Iraq-Iran war in 1985, Iran used the Shahab-1 missile systems in military operations on more than one occasion. In the Iran-Iraq war of 1985, Iran's Shahab-1 launched 13 missiles at Iraq, 26 missiles in 1986 and 1987, and 76 missiles in 1988.<sup>16</sup>

The energy problem was the one of important issues which had been discussed often such as decreasing availability of energy sources, finding new energy sources, developing alternative energies, and the impact of energy use of petroleum on the environment were some of the themes much discussed. Global warming was believed to occur recalling the impact of energy made from petroleum as the main energy source would be finish.

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<sup>14</sup> Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Dictionary*, Trans. Wawan Juanda (USA: Abardin, Rienert and Wistone Inc, 1969), p. 7.

<sup>15</sup> R. Soeprapto, *Hubungan Internasional: Sistem, Interaksi dan Perilaku* (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, 1997), p. 90-91

<sup>16</sup> Shahab-1, See, [http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.180/missile\\_detail.asp](http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.180/missile_detail.asp), accessed on April 10, 2009.

The scarcity of energy had turned oil and gas into important features of global geopolitics. Over a relatively short time period, oil and gas have changed from being merely natural resources, into economic commodities, and have gradually become “political leverage”. Iran’s vast resources have played an important role in its economy and politics. Moreover, in just over a century, Iran’s natural resources have become a fundamental feature of the identity of the Iranian people. The possession of Iranian resources it is conceived by the Iranians to be a part of their nations strength. Nuclear energy function was base on alternative energy consumption in Iran which had been dominated by the use of petroleum and natural gas. In other words, nuclear energy in Iran was the one of the alternatives energy sectors that was expected to increase revenues and improve the Iranian economy. Nuclear program had also been submitted by the Khatami government, as an energy alternative for saving domestic oil and gas consumption, in the energy sector.

Nuclear energy had many applications in medicine, agriculture, industry and they could provide power supply. The most controversial nuclear energy application was the widespread use of nuclear power reactors to produce nuclear weapons. The nuclear industry was divided into two main parts – one designing, developing and installing nuclear-power reactors, and the other providing the fuel of them. The fabrication of nuclear reactor fuel involved with a number of industrial plants.<sup>17</sup>

A country with a nuclear-power program would inevitably acquire the technical knowledge and expertise, and would accumulate the fissile material necessarily to produce nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon proliferation problem should be fully understood. There is a direct link between the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the spread of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Hannes Alven, the Swedish Nobel Prize Winning nuclear physicist, had described the peaceful and military atoms as “Siamese twins.”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Frank Barnaby, *How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s* (London ;Routledge,1993), p. 2.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, p.1.



According to published reports by the IAEA, Hassan from CRS had cited the following nuclear sites which had been declared or were relevant to the implementation of IAEA safeguards:<sup>19</sup>

- a. Teheran: Tehran Nuclear Research Center (1968) was the facility for research reactor and provided by the United States under IAEA safeguards. Supported by AEOI provided research program of Teheran - theoretical physics, and other research and development related to high-energy physics, including particle physics, mathematical physics, astrophysics, theoretical nuclear physics, statistical mechanics, theoretical plasma physics, and mathematics.
- b. Bushehr: Focused on a considerable amount of controversy in the United States.
- c. Isfahan: Nuclear Technology Center. Isfahan was the primary location of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. This was the place for nuclear research center and had 3,000 scientists.
- d. Natanz: Pilot fuel enrichment plant.
- e. Karaj/Karai/Hastgerd: This location was for Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine, and included a dissymmetry laboratory, an agricultural radio chemistry laboratory, and storage-manufacturing facility for chemical weapons.
- f. Lashkar Ab'ad: was to create a pilot laser-enrichment plant and dismantled.
- g. Arak: During a press conference by the representative office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran held in Washington, DC, on August 14, 2002, the existence of a secret nuclear facility at Arak was revealed. It was located at the Qatran Workshop near the Qara-Chai river
- h. Abu Musa Island: Iran held a large number of chemical weapons, principally 115mm artillery shells, in addition to some weaponized biological agents.
- i. Bandar Khomaeni: Manufacturing of chemical weapons.
- j. Damghan: Either a chemical weapons plant or warhead assembly facility. Primarily involved in 155mm artillery shells and SCUD warheads.
- k. Marvdasht: The Chemical Fertilizers Company was suspected to have a manufacturing facility for mustard agents during the Iran-Iraq War.
- l. Parchin: The location of at least one munitions factory and was suspected of being a major chemical weapons production facility.

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<sup>19</sup> Hussein D. Hassan, *Iranian Nuclear Sites* CRS Report for Congress, Order Code: RS22531, (Washington: CRS, 2007), pp. 1-5. See the appendix 1 (table 3) and appendix 2 (table 4) for complete information of the time line Iran's nuclear development, nuclear sites place, the countries that had assisted in building Iranian nuclear sites, and development improvement. And see also appendix 2 (Table 4) for the production result from each sites which had been declared by Iran in 2003.

Reports of uncertain reliability indicated that the plant was in operation no later than March 1988. In April 1997, according to German Federal Intelligence Service, the factories at Parchin produced primary products for chemical warfare agents.

- m. Qazvin: A large pesticide plant at this location was widely believed to produce nerve gas.
- n. Mashar: Iranian opposition groups had made allegations, of uncertain reliability, that a warhead filling facility was operating at this location.

### C. Iranian Security Concern

The management of military security has two aspects. First, concerns in policies to meet threats and risks to security. Second, concern the institutions,<sup>20</sup> Iran's parliament, called for the development of nuclear and other unconventional weapons based on Iran's wartime experience. The importance of such weapons "was made very clear during the (Iran-Iraq) war," Rafsanjani told to the gathering, "We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defense use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons."<sup>21</sup>

The political condition in Middle East as India, Israel, Pakistan never joined the NPT, then China and Russia developed their bombs before the NPT was in placed. Iran was a part of the NPT, but was found in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement and the status of its nuclear program remains in dispute.<sup>22</sup> Injustice was the reason for Iran to continue developing the program either for security, military or civilian.

As the civilian reason, on the below are several reasons why Iran would not rely on its oil and gas resources and move on to develop nuclear energy as an energy substitute.<sup>23</sup>

- a. Fossil energy was limited.
- b. Energy saved for next generations.

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<sup>20</sup> Colin McInnes, The Military Security Agenda, in G. Wyn Rees, ed. *International Politics in Europe, The New Agenda* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 83.

<sup>21</sup> Middle East Defense News, *loc. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi, Iran and Nuclear Geopolitics in the Middle East, See, [http://www.amirahmadi.org/Writing/nuclear%20geopolitics%20vancouver\\_2\\_.pdf](http://www.amirahmadi.org/Writing/nuclear%20geopolitics%20vancouver_2_.pdf), accessed on, December 17, 2009.

<sup>23</sup> Jawaban terhadap pertanyaan-pertanyaan tentang masalah teknologi nuklir damai republik Islam Iran. See, [http://www.iranembassy.or.id/law\\_detail.php?idne=1444](http://www.iranembassy.or.id/law_detail.php?idne=1444), accessed on April 17, 2009.

- c. The environmental consequences were destructive and could not be repaired from the used of fossil fuels.
- d. Expensive prices of new energies such as solar and geothermal.
- e. The high value added in processing crude oil fuel and other fossil fuels. Thousands of products derived from these sources.
- f. To increase necessities of industry, Iran needed more energy.
- g. Demand for electricity would rise (within 20 years of the plan economic, domestic electricity production would reach 120,000 MW per year by the year 2027).
- h. Nuclear energy was multifunction.

Three perspectives of Iran's nuclear program about security concern:<sup>24</sup>

- a. Donald E Nuechterlin about national interest concept. "National interests were defense to protect the citizens and territory or the political system from the threat by another country." According to realism, military doctrine would brought Iran into defensive positions to achieve the objectives which had been set to counteract the potential threat of war from other countries.
- b. In order to protect the country from the war threat, pursuing nuclear weapons was reasonable to the government although it was against to Islam faith.
- c. Its support by influenced of bureaucracy Analysis of Iran's security environment had grown over 30 years. It showed that Iran's pursuit of these interests was to confront the lack of security which always changing at every time.

From McInnes thought, "security was viewed at the level of state - hence the common usage of the term 'national security' and military power involvement was to deter or repel aggression. Nevertheless, this appeared increasingly unsatisfactory both in terms of security level and the range of threats which had addressed. Security was not just a problem of state, but for individuals within a state suffering repression, oppression or a denial of human rights."<sup>25</sup> In the Persian Gulf, states worried about both conventional power threats and neighbors interfering in their domestic politics. For Iran, missile were a strategic option against the enemy and assumed that Iran was a formidable military country. In 2005, precisely on the day of the Iranian military celebration, at that time Iran was

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<sup>24</sup> Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, ed. *The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results*, (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p. 199.

<sup>25</sup> Colin McInnes, *op. cit*, p. 74.

commemorated the victory of 1988. In that commemoration, Iran was displayed the missile of Shihab-3 with the words “Israel should be wiped off the map” and “USA can not do anything”. In following year, the sentence on that missile was changed as “We will trample America under our feet”.<sup>26</sup> Those sentences on the missiles were clear, directly indicated that Iran was against Israel and American intervention in Gulf.

For Iran, Israel was a potential threat, Buzan added that threats often traveled more easily over short distances than over long ones as security is often associated with proximity. Most states fear their neighbours more than distant powers.<sup>27</sup> Geography affected the stability of security and geopolitical of Iran. As a consequence, Iran should increase the security with various ways. Glaser argued “a country seeking security for the convenience of life, and security becomes a primary goal.”<sup>28</sup> In order to seek security and regional power, the Iranian leadership was using following strategies:

- a. Progressively increasing nuclear and missile programs.
- b. Concentration on asymmetric military operations.
- c. Oil as gold and weapon.
- d. Enhancing human resources.

The faith to develop nuclear weapons placed on nuclear geopolitics concept. Dr. Hooshang Amirahdi defined, geopolitics referred to the political significance of places and spaces in international relations. Thus, nuclear geopolitics would mean the spatial distribution of nuclear facilities, its significance and the problem it created, or solutions it offered, for international relations.<sup>29</sup>

Iran situated in an instable and diverse geo-strategic environment. It was surrounded by a number of neighbouring states like Pakistan, Afghanistan,

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<sup>26</sup> Mary Jordan and Karl Vick, “World Leaders Condemn Iranian’s Call to Wipe Israel Off the Map,” *Washington Post*, Friday, October 28, 2005.

<sup>27</sup> Barry Buzan “The Post Cold War Asia Pacific Security Order: Conflict or Cooperation? Andrew Mack and Jhon Ravenhill, ed, in *Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic And security Regimes in The Asia Pacific Region*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 131.

<sup>28</sup> Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relation* (New Jersey: Princeton university Press, 2005), p. 16.

<sup>29</sup> Dr. Hooshang Amirahmadi, *loc. cit.*

Tajikistan, Azerbaijan and Armenia, which are threatened by internal instability due to low-level conflicts between ethnic or religious groups, lawlessness and internal turmoil, which might have dangerous destabilizing spill-over effects for Iran, be it in the shape of refugees, drug trafficking or other forms. Moreover, most Iranian top politicians considered that domestic threats are more serious than external ones. Doubtlessly, the Iranian system faced a number of internal threats which belong to domestic social, economical, political problems that cannot be solved by forceful means.

According to realism, Iran sought material power and capabilities in order to survive in an uncertain and anarchic world. Militaries, industry, natural resources, strategically - endowed land or territory, populations, and economic wealth were all manifestations of such material power and capabilities. Iran had predicted that there would be a conventional arms race in the Middle East region. In addition, one of Iran's objectives in the nuclear weapons field was also preparing to develop long-range means of delivery system to strike the targets within and beyond the Greater Middle East.

Iran achieved its aims to become a regional nuclear atomic power; it would have a significant impact to the military power distribution and would open the new Iranian armed forces. The neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria would seek individually or jointly develop similar weapon systems. According what Iran concerned, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff said that in realism thought, 'balance of power' and 'security dilemma' concepts in international relations were competition to maintain the power of a state in an anarchic international environment to get prestige.<sup>30</sup> Closely related to Iran realist assumptions regarding concepts such as sovereignty and anarchy - there was no superior governing authority, and the sovereign independent states had to struggle to secure their own interest.<sup>31</sup> The Iranian government did not like the presence of Western intervention. Hence, Iran should strive to become a power. The intention

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<sup>30</sup> Michael Sheehan, *Balance of Power: History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 4-5.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8.

of security concern had remained unchanged since two centuries ago, though US had made Iran feel alienated to the international community.

#### **D. Iranian Official Position**

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was supported by the United States as the king of Iran from 1941-1979. In 1979, Richard Nixon (1969-1974) requested the Iran assistance to deter threat of communism without direct intervention from the US. In other words, America helped Iran to become a strong state. Arrived in 1979, Iran became more independent without any interference from the US and as time went by, Iran had prowess in the military field which has been proved by the existence of nuclear weapons. In the Western's view, security considerations dominated the debate on nuclearization. For instance below have been identified three main reasons for a possible covert for Iranian military nuclear program:<sup>32</sup>

- a. Israel was allowed to have nuclear weapons.
- b. Iraq also had a nuclear weapon in 1980.
- c. Threat from the US was perceived by the Iranians.

This perception led to considerations of the West, about whether Iran was planning to leave NPT and had some assumptions that Iran could produce a nuclear bomb within six months. According to Iranian political elite, it was over 30 years of Iranian adopted American double standard, that means in terms of nuclear energy was forced to follow by Western rules, not to the international laws as the priority. Ahmadinejad identified international stance against Iran's nuclear development as 'nuclear apartheid'. Contrary to the (foreign) policy orientation, the nuclear issue in Iran was not dominated by factionalism.

The Iranian government still retained the answer, denied a nuclear weapons programme, and claimed that its main priority for the civilian purpose which proposed to generate the electricity to meet future energy demands.

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<sup>32</sup> Shen Dingli, *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Test China's Wisdom*, in *The Washington's Quarterly* (The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006), pp. 55-66.

However, there were four reasons why Iran was not willing to depend on fossil fuel reserves:<sup>33</sup>

- a. Iran would become a net importer of crude oil and some of its by-products if energy continued to be used in the present form.
- b. Domestic use of local fossil fuels would drastically affect Iran's foreign exchange earnings from export of crude oil and natural gas.
- c. Fossil fuels were better used in petrochemical and other processing industries to generate greater added the values.
- d. Increasing reliance on fossil fuels would have a serious environmental impact.

Iranian nuclear desire or at least to be in the position of “nuclear ambiguity” that Israel and (before 1994) South Africa had, was not to launch the missiles against its foes the day after it acquired them, but to strengthen its political and diplomatic hand across West Asia. Iran wanted, in a phrase, to be the “indispensable regional power” in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and much of central Asia, as well as in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict.<sup>34</sup> Four legal documents for Iran continuing nuclear activities were:

- a. IAEA: IAEA allocated its budget to study nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The recommended budget was set in article 3.
- b. NPT: NPT member states had rights to develop nuclear energy for non-military purposes. The Article 5 of the NPT refused the monopoly of nuclear knowledge in certain countries. Iran was member of the NPT and started applying the rules since 1974
- c. Safeguard Agreement: The Iranian government signed a document, which had registered in 1973 under document number INFICIRC/214 on secretariat IAEA. In Article 4, the agreement provided that implementation of this agreement must be in nature which could not prevent the development of technical or economic and international cooperation regarding Iran's nuclear activities peaceful.
- d. Additional Protocol: (93 +2), On December 18, 2003, Iran signed the additional protocol and started implementing temporary and voluntary. Information published by the IAEA showed that up in October 2006, only 110 countries had signed the additional protocol, and only 78 countries began to implement it. Some members did not sign the NPT additional protocol.

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<sup>33</sup> Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, *The Iranian Nuclear Challenge*, *International Affairs*, Volume 80, Issue 2, p. 258. See, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00382.x/references>, accessed on April 10, 2010.

<sup>34</sup> Iran, See, <http://www.globalissues.org/article/696/iran>, accessed on January 13, 2009.

The four documents mentioned above - the right to develop nuclear weapons was restricted and not banned, even supported and encouraged. The IAEA must continuously supervise to the energy development of a country to prevent the transition into military intentions. Development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was the classic excuse used to cover the proliferation of nuclear weapons for security purposes (to protect his country against threats from other countries). It had been mentioned in previous paragraphs that, each country is vying to increase their prestige and dignity in the international arena in accordance with their capabilities. For Iranian leaders, the significance of international legitimacy as a way of validating their quests for nuclear capability and argued that the ruling Clerics had customers using western opposition to Iran's nuclear courses to generate nationally unity and purpose usage inside Iran on the base of upholding Iranian prestige and national honorariums (Ezzat e Melli).<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Bahman Baktiari, Seeking International Legitimacy: Understanding the Dynamics of Nuclear Nationalism in Iran, in Yudith S. Yaphe (ed), *Nuclear Politics in Iran*, (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategy Studies National Defense University Press, May 2010), p. 19.



### **CHAPTER III**

## **THE AMERICAN POLICY TOWARDS THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT**

“The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists will grow in strength and gain a new recruit. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons.”

Speech of President George W. Bush when presenting  
the new strategy to resolve the conflict in Iraq.  
January 10, 2007.<sup>1</sup>

#### **A. The Viewpoint and Concerns of the United States**

Political relations between Iran and the US began in the mid-to-late 19<sup>th</sup> century. To guarantee the US economy remain stable, the US heavily dependent on oil supplies from the Middle East. Since then, an era of close alliance between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s regime and the American government was followed by a dramatic reversal and hostility between the two countries after the 1979. Since then, US foreign policies toward Iran tended to be unilateral and confrontational, US considered that Iran was a threat and as an obstacle to establishment of peace and stability in the Middle East region. Iran was accused of supporting terrorism groups and developing WMD. All the policies adopted by the US against Iran were the desires of US to fulfill its interests particularly, considered the impact of lost control over oil supply from Iran, recalling that the US were heavily dependent on oil to support stabilization of US economy.

#### **1. Cold War Era**

Cold War was the designation for a period where the conflict, high tension and competition among the US (and its allies called Western) and the Soviet Union (Eastern) which occurred in 1947 to 1991. The foreign policy of a country was a merger and a reflection of domestic politics, and influenced by regional or

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<sup>1</sup> President’s Address to the Nation, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html>, accessed on March 14, 2010.

international situation. Likewise, the foreign policy of US was inseparable from a variety of factors such as, geography, resources, and strategic values.

The US and Islamic Republic of Iran relations during the cold war period were the US main interest to preserve Iran's independence from the Soviet Union threat. During Cold War within the bipolar world framework, the US feared the Soviet expansionism. Therefore, Iran helped the US to resist Soviet pressure of Afghanistan and penetration of the Middle East. During the Shah regime, Washington and Teheran enjoyed the close and warm relations on economic-political levels. Many US policy makers felt gratitude for Iranian support in various Cold War crises.<sup>2</sup> The big arms transfer between Washington and the Pahlavi regime was indicative of their friendship.

Anyway, the situation changed after the fall of Shah. Iran regarded the US as the 'great Satan' and Israel as the 'Little Satan.' The Ayatollah regime engaged in series of violations of international law.<sup>3</sup> For example, from November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981, 55 hostages American diplomats that were captured by Iranian Islamic students were held for 444 days. The crisis followed this seizure created a near state of war, ruined Jimmy Carter's presidency, and began an environment of hostility between America and Iran that was continues to this day. Samuel Huntington in "an inter-civilizational quasi war" has been occurred in the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, which was a turning point for US-Iranian relations.

In Realist perspective, during the Cold War had been awarded several perspectives concerning US relations and Iran were always contradictory. According to the realism have some similarities between Iran and the US as follows:<sup>4</sup>

- a. Both of them changing the behaviours more appropriate with the situation.
- b. The fundamental relation was in deep mutual mistrust since 1980.

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<sup>2</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the Twenty First Century* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), p. 196.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Realism and US-Iran Relations. See, [http://www.us-iran-relations.com/web\\_documents/realism\\_and\\_us\\_iran\\_relations\\_pdf.pdf](http://www.us-iran-relations.com/web_documents/realism_and_us_iran_relations_pdf.pdf), accessed on March 8, 2009

- c. Iran gradually started to seek the power in region which was indicated by the Iranian nuclear program for military means and had potential threaten the US and Israel security (security dilemma).
- d. The rational actor as the main actor in international politic stage.
- e. The policy was depended on rational actor behaviour and international political system.

The end of the Cold War, the US as the sole super power had accompanied by heated debate among politicians and policy makers regarding to the character of foreign policy which would adopted on Post Cold War. In an uncertain and transitional situation, the presence of US was absolutely necessary to prevent dictator regime, oppression, and violations of human rights. The Assumption in international system was in uni-polar conditions. If the US kept maintaining the sole of power in international politics, it would drain US energy. The US should take the burden sharing with other powers; for example, the raise of European Union has proved that the US was no longer to act as the only super power.

## **2. Post Cold War Era**

The hostility between US and Iran never stopped until the Post Cold War era. In addition, the US stressed of geo-political strategies of Iran. The matter made it difficult for the US to move freely to establish relations with other Middle East countries. Moreover, the US was strongly against Iranian technology development particularly on nuclear programs, whether for civilian purpose or military means. To decrease the anxieties, Clinton tried to implemented trade sanctions which had been listed on Executive Order, including nuclear-related technologies on Iran. This policy aimed to prevent the local power growing into a regional power.

The US also attempted to hold off Iran's attack Israel. Politically, the hostility between Iran and Israel deliberately done because Iran was intended to subvert the US ally in the Middle East. Hence, The US foreign policy toward Iran in beginning of Post Cold War era was focused on following specific issues:<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> T. Clifton Morgan, Dina Al-Sowayal, Carl Rhodes, "Unlocking the Assets: Energy and The Future of Central Asia and The Caucasus" *United State Policy Toward Iran: Can Sanctions Work*, The James A. Baker III, Institute for Public Policy of Rice University, April 1998.

- a. To stop Iran pursuing nuclear weapons.
- b. To create an atmosphere that would accelerate a regime change.
- c. Iran suspected of supporting terrorism movements such as Hezbollah.
- d. Iran rejected the legitimacy of Israeli sovereignty, territories, ideology and peoples.
- e. Efforts to acquire technology, materials, and assistance were necessary to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and the missile capability threaten US and Israel.

Moreover, the previous administration and Clinton addressed that Iran as a sponsor of terrorism, opposition to Middle East Peace Process, and having poor human rights record. Therefore, the US offered the EU to join the embargo toward Iran but unfortunately, the EU had refused and said that the US policy was wrong. Another concern to the US security policy, when Ayatollah Rafsanjani statement in October 1988, and announced to encourage Iranian people, that:

“We (for Iranian) should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on, you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task.”<sup>6</sup>

Referring to Morgenthau thought of the moment of Post Cold War, “the anarchic character of the international system forced him.”<sup>7</sup> Accidentally, after Iran-Iraq war, geopolitical character of the Middle East became sensitive on security issues whereupon, the Iranians should prepare all of the attributes to deter the various threats either domestic or external threats in order to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty. In the Abarar daily Newspaper, on October 23, 1991, it had noted Iran intentions which were raised by the Vice President of Iran Mohajerani that deliberately aimed to Israel and US:

“Because the enemy has nuclear facilities, the Moslem states too should be equipped with the same capacity.”<sup>8</sup>

Through that statement, the US accounted the situation. Hence, the US was trying to block Iranian to had cooperation with other country on the nuclear

<sup>6</sup> Anthony Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, *Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race?* (United States: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009), p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, (Revised) by Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Brief ed., (United States: McGraw-Hill, 1985).

<sup>8</sup> Anthony Kairouz, *Nuclear Iran: A Prelude to WWII* (Indiana: Author House, 2007), p. 78.

technology field, in this regard, the Republican Congress might passed the Bill which was proposed by Senator Alfonse D'Amato to close the market of foreign companies. Then, this economic pressure had affected many countries including the Czech Republic, Argentina, and India while Russia and China ignored the US pleas. This US unilateral measure was intended to ban Iranian imports, strict export controls, and the prohibition of foreign aid and credit loans to alienated Iran from nuclear technology such as material, and all of nuclear components. Those of sanctions were intends to prevent Iran from develop military means.<sup>9</sup>

In other efforts in order to achieve the Middle East interest, the Clinton administration invited Iran to be involved into discussions which were appropriate to outstanding issues that being concerned both parties. This invitation intended to break the frozen situation. The goal was to develop a road map that would lead to normal relation but if it was not successful, the economic sanctions would never be revoke until Teheran changed its policies on certain issues as listed on bellow:

- a. Iran was suspected of supporting terrorism movements such as Hizbollah.
- b. Iran rejected the legitimacy of Israel, sovereignty, territories, ideology and peoples.
- c. Nuclear technology concerned for military means.

### **3. George W. Bush Government**

The first time George W. Bush entered to the White House, He had been greeted with great tragedy of 9/ 11. This reflected the main threat had just perceived; hence, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and non-proliferation was listed on the American political and security agenda.<sup>10</sup> In the US National

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<sup>9</sup> Executive Orders 12957 and 12959 of 1995 prohibit US trade and investment in Iran. Executive Order 13059 (1997) further tightened the ban. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 prohibits foreign or domestic "entities" from investing in the development of Iran's petroleum resources. The prohibition covers exploration, extraction, refining, and transportation by pipeline.

<sup>10</sup> Nuclear Capability or Weapons, State Sponsored Terrorism, Backing of Insurgency in Iraq and Threat to Stability in the Middle East, Threat to Israel, Oil Prices Human Rights "Concern."

Security Strategy (NSS) 2002<sup>11</sup> mentioned in a statement against terrorism, as a follow:<sup>12</sup>

“Just three days removed from these events, Americans do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth, deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing.”

The struggle against international terrorism was different from any other war in US history.<sup>13</sup> That statement was a pivot of American security policy to combat terrorism as the new type of war. This referred to various political, legal, and military acts as ‘preemptive war.’ Summarizing the reasoning behind these changes, security policy was usually motivated by fear and the measures to be sought depended of the threat perceived.<sup>14</sup> Kilcullen argued, “It lacks differentiation between the entities use terrorism, the tactic itself, and the phenomenon as a social system.”<sup>15</sup> This war was like a fictional story, hard to gather the facts and moved slowly to combat the phenomenon, and many obstacles faced when finding the cause.

