
日本與東亞關係的再探討：現代主義與後現代主義途徑的搖擺

南華大學亞太所助理教授 孫國祥

摘要

本文將探討日本與東亞的關係，特別是對於中國、朝鮮半島及東南亞。首先將討論日本是如何看待東亞。接下來的小節將檢視每一個行為者以及其如何產生互動並影響到日本與東亞地區政治關係發展的關鍵。另外，本文採用 Robert Cooper 的觀點，他認為日本為一種後現代國家，但是也使用介於後現代主義與現代主義、甚至前現代主義的途徑來處理與東亞國家的邦鄰關係。

關鍵字：日本、東亞、現代主義、後現代主義。

Revisit the Relations between Japan and East

Assistant Professor of Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Nanhua University

Kuo-Hsiang Sun

Abstract

This paper will deal with Japan's relations with East Asia, especially for China, the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia. How Japan view East Asia will discussed firstly. Each section begins by reiterating the factors and how these factors interacted with each other to affect at certain critical junctures the development to Japan's political relations with the East Asia region. Furthermore, this paper hold Robert Cooper's view, that is Japan as a kind of postmodern state, but it need use between post-modernism and modernism, even pre-modernism approach to deal with East Asian neighbor countries relations.

Keywords: Japan, East Asia, modernism, postmodernism.

I. Overview

Today, Japan may be a nation of “a long wind-up and a quick pitch” after so called “lost decade”. It seems that after spending more than a decade of economic stagnation and political paralysis, the Japanese have regained a greater degree of confidence in their state of economy, and now want their government to deliver, to make a “quick pitch.”¹⁸ However, before embarking on a “long wind-up review”, it is important to have a clearer idea about the key domestic parameters—constraints, identity issues, obsessions, and other factors—related to foreign policy decision making.

As Yutaka Kawashima described, before revisits past decisions that have constituted the basis of Japanese foreign policy since the end of World War II, some key decision making processes of the postwar era are reviewed first, and then some reflections about future policy options on East Asia countries are presented. For easier understanding, these parameters are discussed to the extent possible in a dialectical manner, such as catching up with the West versus maintaining an Asian identity, pacifists versus realists on the security issue, realpolitik versus the Wilsonian approach, apologists versus nonapologists, and nationalism versus internationalism.¹⁹ In fact, these parameters can completely describe Japan deal with his neighbor state. This paper desires to supplement to modernism versus postmodernism approach.

The thinker-cum-bureaucrat, Robert Cooper made an argument of “what-if-Japan-was-in-Europe” in his book, *The Breaking of Nations* said, “Of non-European countries, Japan is by inclination a postmodern state. It has self-imposed

¹⁸ Tomohiko Taniguchi, Deputy Press Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, Japan’s Diplomacy under the New Abe Cabinet, <<http://www.brook.edu/fp/cnaps/20061027cnaps.pdf>>.

¹⁹ Yutaka Kawashima, *Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads: Challenges and Options for the Twenty-First Century*, Brookings Institution Press 2005, pp.4-18.

limits on defense spending and capabilities. It is no longer interested in acquiring territory nor in using force. It would probably be willing to accept intrusive verification. It is an enthusiastic multilateralist.²⁰ Were it not on the other side of the world, it would be a natural member of organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the European Union (EU). Unfortunately for Japan it is a postmodern country surrounded by states firmly locked into an earlier age: postmodernism in one country is possible only up to a point and only because its security treaty with the US enables it to live as though its neighborhood were less threatening”.²¹

The German postmodernism was again evinced by a piece in the Financial Times that issued on October 24, 2006. According to the article, Germany has adopted the most radical restructuring of its military since 1945, turning the Bundeswehr, the army, into an international intervention force.²² This is a postmodernism that Japan cannot afford but can only dream of. Many in Japan are supportive of their Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel rushing to the rescue in the disaster-hit areas. They are also proud that the SDF troops helped build schools, assisted local doctors in Samawah, Iraq, and including the Iraqi operation, they have shot not even a single bullet throughout the post-war history. And yet again, what is affordable for Germany is mere luxury for Japan.

That being so, and being pretty much aware of the surroundings Robert Cooper illustrated, Japan, especially since 9/11, has chosen to be much more articulate in

²⁰ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan and Asian-Pacific Security,” in J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency*, California: Stanford University Press, 2004, pp.105-107.

²¹ Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003.

²² Germany in radical shake-up of military,
<<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/b0651290-6384-11db-bc82-0000779e2340.html>>.

advocating universal values, getting itself bound as geographically widely and substantially deeply as it possibly can by forming strategic ties with Australia and India, and for the first time ever, by reaching out to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). That Japan's diplomacy having been much more value-driven than previously, it had seemed for so long extremely shy and reserved in waving any sort of banner. It is proved by the speech of Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso (麻生太郎) delivered at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting on May 4, 2006.²³

For a country where discussing collective defense had long been quasi-taboo, Aso's trip to NATO, an epitome of collective defense, was an even more taboo act. Aso addressed the NAC and said, "We are peers, like-minded, let us move on together"(我々は意識を共有する仲間、さらに協力して行動を).²⁴ He went on to propose the following, "Let us enhance our mutual awareness, as we will most likely find ourselves working aside together much more frequently than in the past. Let us start talking to one another more often and much more on a regular basis, with a view of possibility for operational cooperation in the future. Let us establish a workable interface in order to coordinate our policies".²⁵

Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier said in their article appearing in the September/October 2006 of Foreign Affairs that "[A]s of now, a number of countries with a questionable commitment to democracy and human rights [...] are covered by Article 10,

²³ Japan and NATO in a New Security Environment, Speech by Mr. Taro Aso, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan, at the NAC Meeting in Brussels, Belgium

<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0605.html>>.

²⁴ 麻生外務大臣演説「新たな安全保障環境における日本とNATO」平成18年5月4日於ベルギー王国ブリュッセルでの北大西洋理事会。

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/18/easo_0504.html>

²⁵ Ibid.

while stalwart democracies, such as Australia and Japan, are not. Yet a shared commitment to shared values should be a more relevant determinant of membership than geography.”²⁶ That much is what Japan’s diplomacy is like at the moment.

II. Japan’s View on East Asia

For Japan, the concept of East Asia is, and should be, functional, thus malleable. However, generally speaking, the region roughly covers Northeast Asia, including Japan, China and Korea, and what is currently covered by the regional cooperation scheme of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as surrounding areas.²⁷ This region is, for the first time in history, perceived as a meaningful group of countries to tackle their challenges.

East Asia was traditionally considered to be a region with diversified nations, culture and values, as well as deep gaps of size and economic development amongst countries in the region. Neither of them provided, according to any IR theory and analysis, a sufficient basis for economic integration nor further step for effective inter-State cooperation. This image of East Asia is no longer the reality, however. The region has been the most dynamic in the world, and this trend is further intensifying, the reality of the deepening economic interdependence within the region. The intra-regional trade within ASEAN plus Three (APT), meaning Japan, China and the Republic of Korea, had increased from 35 per cent in 1980 up to 54 per cent in 2004, and still increasing.²⁸

²⁶ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2006.

²⁷ Jiro Okamoto, Japan’s View on “East Asian Economic Zone,” National Policy Foundation Research Institute, October 8, 2001. <<http://www.npf.org.tw/english/Publication/TE/TE-R-090-026.htm>>.

²⁸ Masahiro Kawai, “East Asian Economic Regionalism: Progress and Challenges” , *Journal of Asian Economies*, February 2005.

The trend is not limited to this quantitative aspect. East Asia was once noted for its vertical structure of trade, namely Japan exported manufacturing products, while other countries provided natural resources and agricultural products. Currently, the intra-regional trade is more horizontal, strengthened by the increase of direct investment within the region. Japan exports office machinery and electric appliances to other countries, then imports electronic parts including semiconductors and office machinery from Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs); office machinery and textile products from China; then electronic parts and mineral fuel from ASEAN members.²⁹

As a background for this economic dynamism and deepening interdependence to be realized in two fundamental conditions, Japanese government argued: namely, first, the Japan-US security alliance as a fundamental basis for political stability in the region; and, second, Japan's consistent official development assistance (ODA) to the region.

