1996年的台海危機後，中共開始思考如何面對美國派遣航艦打擊群介入台海衝突的不對稱戰略：若令美國損失航艦與上千人員，將大幅提高放棄台灣的可能。本文所討論的反艦彈道飛彈，就是被寄予厚望能攻擊航艦、嚇阻美軍介入，助中共達成「抗美奪台」目的之「殺手鐧」武器。對此，贊同與反駁的論點皆有，本文即針對這些正反的觀點，從解放軍反艦彈道飛彈的能力、美軍彈道飛彈防禦系統的能力、航艦本身隱瞞行蹤的能力、美國其他類型的戰力、以及中美兩國面對衝突危機時的意志力表現等角度加以檢視，以探究中共反艦彈道飛彈能否達成解放軍「抗美奪台」的目標。透過檢視三個認為反艦彈道飛彈不能「抗美奪台」與兩個認為反艦彈道飛彈能「抗美奪台」的論點，本文發現，擊中航艦與抗美奪台其實沒有絕對的關係：解放軍反艦彈道飛彈雖具有「能」擊中美軍航艦的潛力，但並「不能」助中共達到「抗美奪台」的目的。 After the 1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, Mainland China has been thinking of an asymmetric strategy to deal with the United States’ military intervention. They believed that the loss of U.S. aircraft carriers will greatly enhance the possibility of an end of U.S. involvement. Anti-ship ballistic missile can be a “killer’s Mace” weapon and be able to help them achieve the purpose of “Repelling the U.S., Capturing Taiwan.” By reviewing three cons and two pros regarding anti-ship ballistic missiles, the thesis concludes that anti-ship ballistic missiles do have the potential to hit an U.S. aircraft carrier but can not achieve the Chinese ultimate goal of “Repelling the U.S., Capturing Taiwan.”