American regarded Iran as an obstacle of the interest. However, in order to limit Iranian space movement, the US immediately developed the mechanisms and policy components to deter the security threat of US and Israel. Because of it, President Bush announced that issue to the American citizens and International community, that:<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The National Security Strategy of the US is the strategy document which aimed to prevent and to handle the threats that threaten the US citizen, security either directly or indirectly.

<sup>12</sup> President Bush Delivers Remarks on the War on Terror. See, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/05/AR2006090500656.html>, accessed on accessed on May 1, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of United States of America 2003, p. 1. See, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html>, accessed on accessed on May 1, 2009.

<sup>14</sup> Chittick, W. Pingel, *American foreign policy: A Framework for Analysis* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2006), p. 201.

<sup>15</sup> David Kilcullen, *Countering Global Insurgency. The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (London: Routledge Publisher 2005), p. 592.

<sup>16</sup> President Bush Delivers Remarks on the War on Terror. See, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/05/AR2006090500656.html>, accessed on March 14, 2010.

“... The world’s free nations will not allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon”. Violent Islamic radicalism “oppose(s) the advance of freedom in the region. Imagine a world in which they were able to control governments, a world awash with oil and they would use oil resources to punish industrialized nations. And, they would use those re-sources to fuel their radical agenda, and pursue to purchase weapons of mass murder. And armed with nuclear weapons, they would blackmail the free world, and spread their ideologies of hate, and raise a mortal threat to the American people ... I’m not going to allow this to happen.”

The effect of 9/11 was shifted to Iran, apparently, with what has been announced by Bush has provoked the situation which Iran was accused of developing nuclear weapons. However, the American war was solely in defense of self or its allies. Regarding the development and sophistication of the Iranian nuclear technology, it was considered by US to have passed within reasonable limits. It was because Iran was capable to produce uranium substance in large scale. Because of it, Iran was regarded as the metaphorical factor which had an influential factor as the personification of terrorism and labeling the enemies who might had potential threat. Although sometimes they were not addressed to Iran directly but confrontation and isolation were two strategies to stabilize the Persian Gulf in order to promote American interest. This strategy, at least, had a gain partly based on underlying ideologies.

“Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but no different moralities.”<sup>17</sup>

“In the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately fighting for our democratic values and way of life.”<sup>18</sup>

To reinforce the strategy of US against the potential threat, then the NSS 2002 stated that:

“We will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defence by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country ....”<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002. p. 3. See, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>, accessed on April 8, 2010.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, p. 7.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 6-12.

To prevent attacks by terrorist group, the US government has no higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. The US will launch military's ways against terrorist movements. Hence forth, the hard core terrorists cannot be deterred or reformed; they must be tracked down, killed, or captured. In sum, the US would never let it occur in twice."<sup>20</sup>

Then, in regard, the possession of Iran-WMD was clandestine, the NSS 2006 had claimed that; "The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our (American) national security." For this reason, nuclear weapons hold special appeal to rogue states and terrorists. However, this had been reflected a threat of the assessment:

"The United States may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran. For almost 20 years, the Iranian regime hid many of its key nuclear efforts from the international community. Yet the regime continues to claim that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranian regime's true intentions are clearly revealed by the regime's refusal to negotiate in good faith; its refusal to come into compliance with its international obligations by providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites and resolving troubling questions; and the aggressive statements of its President calling for Israel to "be wiped off the face of the earth"<sup>21</sup>

Generally, the American strategy was intended to isolate Iran economically and politically, and to ensure that its nuclear program was used for civilian purposes. Internationally, the case of Iran had been dominated by a two-track approach, consisting of negotiations and a sanctions regime. Additionally, the Iranian case was a challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to its instruments, and thus pointing out necessary changes in the structure of the regime itself.

In order to understand the US national interests, it was important to analyze the goals and objectives within the setting of the conflict with Iran. 'National Interest' are a country's interest concerning a certain issue derived from its social values, history and political stands. Consequently, it is a very broad and easily blurred concept which is fundamentally influenced by national leadership.

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<sup>20</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006, p. 12. See, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>, accessed on April 8, 2010.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, p. 20.



In this matter, the realism between the two governments had deep misunderstanding because they had lack of communication, bad historical background, different thoughts, and misperceptions.

Iran merely intended to look at the common interests and explored the opportunities to see the serious and honest approach with mutual respect that does not intend to harm Iran and enjoy the bilateral relations although much problem remains that should resolve by them including their behaviours. Yet the predominant approach towards foreign affairs under the present Bush administration is realist and hence geared to maintain US dominance. This approach was illustrated by one article in the realist journal for international affairs, *The National Interest*. It outlined the US approach towards rising powers and new international players:<sup>22</sup>

“They (rising powers) can directly challenge the United States for international leadership, leading to conflict, or they can integrate into the existing liberal order, leading to a peaceful evolution in which rising powers adapt to the American system, rather than make fundamental modifications to it. The future of world politics then is either systemic conflict or eventual assimilation.”

According to this doctrine, the rapprochement towards countries like Iran was relatively obvious: either Iran adapted to the US - led Western system of ‘liberal democracy’ or there would be open conflict. Even though that approach had been formulated by a non-governmental organization, it was in fact very close to the approach maintained by the Bush administration and the foreign policy had been heavily influenced by Natan Sharansky:<sup>23</sup>

“The classical though hardly new reformed discourse of neocolonialism, which justified occupation based on the need of establishing tutelage over childlike populations. The worn-out concept of ‘civilizing mission’ replaced with ‘democratization.’”

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<sup>22</sup> Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber, *A World Without the West*, ed. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, *The National Interest*, No. 90, July/ August, 2007 (Washington DC: The National Interest, Inc., 2007), p. 23.

<sup>23</sup> “If you want a glimpse of how I think about foreign policy, read Natan Sharansky’s book,” ‘The Case for Democracy,’ See, [http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/22/politics/22diplo.html?\\_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1205230374-5kh10zka0jP+O7/hn/Sz8w](http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/22/politics/22diplo.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1205230374-5kh10zka0jP+O7/hn/Sz8w), accessed August 8, 2010.

The main theme in Sharansky's ideology was the justification of militant means in order to forcefully 'democratize' other sovereign nations. In fact, it was an argument to justify preventive warfare. The combination of the above, mentioned belief in the superiority of liberal democracy and Sharansky's arguments for forceful democratization shed light on contemporary US foreign policy. In fact, the Bush administration might argue along those lines in order to legitimize preventive military intervention in Iran.

In terms of Multilateral Peace Operations<sup>24</sup> become skeptical when Bush began to lead the US, it should preside over the two largest international nation-building exercises since the end of the Second World War. As the administration entered its eighth and final year, the effort to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq and Afghanistan continued to dominate America's global agenda, overshadowing many other pressing foreign policy and national security concerns. Through a painful experience, the administration belatedly concluded that the United States needed new doctrines, strategies, and capabilities to help restore peace and assist recovery in war-torn societies. It had also adapted for more pragmatic, less ideological view of the UN, recognizing that the world body was an indispensable (albeit imperfect) vehicle to address protracted conflicts and peace building challenges that the US had an interest in resolving but was disinclined to address on its own.<sup>25</sup> Realist perspectives were not intended to impede the cooperation between countries. However, Realism merely suggested that cooperation was less likely and more difficult to achieve than the suggestions of other theories. Alliances and cooperation were likely to be fleeting and based on material or shared strategic interests rather than on ideas, values, or norms.<sup>26</sup>

America had two roles which are ordinarily known as hegemonic superpower and 'world policeman,' it had been traced by history and rooted in old

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<sup>24</sup> Statement by the Press Secretary, President Clinton has signed the New Peacekeeping Policy. The policy supported by Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.

<sup>25</sup> Stewart Patrick, *A Return to Realism? The United States and Global Peace Operations since 9/11*, *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 133.

<sup>26</sup> Chittick, W. Pingel, *loc .cit.*

value. These depended on who was the leader, what were the priorities, and what kind of the ideology applied to engage an interest. A contextual deconstruction of the main US interests in Iran and the region showed that the applied categories of values, norms, and interests were blurry and intermingled. American foreign policy was clearly not solely a reflection of US interests. However, there was a process of projecting American domestic values onto the international stage, as an attempt to set a general scale for evaluation. The investigation into underlying norms and values were complicated by the lack of adequate measures. The debate of values and interests were the main competing elements.

So far, the US and the UNSC followed a strategy of economic isolation and sanctioning. After the IAEA's renewed concerns about the uranium enrichment program in Iran at the end of February 2008, the UNSC passed a resolution enforcing the third round of economic sanctions against Iran. In the meantime, the Iranian Foreign Minister attacked the Security Council on the legitimacy of the sanctions. In a letter to the Security Council, Manouchehr Mottaki claimed:<sup>27</sup>

“...all the so-called justifications and flawed foundations for the UN Security Council's action on this issue are vanished and it shows that the resolutions ... lack any legal and technical justifications. (...) Naturally the continuation of this trend (of sanctions) would undermine the credibility of the Security Council and ... weaken the integrity and position of the IAEA.”

It had been mentioned in previous paragraphs; Iran was prohibited to develop nuclear technology for military purposes. Between US and Iran, both of them claimed to act appropriately with international law in order to increase their support. In regards to the US - the reason that the Bush administration turned away from unilateral solutions towards multilateral attempts to solve the problem. In order to perform the sanctions, Bush needed broad support for his cause, but ever since the disastrous developments in Iraq, American ‘soft power’ and US legitimacy was in decline. The US could unilaterally destroy many people and

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<sup>27</sup> Louis Charbonneau, “Iran tells UN. Council sanctions aren't legal.” See, <http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/02/28/africa/oukwd-uk-iran-nuclear.php>, accessed on July 27, 2010.

things in Iran, but could not change the character or activities of the Iranian government. Nor physically negate all of Iranian potential including all of relevant facilities, equipment, material, the scientist and knowledge to make nuclear weapons. Even if the US intended to destroy those things, it is impossible to conducted without international support.

On the other side, Germany, Great Britain, and France (Called EU) in 2003 begin to negotiate with Iran. Unity of these three countries would seek to obtain objective guarantees of the purely peaceful intentions of Iran's nuclear program. Generally, Global management and multilateral cooperation were perceived to be crucial for tackling the problem of proliferation. For this reason, dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue was compartmentalized into a multilateral and a unilateral approach. Therefore:

“The United States has joined with our EU partners and Russia to pressure Iran to meet its international obligations and provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided”<sup>28</sup>

When the multilateral approach had already implemented, an emphasis on Iran through power projection in the containment of military assets was followed in order to implement the efficacy of unilateral sanctions though, this measure had raised many debate and could decrease the diplomatic efforts. To avoid this matter, they should be able to distinguish between objectives and means to achieve those goals. The way which was selected should be more appropriate to the frame of the constitution and democratic value, in accordance with the calculations that have been calculated previously.

In 2003, Paris agreement had been agreed by Iran without any legal obligation and voluntary. Suddenly, in November 2004, the Iranian official had decided that they preferred not to follow that agreement. Iran did not respect the position of EU that had been waited until after the Achmadinejad victory election in 2005 of. After more than two years of intensive inspections, the IAEA concluded that Iran violated its international obligations, and to date, it was still

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<sup>28</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006, *op. cit*, p. 20.

not able to answer the remaining open questions. Deciding to bring Iran to the UN Security Council in 2006 was initially aimed at reasserting the IAEA's authority so that by generating political pressure, Iran expected that to comply with the appeals made by the Board of Governors of IAEA's.

EU +China, Russia, and the US (so called P5+1) in June 2006, that Iran would suspend its uranium enrichment. EU representative Javier Solana presented a new offer of incentives and sanctions to Iran.<sup>29</sup> Despite the continuation of talks and commitment between Solana and Iran, there were no results to date. A new proposal was offered by P5+1 which was not described in details for Iran to stop all of enrichment activities. However, the proposal did not preclude the future possibility that Iran could eventually develop indigenous enrichment capabilities; once, all outstanding questions had been resolved and international confidence had been restored as well in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.

Iran showed a lack of clarity on each element within the P5+1 ideas and objects as a fact of the P5+1 proposal 'mute' on the issue. Despite its enrichment was included within the scope of peaceful uses of the atom which recognized as the legitimate by P5+1. Iran was contrary to the Security Resolutions as coercive measures that were inconsistent with the concept of negotiation. Those assessments were opposed to the Iranian which they wanted to have and recognized as "inalienable" in term of developing nuclear energy. It should be without pressure and had written on the P5+1 proposal on June 12, 2006.<sup>30</sup>

For those matters, US sought the geo-strategic/ politics and would be more profitable solely to complete the US national interests which affected the political situation in that region, includes geo-political interests, security interests, and economic interests. In sum, the US tried to play down the potential proliferation of WMD and long-range missiles that threatened peace. Security is a sensitive question for US discussion, it happened that Iranian behavior which had been

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<sup>29</sup> Iran Focus, 2006. See, <http://www.iranfocus.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=7946>, accessed on March 14, 2009.

<sup>30</sup> Islamic Republic of Iran, "Islamic Republic of Iran's Response to the Package Presented on June 6, 2006." See, <http://isis-online.org/publications/iran/responsetext.pdf>, accessed on March 14, 2009.

judged mainly and was based on opposition to the peace process of Arab-Israel or Israel-Palestine, and support the terrorist groups. The policy series towards Iran can be changed or expanded, either Iran would obey the international law under control of US, or the American would be able to serve Iran with economic sanctions and military act.

#### **B. The United States Policy Responses under the Bush government**

In order to further a political objective, countries may unilaterally or as part of a coalition to take measures on economic or military sanctions, therefore this matter can threaten the diplomatic relation. The measures purposed were in order to elicit a change of their behavior (to obey under the control). US Policy was influenced by sterile environment conditions. The challenge for foreign policy makers was, when they must respond to other policies create a new policy which should account for the situation and risk. The issued policies by Iran were a policy that merged among religion, politics, and nationalism. To respond Iranian policy, the US foreign policy makers generally considered this matter as an intellectual exercise to develop policies that would be used as a strategy.<sup>31</sup> Several options had been provided on the table, the policy makers should formulated and calculated the risk as preparation to deter the problem that would come in the future.

Pre-emptive strike Instrument planned by the White House on NSS 2002 had shown the strength of US military instruments to respond the security issues. US Strategy now enhanced with pre-emptive an attack, defensive intervention and deterrence, to counteract abruptly attack such last 9/11. However, to response the 9/11, preemption against rogue states and terrorist groups had been elevated to official US doctrine. To face this challenge, Washington engaged directly by using diplomatic solution but only under the right conditions associated with the resolution of American and international concerns on Iran's nuclear development.

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<sup>31</sup> Daniel Coast and Charie Robb, *Meeting the Challenge: US Policy toward Iranian Nuclear Development* (Washington: Bipartisan Policy Center, September 1, 2008), p. 2.

While a ‘grand bargain’ resolved all issues between Washington and Tehran, it would be an attractive outcome.

According to international relation systemic tools, Daniel Coast and Charles Robb also had the thought the recommendation of US policy toward Iran on their paper:<sup>32</sup>

- a. Alliance building  
The alliance between EU and US should motivate China and Russia to join with the US against Iranian nuclear program.
- b. Leverage Building  
Both of unilateral and multilateral sanctions should be built when the states and international organizations enlarged the leveraged. This conducted before and during any diplomatic approach.
- c. Diplomatic Engagement  
To practice communication active and negotiation could establish new policy that more effective for two parties.
- d. If Diplomacy Did Not Succeed  
It should compose new strategy and policy, and impose intensive sanctions
- e. Military Options  
Kinetic action was served to encourage diplomatic leverage to present military strength in the Middle East.

## 1. Cold War Era

During 1971-1979, during the Cold War, to counter the influence of Soviet and to strengthen the power, the US established alliance with Iran that led by Shah as “Policeman of the Gulf.”<sup>33</sup> During the glorious of Shah, the US was Iran’s foremost economic and military partner, the mark with the provision of a nuclear reactor as a friendship symbol between the two countries. US supported Infrastructure and Industries become modern with 30.000 American expatriates residing in country as technical, consulting, or teaching capacity. On November 4, 1979, the revolutionary group Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s line conducted demonstrations to topple the regime of the Shah. The students held 55 American diplomats for 444 days. This was a sudden blow to the US. The effects of this revolution were immortal damage diplomatic relations particularly on

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<sup>32</sup> Daniel Coast and Charie Robb, *op. cit*, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> Christopher C Joyner, *The Persian Gulf, Lessons for Strategy, Law and Diplomacy* (United States: Greenwood press, 1990), p. 129.

economic field. In November 1979, it was the first time that US dressed Iran unilateral sanctions. Then on November 14, 1979 the US President had announced immediately:<sup>34</sup>

“ .... find that the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.”

With the Executive Order 12170, Jimmy Carter addressed to block Iranian government property and to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States referred to in that Order. In furtherance of the objective, UNSCR 461 (1979) adopted on December 31, 1979 said that:<sup>35</sup>

“Urgently calls upon, the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of the embassy of United States of America being held at Teheran, to provide them with the protection and allow them to leave the country.”

On April 7, 1980, after the revolution was in success, the United States declared broke diplomatic relations with Iran. The US President, Jimmy Carter responded immediately to the assault and hostage crisis by issuing Proclamation 4702 which was declared by the President:<sup>36</sup>

“ ..... That recent developments in Iran have exacerbated the threat to the national security posed by imports of petroleum and petroleum products. Those developments underscore the threat to our national security which results from our reliance on Iran as a source of crude oil. The Secretaries have recommended that I take steps immediately to eliminate the dependence of the United States on Iran as a source of crude oil.”

Hereinafter, the US imposed a ban on the importation of Iranian oil and took another sanction as froze about \$12 billion of Iranian assets (including bank deposits, gold and other properties).<sup>37</sup> Economic sanctions had limited commercial relations between two countries and greatly restricted the development of petroleum resources located in Iran. Situation in Iran was a

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<sup>34</sup> Executive Order 12170 of November 14, 1979 - Blocking Iranian Government Property.

<sup>35</sup> Resolution 457 (1979) of December 04, 1979 and Resolution 461 (1979) of December 31, 1979.

<sup>36</sup> Proclamation 4702 – prohibition for imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products from Iran, November 12, 1979.

<sup>37</sup> Rahmatullah Khan, *Iran-United States Claims Tribunal - Controversies, Cases, and Contribution* (Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990), p.35.



unusual threat toward national security, foreign policy, and economic of the US and through the Executive Order 12205 as furtherance of the objectives of UNSCR 461 (1979) then according to the threat national security, foreign policy, and economy of the US, hence, on this policy the US has banned Iran on:<sup>38</sup>

- a. The sale, supply, or other transfer.
- b. The shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway, or other land transport.
- c. Any transaction involving in Iran, an Iranian governmental entity, an enterprise controlled by Iran, an Iranian governmental entity, or any person in Iran: (making available any new credits or loans, payment, transfer of fund)

Not longer after the sanctions were issued, Iran was back in action on January 19, 1984, the US had found that Iran was involved in bombing of US embassy and killed 247 Marines barracks in Lebanon in October 1983<sup>39</sup>, and another case, Iran had killed 37 sailors and damaged Kuwaiti tankers with US flag.<sup>40</sup> Through this act, the Secretary of State George Shultz had labeled Iran “terrorism list.” The policy for terrorism stated that, Iran was prohibited to received US foreign assistance and credits. In 1986, a ban on US sales of items on the Munitions Control List, and imposed strict requirements for the licensing of US exports of dual use items to Iran the Export Administration Act (EAA). In addition, the US will ask strongly to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) not to lend money for Iran.<sup>41</sup>

Four years after Iran-Iraq war occurred, they were suspected of producing nuclear weapons and other sophisticated military equipment that had potential as a balance of American power. US government applied policy of Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, 1992 which governing the following provisions:<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Executive Order 12205 of April. 7, 1980 - Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Iran.

<sup>39</sup> Congressional Record, Proceeding and Debates of the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress First Session, Volume 152 - Part 11, p. 15146.

<sup>40</sup> Jhon Richard Thackrah, *The Routledge Companion to Military Conflict Since 1945* (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 120.

<sup>41</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Iran: US Policies and Options*, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code: 97-231 F (Washington: CRS, January 14, 2000), p. 5

<sup>42</sup> The National Authorization Act to Fiscal Year 1993, Vinal Version (Enrolled Bill) as passed by Houses, HR5006/ Public Law: 102-484 (10/23/92), Title XVI--Iran-Iraq Arms Non-proliferation Act of 1992.

- a. Opposed for any transfer to Iran-Iraq of any goods or technology related with chemical, biological and kept maintaining the control of them.
- b. denial of export licenses for United States persons and prohibitions on United States Government sales

That policy was to contribute nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementations of guidelines for nuclear control and nuclear-related exports. These policies were applied to state or non-nuclear state, and internationally regulated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Other arrangements on nuclear regime was listed on Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) which aimed to prevent destabilizing accumulations of arms and sensitive of dual-use equipment and technologies that may contributed to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that would undermine regional security and stability, and shared the information among partners as a way to harmonize export control practices and policies.<sup>43</sup>

## **2. Post Cold War Era**

In Clinton Administration, was stamped as Rogue Regime, the US government emphasized that it would list the framework of broader policies to make Iran-Iraq weak. In Clinton administration, the US government tried to implement “Dual Containment” policy to prevent the Iran and Iraq. As the only superpower remained, this US policy presented for the two countries at once in term of balance of power to address the biggest threat at the time. This policy was different from the previous administration. Then on May 19, 1993, at a speech in Washington, the former National Security Council Senior Director for the Near East Martin Indyk introduced the Administration’s policy as one of “Dual Containment”. The objectives of dual containment are:<sup>44</sup>

- a. To isolate the regimes through politically and economically.

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<sup>43</sup> An Overview of US Export Controls. See, <http://www.exportcontrol.org/links/1373c.aspx>, accessed on May 12, 2010.

<sup>44</sup> David H. Slatiel and Jason S. Purcell, *Moving Past Dual Containment: Iran, Iraq, and the Future of US Policy in the Gulf*, *Bulletin The Atlantic Council of the United States*, Vol. XIII, No.1, (Washington: January 2002), p. 1.

- b. Military sanctions were prohibited to develop advanced military equipment.
- c. Diplomatic isolation (used UNSCR sanctions or international boycotts/ shamed)

To declare a national emergency pursuant the IEEPA, and to banned the financing, management or supervision by US to the Iranian petroleum resources development, this action was the response of Iran's government actions and policies, included support for international terrorism, efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process, and the acquisition of WMD and the means to deliver them.

The Effective on March 16, 1995, Clinton issued Executive Order 12957, which prohibited the US involvement for oil development in Iran. This policy issued on March 16, 1995, stated that, Iran was involved in international terrorism and active pursuit of the big weapons. Then, on May 8, 1995, Clinton agreed to Executive Order 12959 to further respond of Iranian threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the US for imposing import ban on Iranian-origin goods and services.<sup>45</sup>

Clinton declared that, Iran was "the world's most active and most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism." US believed the groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad Hizbollah, Hamas, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, those are terrorist group that have tried to derail the Arab-Israeli peace process. Clinton Administration officials had tried to ask help of other countries to combat Iranian supporting terrorism by virtue of its place on the US terrorism list; other secondary sanctions were imposed on Iran by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132, S. 735, signed April 24, 1996,) in this policy also against nuclear proliferation development. Thus, major provisions include the following:<sup>46</sup>

- a. Title III - International Terrorism Prohibitions  
Subtitle A - Prohibition on International Terrorist Fundraising/ Sec. 301 – Sec 303

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<sup>45</sup> Message to the Congress Reporting on the National Emergency With Respect to Iran, Volume 34, No. 38. See, <http://www.uhuh.com/laws/iran9-98.htm>, accessed on February 14, 2010.

<sup>46</sup> Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

Subtitle B - Prohibition on Assistance to Terrorist States/ Sec. 321 – Sec. 330

- b. Title V - Nuclear, Biological, And Chemical Weapons Restrictions  
Subtitle A - Nuclear Materials/ Sec. 501 – Sec. 503  
Subtitle B - Biological Weapons Restrictions/ Sec. 511  
Subtitle C – Chemical Weapons Restrictions/ Sec. 521

In the same year, the US pressured Iran's economic through Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA). This regulation imposed sanctions on foreign enterprises that were invested with \$20 million or more in the energy sector of Iran. The purpose of The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 were:<sup>47</sup>

- a. To deny Iran the ability to support acts of international terrorism; to fund the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means for delivering them by limiting the development of Iran's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum resources of Iran.
- b. To help denying the revenue Iran and Libya that could be used to finance international terrorism.
- c. To impose sanctions on persons making certain investments directly and significantly contributing to the enhancement of the ability of Iran or Libya to develop its petroleum resources
- d. To deny Iran, the abilities to support acts of international terrorism and to fund the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction,
- e. To deny some supports in two aspects: first, any guarantee, insurance, or extension of credit; then, participations in the extension of credit in connections with the export of goods or services to any sanctioned person and president who did not directly give the approval.

Clinton also provided sanctions against foreign companies which were investing financial / asset of more than \$ 40 for approximately 12 months (either intend to the Iran or Libya or, both) were considered as the assistance resources and petroleum development provider. In addition, Bill also applied to foreign companies which trading, transfer, loans or credit from US financial institutions over \$10 Million for 12 month/ period, export/ import of any goods or goods and services related to all equipment for the oil and weapons to the violating company.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (Enrolled Bill [Final as Passed Both House and Senate] - ENR) Bill Text 104<sup>th</sup> Congress (1995-1996) H.R.3107.ENR.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

Then, On August 19, 1997, the President signed Executive Order 13059 clarifying Executive Orders 12957 and Executive Order 12959 and confirming that virtually all trade and investment activities with Iran by US persons, wherever they were located, they were prohibited. Fall of 1997, the companies of French, Malaysia, and Russian which had signed on cooperation agreement with Iran to stabilized oil and gas markets whereas, become a serious problem to US interests. The Clinton administration was back away from imposing the sanctions because of the economic crises in East Asia and Russia in fall 1997 and spring 1998, which were placed larger US foreign policy interests at stake. Continuing on March 17, 2000, the Secretary of State announced that sanctions against Iran would be ease to allow US persons to purchase and import carpets and food products such as dried fruits, nuts, and caviar from Iran. These changes were implemented through amendments to the Iranian Transaction Regulation (ITR) at the end of April 2000.<sup>49</sup>

### **3. In the George W. Bush Administration**

Now turn to the US new government in George Bush administration. The first time George Bush took the White House as the President of the US, an explosion in World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 was occurred and he later expressed directly to the world that Iran was a member of the “Axis of Evil” which including pursuit of weapons mass destruction, chemical, biological, and part of terrorists.<sup>50</sup>

The US should prepare to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they were able to threaten or used weapons of mass destruction against the US, allies, and friends. The US would respond and take full advantages to strengthen the alliances, to establish new partnerships with former adversaries and innovation in the use of military forces, to enhance technologies like the effective missile

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<sup>49</sup> Iran: What You Need To Know About US Economic Sanctions. See <http://www.iranwatch.org/government/US/Treasury/us-treasury-ofac-iransanctions-090806.pdf>, accessed on April 05, 2010.