East Asia, with its diversity amongst countries, is still a region with potential political instability. Some potential flashpoints in the region caused by ideological, religious, and ethnic tensions, as well as territorial disputes and maritime delimitation claims over natural resources. North Korea, with its continued quest for nuclear and missile capacity as well as closed regime, needs most careful but effective handlings. The situation surrounding Taiwan is also attracts Japan's attention. There are also territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Today, challenges facing the region are even increasing. What so called non-conventional threats are rapidly and urgently becoming phenomenal in the region, such as smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, maritime piracy, human trafficking, transnational crimes and infectious diseases.

²⁹ Tran Van Tho, *Trade, Investment and Division of Labor in East Asia*, Economic and Social Research Institute, March 2003. <<http://www.esri.go.jp/en/tie/ea/ea3-e.pdf>>

Given this reality, East Asia area needs a stabilizer, offering a basis for political and military stability in the region. For Japan, the Japan-US security alliance, with its continuous modernization efforts reflecting its circumstances, is the one and will continue to be a major underpinning for security and prosperity in the region. Japan contributes to the US military presence in the region by providing financial support of 6 billion dollars annually as well as providing military bases for US forward deployment, albeit its political and social costs in the domestic domain. Japan's greater role of logistic support for US forces, in order to tackle regional and global issues, including terrorism, is further providing basis for people's welfare in this region.

The second aspect is the significant role of Japan's ODA to the region. Japan's ODA started as early as in the 1950s, with the re-emergence of the Japanese economy after the total devastation during the Second World War. From the inception of Japan's ODA, Southeast Asia has been the main beneficiary of Japan's policy. This was, first, in the context of the Cold War, when Japan, as a member of the Western Alliance, contributed to the stability of the region by non-military means. Mainly, this was carried out through contribution to the regional economic development by transferring Japan's own experience of economic development, which recognized the central role of infrastructure buildings, as well as human resources development through promoting the culture of self-help efforts. This approach resulted in consolidating social and political resilience of the ASEAN countries against Communism.

Retrospectively, Japan's role was to lead East Asian economies as a pioneer of tackling enormous challenges in the course of economic development in the world of technological innovation and globalization. Japan advised to East Asian countries about the importance of infrastructure, education, human resources development, as well as of diligent work ethics, team work, efficiency and quality control. The main principles was ownership by the recipients, leading to self-sustained economic development, as well as

the importance of strengthening the private sector competitive enough to cope with the international market. Japan's approach has been always based upon an equal-footing peer-to-peer stance, as was stipulated by 1978 Fukuda Doctrine(福田ドクトリン),³⁰ Japan's basis for its diplomacy towards Southeast Asia. The Doctrine stated Japan would do its best to strengthen the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based upon heart-to-heart understanding and become an equal partner of ASEAN and its member countries.

It is hard to present precise figures of Japan's contribution to successful economies in the region. One analysis calculated the accumulative effects of Japan's ODA during the period from 1972 to 1991 to Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Japan's ODA contributed to the increase in capital stocks, leading to the increase in production capacity and employment, then finally to the increase in gross domestic products. Its contributions to capital stock increase of the three countries were, respectively, 6.3 per cent for Thailand, 4.7 per cent for Indonesia, and 3.4 per cent for Malaysia. This led to the contributions to GDP increase by 5.3 per cent to Thailand, 3.3 per cent to Indonesia, and 1.4 per cent to Malaysia.

Japan's role as pioneer or by the word used by Aso Taro, as thought leader,³¹ is still valid. Japanese consider that the strong integrated ASEAN will further enhance the stability in the region. This is a reason Japan particularly emphasize the importance of assisting Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Viet Nam (CLV) countries, by advancing the Mekong

³⁰ Sueo Sudō, *The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992.

³¹ わたくしのアジア戦略：日本はアジアの実践的先駆者・Thought Leader たるべし，平成17年12月7日。<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/17/easo_1207.html>

Initiative as an example.³² The fact that on 27 March 2006 the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) was established,³³ with Japan's contribution of 7.5 billion yen,³⁴ for assisting ASEAN's comprehensive integration, with particular emphasis upon tackling intra-regional economic gaps by offering comprehensive assistance in the fields of trade and investment.

As thought leader, Japan's role as pioneer is not limited to positive aspects. As a rapidly grown economy, Japan faced severe environmental degradation and related problems, and tackled two oil crises. Japan is proud of its most efficient and environmentally-friendly economy and society, not comparable to any other country, albeit with enormous sacrifice and compensations to recover the environment. As a country with virtually no natural resources of energy and with concentrated population, Japan made its utmost efforts to make its economy energy efficient. Energy efficiency and advanced environmental technology in every field of the industry are Japan's incomparable achievements which, will contribute to the region which are increasingly facing the same challenges.

It may be added that Japan's rapidly aging society and social security reforms necessary to cope with it, as well as Japan's reformist efforts towards small government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (小泉純一郎), might be also relevant to other countries, as a pioneering endeavor. For Japan, Japan's struggles for the

³² See Major projects of Japan's Initiative for the Mekong Region Development (Dec. 2004 - Present), <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/clv/project0512.pdf>>.

³³ Signing Ceremony for the Establishment of the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF), March 27, 2006. <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/3/0327.html>>

³⁴ Japan Gives Support to ASEAN's Integration Efforts with 7.5 Billion Yen Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund, <<http://www.aseansec.org/18344.htm>>.

past decade to tackle structural stagnation of its economy caused by non-performing loans and deflationary spirals, as another successful example shedding light to countries on the same path of economic development in the region.

Therefore, Japan's strategy to East Asia is depended on these Japan's East Asia views. Japan's relations with East Asia, especially with ASEAN countries, have already entered a new era, though consistently based upon its achievement since 1950s. Koizumi defined the relation, in his speech in January 2002 in Singapore, as sincere and open partners, with the concept of "acting together, advance together,"(共に歩み共に進む)³⁵ and then proposed the idea of an East Asian Community(東アジア共同体) as the final goal of regional cooperation.

In presenting this idea of an East Asian Community, Japan articulate some basis premises: First, "openness and transparency." Any inter-state cooperation in the region should not become an inward-looking disguised exclusive bloc. A community in any form should be open to like-minded outsiders, and its benefit should be extended to non-members in a transparent manner.

Second, it is a "functional approach." A community should be a practical forum to tackle regional issues. Given the diversity of history, culture and society in the region, Japan's position is not support over-ambitious and aim hastily at a political union. The steady accumulation of practical cooperation will be the best way to enhance the sense of community and cooperation amongst people in the region.

Finally, it is an aspect of "shared value" in a community. East Asia is benefited by the globalized market economy, creating a strong layer of middle-class consumers in any

³⁵ 小泉総理大臣の ASEAN 諸国訪問における政策演説「東アジアの中の日本と ASEAN—率直なパートナーシップを求めて—」平成 14 年 1 月 14 日。

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/14/ekoi_0114.html>.

successful country. Japan is of the view that this trend will surely require people's awareness of the importance of democracy and human rights. Any future community in the region should encompass shared goals and views in this regard, as a basis for strengthening members' cooperation.

III. Japan and China's Political Relations

i. Japan's approach towards China: structure, agency and norms

In the mid-1950s Japan and China were separated from political, economic and security interaction with each other by the structural boundaries of Cold War bipolarity, together with the legacies of national division and the colonial past. Even as structural factors and mutual suspicions continued to limit Japan-China relations in this period and beyond, however, at the same time Japan has had powerful motives to circumvent the restraints imposed by the structure of the international system and push for gradual engagement. Japanese attempts to engage China have been driven by a variable mix of Asianist and developmental norms and interests. The Japanese state and its people ever since the period of the Chinese world order have felt a sense of cultural affinity and friendship with their massive neighbor.³⁶

This Asianist norm has been reinforced by a strong developmental norm and perception of the vital economic importance of China to Japan as a source of raw materials and markets. Beyond that, economic engagement is seen ultimately to produce reform and stability in China. Hence, strong pro-China elements have always been present in the political parties, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) and business sectors. These policy-making agents and political actors have exploited all

³⁶ Christopher W. Hughes and Glenn D. Hook, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, New York: Routledge, 2001, 164.

possible diplomatic room for manoeuvre in order to improve relations with China, even whilst attempting to adhere to the general US policy line in East Asia. The outcome during the period of the first Cold War was that Japan was obliged to attempt to instrumentalize the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations through a process of *seikei bunri* and unofficial diplomacy.³⁷

The first official Sino-Japanese contacts in the post-war era did not come until the 1955 Bandung Conference, during which the Chinese side requested improved diplomatic relations. The Japanese government under the leadership of Hatoyama Ichiro (鳩山一郎) who was to achieve the normalization of relations with the USSR in 1956, he was receptive to the idea of a general improvement in political and economic ties with China. At the same time, however, Hatoyama remained wary of making any commitment to normalizing relations with China and taking a high-profile position in support of the political aims of Bandung for fear of jeopardizing relations with the US, which at this time was calling for the increased containment of Chinese communism.³⁸ Informal contacts between Japan and China continued to be mediated throughout the 1950s and 1960s by pro-China faction leaders in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP).³⁹

Nevertheless, the prospects for an improvement in official Sino-Japanese relations were set back following the accession to power of the arch Cold War warrior Kishi in 1957. Prime Minister Kishi's (岸信介) preoccupation with the revision of the US-Japan security treaty, initiation of normalization talks with the revision of the US's

³⁷ See Hugo Dobson, Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, Hugo Dobson, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, New York: Routledge, 2001.

