

自由行動即解脫： 臨濟錄文本脈絡的詮釋重建

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摘要

本文主要的目標在於，提出臨濟錄這本重要禪宗文本脈絡的詮釋重建。我的基本論點是，行動這個概念乃是解讀臨濟禪法——特別是該文本最緊要主題之一的解脫概念——的關鍵。在此一假設基礎上，我將論證另一個副題——自由行動應被解讀成為臨濟解脫概念的同義詞。此外，深層心理學的許多洞見將被整合，用來發明對臨濟禪自由行動修練帶有極重要意義的禪修經驗。在說明前述論題時，首先我將指出過去對此主題研究的明顯缺失；其次，針對把行動這個概念做為探討主題這點，我將提出文本與歷史分析的證成。最後，我將針對身心的徹底轉化，以及身心「內在」轉化與「外在」表現間的關聯，嘗試對文本做出創造性的重建。

關鍵詞：行動、自由行動、解脫、禪、臨濟、詮釋的。

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Free Action as Emancipation:

A Hermeneutical Recontextualization of the *Linchilu*

Abstract

The primary objective of this paper is to provide a hermeneutical recontextualization of an important Ch'an text, the *Linchilu*. My basic position is that the concept of action is intrinsic to the explication of Lin-chi's Ch'an teachings as a whole, especially his concept of human emancipation, which I regard as one of the central themes of the text. As a corollary to this presumption, I contend that free action, the consummate one in the domain of action, should be rendered as an equivalent of Lin-chi's concept of human emancipation. Moreover, various insights of depth-psychology are incorporated as a methodological reorientation to illuminate the meditative experience that bears tremendous significance for Lin-chi's Ch'an training in realizing free action.

To demonstrate this thesis, I will first show the evident shortcomings found in the previous studies of the subject. Then, I will provide a textual-historical justification to my singling out of the concept of action as the primary theme for the investigation. Finally, a creative reconstruction of the text will be attempted in respect to the theme of total transformation of the body-mind, as well as the interconnectedness between its "inner" transformation and "outer" expressions .

Key Words: Action, Free Action, Emancipation, Ch'an, Lin-chi, Hermeneutical.

Free Action as Emancipation: A Hermeneutical Recontextualization of the *Linchilu*¹

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1. Introduction

The primary objective of this paper is to provide a hermeneutical recontextualization of an important Ch'an text, the *Linchilu*. My basic position is that the concept of action is intrinsic to the explication of Lin-chi's Ch'an teachings as a whole, especially his concept of human emancipation, which I regard as one of the central themes of the text. As a corollary to this presumption, furthermore, I contend that free action, the consummate one in the domain of action, should be rendered as an equivalent of Lin-chi's concept of human emancipation. Consequently, our inquiry into Lin-chi's existential project for attaining emancipation prescribed in his discourse cannot properly proceed unless we can offer, in advance, a textual-historical analysis

¹ The full title of the *Linchilu* (臨濟錄) is *The Recorded Sayings of Ch'an Master Lin-chi Hui-chao*, 臨濟慧照禪師語錄). The Chinese text to which I refer is collected in the *Ch'an-tsung Chi-cn'eng* (禪宗集成), Vol.11-12, Taipei, I-wen Yin-shu-kuan (藝文印書館), 1968. As for the translation works, three English translations have been produced, in addition to Paul Demiéville's pioneering French translation in the West. The three English translations are as follows. Ruth Fuller Sasaki., *The Recorded Sayings of Ch'an Master Lin-chi Hui-chao of Chen Prefecture* (Kyoto: The Institute for Zen Studies, 1975); Irmgard Schloegl, *The Zen Teachings of Rin'zai [The Record of Rin'zai]* (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1976); Burton Watson., *The Zen Teachings of Master Lin-chi* (Boston: Shambhala, 1993). Although I consulted with each of the translations except Demiéville's, the quotations used through

on Lin-chi's concept of action, as well as free action, as to how the concepts are formed and what they really signify. Only when this keystone is securely laid on the ground, an interpretive scheme appropriate to the exegesis of Lin-chi's discourse on emancipation can build upon it accordingly.

Due to the hermeneutical nature of our endeavor, however, the textual-historical analysis alone, despite its laying the groundwork, can never suffice to construct such an interpretive scheme for the purpose of our current exploration. It will inevitably require our "modern understanding" of Ch'an to "blend in" in the sense that some modified modern concepts or theories need to be brought into our discussion for shedding lights on the original yet fragmented pieces of the text. Among them, C. G. Jung's notion of "individuation,"² Yuasa Yasuo's distinction of "bright-dark *cogito*,"³ and Nishida Kitarō's worldview of "inter-expressiveness"⁴ will be particularly adapted both for clarification and construction of our scheme. As we'll see later, the application of those modern concepts and theories into our explication of Lin-chi's discourse will be held in check in accordance with the positions maintained by Ch'an tradition. That is to say, while

out the whole investigation are basically my own translation, if not otherwise mentioned.

² It requires a thorough understanding of the basic structure of Jung's work in order to penetrate the full meaning of his idea of individuation. But its fundamental sense can be grasped by reading the following articles written by Jung himself in *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung (CW)*, trans. by R. F. C. Hull, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956): "The Development of Personality," *CW*17, pars. 284-323, "Conscious, Unconscious, and Individuation," *CW*9i, pars. 489-524; "A Study in the Process of Individuation," *CW*9i, "Dream Symbols of the Individuation Process," *CW* 12.

³ For discussion on the philosophical meanings of this distinction, see Yuasa Yasuo, *The Body: Toward An Eastern Mind-Body Theory*, edited by T. P. Kasulis, trans. by Shigenori Nagatomo and T. P. Kasulis (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987), pp. 4-11 and 49-74.

⁴ See Nishida Kitarō, *Last Writing: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview*, trans. by

providing us with modern perspectives of illustrating the text, those modern concepts and theories should not be allowed to overstep the boundaries by violating the basic tenets or principles presupposed by Ch'an. Under this general guideline, a brief overview of our agenda is thus in order.

First of all, some preparatory remarks regarding the importance of the text being studied, as well as the evident shortcomings shown in the previous studies of the subject in Western Academia, will be laid out.

Secondly, I will justify my singling out of the concept of action as the primary theme for the investigation by analyzing the actional implications imbedded in those essential concepts that characterize Lin-chi's "true person," (真人) such as "no-position," (無位) "no-dependence," (無依) and so forth. In the course of this justification, a new reading of those major concepts in the direction of action and free action will be attempted. In addition, other textual evidences in support of our hermeneutical position will be provided along with the analysis.

Thirdly, since Lin-chi's teaching constitutes the integral part of Hung-Chou school (洪州宗)⁵, one of the most important branches of the Southern Ch'an, the justification of our contended hermeneutical position should also include a discussion on how the relevant historical development of Ch'an thought contributes to shaping

David A. Dilworth, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp.47-64.

⁵ Historically speaking, the school characteristic of its dynamic teaching was founded on the Ch'an movement initiated by the Ch'an Master Ma-tsu (709-788), the second generation of the Six Patriarch Hui-neng. Lin-chi's Master Huang-po also came out from this Ch'an lineage. It was a further development of the sudden school.

Lin-chi's discourse as such in the *Linchilu*. To be specific, our attention will be drawn to explicate how the philosophical standpoint of the Hung-chou school that Lin-chi inherited shapes his concept of action and hence free action. On the one hand, this historical analysis further strengthens our previously stated position. On the other hand, it provides us a better understanding of the philosophical imports of Lin-chi's concept of free action.

Fourthly, granted that Ch'an's emancipation is distinctively characterized by its relentless striving for a thorough conversion of the whole person characteristic of its psycho-physical makeup; namely, a total transformation of the person's body-mind. This will lead us to look into the genuine meaning of Lin-chi's notion of person, and as a result of which, a comprehensive delineation of the structure of Lin-chi's personhood as well as the "individuation" model presupposed by him will be propounded. This is where Jung's idea of "individuation" and Yuasa's distinction of bright-dark *cogito* comes to help shed some light on the relevant textual passages. As a result, the textual passages related to meditation practice would be particularly sorted out for demonstration and illustration because the practice itself is indispensable to account for Ch'an person's body-mind transformation, which serves as a foundation for his acting freely.

Fifthly, our attempt to regard free action as emancipation in Lin-chi's teachings will be incomplete if we do not look into the interconnectedness or the corresponding relationship between a person's "inner" transformation of body-mind and his "outer" expression in action through bodily movement and speech act. Here Nishida's worldview of "inter-expressiveness" will provide us the

major conceptual apparatus to account for the relevant passages of the text.

Finally, some concluding remarks as to a new direction for the future investigation on the subject will be proposed in light of the forgoing rearrangements of our reading order.