<sup>50</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002. p, 5. See, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/>, accessed on April 8, 2010..

defense system development, and to increase the emphasis on enhancing intelligence collection and analysis. Thus, Bush had declared that:

“The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology - when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends - and we will oppose them with all our power.”<sup>51</sup>

Due to the existence of nuclear weapons could threaten instability in Middle East region and this problem has been an obstacle of US interests to achieving its goals. To resolve this case, Bush tried to attempted multi-faceted efforts through international diplomacy and applied the sanction which emphasized Iran to “abandon” its nuclear fuel cycle activities<sup>52</sup> at least, it could delay Iran’s intentions to acquire nuclear weapons.

Related to Iranian nuclear weapon intention, John Mearsheimer assumed that each country tried to become a regional power and global hegemony which included politics, military, economic, culture, and ideology referred to the domination and authority short of the kingdom. Therefore, until now, the US was regarded as a global hegemony. According to Mearsheimer thought, in order to find the strength hegemony, the state must act aggressively to improve the strength that would culminate in power against the other party. The main challenge of global hegemony was the emergence of countries that have the potential to become a global state. Furthermore, Mearsheimer stated and demonstrated that great power were concerned mostly with survival and this could only be achieved by attaining the maximum amount of military power and strategic influence.<sup>53</sup> If its matter connected to Iran, then the intention to acquire nuclear weapons could be said that Iran was approaching the hegemony in region.

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, Iran: Furor Over Fuel, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/ June 2003, p.12.

<sup>53</sup> Sean Kay, *Global Security, in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace* (Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 2006), p. 23.

It was different to the US which referred to this hegemonic expansion and increasing the power like things that have been mentioned above.

In 2002, to meet the National Security objectives in the Middle East Region, NSS must be implemented to affect the environment strategy in ways to calculate a balanced relationship among all elements of national power to achieve a unified position that provided for security and promoted national values and interests. Thus, Bush had stated the objectives that the US would:<sup>54</sup>

- a. To enhancing nationalism of US citizens.
- b. To fighting, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favored liberty.
- c. To defending the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants.
- d. To preserving the peace by building good relations among the great powers.
- e. To extending the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

When applying the policy, US should be able to overcome the obstacles to determine whether the Iranian policy met the NSS objectives or not. These constraints included Iranian efforts to manufacture nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and supports for Iran against international terrorism, and hampered peace in the Middle East.<sup>55</sup>

Because Bush and Chiny understood that oil industry was interesting, Bush would lift unilateral sanctions for the oil. Both of them had understood that unilateral sanctions did not work and contained discriminations against US companies themselves while they were expected as long as the Bush administration would not renew ILSA, which was ended in August 2001. American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was a bit offended when President George W. Bush explored the chances for more interactions with Iran. Secretary of State-designate Colin Powell said that Iran:<sup>56</sup>

“An important country undergoing profound change from within” - was different from Iraq which Washington continues to try to isolate.” We

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<sup>54</sup> The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002, *op. cit.*, p. 13.


<sup>55</sup> Kenneth M Pollack, *The Persian Puzzle the Conflict Between Iran and America* (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2004), p 68-69.

<sup>56</sup> Background War and Peace. See, [http://www.ontheissues.org/Background\\_War\\_+\\_Peace.htm](http://www.ontheissues.org/Background_War_+_Peace.htm), accessed on June 24, 2010.

have important differences on matters of policy but these differences need not preclude greater interaction whether in more normal commerce or increased dialogue. “Our national security team will be reviewing such possibilities.”

AIPAC was established in 1963 and it was a lobby group in the United States aimed to lobby the US Congress and the executive branch of government with the aim of developing policies that enhanced closed relations between the United States and Israel. AIPAC was established during the Eisenhower administration and it supported Israel to enhance aid as well. Besides, as an illustration, AIPAC even influenced every policy decision in a US government body oriented to the interests of Israel. Mearsheimer and Walt’s central argument represented that the activities of the Israel lobby were the primary cause of American foreign policy in the Middle East.<sup>57</sup> The following table is the scheme showed the influence of AIPAC:

Table 2. AIPAC Influence



Source: Amerika Serikat Dan Penyelesaian Konflik Israel. See, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/26799620/Amerika-Serikat-Dan-ian-Konflik-Israel>, accessed on January 13, 2010.

<sup>57</sup> Robert. C. Lieberman, The Israel Lobby and American Politics. See, [http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/news\\_events/newsletter/documents/Liebermanexchange-TheIsraelLobbyandAmericanPolitics.pdf](http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/news_events/newsletter/documents/Liebermanexchange-TheIsraelLobbyandAmericanPolitics.pdf), accessed on June 24, 2010.



Related to US foreign policies toward the Muslim world, especially “Iran” which was surrounded by the shadows of AIPAC interests. AIPAC had simple view toward Islamic world politics. Moreover, AIPAC has contributed a lot to the US political influence and foreign policy.<sup>58</sup>

- a. Pressing the Palestinian government through letters signed by 259 members of Congress and 79 senators. The aim was to force the European Union but the United States did not provide assistance to the Palestinian Authority before they reach the international requirements.
- b. Strengthening security ties within the United States-Israel with a long term cooperation.
- c. Obtaining assistance from the US in the form of economic support and military.
- d. Prohibition to cooperate with Hamas.
- e. Money lending the long term.
- f. Condemning Iran’s top anti-Holocaust conference.
- g. Sponsoring the “Iran Freedom and Support Act.”
- h. Hizbolah television station branded as a terrorist agent through a letter which President Bush signed by 51 senators.
- i. Sponsoring the “Syrian Accountability Act” which allowed President Bush to impose sanctions on Syria for meddling in Lebanon.
- j. Increasing military aid to Israel reached US \$ 1 trillion

Main concern of AIPAC toward Iran was the Iranian missiles, and on July 02, 2000, after New York Times was published that 10 Jews espionage were captured in Iran, Israel considered and counted the situation with the presence of terrorism supported by Iran. All the statements which were ever mentioned from Iranian official about against Israel, had become an imperative for Israel to enhance the national security and ask for full protection of US Henceforth, with the security reason, Israel attempted to encourage the US to renew the ILSA.<sup>59</sup> According to defensive realist thought, AIPAC position was unsafe, and the thought showed when the AIPAC continued to encourage the US to protect Israel and to renew ILSA 1996 immediately.

US efforts and the influence of various angles are encouragement to restore the long-term hostility, if it back to normal, the US will be easy to control

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<sup>58</sup> AIPAC. See, <http://www.aipac.org>, accessed on June 24, 2010.

<sup>59</sup> Herman Franssen and Elaine Morton, *loc. cit.*

Iran. In essence, US no longer had a problem on the balance of power or the security dilemma to the country which has power potential to become a hegemonic power in region. Through “Grand Bargain” as the alternative approach tried to fix the relation of US which designed only focus on two immediate issues:

- a. To suspend Iran nuclear weapon.
- b. To change Iran’s regime (ideology, behavior).

On the above, the US objectives against Iran were clear on that grand bargain between Washington and Tehran. The US straightened the meanings that US did not sought to change the regime in real sense but rather to change the nature, policies, and behaviors which were the violation of international rules on the creation of WMD. Therefore, the US expected that Iran could follow all the diplomatic processes and would be willing to agree to the following.<sup>60</sup>

- a. Iran must respect to US regulations and international laws of the Iranian nuclear program.
- b. The assertion that Iran supports the Arab-Israeli peace, Palestinian-Israel, Syria and Israel
- c. A commitment to stop supporting terrorists movements such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.
- d. Respecting to the human rights.
- e. Dialogue strategies on common security interests were contributed to regional stability.

After implementing the grand bargain, incremental engagement also presented to reduce tension. The main priority on this program was to end the Iranian intention to obtained nuclear weapons and stop supporting terrorism movement. The US would ask the European Union to provide their credibility to resolve it. Thus, Iran could evaluate about the circumstances of international politics that the international community had united to isolate nuclear proliferation program. The US, EU, and Russia should develop a joint strategy for incremental engagement policy which was fully effective to resolve this issue. Moreover, asked UN Security Council if Iran did not allow IAEA to have full inspection of uranium enrichment at various sites. Through the incremental engagement, the US

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<sup>60</sup> Flynt Leverett, *Dealing with Tehran: Assessing US Diplomatic Options toward Iran* (New York: The Century Foundation, 2006), pp. 22-23.

changed to negotiate directly with Iran by beginning with a dialogue on nuclear program, but did not allow Iran to have another negotiation at the same time. This policy could form two approaches; carrot and stick.

Openly, the EU's was participated the negotiations, and supporting the IAEA efforts, it would to show that Iran was faced collective international opposition to their nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the clerics will confronted with two alternative choices:<sup>61</sup>

- a. Dismissing intention acquired nuclear weapons and willing to be examined by the IAEA; thus, Iran would be accepted again in the global economy.
- b. With the concealment of nuclear program and a rejection of the examination mentioned above, Iran would be served with more strict sanctions that would cripple its economy.
- c. In this regard, continually, Russia was also involved with the EU and US to monitor the enrichment of uranium and fuel recycling process. Economic sanctions presented by the US had an influence on economic growth in Iran has raised unemployment and reduced the workers. Hence, the US intended to make Iran to consider that the ambition to acquire nuclear weapons is harmful for Iran itself.

Last option, regarded to face rogue state was using military instrument whether as a threat (presence the military strength on Middle East region) or a confrontation (war). The function of military instrument was to destroy nuclear sites and force Iran to change the regime behaviour. However, the president did not take this option off the table which the used of military means to conduct regime change would be the final option to prevent the Iranians from developing a nuclear weapon. If the US undertook a regime change, it should need international supports to fully succeed. Militarism is the power conception of nation which consists in primarily, if not exclusively, in its military strength, conceived especially in quantitative terms. The largest army, the biggest navy, the biggest and fastest air force in the world, superiority in numbers of nuclear weapons become the predominant, if not the exclusive, symbols of national power of the US.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

Washington remained in full alert to monitor Tehran, and some US policymakers hesitated that European officials were too soft to solve this problem. US submitted the IAEA resolution in September 2004 and immediately established on October 31, 2004, as the limit of tolerance to the company on Iran to halt all enrichment activities. The US also wanted a clear “trigger mechanism” that would automatically refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council - where it could face trade sanctions if it was not complied by the deadline. However, because of a lack of supports from European and non-European IAEA members, Washington backed down on these demands. European officials argued that the threat of sanctions would reduce their leveraged point for negotiations and Iran would harden and be more ambitious to acquire nuclear weapons.<sup>63</sup>

Then, on November 17, 2004, Colin Powell, the US secretary of states, said to the reporters that Iran was working to adapt missiles delivery and he also cited a classified intelligence report that Iran was working on mating warheads to missiles. The report, however, still remained some of the unverified.<sup>64</sup> Press reports revealed that the claim was based on a single, un-vetted walk-in source that provided purported documents to be Iranian drawings and technical documents including a nuclear warhead design.

In 2005, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13382, the contents were to isolate Iran financially and to freeze the assets of proliferators of WMD and the companies which supported their development of nuclear energy. Eight Iranian entities and external organizations believed to support Iranian WMD programs which were sanctioned and designated under the Executive Order.<sup>65</sup>

This order was followed in 2006 by the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA) also known as the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. The act provided for “penalties on entities and individuals for the transfer to

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<sup>63</sup> Kristin Archick, *European Views and Policies toward the Middle East*, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL31956, (Washington: CRS, March 9, 2005), p. 18.

<sup>64</sup> Robin Wright and Keith B. Richburg, “Powell Says Iran Is Pursuing Bomb,” *Washington Post*, November 18, 2004.

<sup>65</sup> Economic Sanctions: Pressuring Iran’s Nuclear. See, <http://npsglobal.org/eng/component/content/article/147-articles/872-economic-sanctions-pressuring-irans-nuclear-program.html>, accessed on July 29, 2010.

or acquisition from Iran since January 1, 1999. From Syria since January 1, 2005 and North Korea since January 1, 2006, both of the transfers or acquisition of equipments and technology were controlled under multilateral controlling lists (the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Zangger Committee, Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, NSG, WA).”<sup>66</sup> INKSNA also provided the sanctions for equipments or technology transferring which might to contribute WMD development, cruise, or ballistic missile systems. Subsequently, the United States imposed sanctions on dozens of firms in the countries that sold prohibited commodities to Iran, particularly Chinese companies.<sup>67</sup>

In early 2006, the US and other countries formed the “Permanent Five (of the United Nations Security Council) plus one (Germany)” to be more flexible for having dialogue with Iran. In the three years prior to the alignment of these six countries, the diplomacy was led by EU. The P5+1 gained more diplomatic weight when, on May 31, 2006, the United States offered to join nuclear talks with Iran if it first suspended its uranium enrichment, but Iranian authorities have labeled this as a precondition and refused. On June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2006, the P5+1 agreed to a incentives and disincentives to offer Iran into the World Trade Organization (WTO), an easing of US sanctions, energy partnerships, or guarantees of nuclear fuel for a civilian nuclear reactor, and other benefits in exchange for verifiable guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program could not be used for a nuclear weapon. Tehran ultimately rejected the deal all.

In July 31, 2006, the UNSCR 1696 was adopted to Iran. The resolution, proposed by P5+1 which demanded Iran to halt its uranium enrichment programme. Furtherance, on December 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2006, the IAEA continued to refer the Iranian case to the U.N Security Council, which unanimously passed Resolution 1737, which imposed sanctions on some trade or technology and shared as well as targeted sanctions against individuals and entities linked to

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<sup>66</sup> An Overview of US Export Controls, *loc. cit.*

<sup>67</sup> Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation; Imposition of Sanctions Against Foreign Entities, Including a Ban on US Government Procurement. See, <http://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2010/07/14/2010-17178/bureau-of-verification-compliance-and-implementation-imposition-of-sanctions-against-foreign>, accessed on July 29, 2010.

Iran's nuclear program on March 24<sup>th</sup>, 2007. The U.N Security Council augmented sanctions with the passage of Resolution 1747 and, a year later, augmented them yet again with Resolution 1803. Whereas, Russia, China, and other countries had been reluctant to impose harsh sanctions and against US strict sanctions which would become greater difficulties in passing a new sanction resolution. Under French President Jacques Chirac, the French government suggested that Paris might drop insistence that the Iranian government suspended enrichment instead of settling for a "partial suspension." While Nicolas Sarkozy had taken a far tougher line on Tehran than Chirac, Iranian authorities might cite Chirac's more generously to offered as precedents from which to start bargaining.<sup>68</sup>

Bush encouraged UNSCR 1737 and 1747, and 1803 which emphasized on military threat of Iran. On January 10<sup>th</sup>, 2010, President Bush signaled that the Administration was now favoring a containment option in the case of Iran. He confirmed in his speech that the U.S would send a second US aircraft carrier group into the Persian Gulf, and he announced the extended deployment of Patriot anti-missile batteries in the region, reportedly in Kuwait and Qatar. He had also proposed increased military aid to, as well as increased intelligence sharing with, the Persian Gulf states. Other sources said on a media that the US aircraft flying on Iran-Iraq border.<sup>69</sup> The US had shown a hard power in the region by revealing a bit of military strength in the air. However, although the hard power is intend to threaten Iran, but unfortunately, Iran did not respond and continued to do their activities.

The article 41 of the UN Charter had clearly stated that the Security Council could impose sanctions against nations which posed a threat to international peace and security. The controversy over Iran's nuclear program had raised serious questions about the non-proliferation regime and attention to its weaknesses in establishing a comprehensive sanctions regime. Following Iran's failure to comply with UNSCR 1696, which made mandatory the suspension of

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<sup>68</sup> Economic Sanctions: Pressuring Iran's Nuclear, *loc. cit.*

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

all Iran's uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions against Iran, first in December 2006 and then in March 2007, with the purpose of pre-venting the nuclear program and resolving the conflict (UNSCR. 1737, 1747).<sup>70</sup>

The implementation of sanctions is to change the behavior of a country which had recognized as annoying or threatening instability and emphasized to the government directly. Effectuation change was particularly difficult if sanctions target things were very important to governments. In spite of the fact that humanitarian costs had become better to understand, and concepts of targeted and smart sanctions which shielded civilians from harm have been developed, the efficacy and impact of sanctions were still highly debated. Since some sanctions eventually gave ways to the use of military force, some of controversies were surrounded with the mechanism; some had little influence; and the others appeared to reach the objectives without the use of military force as in the case of Libya. After the call for modifications to the sanctions approach become louder in the 'aftermath' of Iraq, a certain 'sanction fatigue' occurred. Nevertheless, the United States was heavily defending the sanctions regime, and even pushing for unilateral and bilateral sanctions despite the existence of multilateral ones. Getting sanctions right had often been a less compelling goal than getting sanctions adopted. The ad-hoc and politically charged approach which was often prevailed could preclude reflections on how sanctions could become more effective in each particular case."<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> On UNSCR 1737 and 1747 are prohibitions for technology related with uranium enrichment and freeze financial assets. UNSCR 1747 is amended UNSCR 1373 has put denied on arms transfer/ sales/export-import, banned on travel activities (international flights), banned on oil exports.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **THE EUROPEAN UNION POLICY TOWARDS THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT**

The issue of nuclear weapons was still essential especially with the conflict between Iran and the US which Iran insisted that its uranium enrichment program was aiming at generating the electricity, while the United States accused Iran of working on developing nuclear weapons. Both of them were lack of trusts which were an evidence of realist theory of international conditions. The EU position was a mediator between them and through the help from its three European Union member states, they attempted to have a dialogue with Iran and asked Iranian officials to freeze uranium enrichment activities whether in the short-term or the long-term suspension. The core was tended to the EU dialogues or negotiations that could slacken Iranian nuclear activities and exchange interests to take benefits from each other in term of economy. This EU efforts also brought common interests to the international community including encouragements of the regional cooperation, promotions of human rights and sustainable developments, the spread of democratic thoughts and conflicts prevention, fights against international crimes/ violence (such as human trafficking, drugs, or illegal logging), support the UN or other multilateral organizations, and reductions of overtly, disarmament, and so forth.<sup>1</sup>

#### **A. The Viewpoint of the European Union Toward Common Security Threat**

The long-term plan of the EU was to strengthen the elements of the international community like international laws, to cooperate with countries for maximizing those power politics, and to contribute to the international system transformations. European approach to international relations considered on

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<sup>1</sup> Karen E. Smith, *The European Union: A Distinctive Actor in International Relations*, *Brown Journal World Affairs*, Volume IX, Issue 2, (United States: Brown Journal of World Affairs, 2003), p. 107.



deficiencies and achievements which was found in European history and current European unity.

EU called it all as an approach – those were functions of the EU itself and followed by the member states. The lack of military instrument and the abundance of civilian instrument – logically, it could make a difference on the foreign policy and compare to the remaining superpower in particular.<sup>2</sup> A civilian power model could be an alternative form of organization at the EU level. The idea of civilian power had introduced by Francois Dûchene, who had specifically the European Community in mind.<sup>3</sup> According to the definition of Hans W. Maull on the book of Ginsberg, a civilian power could accept the necessity of cooperation when seeking international aims. For Hans W. Maull, being a civilian power implied that:<sup>4</sup>

- a. Nations were willing to cooperate with the others to achieve international objectives.
- b. Nations would focus on non-military means, primarily economic means, to secure national goals; military power, then, would be a residual instrument serving essentially to safeguard other means of international interactions.
- c. Nations would have willingness to develop supranational structures to address critical issues of international managements.

In addition, respecting and protecting human rights, civilian freedoms, and transparency on democratic governance in terms of its procedures and institutions are values of a civilian power.<sup>5</sup> The EU gave a lot of influences to the international economy and acts as a civilian power which was emphasized on diplomacy and cooperation. However, because the civilian power did not possess all the qualities and capacities, states seldom understood or saw the EU as an independent and noteworthy actor in the international field. Thus, since the EU had opportunities to become a political actor in foreign affairs, it was often

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<sup>2</sup> Maurice Keens-Soper, *Europe in the World: the Persistence of Power Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p.134.

<sup>3</sup> Dûchene, F, *Europe's Role in World Peace, in European Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, ed., R. Mayne (London: Fontana, 1972), p.91.

<sup>4</sup> Roy H. Ginsberg, *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire* (New York: Littlefield Publisher, 2001), p. 39.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

examined within the study of international relations. Especially within the realist analysis, such a 'civilian power' was viewed as less than a state. Andrew Moravcsik was among of those who defined the EU as a regime that made negotiations among states more efficient by offering a common framework to reduce insecurity in inter-state interaction. The Union's institutions and norms were not seen to have own capacities or effects on identities and interests of states.<sup>6</sup> Hence, the future option for the EU sometimes was given as a superpower or a civilian power, as if these were contradictory and mutually exclusive options.<sup>7</sup> Realists recognized the states as the principal actors in international system but the EU could not be recognized as an actor: EU was not a state. Moreover, the realists regarded Iran in international relations of power politics which also the key actors in an international system composed of independent sovereign states.<sup>8</sup> The existence of multinational corporations and international institutions had been recognized in the realist analysis, however, as the second position, they were still seen merely as the components of sovereign, independent, and autonomic states which defined the meaning and tasks of the organizations. Moreover, realists emphasized the focal position of the state as an international actor whilst simply dismissing the role of the EU in the international sphere.

The EU managed its member states to act unified in international problems resolving that were located on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP had received extensive attentions in recent years. The EU had attempted to carve out an independent role for itself in foreign policies. Like France, it had assessed that this was a way of the EU being a superpower to balance the USA strength. Other states had sought that EU improved the manner to have good relations with other countries.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Wind, Marlene, *Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist Critique of Rational Institutionalism*, in *Reflective Approaches to European Governance*, ed. K.E. Jorgensen (London: MacMillan Press, 1997), pp. 15-37.

<sup>7</sup> Christopher Hill, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-55.

<sup>8</sup> Michael Sheehan, *Balance of Power: History and Theory*, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> Common Foreign and Security Policy. See, <http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/FSEX/EX3.htm>, accessed on October 12, 2010.

There was an idea that the EU should also take an important role in order to maintain the peace and to handle the security issues which were associated with nuclear weapons, and indeed, should stake the dignity to achieve a good deal. European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was one of the three original communities established in the 1950s and had played its part against proliferation for a long time by allowing Europeans to cooperate under strict and transparent safeguards for the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy. Political Cooperation was developed by EU as a common position and it was more obvious and formal for arms control and issues of non-proliferation arising from international forums.<sup>10</sup>

Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control could make an essential contribution in the global fight against terrorism by reducing the risk of non-state actors gaining access to WMD, radioactive materials, and delivery means. Those matters were put on the Council Conclusions of December 10<sup>th</sup>, 2001 on implications of the terrorist threat, non-proliferation, disarmament, and the arms control policy of the EU.<sup>11</sup>

The presence of WMD<sup>12</sup> was a threat to common peace and security. The legal or illegal proliferation was driven by a small number of countries and non-state actors through helps and shares of technologies and information with the proliferating countries. All kind of weapons could direct or indirectly threaten EU member states in particular. Therefore, EU countries had a collective responsibility to prevent this risk by actively contributing to against proliferation. The EU should prepare, continuously update, and monitored a threat assessment with all available sources; “EU will keep this issue under review and continue to support this process, in particular by enhancing EU cooperation.”<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Fight Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction “EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Council of the European Union, Document Number: 15708/03, Brussels, December 10, 2003.

<sup>12</sup> Nuclear weapons proliferation, chemical weapons proliferation, biological weapons proliferation, weapons delivery or long-range missiles.

<sup>13</sup> Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, *loc. cit.*

## **B. Concerning to the Iran's Nuclear Issue**

Until now, as the influential political player in the Middle East region, Iran was arisen on nuclear issue and the EU and the US had recognized that Iran was the most important power in the region. During the Gulf war of 1991-1992, Iran was vociferous for a withdrawal of US troops from the region. Iranian industrial progress and nuclear fields had given greater potential and more prominent than other countries in the region.<sup>14</sup> To maintain the EU agenda of proliferation, EU should involve into this issue to enhance the credibility to spreading the influence of multilateralism. Hence, of it, EU had considered Iran as a follow:<sup>15</sup>

- a. Iran was playing a pivotal role in the Gulf region and the wider Middle East. Europe and Iran, of course, had their respective grievances and complaints.
- b. Iranian political applied a mixture of participatory politics with an Islamic identity. The religious establishment had managed, yet again, to thwart the yearning of ordinary Iranians for personal and political freedoms.
- c. The most important root causes were Iran nuclear activities which has threatened instability in the region and against the NPT. Therefore, the EU and US needed effective policies to halt the development of WMD proliferation, which became the orthodoxy for policy makers. Implement a rules-based international system.
- d. The EU commitment after Iraq debacle could stay united under pressures and its strategy of 'conditional engagement' - the prospect of closer political and economic ties with Iran, but also, if necessary, the threat of sanctions - could deliver real results.

And the following parts would try to explore slightly the positions of major vocals of EU:

- a. Germany, critics of Iran regarding "double standard" of the Treaty on the NPT were closely connected with the Germany position because German was the only country in the EU that did not have nuclear weapons. Therefore, Germany responded Iran's nuclear issue with a softest approach. As German aspirations had the intention of becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council which had not been achieved, Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister

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<sup>14</sup> Rubab Hasan, "EU-Iran Relations: Focus on Nuclear Politics." International Seminar EU as an Emerging International Power: Its Middle East Policy, 2008, Area Study Centre for Europe, University of Karachi, p.38.

<sup>15</sup> G. Quille and R. Keane, 'The EU and Iran: towards A New Political And Security Dialogue', in *Europe and Iran Perspectives on Non-proliferation*, ed. Shanon N. Kile (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 112.

Steinmeier had worked hard together to bring the informal Contact Group and make sure that Germany had a word in the decisions of this group. At this point, Germany intended to engage this negotiation and wanted to have an important role.