³⁸ Kweku Ampiah, *The Dynamics of Japan's Relations with Africa: South Africa, Tanzania and Nigeria* (London: Routledge, 1997), pp.39-44.

³⁹ Chalmers Johnson, *Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), pp.239-40.

anti-communist ally South Korea, and staunchly pro-Taiwan position served to reinforce the bipolar structural barriers to Sino-Japanese interaction. The response of China was to lambaste the Kishi administration for creating two Chinas and for reviving Japanese militarism, and to cut off all trade with Japan in 1958. The 1960 advent of *seikei bunri* enabled the resumption of bilateral trade and the signing of an unofficial trade agreement in November 1962. Still, the administration's public anti-PRC stance meant that it stopped short of official efforts to improve political ties.

The Sato (佐藤栄作) administration was clearly aware of the importance of improving relations with China. It laid much of the groundwork for eventual normalization under the Tanaka (田中角栄) administration in 1972 through attempts to persevere with the *seikei bunri* policy. However, the administration's foreign policy priorities were to gain US assent for the reversion of Okinawa and to demonstrate support for the US's security position in East Asia. Sato presided over the normalization of Japan-South Korea relations in June 1965 and the automatic extension of the security treaty in June 1970; paid an official visit to Taiwan in September 1967 and indicated in the joint communiqué with President Richard Nixon in November 1969 that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area were also important factors for Japan's security; and he also provided unequivocal public backing for the US intervention in the Vietnam War.

The Chinese government viewed these developments as further evidence of militarism in Japan and its aggressive stance in support of the US's regional allies and containment policy towards China. In response, it launched in Japan itself (despite its own avowed principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states), through pro-China media organizations, LDP factions and opposition parties, a campaign of people's diplomacy designed to mobilize public opinion and break Japan's perceived political dependence on the US. Chinese government leaders informed senior LDP

policy-makers visiting Beijing in April 1970 that China would cease to trade with any Japanese companies found to have contravened four conditions relating to the non-assistance of South Korea, Taiwan or US policy in Vietnam and Indo-China.

In addition, they were informed that China would only normalize relations with Japan in accordance with the three principles of Japan's recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of all China, that Japan accepted the indivisibility of Chinese territory and Taiwan as a province of China, and that it abandoned official diplomatic ties and the 1952 peace treaty with Taiwan.⁴⁰ A fierce debate ensued within Japanese policy-making circles over China policy. The pro-China factions of the LDP joined with Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the Komei Party, and with major business interests in the steel, chemical and automobile industries, such as Kawasaki, Sumitomo, Toyota and Honda, to lobby the government to normalize relations with China.⁴¹ Despite the external and internal pressure exerted on the government, however, Sato remained rigidly in support of US policy towards China.

The relative immobilism of the Sato administration's policy towards China was then swept away by fundamental changes in the structure of the international system surrounding Sino-Japanese relations in the early 1970's. These changes subsequently reduced the impediments placed upon the efforts of Japanese policy-making agents and other non-state political actors to engage China politically. The weakening of the bipolar Cold War structure and Nixon shocks, effectively removed US objections to the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations, although, the US has certainly remained a key

⁴⁰ Akihiko Tanaka, *Nicchu Kankei 1945-1990* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991), pp.68-70.

⁴¹ John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: Athlone, 1988), pp.292-3.

factor in Japanese diplomatic calculations concerning China. Japanese policy-makers reacted swiftly to the weakening of international structural restrictions and enhanced diplomatic freedom by seeking early normalization with China.

Following an intense struggle within the LDP between pro-China and pro-Taiwan factions, Tanaka Kakuei (田中角榮) emerged as Sato's successor and managed to carry overall LDP, MOFA and public opinion with him in favour of normalization. Tanaka journeyed to Beijing in September 1972 and signed a joint communiqué establishing full diplomatic relations. Under the joint communiqué, Japan accepted the three principles of normalization, and thus abandoned official ties with Taiwan. In order to expedite the improvement of bilateral relations, China renounced all claims for war indemnities from Japan, but it declined to discuss the issue of the sovereign of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, deferring it to later generations to decide. This left unresolved a potentially explosive bilateral territorial dispute.

Japan and China then agreed in September 1974 to initiate government-level talks on the conclusion of a peace treaty, during which MOFA as the Japanese government's representative began to take an increasingly important role in the management of diplomacy with China. In the meantime, however, Japanese diplomacy towards China was reinforced by the maintenance of contacts between the LDP and opposition parties and Chinese policy-makers.

Simultaneously, the Japanese business sector, which was keen to expand economic contacts following China's announcement of its modernization drive in 1976, conducted its own private diplomacy: in 1978 the Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) concluded a between Japan and the People's Republic of China was eventually signed in August 1978. During negotiations for the treaty, China indicated privately that it would tolerate Japan's security treaty with the US, and that it was prepared to shelve the issue of whether the 1960 definition of the scope of the US-Japan

security treaty covered Taiwan and the question of the sovereignty of the Diaoyutai Islands.

ii.Sino-Japanese political relations in the post-Cold War period

Prospects for the rehabilitation of Sino-Japanese relations were raised further in the post-Cold War period and early 1990s owing to the increasing fluidity of the structure of the international system. The winding-down of Cold War tensions in East Asia, the clear commitment of the Chinese leadership to continue with its programme of opening the economy to the outside world, and the US's response under the Bush and Clinton administrations of pursuing a general policy of political and economic engagement with China, all serve to lessen barriers to US and Chinese interaction, and subsequently also US objections to, and international structural barriers upon, Sino-Japanese interaction. Economic interdependency between Japan and China has increased in this period, and the Japanese government has continued to pursue its own engagement policy towards China.⁴²

The aim of this strategy is to enhance China's integration into regional and international society through encouraging its entry into multilateral institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and then eventually the World Trade Organization (WTO). Sino-Japanese relations warmed particularly during the Hosokawa (細川護熙) administration (1993-4), which was prepared to take a slightly more independent line on foreign policy. Hosokawa was the first non-LDP prime minister to visit China, in March 1994, and he used the occasion to appeal for Chinese diplomatic assistance in restraining North Korea's suspected nuclear

⁴² Christopher W. Hughes and Glenn D. Hook, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, pp.170-73.

programme. He also issued an apology for Japan's war of aggression in China as well as expressing Asianist norms to note the relativity of the concept and the need not to impose single standards in this area.⁴³

The closing of international structural pressures and the re-emergence of a range of bilateral issues, however, have hindered the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations in the period from the mid-1990s to the start of the twenty-first century. Sino-US tensions have fluctuated but also have seen an overall increase from the late 1990s onwards, owing to a number of factors. US concerns revolve around China's apparent drive to achieve great power economic and military status in East Asia. China, for its part, has been concerned about the US's renewal of its hegemonic position in East Asia and its possible support for Taiwanese independence, as demonstrated by the US's perceived wavering between engagement and containment policy responses towards China and its concomitant strengthening of its military position in the region via the redefinition of the US-Japan alliance in the 1990s.

Japan's own continued rise as a political, economic and military power has produced something akin to an enhanced triangular structure of Japan-US-China political interaction within East Asia.⁴⁴ However, the nature of the triangular interaction has clearly been asymmetric and inconsistent in this period because the power capabilities of each of the states involved are mismatched—Japan possessing great economic but limited independent military power; the US economic and military power; and China as yet

⁴³ Hidennori Ijiri, "Sino-Japan controversy since 1972," in Christopher Howe, ed., *China and Japan: History, Trends and Prospects* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p.87.