2. Critiques of the Hitherto Studies on theText

Lin-chi I-hsüan (d.866) was one of the most renowned and influential Chinese Ch'an Masters.⁶ The spectacular weightiness of the *Linchilu* in the study of Ch'an has been widely recognized ever since D. T. Suzuki took on the task of transmitting Zen to the West. On the textual level alone, for instance, three English translations have been produced, in addition to Paul Demiéville's pioneering French translation in the West. A long tradition of exegesis and commentary by Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Ch'an practitioners and scholars also exists. It then became "the most translated Zen text in history," according to Urs App.⁷ However, since all of those Western translations were heavily dependent upon the commentaries made by Japanese scholars in this field,⁸ the exegetical merits as well as restrictions of the former unavoidably have become transferred to the latter. These contain textual references and offer possible interpretations within the context of Ch'an tradition, i.e., the

⁶ For a thorough discussion of Lin-chi's life, see Seizan Yanagida, "The Life of Lin-Chi I-hsüan," *The Eastern Buddhist* 5.2 (1972), pp. 70-94.

⁷ See *Concordance to the Record of Linji (Rinzai)*, Urs App, ed. (Kyoto: International Research Institute for Zen Buddhism, Hanazono University, 1993) XXIV.

⁸ Among them, Seizan Yanagida is considered the one who provides the most definite and

syncretism of Buddhism, Taoism, and, to some extent, Confucianism.⁹ Although they paved the way for further investigation, those philological studies were not sensitive enough to discern the philosophical nuances of many terms and sentences in the text. Furthermore, they did not explore the modern implications of Lin-chi's teachings.

This is both justifiable and understandable considering the specialties and concerns of the commentators. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that philological studies alone cannot satisfy our need to uncover the philosophical profundity imbedded in the deep structure of the text. They may even become hurdles in our attempted penetration of the core of the text. For example, the key concept of the entire text, *wu wei chen ren* (無位真人), is often translated as true person of "no-rank" or "no-status." This is a more sociologically-oriented rendering, rather than "no-position," the one germane to deeper philosophical interpretations.¹⁰ Adopting a different translation such as this one, would undoubtedly lead to a drastically deeper unfolding of our interpretation.

resourceful translation and commentaries of the text.

⁹ Lin-chi is regarded by a number of scholars as one of the leading representatives of Ch'an humanism due to his explicit discourse on the theme of "true person of no-position." For example, Heinrich Dumoulin adopted this position by citing Yanagida's argument in *Zen Buddhism: A History* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988). And some even believe that this is owing to a Confucian influence. See the discussion in Bernard Faure, *Ch'an Insights and Oversights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) p. 72.

¹⁰ The Chinese character *wei* (位) could be taken to mean spatial location (*fong wei*, 方位) and social rank or status (*ti wei*, 地位), but it also implies the position (*li chan*, 立場) a person takes in various situations both in the practical and the philosophical domain. Based on this understanding, therefore, the latter usage will be adopted throughout the whole investigation because of its broader meaning.

Furthermore, the existing theoretical explorations of Lin-chi's Ch'an teachings appear to be fragmented and sporadic, which justifies our attempt at a thorough re-examining of the text. However, the theoretical contention of our call for initiating a re-examination of the *Linchilu* in the direction stated earlier is not limited to achieving a "thorough" understanding of the text, but involves "depth" as well. Insofar as the notion of depth is concerned, the current project aims at improving our understanding of the text by reorienting ourselves in terms of topic and methodology.

As far as the topic is concerned, most of the philosophical discussions of Lin-chi's teachings so far have drawn on his concepts of language and person. They pay less attention to his conception of action, which I regard as the fundamental for penetrating the core of Lin-chi's teachings, and to the meditative experience implicitly presupposed by Lin-chi's teachings. According to my view, Lin-chi's notion of language and person cannot be properly understood unless we give due consideration to his conception of action, which in turn requires an exposition of the role meditation plays in realizing free action. The failure of previous studies of the *Linchilu* to address these issues, I argue, may be attributed to the general difficulties of penetrating the Ch'an texts as a whole; due to the rich experiential components imbedded therein and their notorious lack of systematic thought.

Take the *Linchilu* for example. Like other typical "recorded sayings" (*yü lu*, 語錄, literally the record of dialogues) in Ch'an

literature,¹¹ the *Linchilu* consists of the Master's lectures [a special style of oral teaching when the master "entered the hall," (*shang-t'ang fa yü*, 上堂法語)], dialogues and encounters between the Master and his students, which generally developed out of the students' individual problems and questions about their practice of Buddhist spiritual training. The *Linchilu* is usually divided into three sections, i.e., "Discourses (語錄)", "Critical Examinations (勘辨)", and "Record of Pilgrimages (行錄)."¹² It appears that the first part provides the most accessible resources for scholars to draw out the meanings of Lin-chi's teachings. Most of the contents have clear references to many major Buddhist doctrines, especially those of Mahāyāna, and they are, relatively speaking, delivered in a more explanatory tone.

In addition to those discursive statements, however, the text also contains considerable portions of highly enigmatic or mysterious material. These sections are mainly concerned with encounters or interviews between Lin-chi and his students or other persons in which the participants aim at probing one another and identifying each other's level of achieved Ch'an experience. While some of those paragraphs exist in the first section, most of them appear in the other two parts. Due to their experiential profundity and complexity, the meanings generated by those events seem incomprehensible to

¹¹ For a detailed discussion of this subject, see Seizan Yanagida, "The Recorded Sayings: Texts of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism," trans. John R. McRae, collected in *Early Ch'an in China and Tibet*, eds Whalen Lai, and Lewis R. Lancaster (Berkeley: The Regents of the University of California, 1983).

¹² I follow Ruth Fuller Sasaki's divisions. Burton Watson further divides the first part into two subheadings, "Ascending the Hall" and "Instructing the Group," by taking into account the occasion on which the sermons or addresses took place and the length of the lectures. Nevertheless, the two sorts of division are very similar.

non-participants. This is the main reason why those materials have seldom been analyzed in previous studies.¹³

Despite their high degree of inaccessibility for exegesis, those encounters or interviews that appear in each section vividly manifest the genuine spirit and vitality of Lin-chi Ch'an. The dynamic interactions among Ch'an persons represent the characteristic Lin-chi teaching style and bear rich inherent philosophical implications for his discourse. If we accept that an organic connection exists between Lin-chi's discourse and his way of teaching and living, then those aforementioned materials can not easily be left untreated. It seems that only when we can successfully tie together these two domains, i.e., his thought and action, in our attempted interpretation, can a holistic picture of Lin-chi's Ch'an philosophy be laid out.

In maintaining such a position, I do not mean to say that this recognition alone can provide us with definite understandings of those encounters or interviews. Their full-fledged explication will certainly require establishing an appropriate hermeneutical structure and an in-depth exploration of the philosophical meanings of the concept of action in Lin-chi's discourse. At this point, I want to stress that by taking this acting dimension into consideration, we begin to perceive that those textual materials so often untreated in the past actually bear tremendous philosophical meanings and implications for deepening our understanding of Lin-chi's thought. One of our theoretical

¹³ Take the text translations for example. Both Sasaki and Watson seem to acknowledge the enigmatic nature of those passages in their commentaries. They either suggest possible renderings or simply leave problematic passages unresolved. Meanwhile, since the cases are numerous and a detailed discussion of them would require the establishment of my own interpretive model, I shall suspend the general discussion. I propose to analyze them case by

intentions in this project is, then, to provide an interpretation of those passages and connect them to the major concepts in the text, particularly the concept of action.

To explore these highly experiential concerns, we need a methodological reorientation able to account for the depths of those experiences implicitly rooted in the background of the text as well. In this regard, I intend to resort to the various insights of depth psychology both to clarify those experientially-laden concepts and to construct an interpretive scheme of the text. I hope that the shortcomings shown in previous studies of the *Linchilu* can be improved by the present effort. Once the experiential components of the text are uncovered, we can appreciate Lin-chi's teaching at a deeper level by making sense of those passages that originally appear to be enigmatic and mysterious.

3. The Primacy of Action from a Textual Viewpoint

The *Linchilu* is usually considered as the text representative of so-called "Ch'an humanism or individualism" due to its overriding emphasis on the concept of person. According to Heinrich Dumoulin's textual account, "a synopsis of all the Chinese characters Lin-chi uses shows that out of the total 1336 characters in the text, the graph for "human being" appears 196 times."¹⁴ Judging from the history of the Ch'an literature, we also observe that Lin-chi was the first Ch'an

case whenever appropriate to our subsequent investigation.

¹⁴ See Heinrich Dumoulin, *Zen Buddhism: A History, India and China*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988) p. 189.

Master to thematize the concept of person in the discourse although it had been always one of the main concerns for his predecessors as well. However, when one attempts to examine the defining feature of Lin-chi's person, it becomes evident that one cannot discuss it without resorting to the concept of action because the primary mode of Lin-chi's person is always an acting one. By the same token, one can never be able to grasp the genuine meaning of Lin-chi's "true person" without properly understand what the concept of free action means to him.

The above statements may be readily testified by our perception regarding Lin-chi's idiosyncratic style of teachings expressive of dynamic functioning and the vibrant encounters between him and his disciples or other Ch'an Masters throughout the text. However, this readily perceived impression has been, I argue, deeply rooted in Lin-chi's teachings and could be explored from a textual analysis of the philosophical imports of those major terms Lin-chi uses to describe the "true person." As I shall demonstrate, all of those terms bear strong sense of pointing to a person in the field of action. Let's first proceed with the "negative" characterizations Lin-chi assigns to the "true person," from which we can derive the basic characteristics of our everyday action.