- b. French and Iran relations were slightly more complicated than the Germany-Iran. When Iran-Iraq war occurred, French supported Iraq transferring weapons to Iraq in 1980; then, in 1982, France claimed that Iran had owed as much as \$ 1 billion, and, the nuclear issue was the determination of France and Iran for a long-term relationship.
- c. The United Kingdom had the most complicated relationship with Iran. The British used the election and re-election of Khatami in 1997 and 2001 as triggers for a policy shift toward Iran. It could be argued that, UK was looking for a scapegoat as a way for finding a more pro-active role in European context. But During a parliamentary debate in 2002 on UK and US relations, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee Donald Anderson asked the government “to state clearly that the UK will continue to take a different line from the more absolutist one taken by the US Administration.”<sup>16</sup> UK was a closed friend with the US British position in this issue tended to the EU and considered the US action on the Executive Order which was condemned by various international political circles.

Their perspectives became serious debate whether unite conceptions or the assessments among them, how to implement the strategy, policies and act. However, the cores of the EU objectives are to stabilize the situation and to establish constructive relationship with Iran and not sought the power as the US intended. The Foreign Office Minister for the Middle East, Ben Bradshaw stated that:

“We have a different analysis of how to encourage change for the good in Iran and, as on a number of other areas, Nowhere We disagree with our American friends, We Are not reluctant to say so.”<sup>17</sup>

The difference between EU and US had widened since the Bush administration entered in the first year. The International Criminal Court and Biological Weapons Convention 1972, Kyoto Protocol 1997, and the imposition of limits on illegal trafficking of small arms, all initiatives were supported by the EU had been rejected by the US. The immediate wake of 9/ 11 terrorist attacks,

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<sup>16</sup> UK pressed to clarify differences with US policy towards Iran. See, <http://www.netnative.com/news/02/apr/1088.html>, accessed on May 11, 2011

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

Transatlantic solidarity was impressive, but divergences were quickly resurfaced on both sides of the Atlantic, it seems have a gap between them, and dire warnings of the “end of the West” have appeared.<sup>18</sup>

Since the 9/ 11 event in Bush’s first year, President Bush labeled Iran loudly as a part of an “Axis of Evil”. He accused Iran as a rogue states who did not want to terminate its nuclear program and support the international terrorism. This statement argued by EU rapidly as disagreement what the Bush stated with the “Axis of Evil” in his speech. Following the speech, many European leaders opposed the military action against the states which were identified by the US. The most characteristic opposition of European to the ‘Axis of Evil Speech’ was expressed by French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, who considered the US policy as “simplistic” - that reduced the problems of the world to the struggle against terrorism.<sup>19</sup> Vedrine also said that “an effective fight against terrorism should not only include the use of military means but deal with its root causes as poverty, injustice and humiliation.”<sup>20</sup>

Bush’s gratuitous unilateralism had been criticized by international political circles. People could debate whether America under Bush had focused excessively on military solutions or reduced complex political problems of the ‘war on terror.’ In addition, Javier Solana urged the US to act multilaterally and not as a global unilateralist.<sup>21</sup> EU argued that terrorism could be undermined by economic and political means and no need too use violence and threats. In essence, this statement showed that the EU opposed the statement “Axis of Evil” and considered it as a form of threat. Jonathan Stevenson explained the different European perceptions of terrorism on the basis of the region’s experience with the old form of terrorism not with the new transnational kind. Stevenson also emphasized that the EU was not a United States of Europe, and therefore:

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<sup>18</sup> Karen E. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

<sup>19</sup> France criticizes simplistic US policy. See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1805341.stm>, accessed on April 05, 2010.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> Ian Black, John Hooper and Oliver Burkeman, ‘Bush Warned over Axis of Evil’. See, <http://www.guardian.co.uk>, accessed on April 5, 2010.

“It simply lacks the kind of power necessary to effect simultaneous changes in the policies of its constituent national governments.”<sup>22</sup>

Within this framework and with references to Iran, EU’s External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten said that;

“The European policy of constructive and critical dialogue with Iran was more likely to bring results than the American approach.”<sup>23</sup>

The European opinion to the unilateral act that was applied by US toward Iran as a policy put a threat and confrontation against Iran’s reformists. It would affect the restoration of harmonic relations between Iran and US while EU were insisted that it was important to encourage moderates in Iran against clerical and Islamic extremist groups, including those involved for arms shipment to the Palestine authority.<sup>24</sup> Thus, the EU preferred to the soft power approach through official dialogues; its goal was to strengthen the leverage of Iranian reformists and, by so doing, encouraged Iran to play a more positive role in the Middle East.<sup>25</sup>

On November 19<sup>th</sup>, 2001, negotiations on Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) as the political dialogue which addressed the issue of human rights, terrorism, WMD, and the Middle East peace process, it has put in TCA negotiations draft and was approved by the European Commission.<sup>26</sup> Moreover, on June 17<sup>th</sup>, 2002, the EU Foreign Ministers agreed to adopt directives for TCA and reaffirmed its willingness to strengthen relations between both sides and called to promote and develop human rights and fundamental freedoms based on relevant international conventions as well as to co-operation with UN through the reform of its judicial system.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Jonathan Stevenson, *How Europe and America Defend themselves, Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 2, (New York: Council on Foreign Relation, March/April 2003), pp 75-90.

<sup>23</sup> EU’s Patten, Criticizes US foreign policy. See, <http://news.bbc.c.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1810615.stm>, accessed on April 03, 2010.

<sup>24</sup> Ian Black, John Hooper and Oliver Burkeman, *loc.cit*.

<sup>25</sup> Daniel Brumberg, *Ibid*, p. 72.

<sup>26</sup> EU - Iran: Commission Proposes Mandate for Negotiating Trade and Cooperation Agreement. See, [http://www.europa.int/comm/external\\_relations/iran/news/ip01\\_161.htm](http://www.europa.int/comm/external_relations/iran/news/ip01_161.htm), accessed on June 02, 2010.

<sup>27</sup> See the Conclusions of the Council of June 17, 2002. See, [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/iran/intro/gac.htm#170602](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iran/intro/gac.htm#170602), accessed on April 05, 2010.

The most alarming developments occurred in mid-2002, Khatami announced plans to construct over the nuclear power plants of the next 20 years with a total capacity of 6000 Mega Watts (MW) as a part of a long-term energy policy to substitute the depletion of Iran's fossil fuel reserves. Still, in 2002, the Iranian opposition group said to the public that they had found two unknown nuclear facilities; a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak also substantial reserves of uranium ore at Saghand were found.<sup>28</sup> Thus, this information led inconvenience to the EU and US while the Iranian had been always selling "peaceful purpose" for its nuclear activities to cover nuclear weapon production.<sup>29</sup>

Then, Iran's nuclear activities became hot issues in international concerns because on February 9<sup>th</sup>, 2003, its nuclear programme and clandestine efforts to cover sophisticated facilities at Natanz were revealed as well as the enriched uranium was produced by several other cities.<sup>30</sup> According the evidence of its clandestine, however, the EU started to negotiation with Iran on the halt of the nuclear weapon proliferation and the important role of EU was given to lead the negotiations. While the US did not want to revoke the isolation that had been planted since the days after Iranian revolution. The European joined on this issue to conduct the negotiations. EU used the soft approach to make Iran convenience.

In order to reduce and due to the elimination of nuclear weapons, countries that did not have nuclear weapons automatically had no more intention to produce it again. As a bridge between the have and have-not, NWS and Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) agreed:

"Inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and used of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. All State Parties to the Treaty agree to full exchanges of equipment, materials and

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<sup>28</sup> Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Iran Profile – Nuclear Overview, February 2005. See, [http://www.nti.org/e\\_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html), accessed on April 05, 2010.

<sup>29</sup> Piere-Emmanuel Dupont, *The EU - Iran in the Context of the Ongoing Nuclear Crisis*, *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*, Vol. 3, Issue. 1, May 2009, Metropolitan University Prague, p. 97-98.

<sup>30</sup> Rubab Hasan, *loc. cit.*



scientific and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”<sup>31</sup>

In April 2003, to face of the Iranian nuclear issue, the EU had adopted policies relating to the WMD proliferation. The Council in its conclusions of November 7<sup>th</sup>, 2005 said that the evolution of its long-term relationship with Iran, effectively addressed all of EU concerns:<sup>32</sup>

- a. Proliferation of WMD and means of delivery were a growing threat to international peace and security.
- b. The EU could not ignore these dangers. It must seek an effective multilateralist response to this threat.
- c. The EU must make uses of all its instruments to prevent, deter, and halt if its possible eliminate the proliferation programme that cause concern at global level.

To cope with those dangers, a broad approach covering a wide spectrum of actions was needed. EU approach would be guide by:<sup>33</sup>

- a. EU used multilateralist approach to maintain EU security, including disarmament and non-proliferation to provide the best way to maintain international order.
- b. Was strengthened by the commitment to implement and strengthen the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements.
- c. Non-proliferation was a top priority in EU security policy.
- d. EU committed to support the multilateral institutions charged respectively with verifications and the upholding of compliances with these treaties.
- e. EU indicated that increased efforts were necessary to enhance consequence management.
- f. Capabilities and the improvement of coordination.
- g. EU committed to strengthen national and internationally-coordinated export controls.
- h. Contributing international stability, the EU must be convinced and effectively pursued non-proliferation;
- i. EU would cooperate with US to share together for this objective.

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<sup>31</sup> Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Article IV, July 01, 1968. See, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf>, accessed on April 15, 2010,

<sup>32</sup> Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, *loc. cit.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

Basing on regionalization scope, if effective multilateralism was implemented, the political problem would persist then international organizations would refer to the political order rather than the local international treaties and agreements (as demonstrated by Europe's own Stability Pact).<sup>34</sup> EU would solve the problem which caused instability to the roots through reducing the poverty, engaging in political conflict as a mediator, and promoting human rights. WMD and missile proliferation had threatened the European security and stability. The EU must be active to use all instruments and policies which aimed to prevent, deter, halt, and to eliminate the illegal proliferation activities.

The EU held talks in October 2003, who has tried to defuse tensions and maintain the integrity of the non-proliferation regime, whereby, EU had chosen to apply the soft power approach offered a "carrot" as a tool of diplomacy which proposed the exchange of commitment to abandon its uranium enrichment program. Besides that, the EU offered political guarantees, economic aids and technologies. The present EU policy was focused on:<sup>35</sup>

- a. Diplomatic dialogue.
- b. Exhausting political and diplomatic channels before.
- c. Resorting sanctions or use of forces.
- d. Addressing the problem of proliferation, by first addressing.
- e. The issue led countries to seek nuclear capabilities.
- f. To preserve the effectiveness of the multilateralism.

The Iranian had followed cooperation with the EU in order not to damage the prospects of their long-term relationship. The agreement between them was signed on November 15<sup>th</sup>, 2004, when Iran pledged to temporarily stop all of its uranium enrichment, conversion, and reprocessing activities and in return, the Europeans agreed to address Iran's security concerns and expand commercial

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<sup>34</sup> Launched in 1999, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is the first comprehensive conflict-prevention strategy of the international community, aimed at strengthening the efforts of the countries of South Eastern Europe in fostering peace, democracy, and respect for human rights, economic prosperity and security.

<sup>35</sup> Mohsen M. Milliani, "Iran the Status quo Power", Vol: 104, Issue 678, January 2005, Current History Magazine, p. 36. See, <http://currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=39>, accessed on March 22, 2010.

exchanges.<sup>36</sup> The IAEA welcomed Iran's decision. It signed and immediately began the full implementation of the Additional Protocol:

- a. It opened its doors to one of the most expansive and intrusive IAEA inspections.
- b. It provided a detailed account of its peaceful nuclear activities, all of which.
- c. It had been carried out in full conformity with its rights and obligations under the NPT.
- d. It began and had continuously maintained for the past 20 months voluntarily.
- e. The suspension of uranium enrichment was the rightful as a confidence building measure.
- f. Further expansion in February and November 2004, following agreements with E3/EU in Brussels and Paris respectively, its voluntary suspension to incorporate activities which went well beyond the original Agency's definition of "enrichment" and even "enrichment-related" activities.

However, the EU and the Iranian negotiations had deadlocked in December 2005 and it was surprising the European to know that the Iranian resumed uranium enrichment activities in January 2006. The EU reported it matter to the UN Security Council to impose a sanctions. In high tension, the EU established new formation through (Britain, France and Germany + China, Russia and US or called Permanent 5 plus 1 'P5+1') to agree to a new package of incentives which was offered to Iran in June 2006.<sup>37</sup> Therefore, EU would enhance the strategic sanctions separately, in order, expected to have a way to avoid the deadlock.<sup>38</sup> Wishing there have the cleft in stalemate, although which very big disappointment of Iranian attitude, however, the EU would still liked to have positive negotiations with Teheran for the value which could develop and move forward.

The sanction imposed the Iranian could not be changed or canceled and it would derail the EU negotiation plan. However, the EU remained to continue the relationship with Iran throughout 2007. While, Russia and China agreed to impose

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Europe's Iran Diplomacy. See, [http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/business\\_media/mediabriefs/Brief7-0803-iran.pdf](http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/business_media/mediabriefs/Brief7-0803-iran.pdf), accessed on September 20, 2010.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

Iran further tightening sanctions through the UN. Stressing on stalemate negotiations and the lack of results, the UN and the EU tried to enhance the strategic sanctions separately to avoid the deadlock.

In July 2008, when the Highest Representatives of the European Union, Javier Solana went to Iran as a diplomatic effort to discuss a new package of proposals which remained Iran to keep continuing on enrich the uranium, but with the requirement: for peaceful purposes, small scale power, willing to be guided by IAEA and the UNSC would revoke the sanctions. This formula was called by EU as ‘freeze by freeze.’<sup>39</sup> In a view of the prevalent situation regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, a logical suggestion was the adoption of an effective diplomatic approach to resolve the problem. The only way to move forward was for all parties to concede something and reach a *modus vivendi*. However, powerful states with nuclear weapons have to review their own policies. As one Nobel Laureate for peace states, “For some to say that nuclear weapons are good for them, but not for others are simply not sustainable. The most powerful nations must remember that as they do, so shall others do.”<sup>40</sup>

### **C. The Policy Responses of the European Union**

In the twentieth century, Iraq had become a threat to Iran’s security concerns and now became the player into the twenty-first century. In Iraq, the West confronted an old-fashioned totalitarian dictatorship that employed traditional methods of conventional aggression of Western interests. As a result, whether one agreed with the American decision to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein or not, and whether one believed that the ultimate outcome would be better or worse than what preceded it – the problem of Iraq lent itself to an old fashioned solution: the invasion and deposition of the tyrant. The Iran problems were more complex. Although Iran’s regime was autocratic, it had pluralistic elements within it. Moreover, Iranian aggression over the past two decades had

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<sup>39</sup> Rubab Hasan, *op.cit*, p. 48.

<sup>40</sup> 4<sup>th</sup> World Summit of Nobel of Peace Laureates, Rome - Campidoglio, November 27th- 30th 2003. See, <http://deathpenalty.procon.org/sourcefiles/Nobel%20Final%20Document.pdf>, accessed on September 26, 2010.

been far more sophisticated than Saddam bumbling inventions and ham-handed threats, employing a range of tactics from terrorism to subversion to financial support to pursue its anti-status quo goals. As a result, the threat from Iran was less transparent and the West ability to influence (or topple) the Iranian government was more problematic. One of the ways to solve problems was to establish the alliance that could be a pillar of international security.<sup>41</sup>

The issues of Iran, which emerged since the Iranian revolution of 1979, were very troublesome to the West. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini finally appeared from the exile and became the absolute leader of the Iranian revolution, preaching a political doctrine that Shi'a Islam to launch struggles against the evil which he was associated with infidel of the West, and particularly with its leader, the USA. Since that time, the Iranian leader had frequently defined their foreign policies as hostilities to the West, or at least, to the US, and had carried on an aggressive struggle against it.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, the shadow of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the EU declared wars against all forms of terrorism and cooperated with the international community especially with the US by establishing an effective contribution to military actions and politics. Basing on anti-terrorism, the EU supported military operations on October 7<sup>th</sup>, 2001 in Afghanistan.

Concerned to the nuclear weapon produced by Iran, being a quite exciting debate among EU and US government, the debate is about the truth of the uranium-enrichment functions of nuclear development, whether Iran sought nuclear weapons or merely the ability to manufacture weapons in short time. This question was very important because if Iran built nuclear weapons, it would be proved that Iran has violated the NPT.

Iran's relations with Europe were improved since dynamics 1990s and primarily took place during the election of President Khatami. In 1998, a "Comprehensive Dialogue" in the form of semi-annual troika meetings was established covering a variety of themes from regional energy issues.

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<sup>41</sup> Kenneth M. Pollack, A Common Approach to Iran in *Crescent of Crisis, US-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East*, ed. Ivo Daalde, Nicole Gnesotto, Philip Gordon (Washington: Brookings Institutions Press, 2006), p. 7.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, p. 8.

Subsequently, high-level working groups on energy and transport as well as on trade and investment were established in 1999 and 2000 respectively. Furthermore, in 2001, the Commission adopted Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which was launched in Brussels in December 2002. This agreement aimed to boost Iranian economic development potential, enhancing the climate for trade and investment from the Europe and the wider world as well as all those fields should also be matched by enhancing political relations. This was why the EU and Iran began negotiating a Political Dialogue Agreement (PDA), which addressed issues such as the situation in the Middle East, the non-proliferation of WMD, Human Rights, and the fight against terrorism.<sup>43</sup>

### **1. Before 2003**

However, in 2003, the Iran nuclear issue appeared as a serious problem for the Atlantic power which was intended to pursue nuclear weapons and support terrorist movements; it could be really annoying especially for the US security and Israel. If Iran gained entry into the “nuclear club,” some fear this might further undermine the global anti-proliferation regime, opening the door to nuclear aspirants everywhere; thus, while Euro - Iranian relations were improving, US - Iran relations remained hostile.<sup>44</sup>

As an additional note, prior to 2003, EU had never concentrated on non-proliferation policy in a sustainable manner. There was an example in 1992, the CFSP established with the Treaty of European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) which poured all foreign policies, including the EU security for them selves. In that Treaty, all of EU members would work together to enhance and develop their political solidarity. They should refrain from any action which was contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

Establishments of non-proliferation policy development were made carefully because each EU member states had different characteristic. For

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<sup>43</sup> EU Iran Basic Facts. See, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-IRAN\\_Basic\\_facts\\_April\\_2009.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-IRAN_Basic_facts_April_2009.pdf), accessed on May 07, 2009.

<sup>44</sup> Europe's Iran Diplomacy. *loc. cit.*

example, majorities were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and minorities were nonaligned and active within the New Agenda Coalition working for nuclear disarmament. The discussions within the EU on nonproliferation and disarmament were primarily carried out on a technical level within two working groups under the Council - One on Non-Proliferation (CONOP) and one UN - related disarmament issues (CODUN).<sup>45</sup>

The EU through the achievement of “Tehran Agreement” on October 21<sup>st</sup>, 2003, had proved soft power. The agreement intended to reduce the anxiety of US against Iran’s nuclear program, reduced the US-Iran confrontation, and strengthened the role of the IAEA as well as the EU would help Iran to develop nuclear energy in a positive direction based on the contents of the agreement which also showed that Iran would voluntarily dismiss its uranium enrichment program temporarily. Then, after received the necessary clarifications, it would signed an Additional Protocol and a safeguards agreement. It also stated that as an additional confidence-building measure, it would voluntarily suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities.<sup>46</sup>

In summer 2003, the EU became frustrated with Iran’s political reforms which tended slowly, and this matter had proved by concerns about the nature of Iran’s nuclear program and a lack of disobedience from EU against the IAEA safeguards and human rights violations. IAEA was threatening Iran with U.N. sanctions as the Washington requested. US officials had not actively opposed moderate or incentive-based approaches advocated by European governments. Many political experts speculated that both Europe and Washington had been eager to avoid another large diplomatic row so soon after Iraq.<sup>47</sup>

## **2. Second Phase in 2004**

In autumn 2003, Javier Solana attended on intense negotiations which were held between Iran and the EU. “The main issue was the EU’s demand that

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<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards. Signing Ceremony Takes Place at IAEA, 18 December 2003. See, <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html>, accessed on May 10, 2009.

<sup>47</sup> Judy Dempsey, “EU to Join US in Pressing Iran,” *Financial Times*, June 11, 2003.

Iran completely suspend its uranium enrichment programme.”<sup>48</sup> A new agreement, known as “Paris Agreement,”<sup>49</sup> reached on November 15<sup>th</sup>, 2004. This agreement would provide objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes and this policy as a continuation of the “Tehran Agreement,” was considered on.<sup>50</sup>

- a. The commitment on the progress of the previous agreement.
- b. Commitments of Iran and the NPT.
- c. EU recognized Iran’s right without discrimination.
- d. Iran’s commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons.
- e. This suspension was a voluntary confidence building measure and not legal obligation.
- f. Together EU would establish the working groups to address security issues, politics, technology, and so forth.
- g. The implements of the safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol.
- h. The door would be open for Iranian trade if the suspension had been verified.
- i. Cooperation with Iran to combat terrorism.

In 2004, the EU always refused the US demand to bring Iran into the UN Security Council. The EU believed that referral to the UN Security Council was too early and may be counter-productive as it would encourage Iran to escape the IAEA cooperation and withdraw from the NPT. The disagreement between the EU and the US over the UNSC referral highlighted fundamental differences over respective strategies to address WMD proliferation and all the risks. The prospect to portray the issue as a crucial test to the credibility of the EU’s multifunctional strategy of “conditional engagement included improving political and economic ties, but also, if necessary, the imposition of sanctions could deliver real and sustainable results in addressing concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities. In doing so, the EU formulated “an alternative approach to US policy regarding the use of

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<sup>48</sup> Shanon N Kile, ‘*Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation*’, in SIPRI Yearbook 2005, p. 561-563.

<sup>49</sup> Communication dated 26 November 2004 received from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Kingdom concerning the agreement signed in Paris on 15 November 2004.

<sup>50</sup> Paris Agreement 2004. See, [http://www.ambafrance-ir.org/article.php3?id\\_article=549](http://www.ambafrance-ir.org/article.php3?id_article=549), accessed on May 12, 2010.



force to address proliferation challenges.”<sup>51</sup> The essential question was how to merge between the economic and politic, and the EU said that, “there will be no progress on trade pact without parallel progress on political consensus.” The EU also rejected US critic, “the EU was used the guise of security for commercial interests.” On New York Times, EU replied with an argument, “The EU does not negotiate only for a pistachio.”<sup>52</sup>

In mid-December 2004, EU released “Proposals for a Long-term Agreement.” The present negotiation between the EU and Iran began in December 2004, following the conclusion of the Paris Agreement on November 15<sup>th</sup>, 2004. The agreement stressed the importance of developing relations of trust and co-operation between the EU and Iran for the preservation of international peace and stability. As part of an overall agreement, the EU proposed that both parties should make commitments in the following areas:<sup>53</sup>

- a. Political & Security Co-operation
  1. Resolutions of disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.
  2. Areas of special interests: Non-proliferation, Regional Security, combating terrorism and trafficking.
- b. Long-Term Support for Iran’s Civil Nuclear Programme
  1. Principle: The EU would: recognize Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy without discrimination.
  2. Framework: Co-operation between the EU and Iran in the nuclear field would be enhanced: Iran would have access to the international nuclear technologies market where contracts were awarded on the basis of open competitive tendering, including the long-term arrangements, resolution by the IAEA, UNSCR 1540, and following the international norms.
  3. Iranian access to the international nuclear fuel market and co-operation in nuclear energy.
  4. Fuel assurances.
  5. Confidence building.

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<sup>51</sup> G. Quille and R. Keane, *The EU and Iran: towards a New Political And Security Dialogue*, in *Europe and Iran. Perspectives on Non-proliferation*, ed. Shanon N. Kile (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 112.

<sup>52</sup> Steven Weisman, “US Takes Softer Tone on Iran,” *New York Times*, October 29, 2003.

<sup>53</sup> Framework For A Long-Term Agreement Between the Islamic Republic of Iran, France, Germany & the United Kingdom with the Support of the High Representative of the European Union, December 2004.

- c. Economic & Technological Co-Operation
  1. They would be prepared to make a policy declaration that they regard Iran as a long-term source of oil and gas for the EU.
  2. Promoting trade, investment and transfer of technology.
  3. EU - Iran Trade & Co-operation Agreement and an EU - Iran Political Dialogue Agreement.
  4. Agreeing to convene a joint export control workshop.
  5. Committing to developing long-term scientific and technological co-operation.
  6. Invigorating co-operation in transport area.

The EU argued that engagement with Iran was currently the only practical option for curbing Iran's nuclear ambitions and they believed, through those agreements, (Additional Protocol and Safeguard Agreement, Teheran Agreement, Paris Agreement, Long-term Agreement) they could retard Iranian nuclear activity progress. EU officials expected to convince Iran to make a strategic decision to halt its nuclear weapon activities and enhance the relation in all of terms in purposes for guarantee Iran nuclear program for civilians.

### 3. Third Phase of 2005

In 2005, when Ahmadinejad took office as the new president of Iran, "the international controversy over the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program intensified." The point of debate in the year 2005 problem was about the future of Iran's nuclear energy enrichment program<sup>54</sup>. As anticipated, the EU demand implied a permanent cessation of Iran's uranium enrichment programme; a demand that was categorically rejected by Iranian officials said that:

"Iran's measures to follow the commitment of suspension of its nuclear activities in the Treaty of Paris was held, by law, Iran has the right to develop nuclear energy for civilian, Iranian officials stated repeatedly that the country would restart enrichment activities, with appropriate assurances about their peaceful purpose, once the remaining safeguards issues had been resolved."<sup>55</sup>

The EU approach orientation was to build international confidence. This proved necessarily in light of widespread international concerns that Iran's

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<sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, p. 619.

<sup>55</sup> Shanon N Kile, *Nuclear Arms Control and Non-proliferation*, in SIPRI Yearbook 2006, p. 620.

nuclear programme might not serve peaceful purposes only. These concerns were based on Iran's history of clandestine and deception of the true scale of its nuclear programme over nearly two decades and it had documented by the IAEA.

Iranian had sent the proposal to the EU on January 17<sup>th</sup>, 2005. The outlines of proposal were as follows:<sup>56</sup>

- a. Together to keep stabilization in the region.
- b. Elimination and non-proliferation of WMD.
- c. Combating terrorism.
- d. Sustainable Partnership on regional issues.
- e. Security and defense cooperation.
- f. Cooperation in the area in export control.