⁴⁴ Yoichi Funabashi, "Thinking trilaterally," in Morton I. Abramowitz, Yoichi Funabashi and Wang Jisi eds., *China-Japan-US: Managing the Trilateral Relationship* (Tokyo: JCIE, 1998), p.47; Yoichi Funabashi, *Alliance Adrift* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), pp.19-84.

limited but rapidly increasing economic and military power – and because the US and China have tended to focus their energies more on each other than their respective relations with Japan.

In turn, this triangular structure has created both opportunities and obstacles for Japan's relations with China. On one level, the potential for increased Sino-American confrontation and Japan's enhanced political status within the triangular relationship allows it to step in and play a mediating role between the two, the actualization of Japan's vision of its *watashiyaku* diplomacy between the West and East Asia. On another level, however, the triangular relationship poses hazards and dilemmas for Japanese policy-makers. The first hazard is that Japan could be bypassed altogether and left powerless in the face of a Sino-US power struggle, the type of Japan-passing.⁴⁵

This is best illustrated by President Clinton's visit to China in June 1998 when he lavished praise on the Chinese leadership and seemed to indicate that China was becoming the US's partner of choice in the region.⁴⁶ Alternatively, the second hazard is that Japan could be caught in the middle of a tug of war between the US and China. In this situation, Japan might be pulled dangerously onto one side or the other and enlisted in a political or even military conflict for which it is not prepared and which it wishes to avoid. Japan's Asianist and developmental norms and interests mean that Japanese policy-making agents clearly wish to obviate conflict with China and to encourage the US to persist with engagement policies. Nevertheless, the strength of the bilateral attachment to the US and Japan's own concerns about the growing power of China

⁴⁵ Quansheng Zhao, *Future Trends in East Asian International Relations*, New York: Routledge, 2002, p.59.

⁴⁶ Kathleen J. Brahney, Clinton to China: 'Engaging the Dragon,'

< <http://www.fas.org/news/china/1998/wwwju24.html>>.

provide a strong impulse to cooperate with US policy towards China.

Hence, from the late 1990s onwards, Japanese policy-makers have performed a new and increasingly precarious balancing act between the US and China. The Japanese government has been convinced of the need to redouble its efforts to engage China politically and economically. It has done so by maintaining ODA flows and arguing China's case with the US for its eventual admittance to the WTO. Nevertheless, the slow pace of China's responsiveness to engagement policies as compared with the perceived rapid rise of its military capabilities and ability to disrupt the structure of the international system, appears to be persuading Japanese policy-makers of the need also to hedge against future Chinese power by strengthening Japan's ties with the US vis-à-vis China.

Japan's policy-makers have been pushed towards this stance by a number of security issues since the mid-1990s, including the lack of transparency of China's defence budget and weapons procurement, the modernization of its nuclear forces and its proactive military activities in the South China Sea. In particular, China's decision to intimidate Taiwan prior to the presidential elections in March 1996 by conducting large-scale military exercise and missile tests in the Taiwan Straits raised Japanese apprehensions about China's willingness to use military power in defence of its national interest.

Japanese disenchantment with China over a range of bilateral issues has been compounded by changes in the nature of the domestic political actors in Japan. Although the pro-China elements in MOFA and the LDP remain powerful, the collapse of the 1955 system and decline in SDPJ support, the generational change which has seen the emergence of few figures in the LDP with well-established personal connections reminiscent of Tanaka Kakuei, and a resurgent Taiwan lobby encouraged by the process of democratization in Taipei, may weaken political support in Japan for engagement with

China.⁴⁷

The policy outcome has been that the Japanese government in the late 1990s took an increasingly hard line in negotiations with China, as demonstrated by Prime Minister Obuchi's (小淵恵三) summit meeting with President Jiang Zemin in Tokyo in December 1998 and in Beijing in July 1999, when he refused to kowtow to China's usual negotiating tactic of raising the issue of the colonial past in order to extract the ritual apology from Japan and exert diplomatic pressure on other issues.

However, Chinese relations with Japan in recent years have been generally close and cordial. Tension erupted periodically, however, over trade and technology issues, Chinese concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, and controversy regarding Japan's relations with Taiwan. In early 2005, Japan and the United States had issued a joint declaration calling for a "peaceful solution" to the Taiwan issue, a declaration which angered the PRC, which protested the interference in its internal affairs.

iii. Japan's View on China

China, with its sheer size of the territory and population as well as poverty, environmental problem and, most importantly, potential economy, is undeniably a pivotal member of the region. Its importance for Japan, and the importance of bilateral relations between Japan and China to this region cannot be over-emphasized. Before everything, as Koizumi's statement, defining the Japan-China relations, when he attended the Boao Summit at Hainan in 2002.⁴⁸ He clearly declared that the economic development of

⁴⁷ Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's changing China policy," *Survival*, Vol.38, No.2, 1996, pp.45-6; Christopher B. Johnstone, "Japan's China policy: implications for US-Japan relations," *Asian Survey*, Vol.38, No.11, 1998, p.1069.

⁴⁸ 小泉総理大臣演説, 「ボアオ・アジア・フォーラム」におけるスピーチ(中国海南島),

China is not a threat, but an opportunity for Japan.

For Japan, China has always been a most important trade partner as well as a host country for its direct investment. Trade between Japan and China amounted to the highest of \$227 billion in 2005, accounting to 20 per cent of Japan's international trade. China, including Hong Kong, has surpassed the United States as Japan's top trade partner since 2004. Japan's investment to China has accounted for 14.4 per cent of Japan's total outward foreign direct investment in 2005.

Japan's ODA has contributed to China's successful economic development. China has been consistently the main recipient of Japan's ODA. The accumulation of Japan's ODA until 2004 amounted to 18.5 billion US dollars, consisting of 13 billion US dollars governmental loans and 1.1 billion US dollar grand aid. During the 1990s, Japan's ODA to China consecutively accounted to more than 1 billion dollars each year, except for 1996 and 1997, when Japan as well as other countries in the region suffered from the Asian financial crisis. In 2004, Japan's ODA to China amounted to 965 million US dollars, by far the biggest amongst donors, bigger than the total of all other G8 members.

On top of this, 3.3 million Japanese tourists visited China in 2004, while 740 thousand Chinese visited Japan in the same year. In 2005, 4.5 million people traveled between the two countries. 130 thousand Chinese students studied in Japan in 2004, while 20 thousand Japanese students studied in China.

Given these situations, many trouble issues between Japan and China, such as the Shenyang consular's case, China's unilateral exploration of the East China Sea seabed, accidents related to wasted chemical weapons in Qiqihar, the Asian Soccer Cup incident, Anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2005 etc. Japan has had many controversial issues with

「アジアの新世紀—挑戦と機会」, 平成 14 年 4 月 12 日。

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/enzetsu/14/ekoi_0412.html>.

the Chinese. It is inevitable that issues such as these come to the fore as interaction between these two countries deepens.⁴⁹ But these single issues should not obstruct the general development of the Japan-China relations.

In this regard, Japan's role as pioneer in the region is even more relevant in its relations with China, who with its rapid economic growth, is causing serious problems such as environmental degradation and rapidly increasing energy consumption. Japan, as a thought leader of the region, may well advise China on these issues reflecting its successful handling of the problems. Moreover, Japan's experience of managing rising nationalism domestically after the Second World War will offer a good reference for rapidly growing great countries like China. It is a common and difficult issue to avert sudden rise of nationalism, as was seen in 2004 anti-Japanese riots following the football match between the two countries.

Japan believes it important that China enhances the transparency of its military spending for the sake of the regional stability of the whole region. Japan understands that the new Chinese military budget for 2006 calls for a 15 percent increase. However, Japan are not sure whether this is a figure reflecting overall defense expenditure, nor of the breakdowns of the budget. Japan strongly hopes that China makes improvement in transparency, particularly for its own benefit to avert any misunderstanding and suspicion by its neighbors in the region.