In the *Linchilu*, Lin-chi uses the term "true person of no-position"¹⁵ (無位真人) to signify his ideal personhood. The other

¹⁵ Instead of rendering it as "true person of no-rank or status," as the three English translators did, the term will be translated as "true person of no-position" throughout our whole investigation because the former is a more socially-oriented term as in social rank or status, whereas the latter implies a broader range of meanings referring to a person's tempo-spatial position, social position and philosophical position.

important synonyms he uses in the text are mainly the person of “no-dependence,” (無依) “no-robe,” (無衣) and “not-being-occupied-with-events,” (無事) etc.¹⁶ Although Lin-chi does not specify the ordinary personhood for us, we can easily derive its characterizations from those terms indicative of the ideal personhood. Since the antonym of the Chinese character *wu* (無, non-being or not having) is *yu* (有, being or having), the ordinary personhood Lin-chi presupposes could be characterized as “being positional” (有位), “being dependent” (有依), “being cloaked [by robe]” (有衣), “being occupied with events” (有事), etc.. Leaving aside the rich philosophical meanings of these two characters¹⁷ for the time being, we shall just focus on the actional implications suggested by the Chinese characters *wei* (位), *yi* (依), *yi* (衣), and *shi* (事).

The Chinese character *wei* (位) could be taken to mean tempo-spatial location (方位) and social rank or status (地位), but it also implies the position or standpoint (立場) a person takes in various situations, both in practical and philosophical sense. The literal meanings of this term already indicate the fundamental characteristics of Lin-chi's ordinary person, namely, he is always situated in a particular tempo-spatial location, associated with a specific social rank or status, and maintains a position, both internally and externally.

¹⁶ The three characterizations we mentioned here are the major ones, but they are not inclusive of Lin-chi's descriptions about the true person. The following is the list of some other terms Lin-chi uses: “no-form,” (無形相) “no-origin,” (無本) “no-root,” (無根) “non-dwelling,” (無住) “non-arising,” (無生).

¹⁷ For the sake of discussion, we simply interpret the character *yu* (being) and *wu* (non-being) in the literal sense despite their rich philosophical meanings. For instance, *wu* could be taken to mean “the transcendence of the opposition of being and non-being. We will suspend this discussion for now.

What seems to be significant in the imports of the character *wei* (位) is that it clearly points out the basic tempo-spatial structure of a person and thereby characterizes Lin-chi's person as a living and lived one, who always engages himself in the world of action.

Why is this so? Because it is commonly understood that in our ordinary mode of existence, a person acting always has a fixed base, or point of origin, to which any of his references to other things can at any time be traced back. That is to say, the condition of our everyday action is that one has to be able to distinguish oneself from other things, or identify oneself as being in a situation or a particular tempo-spatial location. Then, one can move oneself, say, from here (one location) to there (another location). This also holds true when the domain is extended from the natural or physical world to the social world (rank or status) and the metaphysical world (position). Though we certainly cannot regard the position changes occurring in the social or metaphysical domain as action in the ordinary sense, the fact that they require an identifiable position as the point of reference for describing the changes therein indicates the possibility of viewing them as a sort of movement. When a person acts, therefore, he must act from his position, whether it is physical, social or philosophical, and then move from one position to another.

To have an identifiable position in the tempo-spatial world means to situate oneself in relation to other persons or things, animate or inanimate. That is to say, the very fact that we can pinpoint ourselves at certain location or position presupposes the existence of others. It is this fundamental *mutuality* of human existence, I contend, that entails one of the intrinsic meanings of the character *yi* (依,

dependence). In the ordinary mode of existence, one must be dependent upon other things to live, even the very identity of oneself is constituted through the negation of others. It seems to me that this is Lin-chi's way of illustrating the early Buddhist theory of dependent-origination, for a deep sense of mutual dependence is also stressed therein. The difference, however, lies in a shift of emphasis from the early Buddhist universal claim of reality to Lin-chi Ch'an's highly praise of our daily life situation. What this mutual dependence implies is that a person does not enter into relationships, but is constituted solely by them. Because the constitution of a person can only be comprehended through his act of relating to others, it naturally follows that the basic mode of its being is acting qua *relating*.

Moreover, not only does this act of relating bring together the person and the "external" world, but also the "inner" and "outer" realm of the person as well. This is where the character *yi* (衣, robe) comes into the scheme of Lin-chi's person qua acting. In its practical use, robe is something that covers our body. Metaphorically speaking, it symbolizes that which stands between our "inner" self and the "outer" world primarily functioning as the mediating device for a person. In this sense, the character *yi* (衣, robe) could be interpreted as the *persona* we wear in each and every of our life situations from the psychological viewpoint, because *persona* qua social identity can be viewed as a compromising result of the clashing between "inner" personal needs and "outer" social demands. In other words, it functions as our *faces* or *interfaces* manifesting in different situations, through which the "inner" and "outer" realm is linked. What, then, does this have to do with action?

For one thing, the multiplicity of *persona* in relation to our complex life situations implies the dynamic functions and interactions between the “inner” and “outer” world, presupposing a world of action in its background. In addition, the implied meaning of the character *yi* we proposed above also signifies the structure of a person’s action. In the everyday domain, the notion of action presupposes an agent who is performing the act, and the very criterion that enables a person to be an agent is assumed to be his ability of *intending*. Here we can perceive a dichotomy of “inner” and “outer” in describing the person’s life situation. If we follow this ordinary understanding, then the thorough process of an action may be described as the movement that brings together what the person intends and what is intended. Only when we take into consideration the “inner” domain where the action is said to be initiated, the concept of action can be understood in a broader framework. Otherwise, it will be very difficult for us to account for a person’s failure to execute an act and his withdrawal of an act before it is actualized.

If the preceding three characters only entail the acting features of Lin-chi’s person implicitly, then the character *shi* (事, event) explicitly unfolds the world of action where Lin-chi’s person acts. The Chinese dictionary definition of this character is “the totality of that which is performed or acted by a person.” Here we clearly perceive that the person Lin-chi speaks of is the one in action because he is mainly defined by his engagements. Due to the apparent Hwa-yen inheritance in Lin-chi’s teachings,¹⁸ we may also consider how the

¹⁸ The close relationship between Hwa-yen theory and Ch’an practice has long been recognized by the Ch’an scholars both East and West. Tsung-mi, who first expounded the

meaningful contrast of *li* (理) and *shi* (事) formulated in the Hwa-yen philosophy may contribute to our understanding of Lin-chi's acting person.

Despite the varieties of the possible interpretation, the character *li* is usually translated as principle, and the character *shi* event. Whereas the former refers to something abstract, the latter is considered the concrete manifestations of it in the phenomenal world. Since the Hwa-yen philosophy does not assume a duality between noumena and phenomena, we should not interpret the distinction between *li* and *shi* in a Kantian sense. It rather suggests two different aspects of reality in terms of its self-expression. In my opinion, what seems to be meaningful in bringing this contrast into Lin-chi's scheme is that it discloses Lin-chi's emphasis on the primacy of action over thought in understanding the fundamental nature of person. If we translate Hwa-yen's scheme into Lin-chi's (to view the contrast of *li* and *shi* from the perspective of a living person), then they can be taken to mean two kinds of modality of person; the former is a thinking subject, which places the epistemological self as the center for knowing and acting, whereas the latter is an acting one, which follows the natural course of functioning without the interference of the former.

doctrinal origins of Ch'an, characterizes the philosophical standpoint of Hung-chou school, from which Lin-chi descended, as "viewing everything as real" (一切皆真) and "following the nature" (隨順自然). This position can be traced back to Hwa-yen philosophy, where the "true mind" is stressed as opposed to T'ien-tai's position of viewing good and evil as being interdependent upon each other. For a general discussion on the relationship between Buddhist doctrines and Ch'an practice, see Yun-hua Jan, "Conflict and Harmony in Ch'an and Buddhism," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 4 (1977), pp. 287-302. Also, see Steve Odin, *Process Metaphysics and Hwa-yen Buddhism: A Critical Study of Cumulative Penetration VS. Interpenetration*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982) pp.53-65.

In our previous analysis of the character *yi* (衣, robe), we have implicitly pointed out the interconnection between intention and action by referring to the basic assumption underlying our ordinary mode of action. To posit the agent's intention as the initiative of action implies that the ordinary mode of action is, to a great extent, delimited by or subject to the thinking subject because the very act of assuming an agent as the initiative of action is the result of a thought process. In terms of the categories of *li* and *shi*, the person who places the thinking subject over the acting one is bound by the realm of *li* where *shi* and *li* are often perceived as conflicting to each other, whereas the one who assumes acting over thinking is always associated with the realm of *shi* where the oneness of *li* and *shi* is achieved. In asserting the superiority of *shi* to *li*,¹⁹ therefore, Lin-chi intends to convert a person's modality from the realm of *li* to that by *shi*, or from the thinking subject to the acting one.