On March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2005, details of 'objective guarantees, Firms Guarantees, and Firms Commitment' Iran was willing to discuss regarding its nuclear program, including:<sup>57</sup>

- a. IAEA Additional Protocol and continuous on-site inspections at key facilities had adopted by Iran.
- b. Limiting on enrichment program.
- c. Immediately converting all enriched uranium to fuel rods.
- d. EU recognized Iran as a major source of energy.
- e. Guarantees to enhance nuclear technology.
- f. Normalizing Iran's status under G8 export controls.

Iran proposed amendments on several points on April 29<sup>th</sup>, 2005, which was focused on short-term confidence-building was as a follow:<sup>58</sup>

- a. Continued enrichment suspension for six months.
- b. Limiting the quantity of Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) placed in Isfahan.
- c. IAEA Additional Protocol was implemented by Iran,
- d. Iran would seal the UF6.
- e. Establishment on counter-terrorism and export control.
- f. An EU declaration recognizing Iran as a major source of energy for Europe.

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<sup>56</sup> Proposal by Iran, Presented to Political and Security Working Group, Geneva: January 17, 2005.

<sup>57</sup> Proposal by Iran in the Meeting of Steering Committee, Paris: March 23, 2005.

<sup>58</sup> Proposal by Iran, Presented to the Meeting of the Steering Committee, London: April 29, 2005.

In August 2005, EU showed their ‘comprehensive proposal for a long-term agreement,’ but Iran rejected that proposal later, claimed that it did not recognize Iran’s right to enrichment. Therefore, Tehran returned to process uranium conversion, broke the suspension agreement with the EU, and end negotiations. However, the Comprehensive proposal had outlining the following:<sup>59</sup>

- a. Iran-EU relation in term of political dialogue.
- b. Political security and cooperation.
- c. Obeied to the international law.
- d. Cooperation on specific area; non-proliferation, terrorism, regional security, combating drug trafficking.
- e. Long-term agreement to support civilian nuclear program.
- f. Economic and technological cooperation, such as promotion of trade and investment, and so forth.

When Iran abandoned what has been offered, it surprised the European countries. These shared concerns of international community, as the adoption of nine successive resolutions by demonstrating clearly from the IAEA Board of Governors. In September 2005, Mohammed El-Baradei, reported to the Board that “after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation, Iran’s full transparency is indispensable and overdue”<sup>60</sup> and the Board of Governors passed with broad support a resolution finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards-agreement.<sup>61</sup> The IAEA demanded that Iran ceased its conversion activities. The subsequent negotiations between Iran and the EU on the nuclear issue “broke down after having made little progress,”<sup>62</sup> meanwhile the TCA and PDA negotiations were suspended by the Commission.

Considering that the refusal of Iran to the long-term agreement in last August 2005 which already took less than two years and it supported by the international community:

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<sup>59</sup> Communication dated 8 August 2005 received from the Resident Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the Agency.

<sup>60</sup> Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2.

<sup>62</sup> Shanon N. Kile, 2006, *op. cit*, p. 619.

“Iran’s decision to restart enrichment activity was a clear rejection of the process the EU and Iran had been engaged in for over two years with the support of the international community. In addition, it constitutes a further challenge to the authority of the IAEA and international community. We had, therefore, decided to inform the IAEA Board of Governors that our discussions with Iran had reached an impasse.”<sup>63</sup>

#### **4. Forth Phase of 2006**

In September 2006, CJavier Solana met with Ali Larijani (Supreme Head of the National Security Council) in Vienna and Berlin, while the US and France, Britain, Germany, China, and Russia gave Iran a time to consider until October 2006 to suspend uranium enrichment.<sup>64</sup> Solana noted Tehran’s “lack of openness with regard to suspension of enrichment,” the talks were broken off.

In this October, P5+1 was arranged the new strategy to put UNSCR 1696 (2006) and to adopt measures which listed in Article 41. And continued on December 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2006, Resolution 1737 (2006) was adopted unanimously by the UNSC, which strongly emphasized Iran to stop “nuclear proliferation activities” and added the list of the companies and individuals involved for economic sanctions such as financial sanctions, banned on the export-import of weapons, and urged all countries to freeze assets of Iran. Prior to the adoption of the resolution, the Iranian officials including President Ahmadinejad, Foreign Minister Mottaki, and Iran’s Chief Nuclear Negotiator, Ali Larijani reaffirmed, in other statements, Tehran intended to have formal negotiation on its nuclear program, but that unconditional suspension of uranium enrichment should not be considered as a prerequisite to the talks.<sup>65</sup> For its part, the US immediately renewed its calls for the strengthening of sanctions against Iran.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> IAEA Information Circular, ‘Communication dated 13 January 2006 received from the Permanent Missions of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the Agency’, INFCIRC/662, 18 January 2006. See, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2006/infcirc662.pdf>, accessed on August 10, 2010.

<sup>64</sup> New Deadline for Iran, Washington Post, September 21, 2006, A15. See, [www.washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com), accessed on August 10, 2010.

<sup>65</sup> Iran defiant on nuclear programme, BBC, 21 February 2007, See, [www.nti.org/e\\_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825\\_6349.html](http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Nuclear/1825_6349.html), accessed on August 11, 2010.

<sup>66</sup> “US urges sanctions against Tehran”, *The Washington Times*, 16 May 2007.

## 5. Fifth Phase of 2007

In 2007, the EU adopted Common Position 2007/140, which implemented UNSCR 1737 (2006) and banned all travel for certain individual.<sup>67</sup> For the next year, the Common Position 2007/140 amended and replaced by 2007/246 and incorporated stronger sanctions by banning Iranian trade which was relevant to all nuclear and missile commodities contained in the control lists of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. It also restricted the provision of training and financing activities to support Iran's development of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities. Moreover, the EU froze the assets of corporate and governmental entities and individuals directly associated with Iran's sensitive nuclear activities and missile development programs, preventing EU members from making transfers of conventional weapons and military equipment to Iran, and banning member states from establishing new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to Tehran.<sup>68</sup>

On August 27<sup>th</sup>, 2007, the situation was not changed, even some US officials threatening Iran with military intervention. Resolutions between Iran and Javier were continued, while, the IAEA inspection team remained examining nuclear facilities in Iran after doing many discussion rounds, The IAEA had circulated the text of the IAEA document "Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues."<sup>69</sup> After these modalities text issued, IAEA expressed regrets with the decision of Security Council that Iran continued Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) construction and operation of the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). The report also confirmed Plutonium Experiments and Acquisition of P-1 and P-2 Centrifuge

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<sup>67</sup> Who have some business which related to the Iranian nuclear programs or who work for Iran's government. All those criteria had been listed on that policy.

<sup>68</sup> Economic Sanctions: Pressuring Iran's Nuclear. See, <http://npsglobal.org/eng/component/content/article/147-articles/872-economic-sanctions-pressuring-irans-nuclear-program.html>, accessed on July 29, 2010.

<sup>69</sup> IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC/711), Communication dated 27 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency concerning the text of the "Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues."

Technology. Moreover, as part of the August 2007 Work Plan, Iran had pledged to provide, over the course of the next few months, answers to written questions from IAEA as well as clarifications and access to information, as regards the remaining outstanding issues.

EU and US were determined to issue a policy without any compromise from Iran. The meeting, held in New York with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Foreign Ministers of Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany, the US, and Solana, issued a joint statement on Iran's nuclear program. This document stated that a resumption of negotiations with Iran "on a comprehensive long-term agreement" and required that Iran "fully and verifiably suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as required by UNSC Resolutions 1737 and 1747". It recalled that:<sup>70</sup>

"The Security Council has offered Iran the possibility of "suspension for suspension" - suspension of the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all of its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, as verified by the IAEA. In view of the fact that Iran has not fulfilled the requirements of United Nation Security Council Resolutions 1737 and 1747, including the suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing activities.

A text for third UN Security Council Sanction Resolution under Article 41 Chapter VII of the Charter of United Nations had agreed by EU -US, while China and Russia intended to choose the vote in the UN Security Council. These new sanctions were voted unless the report of Dr. Solana,<sup>71</sup> and Dr. El Baradei, both expected for November 2007, show "a positive outcome of their efforts."<sup>72</sup>

On November 30<sup>th</sup>, 2007, Javier Solana as an EU envoy met with Said Jalili to renew negotiations on Iran's nuclear program. After the meeting, Solana said that the meetings were very disappointing.<sup>73</sup> In 1<sup>st</sup> December, P5+1 political

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<sup>70</sup> P5+2 Statement on Iran. See, <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iran/State/92944.pdf>, accessed on August 20, 2010.

<sup>71</sup> The Joint Statement asks Dr Solana "to meet with Dr. Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, to lay the foundation for future negotiations"

<sup>72</sup> P5+2 Statement on Iran, *loc. cit.*

<sup>73</sup> EU disappointed by Iran talks, International Herald Tribune, November 30, 2007. See, [www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/30/africa/iran.php?WT.mc\\_id=rssafrica](http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/30/africa/iran.php?WT.mc_id=rssafrica), accessed on August 20, 2010.

directors met and agreed that, because there was no new gaps from Iran, the members of the P5+1 should make a new resolution, and as a consequence, on December 14<sup>th</sup>, 2007 in Brussels, the European Council stressed the obligation of the suspension and stated that:<sup>74</sup>

- a. The European Council reaffirmed its deep concern at Iran's nuclear program and underlined that the acquisition by Iran of a nuclear military capability would be unacceptable. In this regard, it deplored that Iran had still not complied with its international obligations as reiterated in UNSCR 1696, 1737, and 1747, to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities in order to restore confidence in the entirely peaceful nature of its programme.
- b. The European Council furthermore regreted that neither High Representative of the EU Javier Solana, following his discussions with the Iranian nuclear negotiator, nor the Director-General of IAEA Mohamed El Baradei were able to report a positive outcome, particularly in the fulfillment by Iran of the requirements of the UN Security Council.
- c. The European Council called upon Iran to provide full, clear, and credible answers to the IAEA, to resolve all questions concerning Iran's nuclear activities, to ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and to fully implement the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement, including its subsidiary arrangements. It emphasized that carrying out these actions and the transparency measures as requested by the IAEA would constitute a positive step to build confidence concerning Iran's nuclear programme.
- d. The European Council reaffirmed its full and unequivocal support for efforts to find a negotiated long-term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and underlined that the proposals were presented by the High Representative on June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2006 would give Iran everything it needed to develop a civil nuclear power industry while addressing international concerns.
- e. The European Council reiterated its full support for the work of the UN Security Council to adopted further measures under Article 41, Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and recalled that, following the General Affairs and External Relations Council conclusions on Iran in October 15<sup>th</sup>, the consideration had begun on additional measures that might be taken in support of the UN process and the shared objectives to the international community. In light of the upcoming decisions which would be taken by the UN Security

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<sup>74</sup> Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council (December 14, 2007). See, [www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/97669.pdf), accessed on July 28, 2010.



Council, and the next General Affairs and External Relations Council would decide what actions the EU would take.

## 6. Sixth Phase of 2008

Meantime, on January 13<sup>th</sup>, 2008, the remaining settlement of issues getting a good wind, and the IAEA announced that Iran had agreed to respond the questions about its nuclear activities and given time for approximately four weeks. Unexpectedly, the report came so quickly, in February 2008, Iran informed that the work plan 2007 was delayed due to the internal strife over the report's expected conclusions that the major issues had been resolved.<sup>75</sup>

On February 21<sup>st</sup>, 2008, Britain and France offered a new draft resolution and asked the UNSC to consider formally. This resolution emphasized the restrictions cargos which were delivered to or from Iran, freezing assets to persons or entities which had involved in Iran's nuclear activities, travel restrictions, and tightened to monitoring Iranian financial.<sup>76</sup> After considering, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei circulated his latest report to the Agency's Board of Governors, which stated that:

“The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with its findings in the case of the polonium-210 experiments and the mine are not inconsistent with its findings in the case of the contamination at the technical university and the procurement activities of the former Head of Physics Research Center (PHRC). Therefore, the Agency considers those questions no longer outstanding at this stage. (...).”<sup>77</sup>

The Agency had been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear materials in Iran. Regrettably, the Agency had not been able to make substantive progress on the alleged studies and associated questions which were relevant to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. These

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<sup>75</sup> Disagreements could delay Iran nuclear report: diplomats, The Journal of Turkish Weekly. See, <http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/52394/disagreements-could-delay-iran-nuclear-report-diplomats.html>, accessed on August 12, 2010.

<sup>76</sup> Security Council weighs new sanctions on Iran', International Herald Tribune, February 22, 2008. See, [www.ihf.com/articles/2008/02/22/news/22nations.php](http://www.ihf.com/articles/2008/02/22/news/22nations.php), accessed on August 11, 2010.

<sup>77</sup> Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, p. 9.

regards remained of serious concerns.<sup>78</sup> Ultimately, the IAEA asked Iran to implement the Additional Protocol as soon as possible and the Board of Governors asked for and confirmed by the Security Council to Iran for building the confidence.<sup>79</sup>

Assessment and criticism that never happened before, it about against the work of IAEA and its Director General, which had catapulted by Western states officials. It has been published in media which was regarded Iranian victory of Iran as “official document that proven that all Iranian nuclear projects solely just for peace” which has been described by the Iranian Supreme National Security Council.<sup>80</sup> For mainstream, Western media outlets - to the contrary had written, “highlighted Iran’s lack of credible answers to intelligence about explosives and missile design work relevant to making atomic bombs,” and could “be branded negative on balance by big powers and spur the UN Security Council to adopt more sanctions”<sup>81</sup>

After that, UNSC Resolution 1803 (S/RES/1803 (2008)), which injected on March 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2008. The sanctions which reinforced the previous resolutions had also been applied to Iran such:<sup>82</sup>

- a. Tightening inspection of shipping goods to Iran and suspected carrying prohibited items mainly were related to nuclear activities;
- b. Tightening financial supervision.
- c. Prohibiting traveling flight.
- d. Asset freezes against persons and companies involving in the nuclear program.

This position did not gain unanimity across the Atlantic. Some dissentient voices were heard through criticizing the implementation of new sanctions,

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<sup>78</sup> Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors. See, <http://www.iaea.or.at/newscenter/multimedia/videos/bog220908/index.html>, accessed on August 11, 2010.

<sup>79</sup> Q – Documents Relating to Iran (Islamic Republic of). See, [http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site\\_Files/pdf/bb2009/partii/sectionq.pdf](http://www.mcis.soton.ac.uk/Site_Files/pdf/bb2009/partii/sectionq.pdf), accessed on 20 August 2010.

<sup>80</sup> Jalili: IAEA Iran report nullifies west claims’, IRNA, 22 February 2008. See, [www.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-24/0802228236195454.htm](http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-24/0802228236195454.htm), accessed on August 20, 2010.

<sup>81</sup> Nuclear watchdog says Iran rejects evidence linking it to nuclear weapons’, International Herald Tribune, 22 February 2008. See, [www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/22/europe/EU-GEN-Nuclear-Iran.php](http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/22/europe/EU-GEN-Nuclear-Iran.php), accessed on August 20, 2010.

<sup>82</sup> UNSC S/RES/ 1803 (2008).

advocating the work of the IAEA, and calling for a “nuanced diplomacy of reconciliation.”<sup>83</sup> A critical statement had risen for UNSCR 1803 (2008), EU, the US, China, and Russia stated that, a commitment “to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue”, and reiterated their “recognition of Iran’s right to develop, research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.<sup>84</sup> Another document showed that, “to take this opportunity to engage with us (P5+1) and to find a negotiated way forward.”<sup>85</sup> Then, “once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT.”<sup>86</sup>

In 2008, for further actions, the EU Council adopted a Council Common Position 2008/479/CFSP on June 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2008 amending Common Position 2007/140/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, which included a list of people and an additional company to obey to asset freezes and travel. In August 2008, the EU adopted a new policy with the Council Common Position 2008/652/CFSP on August 7<sup>th</sup>, 2008, which amended Common Position 2007/140/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran, as following:<sup>87</sup>

- a. Asked all member states not to provide for any kind of economic assistances (finances, the investments and trade) with Iran.
- b. Noticed to be careful with all financial transactions which were conducted by Iran’s finance institutions.

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<sup>83</sup> Ray Takeyh and Joseph Cirincione, ElBaradei is quietly managing to disarm Iran. See, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/06a1fa90-e4d7-11dc-a495-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1J64qbLqj>, accessed on August 15, 2010.

<sup>84</sup> Statement delivered by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on behalf of the E3+3. See, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/116679.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/116679.pdf), accessed on January 13, 2011.

<sup>85</sup> Statement by The Foreign Ministers China, France, Germany, Russia, The United Kingdom, the United States Of America, With the Support of the High Representative of the European Union on. See, [http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/Statements/ga/ga\\_docs/Statement250307en.htm](http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/Statements/ga/ga_docs/Statement250307en.htm), accessed on August 03, 2010.

<sup>86</sup> Statement by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union on the Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1803. See, [http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/Statements/ga/ga\\_docs/Statement030308ru.htm](http://www.un.int/russia/new/MainRoot/Statements/ga/ga_docs/Statement030308ru.htm), accessed on August 03, 2010.

<sup>87</sup> Council Common Position 2008/652/CFSP of 7 August 2008 are amending Common Position 2007/140/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran.

- c. Stressed to all of member states to be more careful in checking the cargos to or from Iran at the airport or harbor.
- d. Visa restrictions banned on a number of Iranian officials and other individuals who were associated with the nuclear program activities.

Similar to the case of United Nation Security UNSCR 1737, in June 2010, the European members of the Security Council supported UNSCR 1929, which was followed by a European Council declaration initiating more punitive sanctions on trade with Iran, financial restrictions, and investment in the Iranian gas and oil industries.<sup>88</sup>

Considering to the energy needed for industrialization, although US, UN, and EU policies themselves has banned its member states to establish cooperation with Iran, the cooperation between EU member states and Iran was still existed in term of trade. This matter was influences by several things:

- a. There was no hostility stories to the European countries individually so Iranian nuclear threat not to reached them.
- b. To meet the necessary of country then either secretly or openly they establish cooperation in terms of economic, and sport.
- c. They did not cooperate in political and military consensus.

In sum, Europeans thought that the best way to ensure the international community, Israel and other states that were not listed on NPT, should join and conduct proliferation and disarmament, obey to the IAEA regulations, and intend to establish a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East. Overall, the European soft power approach was to produce harmonization and improvement of cooperation among member countries; further away, the EU also showed attitude vis-à-vis the US in agreeing a higher policy goals as policies related to non-proliferation of WMD. Involvements of Javier Solana as the opening of communication channels were important for the maintained even after three rounds of failed then, the international community expected the next president of US (Barack Obama or so on) to produce a better situation and significant political breakthrough leading to the desired.

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<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER V

### **Analysis the Cooperation between the US and EU on the Iranian Nuclear Issue under the George W. Bush Government**

“We, the United States of America and the European Union, affirm our conviction that the ties which bind our people are as strong today as they have been for the past half century. For over fifty years, the transatlantic partnership has been the leading force for peace and prosperity for our selves and for the world. Together, we helped transform adversaries into allies and dictatorships into democracies. Together, we built institutions and patterns of cooperation that ensured our security and economic strength. These are epic achievements.”

The New Transatlantic Agenda, 1995.<sup>1</sup>

Robert Kagan likened America and Europe to Mars and Venus as two opposing strategic poles “liken.” However, they were potential alliance to solve global problems beyond the ‘Venus and Mars.’ Promotion of democracy was the key concept in foreign policy discourse. Both the rhetoric of EU and US hinted at a belief in the logic of the Democratic Peace thesis. Transatlantic diplomatic relations should be more respected to democracy in term of resolving the outstanding issues through cooperation even with the different approaches. After the black 9/ 11, the US prepared pre-emptive strike action to prevent the sudden attack which was occurred before. One example is US invasion to Afghanistan and Iraq; the politician might believe that the US way to maintain the world order had failed. Meanwhile, the EU started to prepare the security policy strategy in late 2003. These document issues reflected what the US concerned of the terrorism and WMD proliferation; the way of EU was to achieve the security policy objectives were different with the US, whereby the EU was stressed on dialogues and multilateralism. Supposedly, the EU and US no longer went it alone at that time, and basically, they had same principles in democracy.

Talking about the Middle East as the spotlight over it conflict in region, terrorism and WMD issue could be understood in wider space. At least, there were three important dimensions of transatlantic relations:

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<sup>1</sup> New Transatlantic Agenda on 1995. See, <http://www.eurunion.org/partner/agenda.htm>, accessed on April 05, 2010

- a. Concerning to the evolution history of transatlantic relations on the region.
- b. The growing of transatlantic relations on a wider dimension after Bush served as President of the US and was particularly influential in transatlantic discussions since terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001.
- c. On Iranian nuclear issue, US and EU, as the main actors who played important roles in international politics, had special responsibilities on their policy decisions. Their agenda and policy decisions would become important in globalization courses.

In 2003, EU and US started to open the diplomatic efforts to suspend Iran's nuclear program. Then, on October 21<sup>st</sup>, 2003, the EU and Iran issued a joint statement containing Iran intention to return enrich the uranium though concerning on peaceful purposes. In sum, there were three important points on Joint Statement of EU and US:<sup>2</sup>

- a. Applying transparency on nuclear development activities.
- b. Signing and ratifying the additional protocol and safeguard agreement of the NPT, obeying to the international laws, and being willing to IAEA inspection of nuclear facilities.
- c. To halt uranium enrichment activities related to produce nuclear weapon.

Through that agreement, the EU and US would determine to tackle abuse of enrichment of nuclear energy, and this matter was aimed to maintain security stability. On June 21<sup>st</sup>, 2006, José Manuel Barroso on the EU-US Summit Press Conference, asserted:<sup>3</sup>

“I want to emphasize our shared commitment to promoting democracy, freedom all over the world. (...) And that's one of the fields where I see that the United States and European Union can do, and should do, even more together.”

Through those matters, the EU and US had established a dialogue in crisis management and to develop it further. Through the close collaboration between

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<sup>2</sup> Joint Statement; European Council President Konstandinos Simitis, European Commission President Romano Prodi and US President George W. Bush on the Proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction on June 23, 2003 at Washington DC.

<sup>3</sup> Commission President Barroso, Austrian Chancellor Schüssel and US President Bush Press Availability at 2006 EU-US Summit. See, [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/sum06\\_06/docs/transcript\\_press\\_conf\\_210606.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/sum06_06/docs/transcript_press_conf_210606.pdf), accessed on June 07, 2010.

the EU and US on the aspects above which were consistent with and built upon cooperation with the UN, NATO, and other nations or multilateral organization which were appropriate with the outstanding issues. Those crises also had mentioned on The New Transatlantic Agenda through making comprehensive statement on many areas for common action and establishing cooperation to improve common security.<sup>4</sup> They range are from terrorism and nuclear proliferation toward the rise of Islamist fundamentalism, lack of democracy in individual countries, rampant population growth, economic stagnation, oil cooperation in the Middle East, keeping the Middle East peace process alive. such as Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and others. Particularly for Iran, The West had tended to focus on four principal concerns regarding Iran:

- a. Pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.
- b. Supports and participations in international terrorism.
- c. Oppositions to Arab-Israel peace process.
- d. Very poor record of human rights.

Without the European (or conversely), those problem would be difficult to handle. Without the assistance of its allies, Americans would go alone to pay the costs for maintaining global stability. In terms of spread democracy, without support from other democracy leader, America was less effective to spread democracy value in the Middle East and elsewhere. The EU and US joined alliances to protect themselves from another state whose superior resources could pose a threat. To ally with the dominant power means, placing one trust in its continued benevolence. Alliance provide states acting within balance of power system cannot find by looking to their own resources.<sup>5</sup>

A common policy including additional policy areas and strong commitments from UN (UNSCR), EU (Common Position), and US (Executive Order) had been failed when they were applied to the Iranian government. Recalling these two powers, the EU and (US in particular), should be more careful

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<sup>4</sup> The Work Plan EU-US Technical Dialogue and Increased Cooperation in Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention (March 2008).

<sup>5</sup> Michael Sheehan, *Balance of Power: History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 55.

to formulate the policy. However, the role as good and bad cop, the EU and US offered a mix of negotiation tactics. The standard model, a ‘police’ acted in a way threatening, hostile and abusive, and adopting good cop hospitality, and showed the attitude without the threat. Robert Einhorn showed examples of Iran’s case that they were the proper use of the terms good and bad cop.<sup>6</sup>

#### **A. The Debate between EU and the US on the Iranian Nuclear Issue**

The new world order rhetoric helped to mobilize supports for the war against Saddam Hussein. Nevertheless, the notion had little enduring significance as the Bush administration became increasingly preoccupied with domestic political needs and failed to provide either adequate details of the long-term shape of the New World Order or guidance as how it might be established and subsequently maintained. However, one implicit idea in the new world order was that of multilateralism: the US would act in cooperation with other states in efforts to sustain or restore order. Indeed, this concept had increased and it was seen by analysts as one of the keys to manage international relations in the post Cold War era that was regard as particular importance in Atlantic relation.<sup>7</sup> Robert Kagan’s in *Paradise and Power: Europe and America in the new world order* affirmed in its very first sentence that: “It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.” Kagan concluded that “on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less.”<sup>8</sup>

According to Robert Kagan, since Bush Jr, was became the US president, the Europeans and Americans chose a different path, namely the most essential paradigm of ‘what is power’, namely: the benefits and ethics of power. People in

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<sup>6</sup> Robert J. Einhorn, *The Iran Nuclear Issue*, a briefing paper for the Aspen Institute Conference, *Iran: Prospects for a Common Transatlantic Agenda*, July 6 - 8, 2004 in Curtis H. Martin, *Good Cop/Bad Cop as a Model for Nonproliferation Diplomacy Toward North Korea and Iran*, *The Nonproliferation Review*. Volume 14, No.1 (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 70.

<sup>7</sup> Phil Williams, *Multilateralism: Critique and Appraisal in Multilateralism and Western Strategy*, Michel Brenner, ed., (Great Britain: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 209.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Kagan, *Power and Weakness in American Power in the Twenty-First Century*, David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 134.