IV. Japan and Korea Peninsula's Relations

i. Japan's approach towards North and South Korea: structure, agency and norms

⁴⁹ 孫國祥，〈亞太綜合安全年報〉，台北：財團法人兩岸交流遠景基金會，2006年。

As in Sino-Japanese relations, Japan's links with the divided Korean Peninsula have been complicated in the post-war era by the structure of the international system. The first of these structural factors –the legacy of brutal Japanese colonial rule in Korea, and Japan's perceived responsibility for frustrating Korean ambitions for unity and independence by creating the conditions for the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945. Throughout the post-war era, anti-Japanese feeling has formed the focus of both North and South Korean nationalism, and has been manifested in concerns about suspected renewed Japanese imperialism and attempts to play the North and South off against each other in order to keep the Korean Peninsula divided and weak – often termed the two Korea's policy.⁵⁰

The most important structural factor for Japanese policy towards North and South Korea since 1945, however, has been the combined influence in and around the Korean Peninsula of Cold War and bipolar pressures and the security presence of the US. In Japan-North Korea relations, Japan's support of US containment policy vis-à-vis the communist bloc and location of Japan and North Korea on separate sides of the bipolar divide necessarily created barriers to bilateral interaction. In the case of Japan-South Korea relations, the key roles of Japan and South Korea in the US's containment strategy and bilateral alliance systems have meant that the US has maintained a constant interest in pushing its allies towards closer political, economic and eventually limited military cooperation to buttress its security strategy in East Asia.

Japanese policy-making agents have reacted to the constraints and opportunities of the structure of the international system according to their mix of norms and interests, and produced differing policy stances towards North and South Korea. Japan's

⁵⁰ Christopher W. Hughes and Glenn D. Hook, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, pp.173-74.

policy-making norms have generally been compatible with attempts to conform to and overcome respectively the international structural factors of the Cold War and US pressure and the legacy of the colonial past, and to motivate policy-makers actively to improve links with South Korea.

The norm of bilateralism and location of Japan's fundamental security interests with the US and thus by implication with the US's other allies in East Asia and with South Korea, have encouraged policy-makers in factions of the LDP, MOFA, MITI and JDA to promote Japan-South Korea ties in order to stabilize successive authoritarian and democratic regimes in Seoul. The norm of developmentalism and awareness of economic opportunities in South Korean markets and links between economic progress and eventual democratization have also been powerful motives for these groups and the private business sector to seek to engage South Korea. Likewise, Asianist norms and a genuinely-held desire among many policy-making agents and other political actors to correct the mistakes of the colonial past have spurred efforts to improve ties with Japan's closest geographical neighbor.

The flip side to Japan's prioritization of its relations with South Korea has been the circumscribed nature of bilateral links with North Korea. The norms of Asianism and developmentalism to a certain extent have created strong motivations for Japanese attempts to improve bilateral ties, as policy-makers in the LDP, SDPJ and other opposition parties, MOFA, MITI and the private business sector struggle to make amends for the legacy of the colonial past in the same ways as with South Korea. They are, of course, increasingly aware of potential economic opportunities in the North as well as the South.

As will be demonstrated below, however, these Asianist and developmental norms during the Cold War and beyond have never been strong enough to overcome the international structural barrier of particularly vehement anti-Japanese feeling in North

Korea. In any case, they have been overridden themselves by the more powerful norm of bilateralism and the other international structural factor, that is Japan's strategic alignment with the US. This norm and structure dictates that Japan's principal diplomatic efforts in the Korean Peninsula are directed towards support for the US and South Korean containment of the North.

ii. Japan-South Korea relations in the post-Cold War period

The end of the Cold War and changes in the structure of the regional system in East Asia in the 1990s offered opportunities for Japan to improve its relations with both Seoul and Pyongyang. These changes in structure were marked by South Korea's normalization of relations with the USSR in September 1990 and with China in August 1992; a brief period of détente between North and South with the signing of a joint Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchange and Cooperation in December 1991, thereby implying mutual recognition and the official abandonment of respective claims to be the sole legitimate government of Korea.⁵¹

North Korea's concern about its increasing political and economic isolation following the end of the Cold War led it to engage in eight rounds of normalization talks with Japan between January 1991 and November 1992. These Japan-North Korea normalization talks were acrimonious and ultimately unsuccessful because of various bilateral disputes; they also threatened to generate tensions in Japan's relations with South Korea. The government of President Roh Tae-Woo became anxious that the Japanese government might normalize relations with North Korea before the South, thereby allowing North Korea to outflank South Korea diplomatically.

⁵¹ Christopher W. Hughes and Glenn D. Hook, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, pp.178-80.

It also feared that Japan might be prepared to offer North Korea preferential terms on post-war compensation which would exceed the settlement made with the South under the Basic Treaty of 1965, and that Japan was using this to trade North and South off against each other. Moreover, the South Korean government was also increasingly anxious, because of North Korea's suspected development of nuclear weapons, that Japan should only move ahead with normalization if North Korea offered to make progress on allowing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its nuclear facilities.

The Japanese government, aware of the crucial strategic importance of South Korea for Japan's own security, and the far greater commonality of norms and interests between Japan and South Korea than between Japan and North Korea, moved to assuage the concerns of President Roh and his successor President Kim Young Sam. MOFA and LDP policy-making agents stressed that Japan would not normalize relations with North Korea without taking into account the South's concerns about the parallel progress in North-South dialogue, compensation and economic aid, and the North's nuclear programme. MOFA termed this as a policy of *renkei* (連携),⁵² or linkage between improvements in Japan-North Korea relations and North-South relations, and has maintained that this places no formal diplomatic restriction on Japan engaging the North. Nevertheless, in practice the need to synchronize progress in normalization with progress in general North-South détente has placed a new international structural lock on Japan-North Korea relations.

In fact, Japan's closer coordination with South Korea over its North Korea policy, and shared concerns over North Korea's nuclear programme and development of other weapons of mass destruction, have served as an impetus to strengthen Japan-South Korea

⁵² Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan-North Korea Relations: From the North South Summit to the Koizumi-Kim Summit," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol.9, No.2 (November 2002), pp. 61-78.

political and security cooperation. Japan-North Korea normalization talks eventually broke down over Japanese requests for North Korea to accept IAEA inspections. Japan supported South Korean, and especially US, diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The North Korean nuclear crisis reached its height in mid-1994, when it looked as if the stand-off over nuclear inspections could have provoked a second Korean War. The crisis was eventually defused by US-North Korea talks and the production of an Agreed Framework in October 1994. The agreement committed North Korea to freeze and eventually to dismantle its nuclear reactors, in return for US promises to create an international consortium that would supply the North with two light water reactors (LWR) by 2003 at an estimated cost of US\$5 billion. Just as important for the North Korea regime, the US also promised to lift economic sanctions against the North in the future.

The nuclear crisis indicated to the international community the dangers of North Korea's potential involvement in the proliferation of WMD. It served notice that to a large degree its nuclear brinkmanship and other aggressive military behavior were a product of its political and economic isolation since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the fear of some US and South Korean policy-makers has been that North Korea's possible economic collapse could trigger another conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The response of the US and South Korea to the North Korean nuclear and other military crisis has been a mixture of deterrence and dialogue.

The US and South Korea have upgraded their military and alliance capabilities to deter perceived North Korean aggression and cope with the military contingency of its collapse. At the same, in varying degrees they have also pursued a policy of dialogue with the North in an attempt to bring it out of its international isolation, with particular emphasis upon economic engagement and stabilization by the provision of food aid and through bodies such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO),

described below; and the initiation since December 1997 of four-party peace talks between South Korea, the US, north Korea and China in an attempt to replace the Korean armistice with a permanent peace treaty.⁵³

Japanese policy-makers have been concerned that Japan should not become embroiled directly in a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula, but during and since the nuclear crisis they have expressed strong support for South Korea's stance and increased the number of high-level bilateral meetings. Japan has also backed South Korean engagement policy since the crisis by its agreement to participate in KEDO and provide up to US\$1 billion to finance the LWR.

Moreover, Japan has maintained its renkei policy by stating that Japan-North Korea dialogue will only progress with South-North dialogue and that the four-party talks are the for a for that dialogue. One result of this policy has been the emergence of greater bilateral security contacts between Japan and South Korea in the post-Cold War period within the framework of the US alliance system in East Asia, giving rising to a triangular pattern of Japan-South Korea-US defence cooperation with regard to the Korean Peninsula.

Japan-South Korea cooperation has produced on the whole more mature political relations between the two states. Bilateral relations continue to be hampered by the issue of the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands, and the legacy of colonialism, most notably the demands for compensation from known euphemistically in Japan as comfort women. Nevertheless, Japanese and South Korean leaders have made considerable progress in beginning to deal with these international structural impediments of the colonial past. The Japanese government denied responsibility over these women, owing to its stance that claims for compensation had been settled under the Basic Treaty, but it did give in to

⁵³ See 朝鮮半島エネルギー開発機構（KEDO）<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/kedo/>>

pressure from NGOs in South Korea and Japan and backed the creation of an NGO, again termed euphemistically the Peace Foundation for the Women of Asia, to provide up to 10 billion yen for comfort women in Korea and Southeast Asia.