In light of the foregoing analysis, we are now able to envision, at least on the textual level, the relevancy of the concept of action in

¹⁹ Since, in Hwa-yen philosophy, the ideal way of realizing reality is not to exclude *li* from *shi* and vice versa, I do not imply here that Lin-chi intends to exclude *li* by emphasizing *shi*. Rather, one should achieve the "non-obstruction of *li* and *shi* (理事無礙)," a harmony between thought and action in terms of Lin-chi's scheme, and even a higher stage, the "non-obstruction of *shi* and *shi* (事事無礙)," a harmony between every individual events or acts. As we can see here, to place the harmony between *shi* and *shi* higher than that of *li* and *shi* clearly indicates the realm of *shi* is also considered superior to that of *li*, because there still contains a duality between *li* and *shi* in the former whereas no such duality is presupposed in the latter. Chinese Buddhist Scholar Lü Ch'eng (呂徵) suggests that the equivalents of *li* and *shi* in Lin-chi's discourse are "host" and "guest" respectively, meaning that the distinctive characteristic of Lin-chi's teaching is placing the priority of "true and proper insight" (*li*) over events (*shi*). This interpretation seems to be at odds with our position here. However, I argue that the notion *li* in Lü Ch'eng's position has more to do with religious insight than abstract thought. The focal point of his concern is apparently different from what I deal with here.

explicating Lin-chi's understanding of emancipation (解脫) and freedom (自由), the two pivotal and interrelated notions in Lin-chi's discourse. As we have indicated earlier, the fundamental problem of human being's ordinary action is "being positional," (有位) "being dependent," (有依) "being cloaked [by robe]," (有衣) and "being-occupied-with-events" (有事). The state of the person's emancipation will have to be "non-positional" (無位), "non-dependent" (無依), "not-being-clothed" (無衣), "not-being-occupied-with-events" (無事) if we infer on the basis of their logical antitheses. Indeed, Lin-chi calls the emancipated one "the-person-who-is-not-being-occupied-with-events" (無事人) and further depicts him in terms of action as the one who is "going and staying freely" (去住自由). Elsewhere he even gives a concrete picture of what a freed person would be like; he is just "defecating, urinating, getting dressed, eating food, and lying down when tired."²⁰

Since Lin-chi's person is situated in the field of action, his emancipation also has to be achieved through action. The previous quote of how Lin-chi perceives a freed person to be is exactly one of the textual references that point out the intimate association between the person's emancipation and action. But, why does the issue of emancipation arise at all? According to Lin-chi, it is mainly due to the

²⁰ Judging from the surface, one may equate the acting modality Lin-chi describes here with the ordinary one for every one does those things in life. However, a closer look at the essential meaning of this sentence will give us a different idea. While a complete explication of this meaning will have to require the unfolding of our whole project, we can briefly say that what distinguishes the emancipated person from the ordinary one is the quality of how they perform those acts. Whereas the former can act without any trace of obstruction, the latter is known for his unnatural moves resulting from varying reasons. Sasaki p.12; Watson p.31; Schloegl p.26.

person's self-forming "twisted or entangled knots" (葛藤) in his mind that hinder the "originally" free action. Taking a cue from this explanation and the distinction of *li* and *shi* we mentioned earlier, the person's emancipation is, then, to be achieved by a total transformation in which his mode of existence is no longer dominated by the thinking subject. The reason is that the states of "being-positional," "being-dependent," and "being-cloaked [by robe]" are all reflective of the primary functions of a thinking subject.

In addition to the "negative" descriptions of the ideal acting person, Lin-chi also "positively" characterizes him as the one "who is listening to the Dharma," (聽法的人) "who is speaking the Dharma," (說法的人) "who is briskly alive," (活潑潑的) and "who is functioning right here and now." (目前現用) Although what exactly those terms refer to in terms of their philosophical meanings in Lin-chi's discourse is not quite clear to us at this phase, the dynamic nature of this person's functioning and the importance of the aspect of *acting* is, again, readily perceived judging from the present progressive verbs used by Lin-chi in those descriptions. Perhaps the most striking and convincing footnote that illustrates the genuine meaning of this ideal acting person in the text is the following famous passage:

"The Master ascended the Hall and said, 'On your lump of red flesh is a true person of no-position who is constantly going in and out of the face of every one of you. Those who have not yet proved him, look! look!' Then a monk came forward and asked, 'What is he like -- the true person of no-position?'"

The Master got down from his meditation cushion, seized the monk and said, 'Speak! Speak!' As the monk faltered, the Master shoved him away saying, 'What a shit-wiping stick is this true person of no position!' The Master then return to his quarters.²¹

Despite its manifold meanings, the gist of this paragraph apparently is in accord with our previous claim that the person needs to be grasped through action, and his emancipation or freedom has to be testified by the degree of non-obstruction of his performed actions. Whoever fails to realize the person from his concrete relationships to the world is just like the hesitated monk who was completely concealed from the functioning of Lin-chi's "true person." Besides, we can also see in this passage that the major hurdle of preventing us from acting freely is the perpetual functioning of the thinking subject in our ordinary mode of action, because the Chinese term *ni-yi* (擬議), that is translated as "faltered" in the passage, means "intending to argue" or "thinking about proposing argument," if translated literally; both of the two characters *ni* and *yi* have to do with the calculating and discriminating function of the thinking subject.

In light of our interpretation of the previous quote, it may be safe for us to infer that the above four positive characterizations seems to suggest the *immediate presence* of of Lin-chi's acting person in the

²¹ The corresponding passages in the three existing English translations are: Sasaki p.3 ; Watson p.13; Schloegl p.15. The crossed references of each cited passage to the three translations will be maintained throughout the whole project.

daily situations. The fact that most of our daily actions are not in tune with this ideal state, as in the case of the faltered monk, indicates the negative influences exerted from the thinking subject we mentioned earlier. For Lin-chi, therefore, whether or not a person attains emancipation must be determined by whether or not he is able to act freely in every given situation. And the degree of his freedom is determined by that of his ability to release himself from the interference of the thinking subject in his actions.

Through the previous analysis, we have established a textual basis in support of our position that regards the concept of free action as the primary theme in the exegesis of the *Linchi*. In fact, the result is a restatement of the well-known Ch'an position that the Ch'an person needs to be realized in context or the Ch'an person must always be regarded as functioning relationally. To quote T. P. Kasulis' expression, "From the Zen perspective, the person does not perform action; rather action performs the person"²² Lin-chi's teachings apparently testify this position, but "what exactly does free action mean by Lin-chi?" To answer this question, we now turn our attention to the Ch'an tradition that forms Lin-chi's concept of free action.

²² See T. P. Kasulis, *Zen Person, Zen Action*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), p. 139.

4. The Collapsing of "Body" (*t'i*, 體)²³ into "Function" (*yung*, 用)

In the *Linchilu*, the character connoting the concept of action is *yung* (用). The literal meaning of this character is twofold: when used as a verb, it signifies "to use, to employ, to execute," (*shih yung*, 使用) etc., having much to do with the person's daily acting in the world of action; when used as a noun, it denotes the meaning of function (*tso yung*, 作用), suggesting a broader sense of meaning by referring to the grounding of the person's acting, inclusive of the person's body-mind functioning as well as the cosmos'. Lin-chi seems to have both meanings in mind when he uses the character *yung*.²⁴ But, how do these two levels of *yung* explain Lin-chi's concept of action? And, how are they related to each other? Lin-chi does not address this question directly, but we may find out the clues by examining the philosophical standpoint of the Hung-chou school from which Lin-chi inherits and then come back to interpret the relevant passages in light of the findings. In so doing, we can thus establish the theoretical

²³ It needs to be noted that the term is usually translated as "essence" by most of Western scholars. The reason I translated it as "body" is to avoid a misinterpretation of Hung-chou school's and hence Lin-chi's philosophical position. With the common rendition, we tend to impose onto Hung-chou school's Ch'an Masters a dualistic standpoint entailing a dichotomy of essence and existence, which they do not advocate. On the other hand, not only does "body" is the literal meaning of the Chinese character *ti*, it also allows us to differentiate the "body" from its "function" without demarcating them into two unrelated realms ontologically. With our rendition, the body and its function can be then viewed as two ways of describing the same phenomenon.

²⁴ For example, when Lin-chi says "If you want to act (*yung*, 用), then act. Don't hesitate.", he seems to refer to all sorts of action performed by the person. However, the character *yung* apparently suggests a broader meaning in the following sentence: "Mind-dharma is without form; it pervades the ten directions and is functioning (*yung*, 用) right here and now.

connection between Lin-chi's concept of action and the related doctrines he integrates into his teachings.