Europe were no longer to focus on power but rather to the laws and regulations, cooperation, and international negotiations. According to Kagan, Europe had entered a 'post-historical paradise' "which is a manifestation of eternal peace" version of Immanuel Kant.<sup>9</sup> While America was still in the realm of historical and used the power for fight to confront the world that 'anarchist.' According to Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes in the world that 'anarchist,' the international rules cannot hold, and security guarantee and freedom depend on military strength.<sup>10</sup> Europe was now almost equal with America since two centuries ago in which power was not widely used and unilateral aggression was a taboo. For Europe, leading to a peaceful world order as a more important than unilateral action was considered as the norm for the sake of national interests

In a world with current or potential violators of nonproliferation norms and rules, doubts about the feasibility of verifiable nuclear disarmament gave US, French, Russian, and other officials an excuse not to think seriously about a regime whereby, no one was allowed to have nuclear weapons. By contrast, the EU believed that it was worth genuinely trying to create a world basic rules in which all actors forswear possession of certain types of weapons. During Bush's second term, transatlantic relations between Europe and US gradually changed better after Washington satisfied to fight with Baghdad. On that 2005, Seemingly, the US began to open his hand to the Europeans and asked to start the open the channels diplomacy toward Iran seriously. The European had agreed especially to regard to Iran. Although this cooperation was a temporary treatment of transatlantic acrimony, but this was still a good start to restore a sense of trust and foster a sense of togetherness in transatlantic circle although there had the differences assessment of problems, however, transatlantic relations remain standing and harmonious.

The European Union and the United States shared basic objectives in their Iran nuclear activities. Atlantic tensions would begin from the ways as well as be

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<sup>9</sup> Gunaryadi, Pasang-Surut Di Tepi Barat Dan Timur Atlantik Utara. See, <http://indocase.nl>, accessed on December 12, 2010.

<sup>10</sup> Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power – American and Europe in the New World Order* (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003), p. 3.

effective to achieve common goals. In 2004, Europe concerned about the US with two ways; first, it sparked the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) through unilaterally act; then, it also intended to implement sovereign political, economic, and educational changes while the government or regime was changed in Iraq as the last course which might be re-applied in Iran. GMEI strategy was applied by neo-conservative and opposed to the EU policies which were emphasized on democracy as the common goal. Not only the EU did not agree with this US initiatives, but also various heads of states, UN, NATO, the Arab League on the grounds “in drafting the initiative without any consultation with concerned countries and partner countries, of course, were not acceptable.”<sup>11</sup>

European must show optimism in democratization and be processed by concrete works that were believed to be able to handle the contradictions, political opponents, and all kinds of obstacles. The United States tended to cite the democratic deficits of governments that opposed to the Western interests in the region and threatened them with punitive measures such as sanctions (and even the possibility of an externally imposed regime change). European policy makers would be likely to try to support reform-minded forces within the countries in question, and nudge existing regimes towards reform through dialogue, material support, and forms of conditionality.

The views of rapprochements and differences were more contrast. The Transatlantic Alliance considered Iran as a “Rogue States” who rejected the policies of US, EU, and UN rather than an adherent to the IAEA regulations. Europe assessed Iran as a trouble partner but also as a member of the international community which was irregular with the possibilities to develop its domestic policies. It also viewed Iran as the most pluralistic system in the Gulf.<sup>12</sup> While US administration stated with confidence that Iran was developing technology for a nuclear bomb, and the Administration reaffirmed that there was no direct

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<sup>11</sup> The Greater Middle East Initiative. See, Nasim Zehra, <http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/5616/>, accessed on December 10, 2010.

<sup>12</sup> Völker Perthes, America’s, “*Greater Middle East*,” and *Europe: Key Issues for Dialogue*, *Middle East policy*, Vol. Xi, No. 3, fall 2004, pp. 86-87.

negotiations with Iran, US just encourage and motivate the partner countries to help US to close this issue.

In the space dimension of realism, the US concluded simply that the US did not trust any international agreements such as the NPT, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the IAEA, and the UN was also relied upon as an instrument of effective problem solvers to prevent rogue states like North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Iran that was pursuing WMD. The US argued that the instrument was just a waste of time and hassles, in addition, US intended to pressed Iran with military threats and implement more stringent sanctions. For further act, the US would try to implement the regime change immediately. With preemptive doctrine, the US never hesitated to use military force to any state and country that tried to acquire nuclear weapons and support terrorist movement.<sup>13</sup>

The debate was in stark contrast when Bush declared the “preemptive strike” as a last option to prevent Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. This had become a controversy within the Atlantic alliance body, Chancellor Schröder immediately took the opportunity to place opposition to this option by saying that he refused any circumstances to allow German troops to involve military campaign against Iran, in 2003, the US against Iraq. Politically, Schröder added that “attacking Iran was not in our agenda”<sup>14</sup> and Schröder seemed to doubt that pre-emptive strike option was able to bring US and Iran returning to normal diplomatic relations. European diplomats, citing Russian and China opposition, are skeptical about winning a Security Council vote on sanctions. Some European officials said that it might be more effective for Europe and the US to cancel any military means in exchange permanent cessation of all the nuclear projects of Iran.<sup>15</sup>

The EU did not agree to use the military means, EU emphasized on diplomacy art, common dialogue, negotiation and implement multilateralism

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<sup>13</sup> Jhon Feffer, ed., *Power Trip: US Unilateralism and Global Strategy after September 11* (London: Turnaround Publisher, 2003), p. 76.

<sup>14</sup> Richard Bernstein, “Schröder, the Underdog, Plays an Old Card with a New Face: Iran”, *New York Times*, August 16, 2005.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

strategy. Therefore, The European Union appeared to bring international agreements and international agencies to conduct negotiations which were aimed to prevent illegal proliferation and organize effective action. EU's diplomacy was to treat the target with a soft way and present several advantages option. The new EU non-proliferation strategy was willing to use force just for the worst cases; unlike comparable American documents, it did not appear bullish about the effectiveness of military action. Thus, If the first George W. Bush Administration had "shoot first, ask questions later," Europeans were more inclined to harbor doubts and a feeling of guilt, both of them had a strong hesitation to act.

Non-proliferation approach by EU and US could not say that it was true or false. The wisest strategy would blend them more than the relevant governments have to date. If entering into the international evolution space, the US must be willing not to use its own military power as a way involvement to support the resolution of new international issues. US had much to learn from past events that US was unable to resolve international cases especially proliferation in the absence of international cooperation which required a lot of diplomacy. Law enforcement of sanctions was used by President Bush when he took the role to further tighten the isolation to the Iranian regime. In December 2007, the national security adviser Stephen Hadley issued a statement, said; "The international community has to turn up the pressure on Iran with diplomatic isolation, UN Sanctions, and with other financial pressure, Iran has to decide to negotiate a solution."<sup>16</sup> The statement clearly indicated that the way which had been done to US was contradictory and too offensive.

Between US National Security Strategy which was released in September 2002 and the European Security Strategy that was born in December 2003, it revealed that the difference of opinion was not so striking about the threat. The contrast difference was the strategy adopted by the Mars and Venus. A comparison of the September 2002 US National Security Strategy and of the December 2003 European Security Strategy revealed that there was essentially no

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<sup>16</sup> Tony Karon, The Fallout from the Iran Nukes Report. See, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1690515,00.html>, accessed on December 11, 2010.

real difference on opinion over conceivable threats. Differences were likely to arise almost exclusively over the appropriate strategy to deal with them. The debate returned to the current Euro-Atlantic security dilemma: how should the EU combine the US grand strategy? The lessons of Iraq were clear. If the Europeans adopted several contradictory approaches to American policy, they would prove all equally ineffectual. The EU would command the attention of a US administration with one voice. Constraints written into the EU's Constitutional Treaty concerning the imperative of consultation before making national policy pronouncements were unlikely to be any more effective than the past ones.

In June 2006, the EU and the US met to discuss the continuation of their position on the settlement of Iran, and after three years, European was inconsistent to the US decision toward intervention of Iraq. Among political observers said that all the decisions Iran made was because of the consideration of specific decision from the US National Security adviser Stephen Hadley said, "Last month, President Bush offered to join negotiations about the future of Iran's nuclear energy program, a uranium-enrichment program could produce a potential fuel for nuclear weapons."<sup>17</sup> Michael O'Hanlon, senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, expressed his opinion that, "Bush should be able to prove the world that the US would no longer use violence as a negotiation." While the EU showed their diplomacy vision that it could work much better. EU and US must put aside their differences and should work together because their contribution were still needed in the Middle East. EU and the US should avoid protectionist, especially if it related to the developing countries. EU and US must cooperate to create a global economic order that was more equitable which the economies of developing countries were integrated therein.

The way to develop global cooperation was used carrot and stick instead of using military force to change the behavior of a country. Bush touted global cooperation during a commencement speech at the US Merchant Marine Academy, saying that Europe and the United States had united on Iran. "Nuclear

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<sup>17</sup> David Jackson, *Iranian Nuclear Program Focus of .US.-EU Meeting*, USA TODAY, Tuesday June 20, 2006 Page 9A.

weapons in the hands of this regime would be a grave threat to people everywhere,” He said, “President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has denied the claims of Bush that “Iran’s nuclear program is for electricity, not bombs, and He has accused the United States as fomenting a crisis.”<sup>18</sup> Iran had also noted the failure of US policy during the Bush administration which was influenced by neo-conservatives and the internal political considerations. Andrew Moravcsik director of the European Union Program at Princeton University said that it is important for the EU and the US to work together; he adds, however, “most Europeans believe it would be better to have a nuclear Iran to than strike.”<sup>19</sup> The US military plan to attack Iran was against the humanity. Confrontation in Middle East made the situation getting worse. This situation ended by a coalition with other countries to fight terrorism and other challenges that threatened international security. In this matter, if the US did not consider this region, it would affect the Washington prestige and power vacuum syndrome.<sup>20</sup>

## **B. The Diplomacy Efforts and Consultation**

A difficulty to understand and analyze globalization was to accept the complexity that had attached to this day. Now was not the time to say that the world was transparent and readable as we would like to believe in hindsight. This matter was emphasized on coercion to regulate the power of paradox and opposing forces which were operated at the national and global levels. If this formed by strength, it could contribute to make the world more unstable and unpredictable, giving rise to our analytical tools uncertainty and relativity. Globalization affected the foundations, the modalities, and objectives of the European-US relations because during the Cold War, relationship was important and it was emphasized a threat from communist ideology to the western democracies and into Western Europe in particular. Therefore, Europe and US

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<sup>18</sup> Joylon Howorth, *loc. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Iran: A Test for the Great Powers. See, [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n\\_2581](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_2581), accessed on December 13, 2010.

could not go it alone. On one occasion, they were tempted to walk alone; the transatlantic alliance through the crisis caused a rift in European security.<sup>21</sup>

The efforts to against global threats had been wide opened and began to think about what dangers and things would occur in front. The assessment of the security crisis was no longer to look the world through the prism of European security or NATO alone. According to the European, now the US was no longer as a strategic position. Europe had been able to solve its own problems, and US still needed Europe as the right choice.<sup>22</sup> Between European and US, it becomes freer to make different policies. Convergences between them were usually shared each other on international issues like bilateral ties between the US and the EU. The latter were obviously covered with issues such as managements of the financial and economic aspects of globalization, environmental security, climate change and Iranian nuclear proliferation. However, they had same interests on it. Europe's increasing assertiveness in international security matters was a product of the end of the bipolar world. What was an alliance of strategic necessity? It will become an alliance of political choice.

The influenced of globalization made the states surrounded by the uncertain. Iran was developing nuclear energy for peaceful purpose; it had created serious problems at the international level. Iran had the right to develop energy under the NPT to comply with IAEA inspections including the safeguard agreement. Lack of trust against Iran raised obscure allegations like allegations in which Iran was hiding (developing clandestine facilities) nuclear weapons development. A brief history of Iran's nuclear began in the year 1950-1960 with a provision by the US of the Small Tehran Research Reactor. In 1968, Iran signed the NPT and Ratified on 1970. On May 1974, it concluded with the IAEA - the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). After the revolution of Iran 1979, Iran started to build up the power and apply dual functions of nuclear reactors.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Ken Cole, Globalization: understanding complexity. See, <http://pdj.sagepub.com/content/3/4/323>, accessed on June 22, 2010.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Global Security: Iran*, Fifth Report of Session 2007-2008. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. (London: The Stationery Office Limited, March 02, 2008), pp. 49-50.

In the international relations science, there were systemic tools<sup>24</sup> with steps that were often used to make deal with outstanding issues and affecting to the foreign policy toward other countries. Take the diplomacy, sanctions, and wars as examples. In systems of international relations, as a tool, the diplomacy was often defined as a space for communications; sanctions, then, as second tools, were always used after the failed diplomacy while the wars, as a final choice, were emphasized by force. The three tools had mentioned above also be proved by Andrew K. Semmel, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations. He stated that:<sup>25</sup>

“That sanction, as a tools of diplomacy, have a spotty record. They may be a necessary diplomatic tool to express disapproval and to seek change in another country’s behavior, but they are typically insufficient by themselves. Unilateral sanctions rarely work. Success is most likely when the sanctions are smart and targeted. When they are sustained and sustainable over time, when they are universally or broadly adhered to, and when they complement and are complemented by other diplomatic tools, including, if necessary, more coercive means, such as the threat of military force, all of which are difficult, though not impossible to attain. This said, targeted sanctions remain a critical diplomatic tool.”

Because of unsuccessful economic and political methods, the effort of hard power that the US employed to stop its nuclear program and to change Iran’s behavior was using pressure with military threat. On the other track, the soft power with dialogues, negotiations, and political and economic incentives which the EU also used experienced through an impasse. These efforts ever done by the two powers which had been through five stages:

- a. From August 2002 to November 2003, namely, Iran openly announced that Iran had nuclear activities and in the days to come “voluntarily” Iran suspended these activities.
- b. Since November 2003 to November 2004, the agreement was between the EU and Iran through Paris Agreement.
- c. From November 2004 to August 2005, Iran brokered a new deal with EU which aimed at ending activities that could lead to nuclear

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<sup>24</sup> Diplomacy, sanction, war, the mobilization of international shame, the allotment of economic and/ or benefit of diplomacy.

<sup>25</sup> Building a Common Approach to the Iranian Nuclear Problem?. See, <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/77513.htm>, accessed on April 05, 2010.



- weapons production in exchange for Promises of civilian nuclear technology and political and trade incentives.
- d. Since August 2005 to February 2006, Iran refused to bring this issue to the UN Council by the IAEA Board of Governors
  - e. February 2006 – Present. The P5+1 and U.N pressured Iran to obey the UNSCR.

In 2003, US mobilized with own power as an invasion of Iraq. At that time, when the US troops were arrived in the Middle East, Iran immediately tried to reduce international suspicion of its nuclear program. In February 2003, Khatami had declared that the nuclear site in Natanz was intended to produce low-enriched uranium fuel for Iran's planned nuclear power plants and denied that the facility for military purpose. In late February, Iran invited Director General of IAEA Mohamed El Baradei to visit Natanz, and Iran would consider adopting the Additional Protocol, which allowed the IAEA to inspect Iranian sites further.<sup>26</sup> In the same year, France, Britain, and Germany (the "EU") opened a separate diplomatic track to curb Iran's program. On October 21<sup>st</sup>, 2003, in return for peaceful nuclear technology, Iran pledged to:<sup>27</sup>

- a. Fully disclose its past nuclear activities.
- b. Sign and ratify the "Additional Protocol" to the NPT (allowing for enhanced inspections).
- c. Suspend uranium enrichment activities. Although the Majles had not ratified it, Iran signed the Additional Protocol on December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2003. Iran discontinued abiding by the Protocol after the IAEA reported on November 10<sup>th</sup>, 2003 and February 24<sup>th</sup>, 2004, stating that Iran had violated its NPT reporting obligations over an 18-year period.

In 2003, the IAEA inspection team had reviewed all of Iranian nuclear installations and did not find any evidences led by the irregularities and violations of their project. A similar claim was reaffirmed by AlBaradei in section 112 reported in November 2004. That steps taken by Iran to create confidence in the world on its nuclear activities were purely for civilian purposes. Iran hold talks with Europe, which represented by the tripartite German, English and French. Iran

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<sup>26</sup> Garry Samore, Meeting Iran's Nuclear Challenges, P. 2. See, <http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/No21.pdf>, accessed on April 5, 2010.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

had also voluntarily halted its nuclear activities including uranium enrichment activities. These Iranian measures were solely to create confidence and prove that Tehran's nuclear project was purely for peaceful purposes. In fact, there was no rule that required Iran to do so.

For further actions, the US encouraged the Security Council and the EU on November 15<sup>th</sup>, 2004 through the "Paris Agreement" served with several including granting trade opportunities and other assistance. The Bush Administration did not openly support the track until March 11<sup>th</sup>, 2005, when it announced that it would drop US objections to make Iran apply to join the World Trade Organization (it applied in May 2005) and sell civilian aircraft parts to Iran. On that November, the Bush Administration did not participate directly in the talks.<sup>28</sup> However, this EU effort which was expected for Iran may:<sup>29</sup>

- a. Permanently end uranium enrichment.
- b. Dismantle the Arak heavy-water reactor.
- c. Inspect No-notice nuclear and never ignore the NPT. (It has a legal exit clause).

After trying that agreement, the world political players of the US and the EU had tried to combine international security strategy and offered the options to persuade Tehran for "voluntarily" stopping fuel enrichment activities. Unfortunately, their plan was rejected by Iran after Iran found clumsiness on that agreement; hence, Iran returned to nuclear weapons activities with the expected number. Moreover, consider that, the Middle East regional security became extremely vulnerable to war. Realists added that the war was arisen from the efforts of states to acquire the power and anarchy world.<sup>30</sup> The realist saw a world of states using force to pursue security;<sup>31</sup> therefore, the US worried about the Iranian threat of war against Israel (and otherwise) and considered that it should arrange the strategy to reduce high tension for making the situation more better. The way to search for an effective foreign policy toward Iran had been proved elusive for

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<sup>28</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses*, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code: RL32048, (Washington: CRS, 2010), p. 23.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*, p. 24.

<sup>30</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr, *Understanding International Conflicts, An Introduction to Theory and History*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, (New York: Longman, 1997), p.188.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, p. 194.

the successive European and US administrations. Hence of it, the EU and US should search for suitable strategies.

In September 2004, the IAEA Board adopted a resolution in response to Iranian actions and the IAEA Board was threatened Iran to bring this issue to the Security Council. Tehran also said that there were elements of coercion in EU agreement in 2003; the agreement was trying to force Iran to make the suspension permanent. To confirm the refusal, on September 21<sup>st</sup>, deliberately Iran continued with converting 37 tons of yellow cake (uranium oxide) to UF<sub>6</sub>. In addition, Hassan Rohani was threatened that Iran might reject the Additional Protocol or even withdrew from the NPT if it were reported to the Security Council.<sup>32</sup>

According to the EU non-paper, it was intended for Iran to suspend all enrichment and everything associated with the project as a comprehensive and internationally verifiable manner as defined by the IAEA. In other words, Iran must halt enrichment program. The UK-France-Germany non-paper which was laid out the main elements of proposed long-term agreement, expect to:<sup>33</sup>

- a. Commit to address all the outstanding concerns of the IAEA through full cooperation with the IAEA.
- b. Suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by the IAEA as being requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council, and commit to continue this during these negotiations.
- c. Resume implementation of the Additional Protocol.

EU offered a package of incentives to nuclear energy enrichment activities. With this, the EU would:<sup>34</sup>

- a. Reaffirm Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT obligations, and in this context, reaffirm their support for the development by Iran of a civil nuclear energy programme.
- b. Commit to actively support the building of new light water reactors in Iran through international joint projects while Iran was in accordance with the IAEA Statute and the NPT.

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<sup>32</sup> Garry Samore, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>33</sup> Elements of a proposal to Iran, See, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/90569.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/90569.pdf), accessed on December 14, 2010.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

- c. Agree to suspend discussions of Iran's nuclear programme at the Security Council on resumption of negotiations.

The contrast situation in a matter of foreign and defense policy was that after the policies gathered, it became a more robust relationship which was existed across the Atlantic in many areas of economic policy. Besides, fixing the wider problem was not a matter of institutional innovations but alterations of the Europe's fundamental approach. On August 8<sup>th</sup>, 2005, Iran broke the IAEA seals and began with uranium "conversion" (one-step before enrichment) at Esfahan facility. On September 24<sup>th</sup>, 2005, the IAEA Board declared that Iran was in non-compliance with the NPT and decided to refer the issue to the Security Council<sup>35</sup> but there was no period had been set for the referral. After Iran resumed enrichment activities, on February 4<sup>th</sup>, 2006, the IAEA Board voted 27-3<sup>36</sup> to refer the case to the Security Council. On March 29<sup>th</sup>, 2006, the Council agreed on a presidency "statement" setting a 30-day time limit (April 28<sup>th</sup>, 2006) for ceasing enrichment.

When starting to close 2006, the EU and Iran negotiations were fruitless. Therefore, the UN sanction was the solution. Europe and other UN Security Council members had tried to offer political and economic incentives as a repayment for Iran's promise of long-term moratorium on enrichment uranium activities. Technically, Iran had a right to use nuclear technology for civilian purposes and also their enrichment program.<sup>37</sup>

A bilateral talk with Iran was never succeeded by US However, the US would lift economic sanctions, normalize diplomatic relations, and provide guarantee security to Iran to help Iran in managing fuel cycles. But, if Iran followed the international regulations and obey to the international laws. However, that matters could not be expected that Tehran would be willing to do so. The

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<sup>35</sup> Voting in favor: United States, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Argentina, Belgium, Ghana, Ecuador, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia, Japan, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, India. Against: Venezuela. Abstaining: Pakistan, Algeria, Yemen, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, and Vietnam.

<sup>36</sup> Voting No: Cuba, Syria, Venezuela. Abstaining: Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Libya, South Africa.

<sup>37</sup> US Lets Europe Negotiate With Iran. See, <http://www.globalissues.org/article/696/iran>, accessed on December 21, 2010.

possibilities occurred in Iran were would not be respected with international regulations and Iran would keep to maintain its nuclear infrastructure.<sup>38</sup>

On May 13<sup>th</sup>, 2006, Bush tried to offer to join multilateral approach to discuss nuclear issue with Iran. The talks was focused on a package of incentives and possible sanctions. This package was provided by the P5+1 and offered to Iran on June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2006. The P5+1 had two main declarations:<sup>39</sup>

- a. To recognize Iran's right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with its NPT.
- b. To treat Iran's nuclear programme in the same manner as that of any Non-nuclear Weapon State Party to the NPT once international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme is restored.

As a part of multilateral process was attempting to convince Iran to choose the path of negotiations or penalty as further. During 2006-2008, U.N. Security Council had released Resolutions includes 1696 (S/RES/1696 (2006)), 1737 (S/RES/1737/ (2006)), 1747 (S/RES/1747 (2007)), and 1803 (S/RES/1803 (2008)) and they imposed sanctions primarily on Iran's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) infrastructure. While pressing for sanctions, the multilateral group negotiation with Iran ("P5+1) at the same time offered Iran incentives to suspend uranium enrichment; the last meeting between Iran and the P5+1 to discuss these issues was in July 2008. The negotiations made little progress, and then entered a hiatus for the US presidential election, the establishment of the Obama Administration, and the Iranian presidential election as the final. However, after many months of negotiations were passed, Resolution 1929 was adopted on June 9<sup>th</sup>, 2010 by a vote of 12-2 (Turkey and Brazil) with one abstention (Lebanon).<sup>40</sup>

### **C. Implications on the Atlantic Alliance**

International relations and foreign policy toward Iranian nuclear program from 2001 until mid-2008 had been exposed to various developments, challenges,

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<sup>38</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses*, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

<sup>39</sup> P5+1 Updated Incentives Package, <http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/iran/State/105992.pdf>, accessed on December 17, 2010.

<sup>40</sup> Kenneth Katzman, *Iran Sanctions*, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code: RS20871, (Washington: CRS, 2010), p. 36.

and problems. Interesting developments to observe in the last four years is to reposition crucial number of attitude and orientation of the large countries that had dominated international relations in the early half of the decade 2000's. The US should abandon unilateralism and strengthen the soft power in any conflict resolution. The perpetrators of international relations recognized of hard power as a form of unilateralism did not necessarily solve the problem. Conversely, the soft power was even more strengthened in an effort for solving world problems. This was proved by various peaceful dialogues and works which were similar with social and cultural implementation as one embodiment of soft power which was considered to defuse tensions in the various parts of the world today. Other factors that also influenced the constellation and current global political equilibrium were the emergence of new power to balancing the influence of the US. However, the new economic and political powers had created great enthusiasm in international relations with all their positive effects on dynamics of recapitulation regional and international.

Since 1940, the transatlantic alliance had become the reference for US foreign policy in harmonious, dynamic and able toward outstanding issues and geopolitical situations. Simple example: The interests between the European and US had many similarities in multi-polar world; both of them were willing to get involved to forces and maintain the basic rules that were ever made after World War II. Both of them also have the same view in assessing the threat such as nuclear weapons and international terrorism issue. For economic matter, they were strong enough to control the global economy. The most difficult challenges they should to face is internal problems (national interest).

The presence of transatlantic power against WMD proliferation, there were two branches should to concern for them. First, the EU-US must be active in strengthening economic cooperation in the field of finance and trade issues. The EU now looked more superior in taking steps "togetherness" to build an all foreign policies, cooperation, and the responses to security issues. Second, in NATO, it still required coordination for the consideration of what should be

prepared to deal with a security and strategic issues, so that they could walk together and combined the 'soft power and hard power.'<sup>41</sup>

This 'alliance' was a necessary function of the balance of power operating within a multiple-states system. Between EU and US, competing with each other, had three choices in order to maintain and improve their relative power positions. They could increase their own power and add to their own power to become the power which could power other nations, or they could withhold the power of other nations from the adversary. When they made the first choice, they embarked upon an armament race. When they chose the second and third alternatives, they pursued a policy of alliance.<sup>42</sup> Whether a nation should pursue the policy of alliances or not but it was not a matter of the principle because it concern to the expediency of alliance A nation would shun alliances if it believed that it was strong enough to hold its own unaided or the burden of the commitment resulting from the alliance was likely to outweigh the advantages to be expected. It is for one or the other or both of these reasons that, throughout the better part of their history, Great Britain and the United States had refrained from entering into peace time alliances with other nations.<sup>43</sup>

However, establishment the alliance is solely not make the US weak but, the purpose an extension in certain areas in Asia region i.e. Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Israel, and other countries which had depended to the US, it would be easy to control the situation in that region. An instrumentalist approach whereby policymakers defined the alliance of how to respond the problems of the day was not tempting but unhelpful. Collectively, Europe and the US must reinvest in the alliance to come to an understanding about the strategic role of the alliance over the next half century.