Prime Ministers Hosokawa and Murayama offered more explicit apologies for the past, and Japan-South Korea study groups have been established to propagate a correct understanding of Japan's colonial history in both countries, and thus prevent a repeat of the textbook controversies. Moreover, Japanese low and high culture such as food, films, popular songs and *manga* have gained increasing acceptance in South Korea,⁵⁴ and the joint hosting of the 2002 Soccer World Cup by Japan and South Korea has obliged both states to put aside some of the suspicions of the past and find new ways to cooperate.

Indeed, bilateral relations reached a high point with the assumption of Kim Dae-Jung to the South Korean presidency in 1998. Kim Dae-Jung has engagement, or sunshine policy, towards North Korea, and in order to secure financial support for his government's efforts to deal with the impact of the financial crisis which hit South Korea in late 1997. Kim's accession to the presidency in some ways vindicated the Japanese policy of persisting with economic and political engagement in order to promote greater interdependency between Japan and South Korea and domestic stability in the South, which would eventually create also the conditions for the transition in the South from authoritarianism to a democratic form of government.

Kim's official visit to Japan in October 1998 produced a Japan-ROK joint declaration. This confirmed the need to enhance security and political cooperation with regard to North Korea and called on the two states to cooperate in tackling the East Asian economic crisis by bilateral measures, such as Japanese loan assistance and technology

⁵⁴ Brian Bridges, *Japan and Korea in 1990s: From Anagonism to Adjustment* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993), pp.136-9.

transfer and coordination of activities in multilateral for a such as the WTO, OECD and APEC.

iii. Japan-North Korea relations in the post-Cold War period

If Japan succeeded in promoting a higher degree of political and economic interdependence with South Korea by the end of the twentieth century, then once again the reverse side of this improvement of ties with the South has been weaker Japan-North Korea relations. Japan-North Korea normalization talks were initiated following a joint LDP-SDPJ mission to Pyongyang in September 1990, which produce an agreement for the release of the Fujisanmaru-18 crew, and an LDP-SDPJ-KWP three-party joint declaration on Japan-North Korea relations. The declaration urged the governments of both states to move towards the normalization of relations, and stated that Japan should not only apologize for colonial rule but also provide appropriate compensation for this period and the losses incurred during the forty-five-year gap in bilateral relations since World War II.⁵⁵

The government-level negotiations on normalization, which began in 1991, followed this informal diplomacy. They proved problematic from the outset. North Korea insisted that the Japanese government should adhere to the contents of the above-mentioned joint declaration and provide up to US\$10 billion in compensation for the colonial, wartime and post-war periods. MOFA responded by stating that the joint declaration was a non-binding party-to-party statement; that it would not provide compensation; and that it would negotiate only in line with the precedent of the Basic Treaty by providing approximately US\$5 billion in the form of economic cooperation.

⁵⁵ Christopher W. Hughes and Glenn D. Hook, *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, pp.180-82.

Contributing also to the eventual failure of the talks in 1992 were: issues concerning debt repayments to Japanese companies left over from the 1970s; permission for Nihonjinsuma to visit relatives in Japan; Japanese demands for North Korea to investigate individual cases of abductions or *racchijiken*; and demands for North Korea to adhere to IAEA nuclear inspections.

The experience of the failure of Japan-North Korea normalization talks in 1992 and of the nuclear crisis of 1994, and the international structural lock which Japan has imposed upon itself by linking improvements in its own relations with North Korea to an improvement in North-South relations, which in turn are largely contingent upon upon improvements in US-North Korea relations, which in turn are largely contingent upon improvements in US-north Korea relations, have meant that Japan's ties with North Korea have become further circumscribed from the late 1990s onwards.

North Korea's pledge to participate in the four-party talks scheduled for December 1997 produced an opportunity for the Japanese government to negotiate with North Korea in August 1997 an agreement to resume normalization talks in the near future. Japan at the same time agreed to provide US\$27 million in food aid, and North Korea agreed to permit the visits of Nihonjinsuma to Japan in November 1997 and January 1998, and to investigate the possibility of there being any missing Japanese citizens in the North – a compromise term used to describe the *racchi jiken*. In turn, an LDP-SDP-Sakigake mission was dispatched to Pyongyang in November 1997, which confirmed North Korea's desire to restart talks.

Nevertheless, bilateral relations deteriorated again with North Korea's frustration at Japan's reluctance to provide further food aid, its report in June 1998 that it could find no trace of any missing persons in North Korea, and its cancellation on Nihonjinsuma visits. Bilateral relations then shifted from bad to worse following North Korea's test launch of a rocket in August 1998, which crossed over Japanese airspace to land in the Pacific

Ocean. North Korea claimed it was a satellite launch, whereas the Japanese side declared it to be a Taepodong-1 missile and a reckless challenge to Japan's security. The government responded by suspending its signing of the agreement to fund KEDO and imposing limited sanctions on transportation between Japan and North Korea. Japanese policy-making agents, under pressure from the US and South Korea, eventually agreed that Japan would resume funding for KEDO in early 1999 and indicated that it would seek to resume normalization talks if the North would refrain from further missile tests and make concessions on the Nihonjinzuma visits and racchi jiken.

However, the North Korea regime largely ignored Japanese objections and persisted with negotiations with the US, managing to secure the Clinton administration's agreement in September 1999 to lift a number of bilateral sanctions in return for North Korea's halting of any missile tests planned for the remainder of 1999. The improvement in US-North Korean attempts to engage North Korea by pushing forward its own relations with the North. The Japanese government agreed to dispatch to Pyongyang in December 1999 an all-party mission led by the former prime minister, Murayama Tomiichi (村山富市), and in the same month in government-level negotiations with North Korea confirmed it would lift its remaining sanctions and investigate the resumption of food aid and normalization talks sometime in early 2000. In return, North Korea once again agreed to investigate the cases of missing persons. However, Japan-North Korea normalization talks have yet to restart.

North Korea undoubtedly remains interested in improved ties with Japan and access to up to US\$5 billion in economic cooperation to reconstruct its economy. North Korea's interest in pursuing relations first of all with the US, however, has meant that that up until the time of writing it has rejected Japanese diplomatic overtures. Policy-makers have been unable to use Japan's economic power to forge greater engagement and interdependence with North Korea, and thus are unable to influence the development of

the North's political economy as they have done with the South. Meanwhile, Japan is left with only KEDO as a new multilateral but ultimately limited framework for economic engagement with North Korea.

The result is that Japan's political ties with the Korean Peninsula remain one sided. Japanese policy-making agents have succeeded in promoting ever-improving relations with South Korea, but ties with North Korea have deteriorated as the new century starts. Despite Japan's efforts to use quiet diplomacy through party-to-party contacts and the promise of economic aid, bilateral relations with its ex-colony and close neighbour have not improved. North Korea is the only state in the world with which Japan has never maintained diplomatic relations. Moreover, although the Japanese government has professed a desire for greater dialogue with North Korea, it has in fact switched its policy more to one of deterrence in the dimension of security.

iv. Japan's View on the Korean Peninsula

From Japan's point of view, the most imminent challenge in East Asia is the tension on the Korean peninsula. The presence of a secluded society with a population of 22.5 million, an unpredictable pattern of behavior, and a nuclear development program worry people in the region. The Japanese are no exception, and nuclear issues, missile issues, proliferation, abductions are all issues which are a great concern to Japanese.

Up until the 1970's, the Japanese view towards the Korean Peninsula was vastly different from today's perspective. For the average Japanese, South Korea was a country ruled by a dictatorship. Many Korean residents from Japan were arrested in South Korea for their democracy movements. We had a dark image of South Korea. Since then, the ROK has undergone spectacular economic growth and democratization. Exchanges with Japan have also made huge strides. Although there has always existed many historical

issues between the two countries, the Korean presence in the mind of the Japanese has increasingly become bigger and closer.