According to the Ch'an practitioner and scholar Kuei-feng Tsung-mi (圭峰宗密, 780-841),²⁵ the philosophical standpoint of the Hung-chou school can be formulated as "the collapsing of 'body' into 'function'."²⁶ The distinction made in this context has to do with different Ch'an schools' interpretations on the *tathāgathagarbha* or the Buddha-nature doctrine. The term of "body" and "function" can be understood as the Buddha-nature in-itself and its manifestations respectively. Given this distinction, the Hung-chou school is said to advocate the position that the arising of all actions and activities are the "functioning" of the entire "body" of the Buddha-nature, and, accordingly, there is no "body" outside of the "functioning." In other words, the Hung-chou school radically collapses the distinction of "body" and "function" of the Buddha-nature under the category of "function." The corollary of this position in terms of cultivation is as follows. Since the ordinary mind is already the Way, one cannot use the mind to cultivate the mind; simply allowing the mind to act

²⁵ Our discussion here is primarily based on two texts by Tsung-mi: *Chung-hua ch'uan-hsin-ti ch'an-men shih-tzu ch'eng-hsi t'u* (*Chart of the Master-Disciple Succession of the Ch'an Gate That Has Transmitted the Mind Ground in China*, 中華傳心地禪門師資承襲圖) and *Ch'an-yüan chu-ch'uan-chi tu hsü* (*Preface to the Collection of all Explanations on the Source of Ch'an*, 禪源諸詮集都序). The first one appears in series 2, case 15, vol. 5 of *Hsü tsang Ching* (續藏經), a Taiwanese reprint of Dainippon zokuzokyo and the second one appears in Vol. 48 of *Ta Cheng Tsang Ching* (大正藏, Taisho shinshu daizokyo).

²⁶ The distinction of body (ti) and function (yung) had been an aged old methodology used by Chinese scholars to discern the Buddhist philosophy ever since its transmission to China. It started, at least, as early as Seng-chao (384-414), Kumārajīva's brilliant disciple. It was part of the conceptual tools the early Chinese scholars drew from Taoism as they initially encountered the Buddhist philosophy. See Yanagida Seizan, *An Inquiry Into Nothingness: Chinese Ch'an*, chapter 5, p. 66 (Chinese translation, Dain-chin Mao, Gwei Gwain publishing, Taipei, 1992).

spontaneously is cultivation, and one who neither cuts off evil nor does good but freely accepts things as they are is considered an emancipated person.

With this exposition of the basic position Lin-chi stands, we now have a better understanding of the two levels of "functioning" (*yung*) we attributed to Lin-chi. In light of the "body-function" distinction, the fundamental "functioning," including the body-mind "functioning," on the cosmic or natural level seems to correspond to the "body" of the Buddha-nature whereas the human action on the individual level seems to refer to the manifestations of the Buddha-nature. Nevertheless, since the Hung-chou school radically collapses the distinction into "functioning" only, it is then questionable whether or not we can still maintain that there are two levels of "functioning" in the *Linchilu*. In fact, this is exactly the strong criticism Tsung-mi applies to the Hung-chou school.

From Tsung-mi's point of view, there are two kinds of "function" out of the original "body" of the Buddha-nature or the True Mind: the inherent "function" of the Buddha-nature or self-nature and the "function" in response to conditions. For him the constant awareness of the mind is the "function" of the Buddha-nature or self-nature, and its ability for speech, discrimination, motion, and so on are its "function" in response to conditions. Viewed from this perspective, it seems to Tsung-mi that when the Hung-cho school points to the ability to speech and the like, that is only the "function" in response to conditions; they neglect the inherent "function" of the Buddha-nature and self-nature. In other words, Tsung-mi insists that while the "body" and its "functioning" are different aspects of the same reality, they are

nevertheless still different for the former provides the grounding to the Ch'an practice.

One of Tsung-mi's concerns by pointing out this shortcoming of the Hung-chou school is as follows. When the "body" becomes totally eclipsed by its "functioning" in the Ch'an teachings, the Ch'an practice will be aptly led to dangerous directions because it fails to make a necessary distinction between the unenlightened experience and the enlightened one. There is no place for cultivation because good and evil behaviors are altogether regarded as the "functioning" of the Buddha-nature. Surely Tsung-mi's criticism has its point, but whether or not it is altogether fair to the Hung-chou school and Lin-chi is still a debatable question.

Basically speaking, the sustaining of Tsung-mi's criticism about the Hung-chou school is mainly based on his distinction between the "inherent function" and the "responsive function" to the different occasions. But, this distinction is derived from the conceptual framework of "body-function distinction," which the Hung-chou school intends to cancel out once and for all. Philosophically speaking, while the Hung-chou school moves towards the dissolution of the conceptual duality inherent in the Buddha-nature framework, Tsung-mi seems to remain "caught up" within that framework. It has been severely criticized by some modern scholars²⁷ as being deviated

²⁷ Despite their different interests, David J. Kalupahana and those scholars who advocate "critical Buddhism," such as Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shiro, are in line with each other regarding this position. For a brief note of their position, see, David J. Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis*, pp.163-176 and Paul J. Swanson, "Zen is not Buddhism, Recent Japanese Critiques of Buddha-Nature," *Numen*, pp.115-149.

from the original position of the early Buddhists by postulating some sort of underlying reality.

In defense of the Hung-chou school, therefore, we may argue that since the distinction of "body" and "function" has been removed, the distinction of the "inherent and responsive function" also cannot be sustained; that is, all the "functioning" is by definition the "functioning" of the Buddha-nature. But, this does not amount to saying that the Ch'an Masters of the Hung-chou school, including Lin-chi, do not recognize the phenomenal difference between the "functioning" of the enlightened and unenlightened. For instance, the action of the former is often unnatural whereas that of the latter is responsive and spontaneous. But, the phenomenal difference is not fundamental and unchangeable from their viewpoint; in fact, it represents another subtle duality created by our mind and needs to be overcome. Therefore, even for the sake of cultivation, not to create the distinction between "inherent and responsive function" is considered by the Hung-chou Ch'an Masters as the genuine way.

Following this line of argument, we can also defend the Hung-chou school's position from a textual viewpoint. As Cheng Chien Bhikshu points out,²⁸ while there are numerous passages in the records of the masters of the Hung-chou school that leave themselves open to such criticism, there are also passages in which the Ch'an masters of the Hung-chou school unmistakably point to possible misinterpretations of the Ch'an teaching in very much the same way as Tsung-mi. Besides, even Tsung-mi himself appeared to have different

²⁸ See Cheng Chien Bhikshu, *The Teachings of Ma-tsu and the Hung-chou school of Ch'an*, pp.41-42.

evaluations of the Hung-chou school regarding this point.²⁹ In line with Bhikshu's observation, I shall immediately select some passages from the *Linchilu* for Lin-chi's defense and thereby illustrate his concept of free action in terms of the Hung-chou school's position.

To begin with, despite his collapsing of "body" into "function," Lin-chi does not ignore the significance of "the inherent function" as Tsung-mi charges. For instance, when Lin-chi points out that the "mind-dharma" (心法) is originally "one pure radiance (一精明)" and then differentiates into "six harmoniously united faculties of sense (六道神光)" "in eyes seeing, in ears hearing, in nose smelling, in mouth speaking, in hands catching, in legs running."³⁰ In other words, the "one pure radiance" also is well considered along with the "six differentiated functions" though they are the "same" functioning in nature form Lin-chi's view. On another occasion, Lin-chi metaphorically likens "the pure light, the non-discriminating light, and the non-differentiating light" in one's single thought to be "the Dharmakāya Buddha, the Sambhogakāya Buddha, and the Nirmanakāya Buddha in one's body-mind house" respectively. He apparently does not overlook the "inherent functioning" Tsung-mi speaks of, only without making the distinction as such. From Lin-chi's viewpoint, failing to make such a distinction does not mean that he only speaks of the responsive functioning on different occasions. Rather, his point is that whenever or on whatever occasions one perceives the

²⁹ According to Bhikshu's account, Tsumi tends to be critical of Hung-chou school's approach in his *Chung-hua ch'uan-hsin-ti ch'an-men shih-tzu ch'eng-hsi t'u* but much more lenient towards it in his *Ch'an-yüan chu-ch'uan-chi tu hsiü*. He even classifies Hung-chou school's teaching, together with Shen-hui's, as the highest one in the Buddhist teachings in his second work. *Ibid.*, p.56.

“functioning” of a person’s body-mind and cosmos, the “inherent functioning” is already “there” despite the difference on the part of individual’s recognition.

Here we can see that since the sole reality for Lin-chi is that which is “functioning right here and now,” the person’s action and the movement of the universe are rooted in the same foundation, and they are only different in scope and degree. Due to the ontological significance of this living dynamism, Lin-chi repeatedly urges his disciples to recognize this pervasive functioning person. This way of knowing the “true person” is what he calls the “true insight.”(真正見解)

But, how do we come to know this true reality? For Lin-chi, it has to come as a result of rectifying our ordinary acting modality. The basic problem inherent in the ordinary mode of action is that it is under the control of the thinking subject which, being part of this great functioning, is unable to access this living reality directly and often hampers the person’s spontaneous action. Therefore, the only way for a person to emancipate him/herself is to *re-store* the reality by *undoing* the interference of the thinking subject and thereby *re-turning* to this living reality. Since the reality has never been lost insofar as the functioning of the world never ceases to present itself, what a person needs in *turning* to the lived and living world is, paradoxically speaking, “cultivation of no-cultivation” or the “action of no-action” (*wei-wu-wei*, 爲無爲), as advocated by the Taoist philosophy.

