中國大陸對台灣的政治定位，隨著兩岸關係歷經改革開放前的高度對立、改革開放後的和緩，到李登輝後期與陳水扁時期的政治緊張，再到馬英九上臺後的兩岸關係快速回溫，其內涵也出現不斷的轉變與調整。本文研究發現，從毛澤東到胡錦濤時期，中國大陸對台灣的政治定位內涵，從一個中國的定義、對話對象，乃至於未來兩岸整合作法，均越來越來柔性與彈性，也越來越趨近台灣的立場與主張，使得兩岸關係進入當前「最佳狀態」。本文研究認為，雖然中國大陸對台灣的政治定位越來越來彈性，但是若因此衍生出彈性處理兩岸關係、中華民國地位及國號、國旗、國歌的想像空間，恐怕是流於空想，關鍵在兩岸之間缺乏信任，而在台灣現在政治結構制約下，這樣的信任短期內也不可能看見。也因此承認中華民國與否，將會是兩岸關係能否推進到政治談判的重要指標。 The PRC’s cognition about Taiwan’s political status is highly correlated with the development of cross-strait relations. This paper finds that, from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao, the PRC’s cognition about Taiwan’s political status has great changed, not just negotiating objects, the future of Taiwan’s social system, even the definition of one China does. The PRC’s positionis getting flexible and increasingly closer to Taiwan's position and arguments. It makes the current cross-strait relations an ＂optimum state.＂ Even the PRC’s cognition about Taiwan’s political status is getting flexible and positive to Taiwan, this paper suggests that, expecting the PRC to recognize the ROC in short-term is an illusion. Due to a lack of trust across the strait and because it cannot create solid trust under Taiwan’s political structural constraints, the PRC’s cognition about Taiwan’s political status would last for a long time. And we may say, when the PRC recognize the ROC it would be a signal of political negotiation for reunion to begin.