Concerning North Korea, Japan did not then and still struggle now, to gather information about this country. In the 1980's, some books were published describing the inside of the North Korean society, and little by little Japan came to know the economic difficulties and the lack of freedom in that society. In 1983, the Rangoon incident occurred when North Korean agents unsuccessfully tried to assassinate President Chun of the Republic of Korea. In 1987, two North Korean agents exploded a Korean Air jet. Through these incidents, the Japanese got an impression that North Korea is a fearful regime. At that time however, Japan had not yet realized that North Korea presented problems aimed directly at Japan.

It was after North Korea launched a Taepodong missile in August 1998,⁵⁶ that many Japanese came to realize that North Korea is Japan's problem. This missile launch drastically changed the Japanese people's sense of national security. It was followed by the mysterious boat affairs, which happened in 1999 and 2001. Those boats were carrying out mysterious activities in the territorial sea and/or the exclusive economic zones around Japan and they tried to escape capture from the Japanese Coast Guard. Later North Korea acknowledged that these boats were North Korean vessels. All of this, coupled with the abductions cases, which North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Il acknowledged responsibility for during Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in 2002, have given the Japanese a sinister view of North Korea.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Asia-Pacific Anger at North Korean missile launch, BBC News, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/161513.stm>>.

⁵⁷ 小泉総理大臣会見要旨，平成 14 年 9 月 17 日，平壤。
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_koi/n_korea_02/summary.html>

On October 9, 2006, the North Korean government issued an announcement that it had successfully conducted a nuclear test for the first time. The Japanese government has set up a taskforce in response to reports of the test on the one side.⁵⁸ Abe later said the tests were “absolutely unacceptable.” Later, on the other side, the Japanese Cabinet passed a resolution banning almost all trade with North Korea and Japan support UN Security Council Resolution 1718.⁵⁹ Today in Japan, one can hardly find any political parties or opinion leaders who present pro-North Korean arguments.

V. Japan and Southeast’s Political Relations

i. Japan’s approach towards Southeast Asia: structure, agency and norms

Owing to its defeat in the Pacific War, Japan was effectively driven out of Southeast Asia politically, economically and militarily by the early 1950s, leaving behind it a number of international structural factors which ever since have influenced the pattern of its relations with the region. The legacy of Japanese colonialism and militarism has generated varying degrees of anti-Japanese sentiment in Indo-China and the other states, which were later to become members of ASEAN, but in general has worked as a structural barrier to distance Japan from closer relations with Southeast Asia.⁶⁰

The legacy of national division, which was initiated by Japan’s failed colonial

⁵⁸ Burt Herman, North Korea Nuke Test Draws Condemnation,

<<http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2545747>>.

⁵⁹ See <<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/572/07/PDF/N0657207.pdf?OpenElement>>

⁶⁰ Christopher W. Hughes and Glenn D. Hook, *Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, pp.188-90.

exploits during the Pacific War and then compounded by the application of bipolarity as a result of competition between the USSR and the US during the Cold War, also impacted strongly upon Japan's relations with the region. As in the Korean Peninsula, On the one hand, Japan's attachment to the US half of the bipolar divide created structural impediments to interaction with the communist states of Indo-China. On the other hand, Japan's position within the US camp meant that, throughout the Cold War period, its ally was keen to reopen Japan's access to Southeast Asia, and to encourage Japanese engagement with the capitalist states of the region.⁶¹

Japanese policy-making agents during the Cold War and beyond, motivated by various norms and interests, have both exploited and circumvented the opportunities and constraints presented by the structure of the international system, in order to engage Southeast Asia and instrumentalize a general improvement in Japan's relations with the region. The norm of bilateralism has meant that, in many instances, Japan's conservative LDP politicians, MOFA and economic ministries, and the private business sector have been eager to follow US strategy and engage the capitalist states of Southeast Asia so as to resist the spread of communism and promote the general stability of the region.

However, At the same time, Asianist and developmental norms have been influential in reinforcing the conviction of Japanese policy-makers that they should not only seek to engage the capitalist states of Southeast Asia in order to make recompense for the colonial past and to secure access to economic resources and markets, but also that they should seek, wherever possible and without undermining their ties with the US, to circumvent or overcome bipolar structural barriers in order to do the same with the communist states of the region. Japanese policy-making agents and other political actors

⁶¹ Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp.178-211.

ever since the period of colonial expansion during the Pacific War have been aware of the crucial importance of Southeast Asia to Japan's own economic development, and have attempted to promote the integration of the region as one political and economic unit.

Therefore, Japan has cautiously sought to engage the communist states of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and the authoritarian states of Burma and Indonesia, as a means to draw them back into and contribute to the creation of a more complete region. This based on the belief that, as in China and North and South Korea, over the longer term this will promote economic development, economic interdependence, general political stability in the region, and the smoother transition of the newly independent colonies to statehood and less authoritarian forms of government in the region. In order to instrumentalize this delicate strategy, Japanese policy in the Cold War period and since has been characterized by a typical mix of quiet diplomacy combined with the use of economic power.

ii. Japan-ASEAN relations in the post-Cold War period

Therefore, Japan had succeeded by the end of the second Cold War in instrumentalizing a general improvement in its political links with ASEAN and had gone a considerable way towards overcoming the international structural restriction of the legacy of the colonial past. The winding-down of Cold War tensions between the major powers in East Asia, marked by Vietnam's announcement in 1988 of the withdrawal of its forces from Cambodia, lowered in turn the bipolar international structural barriers to Japanese interaction with both ASEAN and the Indo-China states, and has since enhanced Japan's freedom to continue its efforts to strengthen its ties with and reintegrate the region politically and economically.

The conditions for the resolution of the Cambodian problem were created by strategic rapprochement between the USSR, China and the US, but Japan took advantage

of these to play an active role in supporting the actual process of instrumentalizing a peace agreement. Japan sponsored the June 1990 Tokyo Conference concerned with the Cambodian issue and made large financial contributions to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).⁶² At a further conference held in Tokyo in June 1992, the Japanese oversaw the collection of US\$880 million for Cambodia's reconstruction, with Japan itself offering around one-quarter of this sum.

ASEAN's growing acceptance of Japan's political role in Southeast Asian affairs, and Japan's overcoming of the structural impediment of the colonial past, its were demonstrated by the general support for the dispatch of the SDF to take part in PKO in Cambodia between 1992 and 1993. The resurgence of shared Asianist norms in Japan and the ASEAN states also reflects a degree of increased political solidarity: many Japanese policy-makers refused to insist that certain authoritarian states should observe what are seen as essentially US- and Western-determined standards of human right. More extreme forms of this revival of Asianist sentiment are typified by Mahathir's statement that Japan should stop apologizing for the past⁶³ and his co-authorship in 1994 with Ishihara Shin taro of No to Ieru Aija (The Asia that can say no),⁶⁴ which stressed that Japan and East Asia together could resist US influence in the region.

This increasing sense of shared political identity, reinforced by the further strengthening of economic interdependence, prepared the ground for further improvements in ties between Japan and ASEAN, for Japan to play a central role in

⁶² Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, p.201.

⁶³ Simon Elegant, "Memory and apathy," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Vol.158, No.38, 1995, p.37.

⁶⁴ Mohamad Mahathir and Shintaro Ishihara, *The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1996).

creating an integrated Southeast Asia region, and for it to begin to be spoken of as a potential political leader. In January 1993, Prime Minister Miyazawa (宮澤喜一) visited the ASEAN states and announced the Miyazawa Doctrine based on the four principles of Japan's active participation in the advancement of region-based political and, for the first time, multilateral security dialogue; the advancement in the Asia Pacific of economic development in step with economic liberalization; the expansion of democratization and the compatibility of development with environmental protection; and cooperation between Japan and ASEAN to improve relations with Indo-China.⁶⁵

In January 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto (橋本龍太郎) on his visit to Southeast Asia announced the Hashimoto Doctrine, the essence of which was further to strengthen close ties with ASEAN.⁶⁶ This was to be achieved by assisting in the maintenance of the region's traditions and culture and by working together with ASEAN was to be tested by the outbreak of the East Asian financial and economic crises from mid-1997 onwards, and Japanese proposals for an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) under Japan's effective leadership. These Japanese initiatives with their emphasis upon regional and multilateral strategies indicated that, although Japan was certainly not abandoning its attachment to the bilateral norm and the bilateral relationship with the US, these were beginning to be challenged in the minds of Japanese policy-making agents by the resurgent norms of Asianism and internationalism.

In turn, Japan's long-term efforts to achieve the integration of the Southeast Asia region seemed to have been vindicated with Vietnam's accession to ASEAN in 1995, and

⁶⁵ Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1992, p.130.