³⁰ Sasaki, p.9 ; Watson, p.25; Schloegl, p. 22.

In other words, insofar as the notion of free action is concern, what this philosophical position maintains is that free action cannot only be achieved by “letting it be” without human’s contrived efforts. In this sense, when a person’s action is in accord with this great functioning, it is considered the true action expressive of the spontaneity of the nature and this achieved personhood is called the “person-without-being-occupied-with-events” (無事人). And, because the person’s emancipation is mainly achieved through the person’s effortlessly *re-turing* to this dynamic functioning in everyday situation, the degree of a person’s freedom can thus be “measured” in terms of the degree and scope of his or her capacity to act freely.

5. Ch’an “Individuation”: A Total Transformation of the Body-Mind

Affirming the primacy of action in understanding Lin-chi’s teachings and his emphasis on the natural *re-turing* to the living dynamism does not necessarily lead us to endorse the false conception that one literally does “nothing” to realize the ideal state of free action. In fact, if one is ever to perform any action at all, one must first and foremost be able to coordinate one’s body-mind function. And, if we are to bring about free action into life situations, we also inevitably need to delve into the depths of our lived and living body-mind, because as far as Lin-chi is concerned, our “lump of red flesh” (赤肉團) is where we find the “true person of no-position who is constantly going in and out of the face.” To paraphrase Lin-chi’s words in terms of the connection between living body-mind and action, we may state

that the locus of our living body-mind is the genuine “source” of action, and is hence indispensable to the realization of free action in life situations.

More often than not, however, we found that our everyday action deviates from its “originally” natural and spontaneous course due to the separateness of the body and the mind. Philosophically speaking, what this “separateness” refers to is the experience of ambiguity we have towards our own body. On the one hand, there is a deep sense of intimacy of the body insofar as it is “my” body so organically connected to my mind; on the other hand, there is also the otherness of my body tending not to follow the command of my will. To use Merleau-Ponty’s terminology, we may alternatively say that there is always a tension between our “body-object” and “body-subject,”³¹ although the degree of this tension may vary from person to person.

Due to his overriding concern for attaining free action, Lin-chi thus regards this ambiguous tension or separateness between the mind and the body as the most fundamental problem of human existence as far as the human emancipation and freedom is concerned. And, because of this emphasis, we may say that his “individuation” project, first and foremost, aims at overcoming the actional barrier and predicament delimited by this body-mind dualism. In other words, to become an *in-divisible* person in Lin-chi’s scheme is to attain “oneness” of body-mind so as to exhibit not only spontaneous action but also qualitatively unique one. This, of course, does not mean that

³¹ See M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. by Colin Smith, (London & New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962) pp. 67-199.

Lin-chi's "individuation" project solely seeks for the efficiency and perfection of action. It also allows the person to realize life "meaning" and higher spiritual "truth" as his ego, to use Jung's terminology, gradually comes to terms with the "wholeness" of the Self. The reason why this meaning-grasping aspect is not so evident in Lin-chi's discourse at first glance is probably as follows. He sees the world as the one primarily characteristic of its dynamic functioning, and hence the act of meaning grasping cannot be properly done without paying sufficient attention to the living body-mind, the genuine "source" of our action. If the primacy of action and hence the living body-mind is not affirmed, then the meaning realized therein would not be deep enough, it seems to Lin-chi.

Now that we have clarified the basic characteristics of Lin-chi's "individuation" project, we may proceed to dig out the fragmented textual evidences and find out whether or not a comprehensive scheme of Lin-chi Ch'an's cultivation inherent in the *Linchilu* can be constructed. In the Ch'an tradition, meditation practice is the major cultivation method to help Ch'an aspirants achieve the "oneness" of body-mind. Due to this concern, we may consider ourselves the following question as the point of departure: is this meditation practice applicable to Lin-chi's teaching given his position of "cultivation of no-cultivation"?

In respect to this question, one of the prevalent misconceptions about the Hung-chou school in general and Lin-chi in particular has been the following thought. Since they equalize each and every experience as being real and uphold the "cultivation of no-cultivation," there is really not much to say about their scheme of cultivation, at

least, it appears to be not much textual material available for constructing such a scheme. Such a misconception results from a conceptual confusion by mixing up two different views in the paradox of spiritual practice. To use David Loy's distinction,³² one who holds such a position confounds the "phenomenal view" with the "essential view." Whereas the former presupposes a transformative process from delusion to enlightenment, the latter renounces any dualism between delusion and enlightenment or between phenomenal and essential. Lin-chi and his predecessors in the Hung-chou school apparently preach the Dharma from the "essential view" advocating "the path of no-path" in Ch'an's spiritual training as opposed to the "phenomenal view" adopted by other Ch'an schools such as the Northern school. But, this does not altogether cancel out the fact that the unenlightened Ch'an aspirants have to go through a transformative process during their Ch'an training. Even Lin-chi himself has gone through this "process," although it is not perceived as such when viewed from the perspective of the enlightened one.

In fact, we can find textual references to support both of these two views, only that the "phenomenal view" is not so obvious as the "essential view" because it remains in the back scene as a universal presupposition by the Ch'an practice. Be that as it may. Suppose we can generalize the essential aspects involved in the Ch'an training and hence construct a "Ch'an individuation model" in the light of depth-psychology. Then, those previously unnoticed passages that bear tremendous significance in deciphering the Ch'an experience

³² The relevant discussion can be found in Loy's book, *Nonduality: A Study in Comparative Philosophy*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1988) pp. 238-248.

imbedded in the text will start making sense and laying out a scheme of the person's personality development assumed by Lin-chi accordingly. In this sense, the main domain on which the current endeavor focuses is the person's "inner" phenomena of consciousness and unconsciousness. That is to say, we intend to find out the psychophysical foundation upon which Lin-chi's notion of free action is based.

To substantiate the claim that there is a "phenomenal view" of personality development in the text, we would demonstrate that there is, indeed, meditation practice involved in the background of Lin-chi's Ch'an teachings from a textual viewpoint. As far as the textual evidence is concerned, Lin-chi seems to hold two different positions at the same time. Since the "essential view" appears to be dominating in Lin-chi's discourse resulting from his philosophical standpoint, meditation is generally regarded as a method which, by its nature of dependence, will never lead the person to attain enlightenment on its own. For instance, he explicitly discredits the meditation practice, "sitting down cross-legged with his back against a wall, pressing his tongue to the roof of his mouth, completely still and motionless, as not being the true Buddha-*dharma*."³³ The same point is also expressed in *Record of the Pilgrimages* (行錄), where Lin-chi's Master Hung-po regards the sleeping Lin-chi as the one who is practicing meditation but disapproves of a head monk's sitting meditation as being deluded.³⁴

On other occasions, Lin-chi also stresses the need of cultivation in pursuing the Way. For instance, when mentioning the

³³ Sasaki, p.28 ; Watson, p.57 ; Schloegl, p. 49.

³⁴ Sasaki, p.54 ; Watson, p.111 ; Schloegl, p. 83.

way of overcoming the cycle of life and death, he encourages his disciples "better to take ease sitting cross-legged on the corner of a meditation chair in a monastery than searching around."³⁵ In addition, he emphatically affirms the overriding importance or even necessity of cultivation and practice in attaining the Way as follows. "It is not that I understood from the moment I was born of my mother, but that, after exhaustive investigation and grinding discipline, one day I knew myself."³⁶ Although Lin-chi does not explain the seemingly conflicting statements he made regarding meditation practice, it is safe to assume that they arose from different contexts where different viewpoints were emphasized. To our current concern, suffice it to say that there is indeed a "phenomenal view" expressed by Lin-chi, and a structural delineation of it can be supported by the relevant passages in the text.

Generally speaking, the meditation practice is presupposed in all the Ch'an Monasteries regardless of the emphasis of their teachings. Lin-chi is no exception in this respect. The reason why the "essential view" is stressed is because it helps Ch'an aspirants not to be caught up by the method they apply. But, the phenomenal development of a person's psycho-physical make-up has to be presupposed, otherwise the psycho-physical transformation that leads to the attainment of free action will never occur at all. This is a very crucial point that needs to be noticed in our attempt to interpret Lin-chi's discourse, for more often than not, the developmental aspect of a person's psychic state is overlooked as if there were only "essential view" presented in the text.

³⁵ Sasaki, p.23; Watson, p.50 ; Schloegl, p. 41.

³⁶ Sasaki, p.24-25; Watson, p.52; Schloegl, p. 43.

Having demonstrated the necessity of meditation practice in understanding Lin-chi's teachings, we now propose to explicate the general goal of sitting meditation and then tie it to make sense of the related passages in the text. Roughly speaking, sitting meditation has to do with the inner transformation of a person's psychosomatic configuration that is dominated by the thinking subject, the domain of which is always confined by the "light" it casts and overshadowed by the "darkness" of the remaining areas outside the domain. To use Yuasa Yasuo's terminology, the Ch'an meditation aims at appropriating the *dark cogito* into the *bright cogito*³⁷ by temporarily shutting off the external sensory perceptions and thereby unifying the two layers of consciousness so that the person can break through the ordinary boundaries set up by the *bright cogito* and render it transparent. Since the *bright* and *dark cogito* can be respectively interpreted as referring to the reflective consciousness similar to Descartes's subject, and the unconsciousness in the sense of depth-psychology, the meditation practice presupposes that a person's incarnate body takes precedence over the mind in *knowing* and the according transformation is achieved as the result of body-mind integration.