In 1990, the Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations – in section of the common goals of US and the EC and its Member States solemnly reaffirm

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<sup>41</sup> Peter Van Ham, WMD Proliferation and Transatlantic Relation: Is a Joint Western Strategy Possible?, p. 29. See. [http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2004/20040400\\_cli\\_ess\\_vanham.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2004/20040400_cli_ess_vanham.pdf), accessed on January 13, 2011.

<sup>42</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Brief ed (United States: McGraw-Hill, 1985), p. 197.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

their determination further to strengthen their partnership in order to promote international security by cooperating with other nations against aggression and coercion. To contributed the settlement of conflicts in the world by reinforcing the role of the United Nations and other international organizations.<sup>44</sup> Then, to implementing its security objectives, the organization of Allies forces should be adapted to provide capabilities that could contribute to peace protections, solved crisis managements that affected the security of alliance members, those are mean to defend the allies territory, assets, and state components<sup>45</sup>

Henceforth, those matters will fulfill their responsibility to address transnational challenges, in the interest of their own peoples and of the rest of the world. In particular, they will join their efforts in the following fields:<sup>46</sup>

- a. Combating and preventing terrorism.
- b. Putting an end to the illegal production, trafficking and consumption of narcotics and related criminal, such as the laundering of money.
- c. Cooperating in the fight against international crime.
- d. Protecting the environment, both internationally and domestically, by integrating environmental and economic goals.
- e. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear armaments, chemical and biological weapons, and missile technology.

EU and US had recognized the need and acknowledged the responsibility to ensure full respect for the NPT, to refrain from any steps that could lead to the proliferation of WMD, and to take measures to prevent the unauthorized export of nuclear or other destabilizing military technologies.<sup>47</sup>

In the Kerry administration, to seek the consensus of WMD proliferation seemed more easily when it encountered with the transatlantic. Kerry stated that:<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Transatlantic Declaration on EC - US Relation 1990. See, [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans\\_declaration\\_90\\_en.pdf](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_declaration_90_en.pdf), accessed on April 05, 2010..

<sup>45</sup> Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussel, May 30, 1989.

<sup>46</sup> Transatlantic Declaration, 1990, *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, December 20, 1991.

<sup>48</sup> John Kerry. "Making America Secure Again: Setting the Right Course for Foreign Policy." New York, December 03, 2003. See, [http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/speeches/spc\\_2003\\_1203.html](http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/speeches/spc_2003_1203.html), accessed on December 10, 2010.



“Intoxicated with the preeminence of American power, the administration has abandoned the fundamental tenets that have guided our foreign policy for more than half century: belief in collective security and alliance, respect for international institution and international law, multilateral engagement, and the US of force not as a first opinion but truly last resort.”

According to the capabilities, the alliance, NATO in 2003 has expressed that the alliance of NATO had the capability to against the threat of WMD:

“Defence Against WMD: The Alliance’s capabilities effort includes a focus on defence against biological and chemical weapons. Specifically, NATO has five concrete initiatives underway: a deployable nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) analytical laboratory; an NBC event response team; a virtual centre of excellence for NBC weapons defence; a NATO biological and chemical defence stockpile; and a disease surveillance system.”<sup>49</sup>

The threats were the challenged at home and aboard. To confront those threats, between EU and US should further strengthen to adaptation with the partnership that has served they so well. However, for expanding and deepening EU-US relations has been put it on Transatlantic Declaration or Agenda which stated that will fight to the international crime, WMD violator, drug-trafficking, terrorism; address the needs of refugees and displaced persons; protect the environment and combat disease. Hereinafter, on Transatlantic consensus is currently running, the values that could be realized at the EU-US were:

First, based on cooperation has defined at Transatlantic-Summit Declaration on June 22, 2003 in Washington. This basic cooperation was used to develop the initiative to establish the concrete policy. Unfortunately, this policy was too modest and had not been in a follow-up to be practiced seriously while the following declaration revealed many things. A declaration of the EU-US was stated:

“We will work together to deploy our combined political and diplomatic influence most effectively in support of our non proliferation objectives.

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<sup>49</sup> NATO’s Prague Summit, 5<sup>th</sup> High Level Meeting, Between UN and Regional Organizations. New York, 29-30 July 2003.

We will work together to develop common assessment of global proliferation threats.”<sup>50</sup>

Nevertheless, when they tried to implement “Join Statement” they still show the divergences. The European Union confirmed the US intention which had set aside the law for their own interests in international relation; it had stated on ESS 2003:

“Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter.”<sup>51</sup>

United States would rather select a shortcut by declaring the pre-emptive strike to fight terrorism and WMD. To achieve better security in Europe, the ESS offered justice and opportunity for everyone in asserting the rule of law and enforced disarmament commitments under the NPT and the CTBT.

The preemptive strategy was considered very inconvenient because it would tend to be more chaotic that will become nuclear and perpetual wars.<sup>52</sup> To improve and intensify the EU-US dialogue on every transatlantic WMD strategy was to cooperate with related government agencies. It was very easy in theory than in practice; thus, to achieve the progress, it should have a sense of awareness and trust to achieve real results.

Second, in the paper “Joint Statement” stated that the EU and US agreed to help each other fight against WMD proliferation;

“Strengthen the international system of treaties and regimes against the spread of Weapon Mass Destruction. This implies the development of new regimes, as appropriate, and reinforcement of existing regimes.”<sup>53</sup>

The EU and US agreed to implement “effective multilateralism,” and they added, “if necessary will takes another measure in accordance to the laws and cooperate with international institutions to resolve the issue of proliferation”

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<sup>50</sup> Joint Statement; European Council, *loc. cit.*

<sup>51</sup> Javier Solana, “*A Secure Europe in a Better World*,” A draft European Union Security Strategy Paper by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Delivered at the European Council Meeting in Thessaloniki, June 20, 2003.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> Joint Statement; European Council, *loc. cit.*

“There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors.”<sup>54</sup>

With that matter, the EU and US would be able to generate new ideas and practical solutions. For the next measure, the US formed activities (non-organization) of Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)<sup>55</sup> that sought to develop new ways to disrupt the development of WMD, “the new means to disrupt WMD-trafficking at the sea, air, and land.”<sup>56</sup> In addition, EU and the US also continued and strengthened the partnership project with the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) to prevent the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.<sup>57</sup>

Third, the involvement of NATO should really streamline and be more serious to coordinate the aspects that were on non-proliferation policies of military. EU and the US had strategies which could explain that how the instruments of military policy, politics, and economics could work to stop WMD. Their agreement on WMD joint statement, the EU agreed that, “We pledge to use all means available to avert WMD proliferation and the calamities that would to follow.”<sup>58</sup> Chris Patten also ever stated of when the EU will apply the military instrument, it has been stated on his speech at Oxford University as a follow:

“Europeans recoil from using arms to solve problems except as a last resort. Our appetite for negotiation, for soft not hard power, and our contention that this approach is morally superior to the American, is a flight from responsibility, only available as a political option because we

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<sup>54</sup> Javier Solana, “A Secure Europe in a Better World, *loc. cit.*”

<sup>55</sup> President Bush unveiled the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003, “foremost among President Bush’s efforts to stop WMD proliferation.”

<sup>56</sup> Sharon Squassoni, *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)*, CRS Report for Congress, Order Code: RS21881, (Washington: CRS, September 14, 2006).

<sup>57</sup> The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program otherwise known as the “Nunn-Lugar” legislation (named for sponsoring Senators Sam Nunn [D-GA] and Richard Lugar [R-IN]) began in 1991 as a piece of US legislation entitled “The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991” (Public Law 102-228, 12/12/91, Title II Soviet Weapons Destruction)

<sup>58</sup> Joint Statement; European Council, *loc. cit.*

can always count on Uncle Sam to keep us safe and to bear the civilized world's burden."<sup>59</sup>

In the previous paragraph had been mentioned of WMD strategy, the EU would use various policy instruments including military means if the dialogue and diplomatic instrument failed. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and International Law and military or coercive instrument was allowed. Therefore, NATO should consider critically about nuclear weapon policy and think carefully about the preparation and implementation of policies strategies to combat the proliferation of WMD within NATO itself.

Critical assessment focused on the political space to clear that how the behavior would be re-constructed. For example, the US political system could serve as a recommendation to be implementing to EU and other countries; however, not all of US policies were served as a direction in EU policies. The re-constructed function was to enhance constructive basic of decision and with specifically aimed to develop the relation then implemented on this alliance thus, it might be called a pragmatic approach that could be applied to transform and cultivate academic old ideas and would inspire new ideas drawn from various perspective. The following narration had taken from earlier chapters and merged into the specific perspectives of it basic construction:

- a. Strategies:
  1. Long-term strategy: based on a differentiated assessment.
  2. Comprehensive regional strategy with multilateral efforts.
  3. Actively support the multilateralism: UNSC recommended restoring international confidence, and was active to involve in cooperation. The effectiveness of US influenced in eradicate non-proliferation and expanding sanctions.
  4. Engaged Russia and China: involving Russia and China as a strategic planning.
  5. IAEA improvement: strengthened non-proliferation regime, and allowed enrichment but under strict international control: effectively and strictly supervised Iranian nuclear enrichment activities in Iran

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<sup>59</sup> Patten Ponders The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship, February 17, 2004. See, <http://www.eurunion.org/eu/2004-News-Releases/EU/NR-19/04-PATTEN-PONDERS-THE-FUTURE-OF-THE-TRANSATLANTIC-RELATIONSHIP.html>, accessed on December 12, 2010.

6. Exchanging the deal: Iran should agree and ratify the Additional Protocol of the Safeguard Agreement by offering incentives: economic incentives, security guarantees, and an idealistic re-evaluation of Iran as a more equal partner
  7. Implications of a nuclear Iran: develop the scenarios and implement the different strategies how to deal with it.
  8. Be formed and active in vertical non-proliferation activities
  9. Regional WMD free zone: It would be implemented gradually in accordance with the region and international law.
- b. Engagement:
1. (Self) reflection versus ‘psycho-babble’ was to establish a more constructive soft power. To strengthen this concept, behaviour and discourse should be not manipulative.
  2. Developing trust building measures as pre-conditions for the constructive contact: The lack of miss-trust and mutual respect is a trouble source and it stressed the normalization.
  3. Understanding the behaviors: Analyzing gradually for Iranian dynamics. (particularly domestic politics)
  4. Beginning with a courteous talk: First steps were the diplomatic talks about Iraq, environmental, economic cooperation.
  5. Common interests were the key to complete a more constructive relationship.
  6. Preventing common treat should be solved with multilateralism. i.e. terrorism.
  7. Student exchange and cultural exchange.
  8. Rebuilding the diplomatic relationship: asking for Switzerland as a mediator.
- c. The reduction of trade sanctions and other sanctions.
1. The limit of unilateral trade sanctions: Excessive sanctions influenced the growing distant relationship.
  2. Cooperation in term of economy: To diffuse tensions, offering regional economic cooperation was necessary important.

The US was smiling when the Paris Agreement succeeded to halt Iranian enrichment activities. However, suddenly, the situation was changed when Iran abandoned the deal. Good cop approach had failed to handle this issue. Soft power application had provide by the EU interactive dialogue like the security guarantee which guided to peaceful nuclear technology and offered to open relation on economic field with Tehran. Tehran ever chose European carrot but never took the American sticks which put the military pressure on the front-line and added that the US had become a poor discourse of “axis of evil” as an immoral rhetoric. It did not mean that EU policy towards Iran was successful.

This research argued that the EU foreign policy towards Iran was depended to the US - Iran relations. Hence, the EU should not to compete but complement the US policy towards Iran. Therefore, the EU should make its engagement policy more suitable in order to give the feeling for Iranian to accept all of agreement politically and economically.

European international politics were characterized with a lot of negotiations and diplomacy, engagements in terms of trade, and the use of international laws in terms of power through its relationship among multilateralist. Politics were used in recent European political conflicts with the former era. The unitary concept offered in the European Union was effective multilateralism. Political power began to be abandoned and a more humane way connected with the outside world also began to be encouraged. A new method to achieve peace had raised. Unfortunately, the new method was against American understanding campaigns. A real case occurred when arguments arose over the US invasion of Iraq and when what the US used kinds of unilateral acts in the case of Iran since the days of Jimmy Carter to Bush. Indeed, the European method was still not reasonable, due to the lack of solidarity of European countries themselves. Although the EU seemed to be able to apply the method in its member states, it still contained much to be addressed, ranging from the division of local sovereignty and abroad of the European Union, European constitution, and other essential things. Europe must move in order to balance the map of world political powers which were currently dominated by the US.

US expected to joint into the EU influence. The sanctions are pressuring Iran through military instrument is not the proper way for the EU principles. Since 2001, Washington was proud of her role in the world especially when 9/11 made US more enthusiastic in the fight. Unfortunately, Hobbessian picture had not been able to bring the EU into the war and this was against to the EU norms. Supposedly, to maintain the alliance stabilities, US should pay moral values and began to learn what the promotion that the EU had done on the multilateralism for respecting international laws.

Overall, related to the security issue, the divergences in Transatlantic Alliance should be put aside and go through with the same priorities. Here, the simple pattern of task force recommendation for the relationship between EU and US is as follows:

- a. Controlling the way of military means, the European considered using military as a preventive way, while the US regarded that military as the way to prevent the special case immediately, i.e. terrorism, rogue state, WMD, pirates, and other matters that related to the security threat.
- b. Establish the common policy, this aimed to express that both of them are responsible to respond of security threat. Recalling that, no alliance can function successfully in the absence of a common strategy or in the presence of competing strategies – they should learn from the failures over Iraq. Moreover, the diplomacy failure of EU toward Iran also had shown that EU still has the weakness to implement the strategy toward Iran. However, the common strategy of Transatlantic Alliance is necessary how to deal with security issues particularly.
- c. Keep trying to build common approach in Middle East as the special issue in 21<sup>st</sup> century, except the stabilization of Iraq still remain – promoting reform in Iran and ensuring that Teheran does not seek to acquire nuclear weapon, advancing the prospects of peace in the Middle East.
- d. Enhance the Transatlantic Alliance roles and improve to the new geopolitical realities beyond Europe or US borders.

Those recommendations for Transatlantic Alliance which started from 9/11 as the point of crisis.<sup>60</sup> From that moment until the issue shifted to Iran's nuclear weapon also has appeared many divergences; thoughts, principles, assessment and reactions between EU and US. In sum, they keep trying how to answer how to respond and solve it.

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<sup>60</sup> Just to repeat that, the EU began to engage the Iranian cases began in 2003 but for the US, those issues which related to the Middle East security threat was started from crisis 1979.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **CONCLUSION**

After the war in Afghanistan, the suspicion of US towards terrorism was shifted to the Iranian nuclear issue which had become the spotlight on international politics. Terminology of ‘Good and Bad Cop’ or ‘Mars and Venus’ has been proved on the effectiveness of EU and US policies toward the Iranian nuclear issue, and according to 9/11, it also showed the divergences between the EU and US policies over Iran. However, despite the divergences that have appeared, they had same assessment toward this security threat. To respond, the involvement of them had been realized on the NATO or Transatlantic Alliance. However, as their involvement was strengthened by The North Atlantic Treaty 1949, Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations 1990, New Transatlantic Agenda 1995, Joint Statement 2003, and other Declaration and continued by speech or Statement that had been mentioned by the leader of EU or US on their policies i.e. Javier Solana statement on ESS and Bush Statement on NSS.

The EU and US agreed to implement policies toward the issues of terrorism, Middle East peace process, WMD, and human rights and those issues were on the list of the EU and US agenda which was related to Iran. Nonetheless, compared to the American attitude, EU did not want to be equated with the US in terms of approaches in respond of those issues. In sum, since the US declared pre-emptive policy on US National Security Strategy 2003, it was clear that EU was opposed to use of violence. However, with these divergences in their approach, both of them intended to prevent the development and misuse Iran’s nuclear program which was aimed at military means, particularly the manufacture and development of nuclear weapon.

Since diplomatic relations between Iran and the US were broken off following the hostage crisis in 1979, the US had expanded the range of policies instrumental to dealing with Iran’s case. Between 1979 and 2008, the US policies were intended to make Iran weak in many aspects. The US behaviour was oriented on the isolation policy through economic sanctions and attempted to



close all of Iranian diplomatic relations with other countries. The Dual Containment Policy, ILSA-1996, INKSNA, and Executive Order were based on economic and political isolations also did not succeeded in changing Iranian behaviour. Moreover, at the situation in the Gulf region had become much worse; unstable and unsecured. In sum, those policies toward Iran were used as a communication tool of the US Unfortunately, through its confrontational act, the US had the wrong way to respond Iranian behaviour and make the situation worse.

The EU regarded Iran as the regional power in Middle East rather than “rogue state” or “Axis of Evil.” The EU approach was based on critical dialogue and cooperation, this did not mean that EU wanted to seek the business interest with Iran; oppositely, with its effort, the EU tried to slowly coax Iran to suspend its uranium activities. Thus, the soft power approach of EU could play a significant role to change Tehran behaviour. Although the EU efforts did not bring a good result but at least, the EU had urged Iran “temporarily” to suspend its uranium enrichment.

After describing the policy and approaches toward Iranian nuclear program, it could be concluded that all policies adopted by the EU and US judging by their purposes toward Iran were the same. Generally, their policies were divided on two concerns which were economically and politically. Naturally, as both of them emphasized on:

- a. Nuclear sanctions  
Banned on nuclear proliferation goods, technology, exchange technical assistance, training, freeze the financial assistance.
- b. Oil and gas sanctions  
Embargo the equipment and technology of Iranian oil and gas including exploration, refining, shipping, and product. Banned on foreign investment in energy sector and export/ import. Boycott purchases of Iranian oil.
- c. Economic field  
Prohibit on financial loans, export credit insurance, freeze on; all Iranian assets on overseas, the foreign held assets of designated Iranian officials, and further restrictions or prohibitions on private sector financial institutions. Boycott traditional Iranian exports; such as caviar, pistachios, and carpets.

d. Politics

ban travel flight to/ from Iran, inspection of and detail inspection requirement on cargoes to and from Iran, ban on provision of certain services to certain vessels and aircraft, blocked foreign investment, denied the visas for Iranian officials and their families, to stopped Iran's application for World Trade Organization (WTO).membership.

Those policies aimed to make Iran's government become weak in economically and politically. Through those aims, the policies among EU, US and UN expected for the termination Iran's nuclear program permanently. However, in diplomacy efforts and consultation in this research had argued that all those initiatives suspend Iranian nuclear program was conducted by the EU. Although the US has mentioned many times of multilateralism i.e. on NSS 2003, or by saying to agree implemented the multilateral act against the security threat with the EU but the unilateral act and military means has been stipulated by the US policies since 1979 toward Iran as the regard of US diplomacy ways.

Overall, it was clear from the beginning that the US policies were oriented on strict sanctions without diplomacy or talking directly. While, after the EU efforts were failed to persuade Iran, thus, since 2008, the Europeans decided to take this issue to the UN to impose economic sanctions on Iran that were aimed to suspend develop nuclear weapons. The EU behaviour toward Iran tended to follow International law. Hence, its cooperation with UN, the EU implemented the multilateral approach as the strategy to deal with Iran. Anyway, all these EU policies were also supported by Russia and China.

Henceforth, to take further diplomatic steps, the transatlantic countries were gambling between success and failure because the US was less flexible and hasty to control security policy. In addition, the EU was opposed to American's coercive diplomacy as it would just weakened the EU's positive influence toward Iran and extended the deadlock. Moreover, the situation in international politic was in process toward multipolarity. They were undergoing on the process of structural adjustment to strengthen their strategy to tackle the issues raised on the NATO Treaty (article 5), Transatlantic Declaration 1990, the New Transatlantic Agenda 1995, EES 2003 and NSS 2002 and 2006, Join Statement 2003.

The cooperation in the transatlantic alliance toward the Iranian nuclear case still needed the help from other international organizations and individual countries like Russia and China as strategic partners that could help to handle this case, and try to identify the international system which was in uncertain condition. For example, common security threats such as terrorism, WMD, failed states, and rogue states until global warming. Alliances and collaboration were alternative strategies pursued by some of the actors or countries to establish a unity, while a global consensus could not be realized. The EU, Russia, and China believed that a multilateral approach and the achievement of an agreement with Tehran would be better than unilateral actions.

Overall, considering that, these issues were threats to the common security and Iran was a case which the transatlantic alliance tried and considered how to handle the difficult problems together. Moreover, the current political system was more dynamic than ones during the Cold War era. Through the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had acknowledged to no longer walk alone and it also considered the issues today were more diverse and difficult to handle as well. According to the world order and the spreading of democracy, the transatlantic alliance, therefore, should work vigorously for political reform in the Middle East by improving the quality of consultation. Thereby, the future of transatlantic alliance would be much stronger by rising of effective multilateralism idea. However, transatlantic alliance actually still needs the guidance which is to be consistent in the international law in order to improve the constructive alliance and to create a situation led by peace (at least, to reduce the outstanding issue tension).

For further research, what this thesis has been written with focus directed on the cooperation and policies between EU and US toward Iran nuclear program with the Realist approach. The writer suggested to have more interesting discussion rather than this approach. The discussion can be viewed from another perspective, i.e. "A Critical Analysis of the EU Policies within the Myth of Coercive Diplomacy toward the Improvement of a Potential Security Threat in the Middle East Region." The writer expected, to observe further the kind of topic above could use this thesis as the fundamental research which has provided a lot

of the EU and US viewpoints, approaches and policies as the efforts to suspend Iranian uranium enrichment in large scale.

Recalling that, the EU used coercive diplomacy to persuade Iran nuclear programs to abandon their nuclear activities, or related to security threat. Therefore, the strategy of EU was logic within diplomatic terms in front which have shown that the EU was used soft power approach and should be noted that EU was backed by US and other international organization (UN particularly) as the fundamental power of EU. Moreover, on EU coercive diplomacy generally was used two options between demand and threat. According to the demand as a part of coercive diplomacy can be pursue from EU member states which had strong influence on EU body.

Anyway, discussion about the security issues until the policy released to respond its issue will never end, it was a crucial thing in a state to obtain one of the national interests. The Realist considered that the nations lived in uncertain situation, furthermore, the security threat could not be predicted by question neither when or what kind of threat was coming the next day. Therefore, through academic approach, the writer expects that topic can contribute new thought for international relation particularly in security studies or international politic course.

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**Table 3. The Time Line of Iran's Nuclear Program**

Regime	Year	Cooperation	Progress	Place
Shah pahlavi	1950	USA	Iran began receiving American assistance through US Atom for Peace	Tehran Nuclear Research Center
	July 1, 1968	IAEA	Iran signed the NPT	
	1970	US, Germany, UK and France	Iran developed plans to build 22 nuclear power reactors with an electrical Output of 23 gig watts.	
	1975	France	Iran signed an agreement with France to build a nuclear research center in Esfahan and provide training for personnel to operate the Bushehr reactor located at the University of Esfahan.	Efsahan and Bushehr
		Germany	Iran buy eight reactors	Bushehr
		France	Iran build two reactors	Darkhovin.
Shah Khomeini	1979		West German-supplied nuclear power reactors	Bushehr
			Shah's regime was overthrown, Shah had completed 4 of 23 reactors	Afsahan
	1980		build a 40-MWt heavy-water reactor	
Rafsanjani	1990	Russia	nuclear activities focused on the Bushehr reactor program	Bushehr
		Spain	Continue to done the Bushehr.	Bushehr
	Oktober 30, 1991	China	buy materials from China in the form of plutonium and has sold advanced technology for laser surgery	
	1994		build 23 nuclear power plants	
	1995	Russia	Iran signed an \$800 million deal with Moscow to finish the construction of one of the reactors based on a Russian-designed reactor and to house it in the German-designed reactor facility	

Khatami	April 1997		Producing primary products for chemical warfare agents.	Parchin	
	May 1998		development and production Chemical Weapon	Arak	
	2000		Built a pilot laser enrichment plant	Lashkar Aba'ad	
			research and development of Iran's enrichment program	Kalaye Electric Company facility	
	August 14, 2002		the existence of a secret nuclear facility at Arak was revealed	Qatran Workshop	
	August 2004		Iran test the "Sahab III"	Unknown	
	Nov 2004			Iran had planned to eventually install up to 1,000 P-1 centrifuges at the pilot enrichment plant.	Natanz
				Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)	Tehran nuclear research center
				Kalaye Electric Company	Tehran
				Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)	Bushehr
				Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)	Esfahan nuclear technology center
				Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)	Natanz
				Radioactive Waste Storage	Karaj
				Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant	Lashkar Ab'ad
			Iran Nuclear Research Reactor IR-40	Arak	
			Waste Storage Site	Anarak	
Ahmadinejad	August 22, 2006		Secret nuclear facility was revealed	Natanz	
	September 2006		Russia and Iran signed an agreement to built Bushehr nuclear power station	Gulf coast in southwestern Iran.	
	November 18, 2006		Arak's 40-megawatt heavy water research reactor will replace Tehran's 5-megawatt reactor,	Arak	

			which is over 30 years old	
	April 9, 2007,		Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that Iran has now developed the capability to produce enriched uranium using 3,000 centrifuges. which is needed to make nuclear fuel.	Natanz

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**Table 4. Iranian Nuclear Sites Location, Production, Status (Relevant to the Implementation of Safeguards in Iran)**

LOCATION	PRODUCTION	STATUS
Tehran Nuclear Research Centre	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)</li> <li>• AEOI provides: theoretical physics, and other research and development related to high-energy physics, including particle physics, mathematical physics, astrophysics, theoretical nuclear physics, statistical mechanics, theoretical plasma physics, and mathematics.</li> </ul>	Operating
	Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)	Constructed, but not operating
	*Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)	Operating
	*Waste Handling Facility (WHF)	Operating
	*Kalaye Electric Company	Dismantled pilot enrichment facility; being converted to centrifuge enrichment R&D
Bushehr	Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)	Under construction
Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre	Miniaturized Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)	Operating
	Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)	Operating
	Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR)	Operating

	Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL)	Operating
	Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL)	Closed down
	Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)	Hot testing/commissioning stage
	Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor (GSCR)	Decommissioned
	*Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)	In detailed design stage, construction to begin in 2004
	*Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP)	Under construction
Natanz	*Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)	Operational; currently suspended
	*Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)	Under construction; currently suspended
Karaj	*Radioactive Waste Storage	Partially operating
	Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine	Operate
	A dissymmetry laboratory and an agricultural radio chemistry laboratory.	Operate
	Storage and manufacturing facility for chemical weapons.	Unknown
Lashkar Ab'ad	a pilot laser-enrichment plant	Dismantled in 2003