⁶⁶ Michael B. Yahuda, *The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific 1945-1995*, London: Routledge, 2004, p.330.

Laos, Cambodia and Burma's entry as full or observer members into the organization by 1997 – thereby completing the ASEAN-10 and the type of complete regional forum that Japan had envisaged with the MEDSEA proposal of 1966. In particular, Burma's acceptance of observer status seemed to justify Japan's decision to maintain trade and aid relations with the regime as the optimum method to bring it into the ASEAN regional fold, despite a brief suspension of Japanese ODA to Rangoon between 1988 and 1989 in protest at human rights violations, and despite severe international criticism on Japan's policy.

iii. East Asian Economic Caucus

Nevertheless, Japan's emphasis upon political relations with ASEAN and the general re-Asianization of its foreign policy detected by certain observers⁶⁷ is still limited by bilateral structural factors in the late 1990s and into the twenty-first century. The ever-present cognition of the bilateral relationship with the US, and the attendant need to present Japanese policy in Southeast Asia as generally compatible with US regional and global aims, have meant that Japanese policy-makers continue to exercise caution in their political initiatives in the region. Japan has been careful not to engage in open efforts to integrate the Southeast and entire East Asia regions to the exclusion of the US, and thus force Japan to choose between its growing Asianist and well-established Western identities.

The most notable example of this has been Japan's relatively unenthusiastic response to Prime Minister Mahathir's and ASEAN's proposals for the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC).⁶⁸ As proposed by Mahathir, EAEC placed Japan as the

⁶⁷ Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.72, No.5, 1993.

⁶⁸ Edward J. Lincoln, *East Asian Economic Regionalism*, Washington DC.: Brookings Institution Press,

effective leader of an exclusive economic bloc in East Asia, defined as including the ASEAN-10, South Korea and China, but excluding those states in the region which were racially non-Asian, specifically the US, Australia and New Zealand. The EAEC concept thus sat in direct contravention of the APEC programme supported by the US, and threatened to force Japan back into its constant dilemma of choosing between its ties with East Asia and the US. Sections of East Asianist opinion within MITI appreciated the value of EAEC as a means to increase Japan's role in pushing for economic integration in the region and to provide Japan with a counterweight to economic and political dependence on the US, whilst the Southeast Asia Divisions of MOFA were concerned that the rival APEC proposal could undermine Japan's special relationship of economic and growing political interdependence with ASEAN.

However, the more serious concern of MITI, derived in part from the norm of bilateralism, was that Japan's participation in the EAEC proposal would damage its relationship with the US and its economic interests in the US market and globally. MOFA was also concerned that EAEC would be viewed by the US as a political project to exclude its influence from the region which would then have repercussions for Japan's bilateral security relationship.

Thus, in order to avoid an uncomfortable conflict between its interests with the US and those with East Asia, the Japanese government has supported APEC over EAEC, and secured a compromise by acquiescing in the establishment of EAEC within the APEC structure. The Japanese government is convinced that this arrangement will allow it to pursue its norms and interests with both East Asia and the US simultaneously. On the one hand, Japan remains the effective economic leader of East Asia owing to the extensive influence exerted by the economic activities of Japanese TNCs in East Asia.

It can push an agenda within APEC of considering the interests of ASEAN and the other East Asian countries in the face of US demands for liberalization by stressing the need for economic development assistance and staged changes to accompany this process. On the other hand, the APEC framework, most vitally, keeps the US engaged in the region, enables Japan to maintain its adherence to the liberal economic trading system and provides a forum for Japan to cooperate with the US to manage regional economic integration. APEC has then once again enabled Japan to navigate its way between its perceived norms and interests with regard to both East Asia and the US.

iv. ASEAN Plus Three and East Asia Summit

The continuous importance of the ASEAN plus Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, the so-called APT process. Japanese believe that the ASEAN plus Three continues to be useful in tackling issues suitably handled by its framework. This region is surrounded by a number of various challenges. We have to be sensible about an optimal geographical area in which a certain issue is most suitably tackled. The APT framework started in 1997 after the Asian financial crisis. Its most noted success is a financial cooperation based upon the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000, which set up a regional network of financial swap agreement, and, in addition, the Asian Bond Markets Initiative in 2003, aiming at encouraging more Asian bonds to be issued by Asian currencies.⁶⁹

The APT process is equally producing achievement in the fields such as maritime piracy, energy security cooperation and environmental protection. These issues are relatively more confined in regional scope, compared to the avian flu problem, which is more geographically open-ended with potential global ramifications in a direct manner.

⁶⁹ Shaun Narine, *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia*, Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2002, p.176.

In this way, the APT framework is perfectly complementary to the newly launched East Asia Summit (EAS) process. Koizumi elaborated in his post-summit press conference on 17 December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, saying that “as we hold East Asia Summit meetings a number of times,...at the same time, ASEAN, ASEAN plus One and APT meetings will all take place as well simultaneously. As we hold these meetings a number of times, I believe a close sense of community will be fostered.” At the current stage, Japan argue they should open to any creative and perspective ideas of a future community, and continue to discuss with other countries what will be the best way to construct a community which is tailor-made to this region.

Based upon these basic policy principles, Japan highly appreciates the successful launch of the EAS Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 in line with Japan’s goals and preoccupations. 16 countries participated in this first East Asia Summit, namely ASEAN plus Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, as well as Australia, New Zealand and India. The participation of these last three democracies is a sign of openness and shared values of the Summit. The EAS successfully produced coordinated action plans including combating avian flu. This is a reflection of Japan’s desire for the practical and functional approach of regional cooperation. The Summit was concluded by the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, stating that the EAS “could lay a significant role” in community building in this region, providing an open, inclusive and transparent framework in which the participating countries strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognized values as well as regional peace and stability. Japan particularly supports this direction of the Summit for the reason I elaborated earlier.

VI.Concluding

This paper has demonstrated how in the post-war era Japanese policy-making

agents have steadily managed in the dimension of politics to overcome and circumvent in varying degrees the structural barriers to interaction with East Asia imposed by the legacy of colonialism, national division and bipolarity. Sino-Japanese relations are still fraught with difficulties over the colonial past, and Japan is still often forced to stand in the middle between China and the US in the newly-emerging pattern of triangular interaction between these three powers in working political relationship with China. Similarly, Japan has also achieved a major turnaround in its post-colonial relations with South Korea, and the two are moving increasingly towards political and economic interdependence. Furthermore, Japan, despite the tribulations of the colonial past, bipolarity and the Vietnam War, has succeeded both in improving its relations with states of ASEAN and Indo-China, once again conjoining politics and economics, and in knitting together a more complete sub-region in Southeast Asia. North Korea thus remains the main black spot on Japan's record of upgrading its ties with East Asia. Japan has instrumentalized this remarkable revival in its political fortunes in the region by the use of economic power and cautious, quiet diplomacy and leadership.

However, Japan's East Asia policy faced a kind of swing between modernism and postmodernism approach, because other East Asia countries still is building their modern state, but Japan have began enter to postmodern era. For example, When Shinzo Abe (安倍晋三) made his first trip abroad as Prime Minister and went to Beijing and Seoul, he got out of the Prime Ministerial airplane hand in hand with his 44-year-old wife Akie (安倍昭惠). It was an elaborately calculated action to appear modern and urbane with an aim to shake Confucian minds in the capital cities of China and Korea. Rumor has it that Aso gave a hand-written memo to Abe urging him to do that. In many respects, Akie and Shinzo Abe belong to a new generation. It's never seen a Japanese prime minister walking down the landing steps side-by-side, hand-in-hand with his wife.

Illustrative of this fact would be that he succeeded in meeting both heads of China and

South Korea upon taking office as Prime Minister, thereby sweeping off for now the belligerent image that Beijing and Seoul have long projected about Tokyo.

In fact, Hu Jintao chose to come a long way by “positively appreciating,” the Japan-China Joint Press Statement that, “Japan more than 60 years after the War, has been consistently following the path of a peaceful country, and would continue to follow this path.”⁷⁰ It was the first time ever that a Japanese Prime Minister let his Chinese counterpart “positively appreciate” what Japan had become after the war. When China’s history textbooks will finally start talking about some of the positive aspects of Japan’s post-war development, may be a good example for Japan’s postmodernism diplomacy some kind achievement.

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⁷⁰ 日中共同プレス発表，<http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/s_abe/cn_kr_06/china_kpress.html>.

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