Viewed from this perspective, it is interesting to take note of the fact that Lin-chi seems to *intentionally* use some metaphorical

³⁷ Roughly speaking, the bright-cogito refers to the conscious mind such as the thinking and perceptual function whereas the dark-cogito refers to the unconscious mind such as the affective, imaginative, volitional, intuitive function. The latter is conceived of as "deeper" than the former in terms of the psychosomatic structure, and supports the function of the former. But, it remains "dark" under the normal circumstances in the sense that they appear to be "invisible" and are relatively unaware to the conscious mind. See Yuasa Yasuo, *The Body: Towards an Eastern Mind-Body Theory*, pp. 4-11 and 49-74.

expressions to echo the aforementioned *bright-dark cogito* structure inherent in the person's psychophysical make-up. When he says that "by the time he had not come to the true realization [of the Dharma], he was completely [enclosed] in the darkness,"³⁸ according to our interpretation, he seems to suggest that he was overshadowed by the *dark-cogito* that he attempted to appropriate. If this is not all that clear, then the following sentences he utters to instruct his disciples should give us a better understanding of the bright-dark contrast he intends to convey.

"..... the Buddha-dharma is deep and mysterious,
I explain it exhaustively all day long, but you
students simply do not give the slightest heed. You
tread it under foot thousand or even ten thousand
times. You are still [enclosed] in the utter darkness
incapable of achieving a solitary shining form."³⁹

In this paragraph, Lin-chi apparently contrasts the unenlightened state of mind qua darkness with the enlightened one qua shining form, and it implies that to achieve such a consummate state of body-mind, it will require students to break through the darkness characteristic of our everyday incarnate body. In fact, Lin-chi consistently compares the enlightened mind to the transparent light throughout the text by conferring upon the latter with different characterizations such as "the

³⁸ Sasaki, p.38; Watson, p.77; Schloegl, p. 62.

³⁹ Sasaki, p.28; Watson, p.56-57.; Schloegl, pp. 48-49. In order to be consistent with my hermeneutical position, I render the last sentence of this paragraph radically different from the three existing translations.

shining divine light [of six faculties](六道神光),” “the pure light (清淨光),” “non-discriminating light (無分別光),” “non-differentiating light (無差別光),” “a single bright essence (一精明),” and so forth. Given this bright-dark structure of a person’s psyche, the basic task of Lin-chi’s notion of cultivation in general and meditation in particular is, then, to remove the psycho-physical obstacles that prevent us from experiencing this shining bright light.

To carry out this task, one must delve into the depths of a person’s body-mind where the psychic torrents are stilled untamed. Lin-chi even goes so far to assert that all the Buddhist teachings point to this psychosomatic transformation. Among the ample textual supports, one dialogue between Lin-chi and a monk particularly illustrates this point. When Lin-chi was asked “Isn’t it true that The Three Vehicles’ twelve divisions of teachings (三乘十二分教) reveal the Buddha-nature?”, he responded with a metaphorical expression, “This wild grass has yet to be spaded (荒草不曾鋤).”⁴⁰ Following the course of our hitherto interpretation, I take the Buddhist scriptural teachings mentioned in this context to mean the surface contents manifested in the field of consciousness and the “wild grass” as the not-yet-appropriated psychosomatic functions that make those manifestations possible.⁴¹ Therefore, the central meaning of this dialogue is to emphasize the significance of directing the attention

⁴⁰ Sasaki pp. 1-2, Watson p. 10, Schloegl, p.14.

⁴¹ Here my interpretation is drastically different from the hitherto commentaries given by Sasaki and Watson, who render the wild grass as the Buddha-nature and the sentence as “no need for cultivation.” According to our interpretation, the meaning is completely opposite, stressing the need for cultivation of the inner psyche.

towards the inner psychosomatic formations and of integrating this dark undercurrent into a brighter consciousness.

Since this is a rather risky journey unknown to our everyday situations, it is not unusual to assume that the practice is guided by the experienced Master like Lin-chi himself. Therefore, many of Lin-chi's meditative advises on how to deal with the fluctuations of mind (心), thought (念) and other psychosomatic functions must assume this act of appropriating the dark-*cogito* in the background. Furthermore, I argue that the explication of the encounters between Lin-chi and other Masters or students must also take into consideration the level of the involved persons' body-mind integration; i.e., the degree of their appropriating the dark-*cogito* to the bright-*cogito*. Otherwise the meaning of those relevant passages that often appear to be mysterious to the majority readers will never become intelligible. In light of this reflection, I conjecture that it would be hermeneutically fruitful if we attempt to interpret Lin-chi's teaching such as "Four-fold Formula (四料簡)," "Three Mysteries and Essentials (三玄三要)," and the "guest/host sentence (賓主句)" from this developmental perspective in the future inquiry.

In explicating this appropriating process, Lin-chi does not really tell us much about what is really going on "inside" the person's psychic domain. In this respect, we have no choice but resort to Jung's depth-psychological insights on the psychic structure dynamics, among others, and Yuasa's "body-scheme"⁴² for re-constructing a

⁴² Yuasa's body scheme consists of four circuits: (1) the external sensory-motor circuit; (2) the circuit of coenesthesia; (3) the emotion-instinct circuit; and (4) the circuit of unconscious quasi-body. The last one refers to the ki-flow circulating through the meridian points of the body according to the Chinese acupuncture theory. See Yuasa Yasuo, *The Body*,

hierarchical order of the psychosomatic configurations. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Lin-chi's discourse does not contain those elements. As a matter of fact, they do exist, only in sporadic forms, which need to be re-organized in light of the conceptual scheme we mentioned above so as to make sense of them. On the other hand, we do not intend to superimpose those conceptual schemes onto Lin-chi without any modifications, either. What we will do in our investigation is, instead, to formulate the psychosomatic layers in terms of the concepts appearing in Lin-chi's own discourse. Jung's and Yuasa's conceptual schemes only serve to help make sense of those concepts and locate their relative positions in the depths of psyche.

While leaving aside Lin-chi's detailed meditative insights for later discussion, we do intend to bring up the general guiding principle involving in this transformative process of the psyche for illustration so as to prepare us with a bird-viewed vision of Lin-chi's meditation practice in advance. Basically speaking, the Ch'an doctrine of "Nothingness" (無) is the general principle Ch'an meditators follow throughout the entire process of practice. In the *Linchilu*, it is diversely characterized as "non-dependent," "no-position," and so forth, depending upon the context in which Lin-chi articulates. In the domain of meditation practice, "Nothingness," what initially signifies the non-substantial reality Ch'an asserts, now serves as the epistemological viewpoint for "checking" the meditator's tendency to grasp what he encounters as something substantial during the course

Self-Cultivation, and Ki-Energy, trans. by Shigenori Nagatomo and Monte S. Hull, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993) pp37-128. Also, for an introduction of this body scheme, see Shigenori Nagatomo, *Attunement through the Body*, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992) chapter 3, pp.59-76.

of meditation. It helps the practitioner untie all sorts of entangled psychic conditions, such as thought, images, symbols, and so forth, by not identifying them as “true” or identifying oneself with them accordingly. Consequently, Lin-chi’s warning of correctly “discerning the Buddha from the devil” (辨佛魔) and his unprecedented remarks, that “if you meet a Buddha, kill the Buddha (逢佛殺佛),”⁴³ should be also understood in this light. Only when one truly actualize this Ch’an doctrine of “Nothingness” in one’s psychosomatic domain in the sense that all the negative effects exerted from those psychosomatic functions are cleansed, one is able to attain free action in his daily situations.

5. The Inter-expressiveness of the “Inner” and the “Outer”

In addition to the developmental view of integrating a person’s body-mind, there is another important dimension in the text that bears tremendous significance to the understanding of Lin-chi’s notion of free action. That is, the “inter-expressiveness” between the “inner” and the “outer” realm, or between the personal body-mind and the world where he lives his body-mind. This doctrinal position obviously inherits from Hwa-yen philosophy in which reality is viewed as a monad-like world; each realm, like a mirror, reflects upon and interpenetrates into other realms simultaneously without obstruction. In the text, when Lin-chi describes that what the “true person” perceives is the “emptiness of all dharmas” (諸法空相) in the

⁴³ Sasaki, p.25 ; Watson, p.52 ; Schloegl, p. 43-44.

“Hwa-yen world” (華嚴世界), he metaphorically characterizes its “inter-expressiveness” as the “moon in the water” (水中月), a beautiful image of the inter-penetration and non-obstruction between beings. Unlike Hwa-yen philosophy, however, Lin-chi is first and foremost concerned with the issue of how an individual is able to embody this “inter-expressiveness” in his lived body-mind. Seen from this perspective, Lin-chi’s “true person” may be described as always active in a “transpositional” manner through which “the self determines itself by expressing the world in itself, and the world also expresses itself in the self,”⁴⁴ to borrow Nishida’s characterization of his “inter-expressive” world view. However, the actual meaning of this characterization needs to be further elaborated.