Arak	Heavy water research reactor	Moved to Teheran
Abu Musa Island	Chemical weapon	Unknown
Bandar Khomeini	Manufacturing for chemical weapon	Unknown
Damghan	Chemical Weapon or warhead assembly	Unknown
Parchin	Chemical weapon facility	Unknown
Qazvin	Pesticide plant and nerve gas production	Unknown
Mashhad	Warhead filling facility	Unknown
Marvdasht	The Chemical Fertilizers	Unknown

**Table 5. List of Foreign Policy Issued by US, EU3 and UN**

Issued By	Policy Name	Year	The Measures
United States	The Proclamation of 4702	1979	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Banned Import the oil from Iran</li> <li>• Prohibit to establish of any trade, travel, financial transfer</li> <li>• Freezing Iran assets about \$12 billion</li> </ul>
	Executive Order 12170		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prohibits on transaction with Iran</li> <li>• Freezing of all Iranian assets held within US</li> </ul>
	12205	1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As furtherance of the objective of UN 461</li> <li>• Prohibiting certain transaction with Iran sale, supply, or transfer</li> <li>• Prohibits transferring by ship, vessel, aircraft and railway.</li> </ul>
	12957	1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prohibiting certain transaction with respect to the development of Iranian petroleum resources</li> </ul>
	12959		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The steps with respect to Iran in addition to those set forth in Executive Order 12957</li> </ul>
	ILSA 1996	1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Export-import bank assistance for exports to sanctioned Persons</li> <li>• Prohibition the loans from united states financial institutions</li> </ul>



	Anti Terrorism and Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)	1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prohibition on International Terrorist Fundraising.</li> <li>• Prohibition on Assistance to Terrorist States</li> <li>• Removal of Alien Terrorists</li> <li>• Denial of asylum to alien terrorists.</li> <li>• Enhanced penalties and control of biological agents.</li> </ul>
	Executive Order 13059	1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supplement of Executive Order 12957 of 1995</li> </ul>
	Executive Order 13382	2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Blocking property of WMD proliferators and their supporter</li> </ul>
	Iran North Korea Sanctions Non-proliferation Act (INKSNA)	2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The policy of the United States to impose sanctions on persons who transfer such weapons, and goods and technology related to such weapons, to and from North Korea in the same manner as persons who transfer such items to and from Iran and Syria currently are sanctioned under United States law.</li> </ul>
EU	Common Position 2007/140/CFSP	2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EU and its member states welcomed the measures contained in UNSCR 1737 (2006).</li> <li>• Denied transfer or sell arms or material.</li> <li>• Denied related assistance, investment service.</li> <li>• Banned on travel flight for certain entities and person.</li> <li>• Freezing funds, other financial assets and economic resources.</li> <li>• Banned the direct on indirect supply, sale, transfer of the items, material, and equipment to certain entities or person.</li> </ul>

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) - 423/2007		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• freezing of funds and economic resources of persons, entities and bodies.</li> <li>• to sell, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, the following goods and technology, whether or not originating in the Community, to any natural or legal person, entity or body in, or for use in.</li> <li>• freezing of funds' means preventing any moving, transfer, alteration, use of, access to, or dealing with funds in any way that would result in any change in their volume, amount, location, ownership, possession, character, destination or other change that would enable the funds to be used, including portfolio management.</li> </ul>
Common Position 2007/246/CFSP		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Common Position 2007/246/CFSP is the implementing UNSCR 1737 2006</li> <li>• Amending of Common Position 2007/140/CFSP.</li> <li>• Common Position 2007/246/CFSP adding: prohibit the direct or indirect supply or transfer of arms and related materiel of all weapons and ammunition (military equipment/ parts).</li> <li>• Member states shall not enter into new commitments for grant, financial assistance.</li> </ul>
Common Position 2008/479/CFSP	2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adopted from UNSCR 1737 and amending the Common Position 2007/140/CFSP</li> <li>• Froze account due under contracts/ agreement or obligation before the date</li> <li>• Adding new entities and person to denied their travel flight</li> </ul>
Common Position 2008/652/CFSP		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Amended from Common Position 2007/140/CFSP and Common Position 2008/652/CFSP are implementation of UNSCR 1803.</li> <li>• Ask all the member states to exercise restraint when they enter into new commitments to provide official financial support for trade with Iran in particular in the granting of export credits, guarantees and insurance.</li> <li>• Inspect the cargos to and from Iran.</li> </ul>

UN	UNSCR 461	1979	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decide what measures not involving the use armed force are to be employed to give effect its decisions. The measures include complete partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations.</li> </ul>
	UNSCR 1696	2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urged all states to be exercise vigilance”</li> <li>• Prohibit the transfer or any materials that could contribute to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program.</li> </ul>
	UNSCR 1737		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sponsored by EU3</li> <li>• To warn Iran to stop its uranium enrichment program, banned supply of nuclear-related technology and material</li> <li>• Froze the assets of key individual or companies</li> </ul>
	UNSCR 1747	2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• This policy aimed to tightened the previous policy</li> <li>• To delay its uranium enrichment</li> <li>• Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory</li> <li>• Denied international financial institution to enter new commitments for grants, financial assistance, concessional loans</li> </ul>
	UNSCR 1803	2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Widened the scope of the restrictive measures</li> <li>• Imposed by UNSCR 1737, 1747 and require all states to take the necessary measures to implement those provisions effectively.</li> <li>• Tightening inspection of shipping goods to Iran and suspected carrying prohibited items mainly were related to nuclear activities</li> <li>• Tightening financial supervision.</li> <li>• Prohibiting traveling flight.</li> <li>• Asset freezes against persons and companies.</li> </ul>

## Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations, 1990

The United States of America on one side and, on the other, the European Community and its Member States,

- mindful of their common heritage and of their close historical, political, economic and cultural ties,
- guided by their faith in the values of human dignity, intellectual freedom and civil liberties, and in the democratic institutions which have evolved on both sides of the Atlantic over the centuries,
- recognizing that the transatlantic solidarity has been essential for the preservation of peace and freedom and for the development of free and prosperous economies as well as for the recent developments which have restored unity in Europe,
- determined to help consolidate the new Europe, undivided and democratic,
- resolved to strengthen security, economic cooperation and human rights in Europe in the framework of the CSCE, and in other fora,
- noting the firm commitment of the United States and the EC Member States concerned to the North Atlantic Alliance and to its principles and purposes,
- acting on the basis of a pattern of cooperation proven over many decades, and convinced that by strengthening and expanding this partnership on an equal footing they will greatly contribute to continued stability, as well as to political and economic progress in Europe and in the world,
- aware of their shared responsibility, not only to further common interests but also to face transnational challenges affecting the well-being of all mankind,
- bearing in mind the accelerating process by which the European Community is acquiring its own identity in economic and monetary matters, in foreign policy and in the domain of security,
- determined further to strengthen transatlantic solidarity, through the variety of their international relations,

have decided to endow their relationship with long-term perspectives.

### **Common Goals**

The United States of America and the European Community and its Member States solemnly reaffirm their determination further to strengthen their partnership in order to:

- support democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and individual liberty, and promote prosperity and social progress world-wide;
- safeguard peace and promote international security, by cooperating with other nations against aggression and coercion, by contributing to the settlement of conflicts in the world and by reinforcing the role of the United Nations and other

international organisations;

- pursue policies aimed at achieving a sound world economy marked by sustained economic growth with low inflation, a high level of employment, equitable social conditions, in a framework of international stability;
- promote market principles, reject protectionism and expand, strengthen and further open the multilateral trading system;
- carry out their resolve to help developing countries by all appropriate means in their efforts towards political and economic reforms;
- provide adequate support, in cooperation with other states and organisations, to the nations of Eastern and Central Europe undertaking economic and political reforms and encourage their participation in the multilateral institutions of international trade and finance.

### **Principles of US-EC Partnership**

To achieve their common goals, the European Community and its Member States and the United States of America will inform and consult each other on important matters of common interest, both political and economic, with a view to bringing their positions as close as possible, without prejudice to their respective independence. In appropriate international bodies, in particular, they will seek close cooperation.

The EC-US partnership will, moreover, greatly benefit from the mutual knowledge and understanding acquired through regular consultations as described in this Declaration.

### **Economic Cooperation**

Both sides recognize the importance of strengthening the multilateral trading system. They will support further steps towards liberalization, transparency, and the implementation of GATT and OECD principles concerning both trade in goods and services and investment.

They will further develop their dialogue, which is already underway, on other matters such as technical and non-tariff barriers to industrial and agricultural trade, services, competition policy, transportation policy, standards, telecommunications, high technology and other relevant areas.

### **Education, Scientific and Cultural Cooperation**

The partnership between the European Community and its Member States on the one hand, and the United States on the other, will be based on continuous efforts to strengthen mutual cooperation in various other fields which directly affect the present and future well-being of their citizens, such as exchanges and joint projects in science and technology, including, inter alia, research in medicine, environment protection, pollution prevention, energy, space, high- energy physics, and the safety of nuclear and other installations, as well as in education and culture, including academic and youth exchanges.

## **Trans-national Challenge**

The United States of America and the European Community and its Member States will fulfil their responsibility to address trans-national challenges, in the interest of their own peoples and of the rest of the world. In particular, they will join their efforts in the following fields:

- combating and preventing terrorism;
- putting an end to the illegal production, trafficking and consumption of narcotics and related criminal, such as the laundering of money;
- cooperating in the fight against international crime;
- protecting the environment, both internationally and domestically, by integrating environmental and economic goals;
- preventing the proliferation of nuclear armaments, chemical and biological weapons, and missile technology.

## **Institutional Framework for Consultation**

Both sides agree that a framework is required for regular and intensive consultation. They will make full use of and further strengthen existing procedures, including those established by the President of the European Council and the President of the United States on 27th February 1990, namely:

- bi-annual consultations to be arranged in the United States and in Europe between, on the one side, the President of the European Council and President of the Commission, and on the other side, the President of the United States;
- bi-annual consultations between the European Community Foreign Ministers, with the Commission, and the US Secretary of State, alternately on either side of the Atlantic;
- ad hoc consultations between the Presidency Foreign Minister or the Troika and the US Secretary of State;
- bi-annual consultations between the Commission and the US Government at Cabinet level;
- briefings, as currently exist, by the Presidency to US Representatives on European Political Cooperation (EPC) meetings at the Ministerial level.

Both sides are resolved to develop and deepen these procedures for consultation so as to reflect the evolution of the European Community and of its relationship with the United States. They welcome the actions taken by the European parliament and the Congress of the United States in order to improve their dialogue and thereby bring closer together the peoples on both sides of the Atlantic.

## The New Transatlantic Agenda

1. Promoting Peace And Stability, Democracy And Development Around The World
2. Responding To Global Challenges
3. Contributing To The Expansion Of World Trade And Closer Economic Relations
4. Building Bridges Across The Atlantic
5. Parliamentary links
6. Implementing our Agenda

We, the United States of America and the European Union, affirm our conviction that the ties which bind our people are as strong today as they have been for the past half century. For over fifty years, the transatlantic partnership has been the leading force for peace and prosperity for ourselves and for the world. Together, we helped transform adversaries into allies and dictatorships into democracies. Together, we built institutions and patterns of cooperation that ensured our security and economic strength. These are epic achievements.

Today we face new challenges at home and abroad. To meet them, we must further strengthen and adapt the partnership that has served us so well. Domestic challenges are not an excuse to turn inward; we can learn from each other's experiences and build new transatlantic bridges. We must first of all seize the opportunity presented by Europe's historic transformation to consolidate democracy and free-market economies throughout the continent.

We share a common strategic vision of Europe's future security. Together, we have charted a course for ensuring continuing peace in Europe into the next century. We are committed to the construction of a new European security architecture in which the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the European Union, the Western European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe have complementary and mutually reinforcing roles to play.

We reaffirm the indivisibility of transatlantic security. NATO remains, for its members, the centrepiece of transatlantic security, providing the indispensable link between North America and Europe. Further adaptation of the Alliance's political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance.

As to the accession of new members to NATO and to the EU, these processes, autonomous but complementary, should contribute significantly to the extension of security, stability and prosperity in the whole of Europe. Furthering the work of Partnership for Peace and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and establishing a security partnership between NATO and Russia and between NATO and Ukraine will lead to unprecedented cooperation on security issues.

We are strengthening the OSCE so that it can fulfil its potential to prevent destabilising regional conflicts and advance the prospect of peace, security, prosperity, and democracy for all.

Increasingly, our common security is further enhanced by strengthening and reaffirming the ties between the European Union and the United States within the existing network of relationships which join us together.

Our economic relationship sustains our security and increases our prosperity. We share the largest two-way trade and investment relationship in the world. We bear a special responsibility to lead multilateral efforts towards a more open world system of trade and investment. Our cooperation has

made possible every global trade agreement, from the Kennedy Round to the Uruguay Round. Through the G-7, we work to stimulate global growth. And at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, we are developing strategies to overcome structural unemployment and adapt to demographic change.

We are determined to create a New Transatlantic Marketplace, which will expand trade and investment opportunities and multiply jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. This initiative will also contribute to the dynamism of the global economy.

At the threshold of a new century, there is a new world to shape--full of opportunities but with challenges no less critical than those faced by previous generations. These challenges can be met and opportunities fully realised only by the whole international community working together. We will work with others bilaterally, at the United Nations and in other multilateral fora.

We are determined to reinforce our political and economic partnership as a powerful force for good in the world. To this end, we will build on the extensive consultations established by the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration and the conclusions of our June 1995 Summit and move to common action.

Today we adopt a **New Transatlantic Agenda** based on a Framework for Action with four major goals:

*Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world.* Together, we will work for an increasingly stable and prosperous Europe; foster democracy and economic reform in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Russia, Ukraine and other new independent states; secure peace in the Middle East; advance human rights; promote non-proliferation and cooperate on development and humanitarian assistance.

*Responding to global challenges.* Together, we will fight international crime, drug-trafficking and terrorism; address the needs of refugees and displaced persons; protect the environment and combat disease.

*Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations.* Together, we will strengthen the multilateral trading system and take concrete, practical steps to promote closer economic relations between us.

*Building bridges across the Atlantic.* Together, we will work with our business people, scientists, educators and others to improve communication and to ensure that future generations remain as committed as we are to developing a full and equal partnership.

Within this Framework, we have developed an extensive **Joint EU/U.S. Action Plan**. We will give special priority between now and our next Summit to the following actions:

### **I. Promoting Peace And Stability, Democracy And Development Around The World**

- We pledge to work boldly and rapidly, together and with other partners, to implement the peace, to assist recovery of the war-ravaged regions of the former Yugoslavia and to support economic and political reform and new democratic institutions. We will cooperate to ensure: (1) respect for human rights, for the rights of minorities and for the rights of refugees and displaced persons, in particular the right of return; (2) respect for the work of the War Crimes Tribunal, established by the United Nations Security Council, in order to ensure international criminal accountability; (3) the establishment of a framework for free and fair elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as conditions permit and (4) the implementation of



the agreed process for arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures. While continuing to provide humanitarian assistance, we will contribute to the task of reconstruction, subject to the implementation of the provisions of the peace settlement plan, in the context of the widest possible burden-sharing with other donors and taking advantage of the experience of international institutions, of the European Commission and of all relevant bilateral donors in the coordination mechanism.

- We will support the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their efforts to restructure their economies and strengthen their democratic and market institutions. Their commitment to democratic systems of government, respect for minorities, human rights, market oriented economies and good relations with neighbours will facilitate their integration into our institutions. We are taking steps to intensify our cooperation aimed at sharing information, coordinating assistance programmes and developing common actions, protecting the environment and securing the safety of their nuclear power stations.
- We are determined to reinforce our cooperation to consolidate democracy and stability in Russia, Ukraine and other new independent states. We are committed to working with them in strengthening democratic institutions and market reforms, in protecting the environment, in securing the safety of their nuclear power stations and in promoting their integration into the international economy. An enduring and stable security framework for Europe must include these nations. We intend to continue building a close partnership with a democratic Russia. An independent, democratic, stable and nuclear weapons-free Ukraine will contribute to security and stability in Europe; we will cooperate to support Ukraine's democratic and economic reforms.
- We will support the Turkish Government's efforts to strengthen democracy and advance economic reforms in order to promote Turkey's further integration into the transatlantic community.
- We will work towards a resolution of the Cyprus question, taking into account the prospective accession of Cyprus to the European Union. We will support the UN Secretary General's Mission of Good Offices and encourage dialogue between and with the Cypriot communities.
- We reaffirm our commitment to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. We will build on the recent successes in the Peace Process, including the bold steps taken by Jordan and Israel, through concerted efforts to support agreements already concluded and to expand the circle of peace. Noting the important milestone reached with the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, we will play an active role at the Conference for Economic Assistance to the Palestinians, will support the Palestinian elections and will work ambitiously to improve the access we both give to products from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. We will encourage and support the regional parties in implementing the conclusions of the Amman Summit. We will also continue our efforts to promote peace between Israel, Lebanon and Syria. We will actively seek the dismantling of the Arab boycott of Israel.
- We pledge to work together more closely in our preventive and crisis diplomacy; to respond effectively to humanitarian emergencies; to promote sustainable development and the building of democratic societies; and to support human rights.
- We have agreed to coordinate, cooperate and act jointly in development and humanitarian assistance activities. To this end, we will establish a High-Level Consultative Group to

review progress of existing efforts, to assess policies and priorities and to identify projects and regions for the further strengthening of cooperation.

- We will increase cooperation in developing a blueprint for UN economic and social reform. We will cooperate to find urgently needed solutions to the financial crisis of the UN system. We are determined to keep our commitments, including our financial obligations. At the same time, the UN must direct its resources to the highest priorities and must reform in order to meet its fundamental goals.
- We will provide support to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), underscoring our shared desire to resolve important proliferation challenges throughout the world.

## **II. Responding To Global Challenges**

- We are determined to take new steps in our common battle against the scourges of international crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. We commit ourselves to active, practical cooperation between the U.S. and the future European Police Office, EUROPOL. We will jointly support and contribute to ongoing training programmes and institutions for crime-fighting officials in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Ukraine, other new independent states and other parts of the globe.
- We will work together to strengthen multilateral efforts to protect the global environment and to develop environmental policy strategies for sustainable world-wide growth. We will coordinate our negotiating positions on major global environmental issues, such as climate change, ozone layer depletion, persistent organic pollutants, desertification and erosion and contaminated soils. We are undertaking coordinated initiatives to disseminate environmental technologies and to reduce the public health risks from hazardous substances, in particular from exposure to lead. We will strengthen our bilateral cooperation on chemicals, biotechnology and air pollution issues.
- We are committed to develop and implement an effective global early warning system and response network for new and re-emerging communicable diseases such as AIDS and the Ebola virus, and to increase training and professional exchanges in this area. Together, we call on other nations to join us in more effectively combating such diseases.

## **III. Contributing To The Expansion Of World Trade And Closer Economic Relations**

- We have a special responsibility to strengthen the multilateral trading system, to support the World Trade Organisation and to lead the way in opening markets to trade and investment.
- We will contribute to the expansion of world trade by fully implementing our Uruguay Round commitments, work for the completion of the unfinished business by the agreed timetables and encourage a successful and substantive outcome for the Singapore WTO Ministerial Meeting in December 1996. In this context we will explore the possibility of agreeing on a mutually satisfactory package of tariff reductions on industrial products, and we will consider which, if any, Uruguay Round obligations on tariffs can be implemented on an accelerated basis. In view of the importance of the information society, we are launching a specific exercise in order to attempt to conclude an information technology agreement.
- We will work together for the successful conclusion of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment at the OECD that espouses strong principles on international investment

liberalisation and protection. Meanwhile, we will work to develop discussion of the issue with our partners at the WTO. We will address in appropriate fora problems where trade intersects with concerns for the environment, internationally recognised labour standards and competition policy. We will cooperate in creating additional trading opportunities, bilaterally and throughout the world, in conformity with our WTO commitments.

- Without detracting from our cooperation in multilateral fora, we will create a New Transatlantic Marketplace by progressively reducing or eliminating barriers that hinder the flow of goods, services and capital between us. We will carry out a joint study on ways of facilitating trade in goods and services and further reducing or eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers.
- We will strengthen regulatory cooperation, in particular by encouraging regulatory agencies to give a high priority to cooperation with their respective transatlantic counterparts, so as to address technical and non-tariff barriers to trade resulting from divergent regulatory processes. We aim to conclude an agreement on mutual recognition of conformity assessment (which includes certification and testing procedures) for certain sectors as soon as possible. We will continue the ongoing work in several sectors and identify others for further work.
- We will endeavour to conclude by the end of 1996 a customs cooperation and mutual assistance agreement between the European Community and the U.S.
- To allow our people to take full advantage of newly developed information technology and services, we will work toward the realisation of a Transatlantic Information Society.
- Given the overarching importance of job creation, we pledge to cooperate in the follow-up to the Detroit Jobs Conference and to the G-7 Summit initiative. We look forward to further cooperation in the run up to the G-7 Jobs Conference in France, at the next G-7 Summit in the Summer of 1996 and in other fora such as the OECD. We will establish a joint working group on employment and labour-related issues.

#### **IV. Building Bridges Across The Atlantic**

- We recognise the need to strengthen and broaden public support for our partnership. To that end, we will seek to deepen the commercial, social, cultural, scientific and educational ties among our people. We pledge to nurture in present and future generations the mutual understanding and sense of shared purpose that has been the hallmark of the post-war period.
- We will not be able to achieve these ambitious goals without the backing of our respective business communities. We will support, and encourage the development of, the transatlantic business relationship, as an integral part of our wider efforts to strengthen our bilateral dialogue. The successful conference of EU and U.S. business leaders which took place in Seville on 10/11 November 1995 was an important step in this direction. A number of its recommendations have already been incorporated into our Action Plan and we will consider concrete follow-up to others.
- We will actively work to reach a new comprehensive EC-U.S. science and technology cooperation agreement by 1997.
- We believe that the recent EC/U.S. Agreement on Cooperation in Education and Vocational Training can act as a catalyst for a broad spectrum of innovative cooperative activities of

direct benefit to students and teachers. We will examine ways to increase private support for educational exchanges, including scholarship and internship programmes. We will work to introduce new technologies into classrooms, linking educational establishments in the EU with those in the U.S. and will encourage teaching of each other's languages, history and culture.

### **Parliamentary links**

We attach great importance to enhanced parliamentary links. We will consult parliamentary leaders on both sides of the Atlantic regarding consultative mechanisms, including those building on existing institutions, to discuss matters related to our transatlantic partnership.

### **Implementing our Agenda**

The New Transatlantic Agenda is a comprehensive statement of the many areas for our common action and cooperation. We have entrusted the Senior Level Group to oversee work on this Agenda and particularly the priority actions we have identified. We will use our regular Summits to measure progress and to update and revise our priorities.

For the last fifty years, the transatlantic relationship has been central to the security and prosperity of our people. Our aspirations for the future must surpass our achievements in the past.



For Immediate Release  
Office of the Press Secretary  
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## **Joint Statement on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush, European Council President Konstandinos Simitis, and European Commission President Romano Prodi on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems constitutes a major threat to international peace and security. The threat is compounded by the interest of terrorists in acquiring WMD. This would undermine the foundations of international order. We pledge to use all means available to avert WMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow.

We will work together to strengthen the international system of treaties and regimes against the spread of WMD. This implies the development of new regimes, as appropriate, and reinforcement of existing regimes. We will pursue the goal of universal membership of relevant multilateral treaties and agreements.

We will seek to ensure strict implementation and compliance. We are willing to work with all those who respect international nonproliferation norms; we are committed to dealing effectively with those who ignore them or cheat.

We will support, when necessary, non-routine inspections.

We recognize that, if necessary, other measures in accordance with international law may be needed to combat proliferation.

We will work together to deploy our combined political and diplomatic influence most effectively in support of our nonproliferation objectives.

We will work together to develop further a common assessment of global proliferation threats.

We welcome the statement on nonproliferation by European Union Heads of State and Government at Thessaloniki and the G8 Declaration of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. We reaffirm our joint commitment to relevant treaties and agreements, in particular the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. We will work together in all areas to stop and reverse proliferation.

In particular:

We will explore ways to make the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols a standard for nuclear cooperation and nonproliferation. We urge all States with nuclear facilities or activities to ratify and implement these Agreements and Protocols without delay. Furthermore, on an urgent and exceptional basis, taking account of the increase in the Agency's workload in this area, we will support an adequate increase in the IAEA safeguards budget to ensure the credibility of the IAEA's verification system.

We will strengthen both export controls on materials and technologies related to WMD and their delivery systems as well as their enforcement and implementation. We believe that national controls should include criminal penalties for the illegal export, transshipment or brokering of weapons of mass destruction, missile delivery systems, and materials or technology for use in WMD or missile programs. We will work together with like-minded partners to tighten export controls, where necessary providing assistance to create and improve effective, enforceable national export control systems. We agree to introduce catch-all provisions, where appropriate. We will share information so as to identify new patterns of procurement by State and non-State actors. We will seek new methods to stop the proliferation trade to and from countries and entities of proliferation concern.

We will work together in the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to strengthen

national control over pathogenic micro-organisms and toxins and, in the framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to foster the elimination of all chemical weapons.

We will strengthen identification, control and interdiction of illegal shipments, including national criminal sanctions against those who contribute to illicit procurement efforts.

We emphasize the importance of cooperative threat reduction programs with third countries.

We will cooperate actively to address specific proliferation challenges. In particular:

We condemn North Korea's nuclear weapons program and its failure to comply with the IAEA safeguards agreement, which undermine the nonproliferation regime. We call on North Korea to refrain from any action that would further aggravate the problem. We strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle that program and to come into full compliance with international nonproliferation obligations, as a fundamental step to facilitate a comprehensive and peaceful solution.

We express our continuing serious concern at Iran's nuclear program, in particular as regards the pursuit of a full nuclear fuel cycle, as announced by President Khatami. We are troubled by the information in the IAEA's report detailing Iran's failures to meet its safeguards obligations, and we fully support ongoing investigation by the IAEA to answer the unresolved questions and concerns identified in that report. Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA, remedy all failures and answer all questions. It must also sign and implement an Additional Protocol, without delay or conditions, as a significant first step towards addressing those concerns.

We remain concerned at the pursuit of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and missiles for their delivery by a number of other States. We will continue to monitor these closely and to exchange information, including with other concerned States.

Proliferation is a threat not only to our security, but also to the wider international system. We call for a halt to proliferation activities in a way that is demonstrable and verifiable. Nonproliferation is a global challenge which requires a multifaceted solution. We need to tackle it individually and collectively -- working together and with other partners, including through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system.

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