習近平主政下的權力清單制度，是中國自1997年中共十五大確立依法治國、建設社會主義法治國家以來，中共中央首度以強制力推動地方各級政府投入簡政放權和依法行政的一項重要的制度性改革，意義重大。然而，中共中央和國務院下發的《關於推行地方各級政府工作部門權力清單制度的指導意見》卻充斥模糊用語。本研究運用艾森伯格（Eric M. Eisenberg）的組織溝通理論中的「策略性模糊」理論為研究途徑，探討此一現象。本研究發現，中共中央在權力清單制度指導意見的制定上，運用了策略性模糊，有助於降低推行簡政放權和依法行政的阻力。而為配合推行權力清單制度而修訂的《立法法》，也運用了策略性模糊，讓絕大多數地方二級人大和人大常委會擁有因地制宜的立法權，且可在某些情況下與國家法律和行政法規脫勾。策略性模糊是一把雙面刃，它可以促進地方政府在執行該政策時，雖有分歧卻仍可團結擁護黨中央的政策；但地方政府也可能利用模糊空間謀求私利進而危害共產黨的領導地位。因此中共在推行權力清單制度時，也不得不進行組織變革，包括重新詮釋「黨的領導」和分散「黨管幹部」的權力，以維繫共產黨的領導於不墜。 According to a guideline issued by the General Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the General Office of the State Council, local governments must introduce a power list system that publicize their administrative powers and processes to ensure accountability and transparency. The power list system is part of the central government's effort to streamline administration and delegate power to lower levels. One can imagine that the central government should have communicated with local governments clearly to make sure they implement the power list system unequivocally. The guideline, however, is full of ambiguities. This study employs Eric M. Eisenberg's theory of strategic ambiguity to explain why. It is found that the ambiguous guideline allows local governments to maintain ＂diversified unity＂ and the CPC to consolidate its leadership.