In a manner similar to *Dasein*’s *being-in-the-world* in Heidegger’s scheme, we may regard the “inter-expressiveness” as the very characteristic of Lin-chi’s person qua *acting-in-the-world* because the primary mode of the person’s being is always a mode of *relating* himself to the other. In this sense, the otherness of our body we mentioned earlier does not solely refer to the bodily inertness or resistance to the mind, but also signify the inherent *openness* of our body to the world because our body, as the phenomenological field of our desire, is always tending towards the other for meaning. Therefore, Lin-chi’s project of attaining emancipation through body-mind integration described in the previous section can never really complete itself unless the Ch’an person is able to express himself freely in the midst of everyday situation.

⁴⁴ See Nishida Kitarō, *Last Writing: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview*, pp.52-53.

Insofar as Lin-chi's free action is predicated on his body-mind transformation, it seems reasonable for us to assume that Nishida's description of the "transpositional" or "inter-expressive" relationship between the self and the world also requires the person's breakthrough on the logical contradiction and the existential tension existing between the self and the other in its background. In other words, our body's "naturally" tending towards others is not sufficient enough to *realize* such a world view, despite the claim made by the Buddhist philosophers, because the quality of "inter-expressiveness" mentioned here, philosophically speaking, entails a complete "collapsing" of the ontological difference between the self and the other. In terms of experience, there should be virtually no resistance felt in-between my self and the world when this world view is actually embodied in my being; whatever is "inside" a person, then, gets expressed "outside," and vice versa.

What, then, is the significance of stressing this "inter-expressiveness" world view in Lin-chi's teaching as it relates to the issue of emancipation and freedom? I argue that the value of Lin-chi's stressing the "inter-expressiveness" between the "inner" and the "outer" in preaching the discourse of emancipation can be appreciated, at least, from the following two perspectives. By maintaining this position, Lin-chi means emancipation to be an enterprise not pointing to or depending upon the "other world" and the "inner world." On the contrary, it is firmly rooted in "this world," or the lived and living world because the distinction between "this" and "that" world no longer makes much sense when they are understood as related to each other in an "inter-expressive" manner. This thus assures that Lin-chi's

acting person could, theoretically speaking, attain his emancipation in any moment or on any occasion as he relates himself to others in his *acting-in-the-world*.

Secondly, Lin-chi's emphasis on "this-worldliness" in pursuing emancipation will result in a number of practical consequences. Among them, this emphasis particularly advocates the importance of evaluating the level of a person's spirituality from a concrete, everyday basis. That is to say, the "inter-expressiveness" means that the emancipated spirit attained "inwardly," no matter how mysterious it is, should be and can be expressed "outwardly" through the person's speech act or bodily movement in daily situations. Also, it is done in a spontaneous, creative manner that qualitatively different from the ordinary person's act. Besides, it is exactly due to the assumption of this "inter-expressiveness" in the background that Lin-chi's Ch'an tactics such as shouting, hitting become so central to his teachings on emancipation and can exert so much influence onto his disciples' body-mind in their pursuit of enlightenment. This may also partially explains why the section of "testing" or "examination" (勘辨) can stand out on its own in the *Linchilu*. While the section records the dynamic encounters between Lin-chi and other Ch'an Masters or his disciples, the real intent of displaying them is to demonstrate that the degree of the person's emancipation is primarily determined by the spontaneity of his act, whether it is verbal, bodily, or intentional.

But, how exactly does this testing or examination proceed? we may ask. More specifically, is there any theoretical criterion for us to judge whether a person's act is spontaneous or even creative? A more detailed answer to this question, of course, will require an analysis of

the essential quality of the emancipated person's free action, which is beyond the scope of this essay. For our current purpose, a depiction as to how Lin-chi distinguishes the enlightened person from the unenlightened one suffices to delineate a general picture about the theoretical foundation upon which the testing or examination proceeds.

To substantiate my claim, I propose to analyze Lin-chi's distinction between the "person" (*jen*, 人) and the "environment" (*jing*, 境), which is most crucial to his discernment as to whether a person has attained free action and hence emancipation. Take into consideration Lin-chi's emphasis on action, the linguistic meaning of these two Chinese characters may be rendered as the "one who acts" and the "living ambiance towards which one directs his act." Epistemologically speaking, however, the connection between the "person" and the "environment" in this distinction also signifies the fundamental subject-object relationship in the act of knowing. For Lin-chi, acting is a more fundamental mode of being than knowing and is so intrinsic to our knowing. Therefore, insofar as knowing is a way of *relating* oneself to the other, it is still an act, a *noetic* act. When action is known reflectively, however, it thus differentiates itself into the "person," that which acts, and the "environment," that which is acted upon. The above brief analysis clarifies a crucial point with regard to the distinction of the "person" and the "environment," that is, although it does have epistemological connotations, the distinction is made basically from an acting viewpoint.

In terms of its epistemic meaning, the Chinese character *jing* here signifies that which is being objectified in the person's

acting-in-the-world. It may be a concept, an image, an idea internally, or a linguistic term, a word, an object externally. Whatever it may be, it refers to various noematic contents⁴⁵ of our noetic act, to use Husserl's terminology. Since the epistemic nature of *jing* is related to that which is formed in the act of forming, it is always considered by Lin-chi as secondary to that which is forming, the "person."⁴⁶ Mainly referring to their superficiality, Lin-chi consistently regards those Buddhist concepts, terms, and ideas as robes, one of the synonyms of *jing*⁴⁷ in the *Linchilu*, whether they are "Nirvana robe (涅槃衣)," "Bodhi robe (菩提衣)," "emancipation robe (解脫衣)," "Buddha robe (佛衣)," or "patriarch robe (祖衣)."

Since the notion of "inter-expressiveness" entails a shift of viewpoint from what is formed to what is forming, Lin-chi's basic idea of emancipation can be, then, rendered as not to be bound by all sorts of *jing* while engaging oneself in the world of action. The acting person should discipline him/herself in such a way that he/she "enters the realm of form without being deluded by form, enters the realm of sound without being deluded by sound, enters the realm of smell

⁴⁵ Since Lin-chi's person is conceived of as a living, incarnate, psychophysical make-up, the noematic contents the character *jing* signifies may be further differentiated in light of the early Buddhist conception of a person's perception, which consists of six pairs: 1. eye and form, 2. ear and sound, 3. nose and smell, 4. tongue and taste, 5. body and tangible, 6. mind and concepts. Each of those realms produces visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental consciousness respectively. In light of this scheme, form, sound, smell, taste, tangible, and concepts all correspond to Lin-chi's concept of *jing*, that which is objectified by the subject.

⁴⁶ In this context, the "person" refers to the pre-reflective, non-dualistic "source" of action, having transcended the dualistic structure of subject-object relationship. On other occasions, the "person" is simply juxtaposed with the "environment" as in the subject-object relationship.

⁴⁷ In addition, the term "guest" is also considered as a synonym of *jing*, referring to its transient status of coming and going.

without being deluded by smell, enters the realm of taste without being deluded by taste, enters the realm of tangible without being deluded by tangible, enters the realm of *dharmas* without being deluded by *dharmas*.⁴⁸ Only when this acting modality is achieved, one can be truly said to be emancipated according to Lin-chi's scheme, because the emancipated person now experientially realizes the "inter-expressiveness" by expressing his/her action freely without attaching to the objectified realms.

6. Concluding Remarks

Based on our foregoing analysis, we can clearly perceive that a person's fundamental mode of being for Lin-chi is action rather than thought because the sole reality is the dynamic functioning of Nature. And, as part of the Nature, human being as well as his action is considered the small cosmos of that great functioning. Given this position, the ideal personhood Lin-chi conceives of is the one who can always act in accordance with the rhythm and dynamism of that great functioning, that is, acting freely without slightest obstruction.

Existentially, however, we rarely perceive the exhibition of free action on the part of persons except, perhaps, a habitual or compulsive act. The apparent chasm between our ordinary action and the ideal one prescribed by Lin-chi thus gives rise to our conceptual juxtaposition of two distinctive modes of being, the ordinary and extraordinary, for investigation. Given this contrast, we can then

⁴⁸ Sasaki, p.22 ; watson, p.49; Schloegl, p.40

conceptualize the basic scheme of Lin-chi's existential project of emancipation as the one aiming at transforming a person's acting modality from unnatural to natural, from fixed to creative, from stagnant to dynamic, and so forth.

To explicate this transformative process on a full scale requires much further elaboration, but it is believed that we have by far demonstrated a new way of reading the *Linchilu* by introducing the concept of action as well as free action to be the integral part of the text. Since other Ch'an texts are similar to the *Linchilu*, although our current study is confined to one text, its significance actually goes beyond ordinary textual studies due to its ample implications for future studies of other Ch'an texts.

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